

INSTITUTIONS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES:
VARIATIONS IN AFRICAN POLITICAL PARTY SYSTEMS

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Abstract

The maturation of ‘third wave’ democracies across the globe provokes new salient questions about how the characteristics of formal democratic institutions, such as political party systems, relate to critical outcomes in political economy, democratic endurance and peace studies. Understanding how political parties operate is central because they serve to mediate interests, mobilize the citizenry and provide a link between rulers and the masses. This project analyzes a fundamental question in the study of institutional crafting in the developing world: *why have political party systems developed across new democracies with such diverse forms and functions?* In so far as Africa is home to nearly two dozen enduring multiparty democracies combining high degrees of ethnic heterogeneity, low economic development, and weak state capacity, it provides a ripe testing ground for theories of democratization and democratic endurance. My dissertation presents a theoretical model and empirical analysis that seeks to explain how new party systems in Africa have developed and why they exhibit particular, enduring and extremely diverse characteristics. The argument places central explanatory emphasis on the power of authoritarian incumbents in the initial stages of democratic opening. Empirically, I combine four detailed case studies in Ghana, Senegal, Zambia and Benin with cross-national statistical analysis to show that the power of the authoritarian incumbent to control the transition agenda and create the formal rules of competition in its favor has far-reaching and unintended consequences for the development of the party system.

The two-step model of party system institutionalization builds from the premise that all political actors seek access to the state and assumes that they try to maximize their own likelihood of being in power while limiting other challengers. The first step details modes of authoritarian power accumulation. In most African authoritarian regimes, incumbents seek legitimation and regime consolidation through essentially one of two routes: ‘*Incorporation*’ of traditional local authorities, or an attempt to ‘*modernize*’ and neutralize existing local powerbrokers to replace them with state-sponsored organizations. In times of contestation, such as democratization, the incumbent party is beholden to their earlier legitimizing strategies. Incumbents want to control the transition process and set the rules of the new multiparty system in their favor, but need the support of local elites and their followers in order to do so. At this moment, authoritarian incumbent power is determined by the degree of support of local elites, who can either mobilize their networks to support the incumbent or defect to the opposition. Strategic decisions, first on the part of the incumbent party and second by local elites, determine who shapes the rules of the game for the multiparty system. The rule-making process is, therefore, endogenous to the position and power of the players involved in the transition.

The second step details the electoral marketplace and isomorphic competitive pressures that sustain over time the particular form of the party system that emerges from the democratic transition. Eligibility rules, organizational imperatives, and strategic inter-party alignments drive parties to resemble each other *within* the competitive

national system. Where authoritarian incumbents are strong, they are able to tightly control the transition, restrict entry of new challengers and force opposition to coalesce and model the incumbent in order to compete. Paradoxically, these competitive pressures force organizational emulation, aggregation into fewer effective parties, and polarization into discrete ‘incumbent’ and ‘opposition’ camps, thereby contributing to *higher* party system institutionalization in the democratic era. Where authoritarian incumbents are weak, they lose control of the transition agenda, and new players contribute in uncoordinated ways to press for greater reforms and more open participation. New parties seek distinct and original models of organization and differentiate themselves from the past rather than other new parties, and the party system is open to reinvention and party proliferation, which results in *lower* party system institutionalization.

Based on a combination of census and survey data, cross-national macroeconomic and electoral data, archival research, focus group discussions and over 260 original individual interviews conducted in three regions in each of four countries, I show that rival explanations of levels of economic development, ethnic demographics and electoral system institutional design have limited predictive power in explaining the variation in party system institutionalization in African democracies. I use two sequential measures of authoritarian incumbent power: 1.) interview data of local elite calculations prior to democratization; and 2.) voting data from the founding elections. These measures of authoritarian incumbent power provide sub-national comparisons in paired districts according to economic and ethnic criteria. The data highlight two key findings. First, they support the central claim of the study that historical legacies of authoritarian power accumulation strategies shape the nature of formal democratic institutions. Secondly, these data suggest that the competitive electoral marketplace is an important factor in explaining the characteristics of institutions and their effects. African political party systems demonstrate that either high or low party system institutionalization can endure over time according to the logic of the *competitive system*. Using an expanded data set I compare the findings suggested by the African cases to party systems in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia and find support for the claim that authoritarian power on the eve of democratic transition is a central factor shaping the nature of the new multiparty system. This research suggests that social networks of neo-patrimonialism have shaped the authoritarian legacies, democratic transition context, and the formation of the modern multiparty system in ways that can provide the foundation for democratic persistence, stability and peace in the developing world.

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List of Acronyms

COSU Coordinating Association for the Unified Senegalese Opposition
 GMR gouvernement militaire révolutionnaire
 PSI Party System Institutionalization

Party Names

AFP Alliance des Forces de Progres
 ANC African National Congress
 CPP Convention People's Party
 FARD Front d'Action pour le Rénouveau et le Développement
 MADEP Mouvement Africain pour la Développement et le Progrès
 MMD Movement for Multiparty Democracy
 NDC National Democratic Congress
 PAI Parti Africain de l'Indépendance
 PDS Parti Démocratique Senegalais
 PIT Parti de l'indépendance et du travail
 PNC People's National Convention
 PNDC Provisional National Defence Council
 PRD Parti du Rénouveau Démocratique
 PRI Partido Revolucionario Institucional
 PRPB Parti de la Révolution Populaire du Bénin
 PS Parti Socialiste
 PSD Parti Social-Démocrate
 RB Renaissance du Benin
 RND Rassemblement National Démocratique
 UNIP United National Independence Party
 UPND United Party for National Development

Note on Party Names: Where party names changed over time, such as the Parti Socialiste in Senegal, I consistently use the contemporary party name to describe that party even during historical periods when it was officially known as the Bloc démocratique sénégalais (BDS), l'Union progressiste sénégalaise (UPS) or Bloc populaire sénégalais (BPS). This holds true for other party name changes as well, with the exception of the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) in Ghana which officially changed its name to the National Democratic Congress (NDC) with the transition to multipartism. During the transition period I refer to the party as the (P)NDC.

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Chapter 1

Party Systems in New Democracies: African Models

The broad sweep of democratic regime change across much of the developing world at the end of the 20th century resulted in the creation of new political parties across the globe. Political parties have long been at the forefront of political science analysis (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Duverger 1972; Sartori 1976; Panebianco 1988), and party systems are posited to explain a vast range of critical outcomes in political economy, public policy and democratic regime survival (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Kitschelt 1999). Yet despite the abundance, centrality and importance of political parties, the existing literature has not focused on how new party systems develop and why they exhibit particular, enduring, and extremely varied characteristics. This dissertation addresses this void by positing a fundamental question in the study of institutional development and democracy: why have political party systems developed across new democracies with such diverse forms and functions?

Where political parties are well-established, they have the potential to mobilize voters, aggregate interests and provide a communication link between the top echelons of the government hierarchy and the citizens at the mass level, among other functions. In Ghana, indeed, political parties are playing these roles, serving as a vital link between the state and society. Party affiliation is strong and often serves as an important social identity. Citizens follow party activity closely, and remain informed about political events through their local party representatives. When citizens want to become involved

in the political process, they generally head to the party headquarters in their neighborhood. In brief, parties are strong and vibrant organizations, with meaningful and enduring connections to the population.

In contrast, political parties in Benin are personalist machines in general, sponsored and run by an individual candidate. Parties are often temporary, springing into action around elections to serve as mobilizational vehicles. Party identities are fluid, even among candidates themselves, who frequently switch affiliations depending on their perceptions of advantage. Party names are almost unknown among citizens— rather candidates must build their own name recognition to draw a following. Voters are often wary of a large party organization in making electoral calculations, assuming that only those already affiliated with the candidate’s party would have any benefit from his or her victory. Thus, they prefer to vote for a more ‘available’ candidate with whom they could establish new relations. Benin’s democratic electoral record of three presidential alternations, all victories by independent candidates who wooed numerous existing parties to mobilize on their behalf, reflects a different party system altogether. The contrast between Benin and Ghana illustrates how political parties play different roles and have different meanings across new democracies.

The third wave of democratic transitions created new imperatives to explore questions about party system diversity across the developing world. The plurality of these transitions occurred in Africa, and the political party systems remain remarkably varied across the continent today. Many countries have democratic political party systems that are similar to Ghana’s – where stable, deeply-rooted and nationally organized parties compete in a systematic fashion, mobilize participation and aggregate

interests. On the other side of the spectrum, there are many pluralist democracies similar to Benin in which the parties are fluid, political affiliations are in flux and electoral competition is volatile. This project provides the empirical data and measures to demonstrate that the character and institutionalization of democratic party systems across Africa range from stable, deeply-rooted, and nationally organized party systems to fluid party identities, volatile competition, and personalist party systems (Figure 1.1).

While all party systems play an important role in shaping the central competition over access to the state, higher levels of institutionalization provide greater opportunities to maintain stable, peaceful competition – a prospect that is of particularly high value in contexts where the threat of violent conflict exacerbates the challenges of economic scarcity and ethnic heterogeneity. Party system institutionalization is defined briefly as the degree of stability or fluidity in repetitive strategic interactions between parties, the depth of party attachment, and the extent of acceptance and legitimacy of party competition.¹ The first step in this study is to establish the empirical validity of the range of outcomes and the significance of this variation in the level of institutionalization of party systems in African democracies. This requires in-depth empirical evidence about the nature of party systems, as well as a justification of the measurement of party system institutionalization for the broader universe of cases (all countries meeting a threshold level of democracy in Africa), which is provided in Chapter 2. The measurement and


¹ See chapter 2 for a full discussion of the concept and measurement. This analysis works substantially from the original formulation by Mainwaring and Scully 1995 and Mainwaring 1999. Mainwaring, S. and T. Scully (1995). Building democratic institutions : party systems in Latin America. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press.

, Mainwaring, S. (1999). Rethinking party systems in the third wave of democratization : the case of Brazil. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press.

See also Kuenzi and Lambright who measure party system institutionalization in a variety of democratic and non-democratic African cases. Kuenzi, M. and G. Lambright (2001). "Party system institutionalization in 30 African countries." Party Politics 7(4): 437-468.

empirical detail of African parties systems I provide in this project contributes to a rich literature on the centrality of political parties to democratic functioning that emerged out of more established democracies.² However, the primary goal of my research is to go beyond describing the character in order to explain *why political party systems in African democracies have formed and function so differently*. What explains the variation in evolution of party systems in these new democracies, as measured by the varying levels of party system institutionalization (PSI)?

Figure 1.1: Variation in Party System Institutionalization in African Democracies



² On formation see Chhibber, P. K. and K. Kollman (2004). The formation of national party systems : federalism and party competition in Canada, Great Britain, India, and the United States. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.

On character of party systems see Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and party systems : a framework for analysis. Cambridge [Eng.] ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

On levels of institutionalization see Mainwaring, S. and T. Scully (1995). Building democratic institutions : party systems in Latin America. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press.

This dissertation explains the differential development of party systems in African democracies as the result of the *power of incumbent authoritarians*, which is defined according to their ability to harness clientelistic support, in the initial stages of democratic opening. The power of the authoritarian regime, along with the strength of the opposition, determines the players and their incentives in the transition period. Each side attempts to use their capabilities to control the transition agenda and create the formal rules of competition in their favor. Where authoritarian incumbents are strong, a tightly controlled transition restricts entry of new challengers and forces opposition to coalesce and model the incumbent in order to compete. Where authoritarian incumbents are weak, a greater degree of political space is available for new players to shape the transition agenda and press for reforms that would allow greater access. Paradoxically, *more open, participatory and transformative transitions produce less institutionalized party systems, while more controlled and limited transitions provide for a more highly structured competitive party system.*

The argument presented here provides a critique of two seemingly contrasting literatures. First, it challenges the conventional wisdom that holds that formal institutions of democracy, such as political parties, are so weak in Africa that they are not an important factor in explaining political dynamics.³ Secondly, it challenges the

³ This perspective is well established, particularly in the literature addressing the continued economic malaise in Africa, which recognizes the institutional weaknesses of the African state. See P.M. Lewis 1996 which reviews Callaghy and Ravenhill, eds 1994, Hyden and Bratton eds 1992, Olukoshi, ed 1993, Rothchild, ed 1991, Sandbrook, 1993, and Widner, ed 1994. Lewis, P. M. (1996). "Hemmed in: Responses to Africa's economic decline - Callaghy, TM, Ravenhill, J." *World Politics* 49(1): 92-129.

The point has also been made for political parties specifically: see Randall, V. and L. Svasand (2002). "Party institutionalization in new democracies." *Party Politics* 8(1): 5-29.

See also Mozaffar and Scarritt for the perspective that, on average, African democracies exhibit very high levels of volatility and low fragmentation. Mozaffar, S. and J. R. Scarritt (2005). "The puzzle of African party systems." *Party Politics* 11(4): 399-421.

institutionalist perspective that explains party system outcomes as the result of exogenous formal rules.⁴ This dissertation amends both of these approaches by focusing on the interaction between the informal institutions of patronage and formal rules in a sequential process: *historical legacies of authoritarian power accumulation strategies and clientelistic relations shape the nature of formal democratic institutions as they are created in the democratic transition, and these new rules become constraints in the multiparty era and condition future rounds of competition.* Formal democratic institutions are constructed throughout the transition period, endogenous to clientelistic social relations that shape the struggle for power across Africa. Once established, institutions – in this case, formal democratic institutions and informal structures of competition- influence trajectories of subsequent institutional and, therefore, historical development.⁵

A broader application to institutional theory suggests that institutions are neither fully exogenous from the structural context nor wholly adaptable and reducible to the optimal responses of decision makers. New institutions can develop in response to a catalyst and reflect existing social conditions or emerge gradually through endogenous institutional transformations, but they endure beyond their initial conditions, *as forces of continuity or change that do not reflect the conditions that led to their emergence.* Authoritarian incumbents cannot simply establish the democratic institutions that they

⁴ Downs, A. (1957). *An economic theory of democracy*. New York,, Harper.

Duverger, M. (1972). *Party politics and pressure groups: a comparative introduction*. New York,, Crowell.

Cox, G. W. (1997). *Making votes count : strategic coordination in the world's electoral systems*. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

⁵ See also Greif 2006 for perspectives on endogenous institutional change. Greif, A. (2006). *Institutions and the path to the modern economy : lessons from medieval trade*. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

prefer regardless of their power capabilities. Rather, past patronage relations provide differential foundations for mobilizing support during times of challenge, and with democratization authoritarian incumbents test their abilities to create the rules of the multiparty system in their favor. The formal rules established in the multiparty era are endogenous to pre-existing informal institutions of clientelism; the centrality of patronage support determines the extent of support for the authoritarian incumbent transition agenda, and is manifest in the group interests, strategies and *capabilities* of both the incumbent authoritarians and nascent opposition. The interaction between the formal and informal realm continually defines the enduring character of the party system.⁶

The approach developed here, therefore, suggests two important implications for inter-related features common to the new democracies in the developing world: the enduring salience of authoritarian legacies and the centrality of patronage relations to understanding contemporary political development. Many assume that authoritarian incumbent power and clientelistic relations to access the state are inimical to democracy and must be replaced with new institutions and modern modes of representation.⁷ This study demonstrates, however, that both authoritarian legacies and patronage systems influence the emerging character of the new multiparty system in unintended ways that

⁶ Institutions, therefore, can serve as either the shackles of history or a catalyst for change. Ibid.

Following the establishment of the new democratic regime, ethnic identities and informal institutions of patronage may readjust to fit the new formal institutional context. Posner, D. N. (2005). Institutions and ethnic politics in Africa

A theoretical model of institutional change is developed in Thelen, K. and J. Mahoney, Eds. (Forthcoming). Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power in Historical Institutionalism.

⁷ See, for example, the Latin American work that emphasized authoritarian legacies as destabilizing and threatening to democracy, factors that need to be overcome in order to consolidate democracy. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe*. Linz, J. J. and A. C. Stepan (1996). Problems of democratic transition and consolidation : southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.

In post-communist studies see Jowitt, K. (1992). New world disorder : the Leninist extinction. Berkeley, University of California Press.

may help sustain democracy, particularly given contexts of extreme scarcity and multiple ethnic cleavages. It is indeed a puzzle to the modernization literature how thriving democracies in Benin, Senegal, Zambia and Ghana continue to function despite the very low levels of development where GDP per capita ranges from \$1,000 to \$2,700.⁸ To account for these ‘democratic anomalies’, this dissertation highlights how the authoritarian legacies and informal institutions of clientelism can actually contribute to democratic transition and maintenance by fostering adaptation to regime change, structuring electoral competition and organizing various social groups into representative parties, facilitating distribution in the multiparty regime and, ultimately, contributing to stability.

Furthermore, the centrality of clientelistic relations embedded within the democratic system offers a critique of the argument for civil society’s contribution to democratic consolidation.⁹ Civil society in Benin, Senegal, Zambia and Ghana, and across many African democracies, remains weak and reactive.¹⁰ The contribution of this study is to emphasize the importance of *links to society* within the heritage of Africa’s neopatrimonial regimes that now form the basis of multiparty democracy. The masses are mobilized by patronage relations, and are therefore connected to the competition over state access through local elites. Rather than assuming the replacement of clientelistic networks by autonomous and pro-democratic civil society, the tiered connection of government, local elites and society must be brought into the analysis in order to

⁸ US 2006 dollars. CIA Intelligence Report. Factbook, C. I. A. W. from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html>.

⁹ Harbeson, J. W., D. S. Rothchild, et al. (1994). *Civil society and the state in Africa*. Boulder, L. Rienner Publishers.

¹⁰ GyimahBoadi, E. (1996). "Civil society in Africa." *Journal of Democracy* 7(2): 118-132.

understand the power equations, the organization of society, and the functioning of the multiparty system.

This introduction provides the dissertation's theoretical and empirical approach, first by presenting the specific analytic puzzle posed by the African cases in detail and the reasons they contribute to a broader discussion of party systems and institutional development. The second section discusses alternative explanations, particularly economic development, social cleavages, and electoral systems and presents a critique of their explanatory potential. The third section presents the comparative theoretical approach developed in this dissertation and the assumptions of politics that drive the logic of the argument. The concluding section discusses broader implications of this research, as well as methodological design and the organization of the dissertation.

THE PUZZLE

The central objective of this dissertation is to explain the puzzle of variation in form and functioning of party systems in African democracies. Two pairs of African cases help to motivate the central empirical puzzle, and allow for detailed, structured comparative analysis. Senegal and Ghana are at the high end of party system institutionalization, with well organized political parties and stable competition. Both have experienced alternation and have been, at various times, democratic leaders on the continent. Zambia and Benin are at the low end of party system institutionalization, and volatility is high and amorphous political affiliations are rife. Yet, Benin has also experienced alternations and is a thriving democracy, and Zambia continues to sustain a vibrant, if fluid, opposition.

By matching the four cases in various combinations, the potential influence of colonial legacy, authoritarian regime, economic development and volatility, and ethnic heterogeneity are held constant. These four cases meet the twin goals of case selection – representativeness and leverage (useful variation) – as very ‘typical cases’ of African social, geographic and economic conditions generally. They provide critical variation in modes of authoritarian power accumulation, reflected in the dynamics of how the democratic transition played out (Figure 1.2).¹¹ From the larger set of 23 African democracies, Ghana and Senegal present cases of strong authoritarians during the transition period; Zambia and Benin are cases of weak authoritarians, but vary on the capabilities of the opposition.¹² The cases demonstrate the theoretical primacy of the power of the authoritarian incumbent. The opposition has a significant opportunity to influence the character of the transition and resulting party system only where the incumbent is weak.

¹¹ Ghana also serves as a ‘crucial case’ or ‘pathway case’. as a former military regime that has developed a highly institutionalized party system. On case selection, see Gerring, J. (2007). Case study research : principles and practices. New York, Cambridge University Press.

¹² Measurement of these variables is detailed in Chapter 3.

Figure 1.2: Authoritarian Incumbent and Opposition Power

		AUTHORITARIAN INCUMBENT POWER	
		Strong / Supported	Weak / Fragmented
OPPOSITION CHALLENGER POWER	Strong / Supported	HIGH PSI Ghana	LOW PSI Zambia
	Weak / Fragmented	HIGH PSI Senegal	LOW PSI Benin

Note: PSI = Party System Institutionalization

Party Systems in Africa

The same puzzling variety of forms and functions of party systems is reflected across the African continent. The African party systems lend themselves to intra- and cross-regional comparison because of the simultaneity of numerous democratizations, as well as the similarity in causal factors driving these transitions across the continent. The plurality of third wave democratic transitions occurred in Africa, and this set of cases can meaningfully contribute to larger theoretical debates by differentiating which causal factors matter and *how*. In order to assess the contributions of this theory to comparative studies of institutional development, party systems and democratization in the developing world, three distinctive features of African politics should be addressed. These features hold for most, if not all, of the democratic African countries.

First, while there are nominal distinctions between single party and military rule across the continent, the strongly personalist nature of the preceding authoritarian regimes and the centrality of clientelistic relations in accumulating power largely

overshadows these differences in regime type.¹³ Secondly, the centrality of elite group access to the state has limited the causal role for labor organization or civil society and social mobilization more generally as a catalyst for change. These two factors relate to the third element of African transitions that may be distinct from other regions. African authoritarian incumbent regimes continued to seek a central role for themselves in the transition process as well as the multiparty system. Rather than a complete discrediting of a certain type of leadership (be it military rule or communist parties) that occurred in other regions of third wave transitions, the incumbents in Africa all intended to be winners in the new system when they began political liberalization.

These issues will be discussed further throughout the dissertation according to their theoretical significance, but they highlight the core assumption about African politics that underlies this analysis: political organization reflects not material power per se, but social network power. Regime consolidation requires support of local elites who command an independent following. Local elites seek to maintain their autonomy while benefiting from access to the state.¹⁴ Competition over state access and clients creates an interactive relationship between state, local elites and the masses. While studies of Africa have been dominated by a focus on informality and instability, this analysis highlights a new paradigm in the analysis of institutions as significant in the study of African politics. By tracing the process through which institutions are established, we

¹³ For example, Barbara Geddes categorizes all of the African cases as personalist rather than single party or military regimes despite the nominal differences in origin. Geddes, B. (1999). "What do we know about democratization after twenty years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2: 115-144.

¹⁴ Migdal, J. S. (1988). *Strong societies and weak states : state-society relations and state capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.

gain insight into the enduring impact of institutions in the democratic era *and* the ways in which these institutions encompass the underlying social relations.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Then, the question is, what accounts for patterns of cross-national variation in party system institutionalization? While little work has been done on the *causes* of party system institutionalization in any region, alternative explanations this work considers include social cleavages of ethnic mobilization, electoral systems, and levels of economic development.

Social Cleavages

A longstanding theory regarding the development of the party system claims that social cleavages can be politicized and transformed by political elite into party formation that is particularly durable and lasting (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). In Lipset and Rokkan's original analysis based on European party formation, these social cleavages were consequences of industrial and national revolutions, and encompassed dimensions of religious, territorial, capital-labor and rural-urban conflicts that were then 'frozen' into enduring political parties. In Africa, the relevant social cleavage has been routinely been determined to be ethnicity, described as a process of "constructing the ethnic identity", 'its politicisation' and finally its 'particisation' (Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005). Because ethnicity is variable and multifaceted, so are ethnic cleavages, and hence, the articulation of ethnic cleavages in the political arena. However, a plausible argument is that the numbers, concentration and relative sizes of ethnic groups, as well as the intensity or

quality of ethnic identity and the extent to which coexisting ethnicities are politically mobilized or not, would contribute to the political articulation of ethnic cleavages and its transformation into party formation.¹⁵ This translates very roughly to an expectation that higher the number of ethnopolitical groups, the greater the total number of parties and party system fragmentation (and these cleavages would be particularly enduring and potentially polarizing).

However, multiple analyses have shown that politicized ethnic groups do not translate directly to their own political party – as suggested by the presence of alternating majorities of ‘dominant parties’ (Erdmann and Basedau). Mozaffar and Scarritt find an inverse relationship between the number of ethnopolitical groups and the number of parties.¹⁶ In fact, the real puzzle is why in some places an ‘ethnic congress’ party forms that can bring together a number of different ethnic groups under a common umbrella, whereas in other places political party mobilization remains localized to a particular sectional group per party. This is not to say that ethnic identities are not central to political party mobilization; the relationship between national leaders, local elite and followers remains salient across the continent in democratic competition. It is essential, given the salience of ethnic competition, to understand why and how the ways in which ethnicities are politicized and become partisans across the continent, responding to the institutional incentives at hand.¹⁷

¹⁵ Ferree, K. (2004). Ethnic Demographics and Electoral Volatility in Africa. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 2004.

Erdmann, G. and M. Basedau (2007). Problems of Categorizing and Explaining Party Systems in Africa. *GIGA Research Programme: Legitimacy and Efficiency of Political Systems*. G. I. o. G. a. A. S. (GIGA). Hamburg, Germany. **No. 40, January 2007**

¹⁶ Mozaffar, S. and J. R. Scarritt (2005). "The puzzle of African party systems." *Party Politics* **11**(4): 399-421

¹⁷ Following Daniel Posner’s recent work on the level of ethnic identity that becomes politically salient, in response to changing institutional contexts, my model builds on this logic to explain why in some cases

Electoral Systems

An equally prominent alternative argument to explain party system outcomes focuses on the effects of the electoral system (Duverger 1954; Rae 1971; Lijphart and Grofman 1984). Strict institutionalists have demonstrated that electoral systems – particularly plurality rule – affect the strategic behavior, and therefore, total number of candidates and parties. Plurality rule forces strategic coordination of both elites and voters around candidates that appear viable, in order to avoid wasting votes and resources. This logic holds particularly at the district level where single-member districts encourage the effective number of parties to reduce to two.¹⁸ The number of viable candidates will increase with district magnitude.¹⁹ While national level institutions are also hypothesized to matter for shaping party coordination across districts, the overwhelming majority of African countries exhibit the same national level institutions: presidential systems and weak legislative bodies in relation to the centralized executive branch. Therefore, in Africa, this approach would suggest that difference in electoral rules at the district level should be the determinative factor in shaping the party system.

The critique of electoral systems as a subset of the institutionalist literature discussed above is that electoral rule formation is endogenous to the incentives and capabilities of the incumbents and opposition in the transition.²⁰ While the choice of

political elites find it effective to aggregate and in others not. Posner, D. N. (2005). Institutions and ethnic politics in Africa

¹⁸ Duverger, M. (1954). Political parties, their organization and activity in the modern state. London, New York, Methuen; Wiley.

¹⁹ Cox, G. W. (1997). Making votes count : strategic coordination in the world's electoral systems. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

²⁰ In this dissertation, see in particular Chapter 5. See also Easter, G. M. (1997). "Preference for presidentialism - Postcommunist regime change in Russia and the NIS." World Politics 49(2): 184-&

Moser, R. G. (1999). "Electoral systems and the number of parties in postcommunist states." World Politics 51(3): 359-+.

certain formal rules is an important element of this causal story because it reinforces the nature of the party system that emerges out of the transition dynamic, the choice of rules reflect the power of the incumbents and the opposition. Electoral rules were largely left in tact from previous systems in both highly reformative transitions as well as democratic transitions that favored the status quo. The general preference, expressed by many involved in the electoral rules negotiations (opposition and incumbents alike), was to encourage broad understanding of how votes transfer into legislative seats. And while both incumbents and opposition endeavor to create rules that suit their position in the context of immediate competition, these rule, once established, create constraints on future modifications to the party system. While I highlight eligibility rules' constraining effects that contribute to the enduring character of the party system established in the democratic transition, these formal institutions are the *product of authoritarian incumbent or opposition power to influence the transition agenda and shape the rules according to their preferences*. The electoral institutionalist literature is largely handicapped by the inattention to history and sequence, and therefore lacks the ability to explain the way in which institutions and parties were created and changed over time.²¹

Economic Structure

The economic features of a country could be expected to influence the level of party system institutionalization in two primary ways. First, with a greater level of economic development, we would expect more complex social structures, labor processes

Grzymala-Busse, A. M. (2002). Redeeming the communist past : the regeneration of communist parties in East Central Europe. Cambridge, [England] ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

²¹ See summary in Boix, C. (2007). The emergence of parties and party systems. The Oxford handbook of comparative politics. C. Boix and S. C. Stokes. Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press: xi, 1021 p.

which require active participation and form new groups, out of which common interests would be defined (Lipset 1959). All of these processes would potentially allow for stronger linkages between parties and citizens, as they form constituencies, and thus, greater levels of party system institutionalization.

Secondly, with any given level of development, an extreme downturn in the economy could potentially influence the party system, particularly in new democracies in which economic crises are a defining feature of the transition. Haggard and Kaufman claim that countries facing economic crises were able to launch wide-ranging reforms, but that countries that had regime transitions without economic crisis exhibited more stability.²² They continue with the argument that centrifugal tendencies for the party system were greater in cases facing economic crisis, encouraging both party fragmentation and polarization, whereas in non-crisis cases these pressures were more likely to be contained.²³ Thus we would expect countries experiencing greater economic crisis to show higher levels of electoral volatility and, therefore, lower levels of party system institutionalization. Furthermore, the robust literature on economic voting would lead us to expect that economic hardship will raise volatility by increasing anti-incumbent votes and preventing new party loyalties from emerging, encouraging voters to support a variety of opposition parties in search of new political alternatives. In contrast, in a positive economic climate, the population would be more in favor of the status quo.²⁴

²² Haggard, S. and R. R. Kaufman (1995). The Political economy of democratic transitions. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.

²³ Ibid. p. 126

²⁴ Tavits, M. (2005). "The development of stable party support: Electoral dynamics in post-communist Europe." American Journal of Political Science 49(2): 283-298.

Therefore, we would expect party system institutionalization to be a linear function of economic performance.

The theoretical predictions for greater political instability in times of economic difficulty are sound, but the African ‘politics of permanent economic crisis’ do not bear out this relationship. African regimes have, on the whole, been able to withstand extreme levels of poverty. The symbiotic relation between economic scarcity and neo-patrimonial rule reinforces either high or low party system institutionalization. Furthermore, incumbent governments in more developed African countries were just as likely to lose control of the transition as in poorer ones. Rather than the predicted modernization of relations between political leaders and their followers to party candidates and autonomous voters, in all case studies practices of clientelism shape individual relations between parties and their followers regardless of very different levels of economic development and economic characteristics.

While these possibilities do not provide purchase in the African context, considering the alternatives brings the new African democracies into a broader theoretical debate about the social forces and institutions that shape new regimes. I now turn to a model that integrates the rules and existing structural conditions through a focus on power and the struggle over access during the transition process.

THE ARGUMENT

The democratic transition is a critical moment in which the new party system emerges. Although the democratic transition provides a window of opportunity for reform, this argument maintains that the transition dynamics are not due to the chance of

contingency or agency of a few key leaders. The structural emphasis on power and the underlying group relations of patronage networks provides a framework for understanding how and why elites pursue particular agendas and when they are capable of carrying out their preferred strategies. The *breadth and depth* of local elite support, and therefore, the following of the majority of society, for either the authoritarian incumbent regime or the nascent opposition leads to particular incentives in managing the democratization process, and particular capabilities for each group to carry out their preferred agenda. Fundamentally, the extent of authoritarian power shapes the nature of bargaining dynamics and pressures at the transition, allowing for a greater or lesser degree of reform for the democratic era, thus establishing the nature of the emergent party system. The character of the multiparty system *endures over time because of the isomorphic pressures* at work in the newly competitive environment. The organizational rationalization that sustains either high or low levels of institutionalization occurs through three main channels: eligibility rules (barriers to entry), models of party organization, and the structure of electoral competition that leads to a logic of either polarization or mutable coalitions of fluid combinations. The legacies of authoritarian power shape the establishment of new rules and competitive structures, and these in turn, create future constraints on the actions of authoritarian incumbents and opposition alike.

Model Summary

I present a two-step model that explains party system institutionalization as the result of the extent of authoritarian power to shape the democratic transition and compete successfully in the multiparty system. Authoritarian incumbents are important

throughout the democratization period because democratization did not occur through revolution; rather, incumbents responded to pressures to their rule by *attempting* to control the process to their benefit, and maintain power in the multiparty era. Their ability to carry out their agenda, however, depends on earlier strategies of garnering support.

Beginning with democratization (step 2), where the authoritarian incumbent is powerful, the nascent party system forms *in relation to* its dominant presence, and opposition faces competitive pressures to aggregate and emulate organizationally, which results in a polarized field of ruling party and anti-incumbent rivalry. The authoritarian incumbent retains a great deal of influence over the rule making process of the democratic transition, and in particular uses party registration requirements as barriers to entry in order to restrict new entrants. The dominating presence of the incumbent defines social expectations and opposition conceptions of party organization, and sets the standard in terms of established party infrastructure, resources and networks to emulate. And the incumbent's concentrated force has a polarizing effect, as voters and nascent opposition alike can identify the main player, and must coalesce in an alternative pole to offer a viable choice.²⁵ This process of polarization of the competitive party relations echoes Duverger's theoretical discussion of 'mirroring' and left/right ideological


²⁵ This incentive structure is at work despite the likelihood of multiple factors that exist to keep the opposition weak. The prospects for opposition strength and unification are indeed very challenging, particularly in contexts of scarce resources, yet these challenges are more likely to be overcome in cases where the incumbent authoritarian successfully manages the transition and establishes itself as a hegemonic pole, against which the opposition must organize in a similar manner. The continuation of the incumbent provides a model for organization and a constant demand for opposition unity, despite likely incumbent attempts to divide and weaken the opposition through harassment and co-optation.

‘contagion’, in so far as parties transform themselves to *be more like their rival*, out of competitive incentives when their rival is successful.²⁶

When the authoritarian incumbent is able to inscribe highly restrictive eligibility rules, well-defined model of party organization and structured, polarized competitive pressures lead to an enduring highly institutionalized party system – one that offers stable competition and alternation. Where the authoritarian incumbent is weak or non-existent, it creates a void in which many new competitors enter the electoral arena without an incentive to aggregate. The opposition forces influence the new rules of the multiparty system, and prioritize ease of entry to ensure their own access. New parties must innovate organizationally to distinguish themselves from the unpopular and potentially obsolete authoritarian party and create new linkages to newly available voters. The proliferation of new parties and unstructured competition leads to a volatile new party system, and low party system institutionalization in the long term (Figure 1.3).

²⁶ Duverger “was referring to the phenomenon whereby the right, in its own self-defense and as a means of maintaining [or gaining] its positions of power and influence, is forced into mirroring the left.” See Chandler, W. M. (1977). "Canadian Socialism and Policy Impact - Contagion from Left." Canadian Journal of Political Science-Revue Canadienne De Science Politique **10**(4): 755-780. p. 755.

Figure 1.3 Determinants of Party System Institutionalization



Given that the degree of authoritarian incumbent control over the transition is critical to establishing the nascent party system, step 1 of the argument explains what makes authoritarian incumbents powerful in the face of regime challenge, such as democratization. I argue that prior strategies of regime consolidation – categorized as incorporation or modernization – have lasting effects for the regime’s ability to count on the necessary basis of support from local elites to mobilize the masses.

This argument is based on the assumption that reciprocal relations of patronage between the state, local elites and the peasant majority form the basis of power relations in Africa. I assume that access to the state is the driving motivation: for national elites

who form parties and endeavor to shape the rules of competition to maximize their access while limiting other entrants; for local elites who seek to maintain their autonomous following and provide benefits from their relations to the state; and for the masses who see their access through the conduit of their local patron.

These assumptions suggest that social networks rather than material resources make up the basis of authoritarian incumbent *or* opposition power. Therefore, authoritarian era legacies of modes of power accumulation determine the extent to which local elites remain loyal or easily defect to the opposition when political liberalization commences. I argue that local elites remain loyal and support the authoritarian regime where earlier modes of power accumulation were broadly incorporating. In contrast, local elites are likely to defect to the opposition at the onset of democratization where authoritarian regimes pursued modernization strategies that attempted to neutralize traditional elites and replace them with new state-centered organizations. This strategy leaves the authoritarian incumbent with a precarious hold on power, and when nascent opposition forces become viable with the onset of democratization, local elites rapidly switch allegiances.

The result of authoritarian modes of power accumulation and the resulting levels of local elite support for either the incumbents or the opposition shape the dynamics of the democratic transition. A controlled transition carried out by powerful and cohesive incumbents provides a very limited degree of possible reform – the authoritarian incumbents will largely be capable of setting the agenda and determining who will be involved in the transition process. The powerful authoritarian incumbents will endeavor to control democratization and party formation to reflect the status quo. In contrast,

where the incumbent party is less powerful and support is fragmented, the nascent opposition will have a greater opportunity to participate and influence the agenda. At this point, there are two possible paths, which depend on the cohesion of the opposition forces. The opposition is likely to be disorganized and lack a sense of united purpose other than achieving multiparty competition. Where the opposition is fragmented and incoherent, the multiplicity of heterogeneous forces pushing for reform forces a very transformative democratization process, or an ‘open’ transition. However, where there are structural conditions that provide a rationale for unity, information channels and independent resources, the opposition can act coherently and impose an outer limit on the extent of reform, as they foresee their inheritance of the state and endeavor to keep the benefits of incumbency intact. This is described as a ‘contested’ transition (see Figure 1.4). Contested and open transitions provide an opportunity for a great deal of reform and expanded participation as the agenda of the incumbent is thwarted and new forces become involved in setting the multiparty system in motion. The balance of incumbent and opposition forces involved in the democratization process shape the formal rules and competitive pressures of the new multiparty system, which endure beyond the initial transition conditions due to the competitive pressures driving institutional isomorphism.

Figure 1.4: Independent Variables and Transition Context

		AUTHORITARIAN INCUMBENT POWER	
		Strong / Supported	Weak / Fragmented
OPPOSITION CHALLENGER POWER	Strong / Supported	Controlled Transition	Contested Transition
	Weak/Fragmented	Controlled Transition	Open Transition

Authoritarian incumbents and opposition share the same goals: to enact limited reform (while ensuring their own inclusion in the system and shoring up their bases of support), maintain the highly controlled state system, win power and maintain advantages of controlling the state system while limiting others’ access. However, their strategies differ. Incumbents attempt to carry out a limited transition using their existing control over the mechanisms of the state, to establish a purely *de jure* multiparty system.

The opposition employs different resources and tactics to influence the transition trajectory. Their strength may reside in communication networks and independent resources, as well as their organizational and social ability to mobilize protests and pro-democratic international pressure. Therefore, opposition strategies are challenging because of the difficulties in carrying out coherent, united action and the contradictory nature of their power assets – mobilizing protests. A particularly cohesive opposition may be loathe to use its ability to mobilize protest, which will only create limitations on the political kingdom they hope to inherit. Furthermore, the opposition agenda will

necessarily focus on certain reforms to try to reduce the advantages of the incumbent and shift the playing field to a more equal competition. While both sides want to limit entrants to the multiparty system, the opposition must achieve certain reforms in order to compete successfully in elections, in the hopes of taking over the system largely intact. So while opposition also has the incentive to maintain a limited transition, their more fragmented starting point, the future costs of mobilizing protests, and the necessity of reforms to shift the electoral playing field mean that where opposition has the ability to influence the transition, it will push open participation and reform to a greater extent. In general the greater the opposition's power in relation to the authoritarian incumbents, the more extensive the democratic reform will be. I do not assume that this is because opposition are motivated by ideologies or the intrinsic desire for free competition, but rather because the opposition's strategic position requires greater openness and reform to ensure their own access to the new system.

The incentives and capabilities of the incumbents and opposition determine the degree of political space available in the democratization process, which can be described as a controlled, contested, or open transition. The transition context transfers the authoritarian legacies of successful or alienating regime consolidation strategies into the multiparty era, shaping either a highly structured or extremely volatile party system.

BROADER IMPLICATIONS

This analysis addresses several central areas of political science research and can contribute to general theoretical debates about party system development,

democratization, and the nature of institutions, as well as advancing our understanding of African politics more specifically.

African Politics

A common description of African politics identifies dominant parties as the defining feature (Kuenzi and Lambright 2005; Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005; Randall and Svasand 2002; Manning 2005). Mozaffar and Scarritt claim to identify a surprising combination of dominant majorities (low fragmentation) and high electoral volatility across the continent.²⁷ However, they employ two tactics that, in fact, obscure the real dynamics of African party systems. First, the analysis is based on a database of electoral system features and election results that includes all sub-Saharan African countries with elections regardless of regime type or the quality of elections. This leaves open the possibility that their apparent finding of concentration in African party systems is at least in part due to undemocratic elections and that aggregate electoral stability is different in democratic versus non-democratic countries (Bogaards 2008). Secondly, the analysis is conducted with averages at the continental level. To describe the ‘party-system structure’ in Africa, Mozaffar and Scarritt provide continent-wide averages. By consequence, it is very difficult to make statements about *national* party systems. Indeed, I demonstrate that important differences exist among the African party systems and that the continent displays a diversity of constellations (Chapter 2). Despite these different ways of characterizing the contemporary party systems in Africa, Mozaffar and Scarritt make a historical argument similar to my own in that they also emphasize the role of strategic

²⁷ Mozaffar, S. and J. R. Scarritt (2005). "The puzzle of African party systems." *Party Politics* 11(4): 399-421

incentives of the multiparty competitive environment, emerging with democratization, which are “structured by the institutional legacies of authoritarian regimes”. They argue that information deficits and coordination constraints restrict party formation to more immediate ethno-political cleavages as alternative sources of mobilization. I agree that ethno-political cleavages are important sources of mobilization in the formation and development of political party systems, but emphasize the differential ways that identities are politicized into political parties according to the incentives of the transition dynamic.

Another recent work offers a useful contribution to the debate by demonstrating the need to decipher between democratic party systems and authoritarian elections. In doing so, Bogaards argues that what looked like dominant party systems in Africa in the early rounds of competition has given way to a pattern of alternating majorities.²⁸ Even where incumbents have not yet been replaced, in many cases they have a decreasing vote share, so that far from becoming increasingly hegemonic and on the path to re-establishing an authoritarian system (as went the earlier concerns), the electoral outcomes show that a concentrated party system can still be highly competitive.²⁹ This argument is completely in line with my expectations of the dynamics in highly institutionalized party systems, and is confirmed in political trajectories to date in Ghana and Senegal.

Finally, a strain of research has tapped into the broader literature on political parties and party systems and tests whether the orthodoxy of theoretical hypotheses regarding the effects of electoral systems holds true in Africa. Using a range of methodological applications there have been contradictory findings, but when only

²⁸ Bogaards, M. (2008). "Measuring democracy through election outcomes – A critique with African data." *Comparative Political Studies* 40(10): 1211-1237

²⁹ Bogaards, M. (2008). "Measuring democracy through election outcomes – A critique with African data." *Comparative Political Studies* 40(10): 1211-1237

democratic countries are considered, the evidence shows that the electoral system (operationalized as Proportional representation versus plurality rules) has *no significant effect on the number of parties competing for and attaining seats in legislative elections*.³⁰ Furthermore, it is argued that majoritarian systems do not seem to provide clearer accountability for voters than do PR systems - we do not see greater levels of electoral turnovers/ shifting majorities in the legislature in majoritarian systems – the incidence of legislative turnover is about 3x more common in PR systems.³¹ Whereas some studies do find, however, significant and expected effects of the electoral system on the levels of popular participation and governing capacity, I believe these studies underscore the need for a prior understanding of *how the electoral systems* are determined and in whose interests they are meant to serve.

Parties and Party System Development

The project responds to the paucity of comparative analyses of parties and party systems in Third Wave polities, identified by Kitschelt et al 1999.³² The authors in that study of competition, representation and inter-party cooperation in post-communist party systems correctly identify a needed research agenda to explore the “alternative modes of party competition in the electoral arena” as well as practices of representation and policy-making.³³ This study of African political party systems contributes to comparative analysis of institutional development in new democracies more generally because the

³⁰ *ibid*

³¹ Lindberg 2005 “Consequences of electoral systems in Africa: a preliminary inquiry” *Electoral Studies* 24 p. 41 - 64

³² Kitschelt, H. (1999). Post-communist party systems : competition, representation, and inter-party cooperation. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

³³ *Ibid.* p. 3

continual interaction between formal and informal realms is laid bare. Politics is about the struggle for power, and party systems are a means of organizing this struggle. Party systems, then, reflect all of the complexity and ongoing interaction between social structures, informal institutions that organize society and formal institutions of democracy. While the study of Africa highlights this complexity and the salience of the informal realm, its application to new democracies worldwide should not be overlooked.

One critical assumption that drives much of the comparative-historical work on party formation (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Kitschelt 1999), as well as institutionalists (Lijphart and Grofman 1984) and formal theorists (Downs 1957) is that parties situate themselves on programmatic issue dimensions. This assumption is largely the reality in other regions of the world, and Africa may well be unique to the extent that ideological differentiation is often not the driving factor in political identification – which is more directly related to group calculations of advantage through state access. Yet this dissertation suggests that linkage strategies to the population and methods of competition is part of what must be problematized; the African cases suggest that underlying social relations of clientelism shape the formal institutions of democracy and that competitive alignments are determined by institutional pressures rather than a close mapping of interest group representation. Multiparty competition in many ways reifies the power of traditional authorities and patronage linkages rather than suggesting a modern evolution away from clientelism. This project does not take for granted the *functions* of parties, their representation of society, and how parties connect the state and society. Rather, these are outcomes to be explained. The marginal role of ideological position in African

party development leaves open the analysis of why various national party systems have emerged.

My analysis stresses the importance of specific prior regime legacies, specifying the ways in which authoritarian and opposition power can shape the resulting multiparty system.³⁴ This supports some recent research on political parties and institutional development which looks at previous regime type (Lust-Okar 2002))and predemocratic elite resources and skills (Grzymala-Busse 2002) to explain new democratic outcomes. The African context varies, however, in the extent to which the incumbent dominated the transition process. Work in East Central Europe has focused on the regeneration of former communist parties, which required an ability to transform and adapt to the new system after being discredited and swept out of power. In Africa and the Middle East, liberalizing regimes must bargain to varying degrees with opposition to set the terms of the new system in which they plan to compete. Their goal is to *control the transition and create the new system according to their preferred agenda*. By assessing authoritarian era strategies of regime consolidation, I expand the theoretical framework to explain why authoritarian incumbents have differential capabilities to control the transition dynamics. In both the type of transition and the incumbent authoritarian's need to reform, the lack of ideological debate over the nature of the pluralist system reflects a significant difference in *how* authoritarian legacies and resources could be utilized to shape the emergent party system.

³⁴ The importance of the authoritarian period in determining the incumbent and opposition position for the transition bargain is distinct, however, from rival explanations that would explain democratic outcomes and party system characteristics as resulting from previous experiments with democracy, the nature of earlier multiparty systems, and the varying ability of these pre-authoritarian structures to endure through military rule OR variations in type of authoritarian regimes – see analysis below regarding democratic transitions and regime consequences.

Given the importance of previous regime legacies in shaping the power balance, the African transition negotiations highlight the elite-driven process of party formation. The elite focus presents a central difference in the study of African politics and party development to works on Europe and Latin America which focus on the role of class structure, social mobilization and labor incorporation (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Collier and Collier 1991; Yashar 1997; Collier 1999)³⁵. The predominately agrarian nature of African society remains a defining factor for political dynamics; even among the more urbanized countries, *society remains reactive* to the power configurations and levels of coherence among incumbents and elite opposition. A party official in Northern Senegal, in an isolated rural community along the frontier river basin, expressed the long *durée* of the conservative nature of the agrarian population, due to their allegiance to traditional authorities, and links to the incumbent authoritarian party-state:

We (*la Parti Socialiste*) worked via the *marabouts* and ‘*grand électeurs*’ – religious and social local leaders in the traditional arena - to recruit here locally and nationally. We built party support via individual local leaders, so that the followers of person A and person B would back us. During the single party era, people would follow the recommendations of their party in all realms because party members were always with you, in your life, they had lasting relations and continued contact because it was a dominant party and all the resources were concentrated within the PS. Since we – the party - were there, we provided for the society and our community remained loyal. M. Kenemé. Podor, Senegal. 2005.

Modern party systems have not replaced the logic of neo-patrimonial rule. Instead, they institutionalize these relations in new forms, and reify the relations of local elites who command a mass following as powerbrokers in multiparty electoral competition.

³⁵ Elite perspectives have also figured centrally in the Latin American transitions literature (O'Donnell and Schmitter), but these focused on agency, stressing the uncertain outcomes of transitions. Here I present an analysis in which the elite group positions are structural, based on the power and cohesion of the authoritarians and opposition. O'Donnell, G. A., P. C. Schmitter, et al. (1986). Transitions from authoritarian rule. Comparative perspectives. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.

My focus on strategies of authoritarian power accumulation, via patronage relations, supports the general emphasis that Bratton and van de Walle place on the “institutional heritage of previous regimes”.³⁶ While Bratton and van de Walle explain the occurrence or lack of political protest, liberalization, and democratic transitions, this project’s focus on the enduring party systems that occur only in those countries that successfully achieved democratic transitions extends the question to explore the increasing diversity *within* a common regime type. Furthermore, this analysis seeks to trace through time and connect the role of prior regime types, the extent of political protest, the trajectories of transition, and the resulting party systems in a causal framework. Although there are obvious differences in the conceptualization of previous regime type categories and which legacies endure, the ways in which prior institutions structure the choices available, political strategies and outcomes is a shared feature in these works that take sequence and process seriously.

Democratic Transitions and Regime Consequences

By furthering our understanding of transitions in Africa, this research presents an opportunity to compare similarities and differences across regions, and contribute to our understanding of transition effects for regime outcomes. First, while I pinpoint the democratic transition as the period in which the new party system is established, this argument does not emphasize the role of agency, which earlier transitology literature

³⁶ Bratton, M. and N. Van de Walle (1997). Democratic experiments in Africa : regime transitions in comparative perspective. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, NY, USA, Cambridge University Press.

highlighted.³⁷ Although African politics occurs at the elite level – and the lack of labor organization is evidence of this phenomenon – elite strategies were largely pre-determined by the pre-existing balance of power between incumbents and nascent opposition forces. The time frame presented here, therefore, must explain what happens in the transition by expanding the analysis back in time to the preceding regime consolidation strategies. Furthermore, I highlight how and why the transition effects transfer into formal institutions in the multiparty arena and how these have enduring consequences by detailing the isomorphic processes that exhibit a sustaining influence.

Secondly, because the democratic transition offered the possibility for the authoritarian incumbents to maintain a central role throughout the transition dynamic and into the multiparty system, the implications are very different from the Latin American democratization experiences. In particular, the diminishing role of the military over time in Latin American transitions and their specific agenda of protecting themselves and their institution from retaliation meant that the influence of the incumbent was limited to a group protection agenda in many senses.³⁸ In Africa, because of the possibility for authoritarian incumbents to maintain control and minimize reform, their agenda in securing power was *parallel* to opposition elites seeking to inherit ‘the political kingdom’. The advantages to state access are so great that elites generally *shared the same motivation*: to be included in the pluralist system and then limit further transition reform to embed their advantage of access. This analysis rests on a general assumption about

³⁷ O'Donnell, G. A., P. C. Schmitter, et al. (1986). Transitions from authoritarian rule. Comparative perspectives. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.

Hagopian, F. (1990). "Democracy by undemocratic means - elites, political pacts, and regime transition in Brazil " Comparative Political Studies **23**(2): 147-170.

³⁸ Espana-Najera, A. (Forthcoming). Party systems and democracy after the conflicts. Political Science. South Bend, IN, University of Notre Dame. **Dissertation**.

leadership: that political leaders will seek to maximize control and authority while minimizing the chances of losing access altogether through electoral or other means of alteration. This builds on the earlier discussion of the lack of ideological positioning in the competitive arena in Africa, as well as a general assumption of power seeking rather than altruistic competition. And because the incumbent authoritarian party initiated the democratic transition with the intent to compete and win, there were few internal divisions between hardliners and softliners based on ideological differences towards reform from within the regime.³⁹ Furthermore, the argument that the nature of the party system emerged out of the continued dominance or absence of the authoritarian incumbent suggests that its role in influencing the party system will change little following the founding elections. This is in marked contrast to the declining influence of the military and their transition negotiations over time in Latin America.⁴⁰

Furthermore, elite-driven transitions in Africa rely on local-elite powerbrokers to mobilize the masses to support either the incumbents or the opposition as the best bet for maintaining access to the state. The transitions, therefore, lack the ‘push from below’, particularly the influence of organized labor, which has played a role in shaping democratic institutions in Western Europe and South America.⁴¹ The African transitions, as generally simultaneous in timing and due to a similar range of internal and external pressures facing weak states, were vulnerable to change in the face of minimal protest or

³⁹ As there were in Latin America – see O'Donnell, G. A., P. C. Schmitter, et al. (1986). Transitions from authoritarian rule. Comparative perspectives. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.

⁴⁰ Hunter, W. (1997). Eroding military influence in Brazil : politicians against soldiers. Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press.

⁴¹ Collier, R. B. (1999). Paths toward democracy : the working class and elites in Western Europe and South America. Cambridge, UK ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

social mobilization.⁴² Because class interests generally did not organize to push for democratization, they were also not the basis from which new political parties formed.

Finally, there is also a distinction to be made in the literature that focuses on the influence of preceding regime type. Two key points are relevant for the African cases in respect to the influence of earlier periods of democracy, and type of authoritarian regime, respectively. First, the focus on lasting legacies of pre-authoritarian characteristics in the Latin American context does not transfer well to explain variation in Africa. This is primarily because most countries followed a similar independence era trajectory to eliminate pluralism either through the installation of a *de jure* single party system or through successive coups.⁴³ The type of authoritarian regime is also used to explain democratic transition according to Geddes's choice-based perspective, who argues that the incentives facing military officers, cadres in single-party regimes and personalist regimes explains varying degrees of willingness to initiate transitions, negotiate the terms, or cling to power.⁴⁴ However, the overwhelmingly personalist nature of the preceding authoritarian regimes in Africa does not adequately explain the great multiplicity of outcomes that has occurred across the continent since the transitions began. My research differentiates between the authoritarian regimes according to their strategies for accumulating power, to link the causal pathway from preceding institutions to their particular legacies for the multi-party system.⁴⁵

⁴² Herbst, J. (2001). "Political liberalization in Africa after ten years." *Comparative Politics* 33(3): 357-+.

⁴³ Furthermore, very few African countries experimented with a 'second wave' attempt at democratization, and those that did democratize briefly (Burkina Faso, Nigeria) did not build on prior party identities or organization.

⁴⁴ Geddes, B. (1999). "What do we know about democratization after twenty years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2: 115-144.

⁴⁵ My emphasis on authoritarian capabilities to influence the nature of the multiparty system also supports Grzymala-Busse's conclusion that "legacies of the past can exert a positive influence.... Democratic transitions are not *tabulae rasae*, blank slates on which any given institutional arrangement can be imposed.

Institutions

The theoretical argument and empirical evidence presented here support the emerging perspective that formal institutional arrangements are frequently endogenous to regime outcomes, rather than causal.⁴⁶ This work seeks to further our understanding of the role of institutions by showing how the initial features of the democratic transition translate into stable, enduring outcomes of party system competition. While this speaks to recent work on institutional persistence and endogenous change,⁴⁷ the subject of political parties in the developing world also returns to an earlier debate within the institutional literature. Huntington's concern for the stability of a polity was dependent on the relationship between levels of participation and levels of institutionalization.⁴⁸ While the forces of modernization and regime change have not erased pre-existing institutions of social order such as neo-patrimonial rule and clientelistic exchange in Africa, the new question must be whether the interaction of these traditional forms of organizing social relations and modern democratic competition provide a basis for stability and peace.

Nor is the influence of the legacies of the previous regime exclusively negative. Rather, past organizational practices and networks persist, and can influence democratic development in surprisingly constructive ways". My analysis of how authoritarian legacies impact the new multiparty system supports this conclusion, with the possibility of a highly institutionalized party system providing meaningful and structured electoral competition. Grzymala-Busse, A. M. (2002). Redeeming the communist past : the regeneration of communist parties in East Central Europe. Cambridge, [England] ; New York, Cambridge University Press. p. 12.

⁴⁶ Easter, G. M. (1997). "Preference for presidentialism - Postcommunist regime change in Russia and the NIS." *World Politics* 49(2): 184-&.

⁴⁷ Greif, A. (2006). Institutions and the path to the modern economy : lessons from medieval trade. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

⁴⁸ Huntington, S. P. and Harvard University. Center for International Affairs. (1968). Political order in changing societies. New Haven,, Yale University Press.

This dissertation demonstrates that greater control and limiting participating can lead to higher levels of party system institutionalization. More powerful authoritarians and more controlled transitions limit reform and channel social participation into more highly structured party competition. Yet the empirical evidence here also questions Huntington's claim that instability is due to modernization, as changing societies produce political disorder (in the absence of modern political institutions). Rather, society is reactive to elite power struggles and alignments as they are channeled through existing traditional institutions of social order. Furthermore, social mobilization is not equivalent to instability and violence.⁴⁹

This argument highlights the central tension Huntington addressed between order and liberty. Political parties do indeed serve as an institution to organize mass participation in politics, yet the degree of liberty achieved through this reformation must be taken in light of the concomitant goal of maintaining authority, particularly in African states where the main source of instability has been too little central authority rather than too much.

Research Design

My research combines both statistical and comparative case study analysis. The multi-method approach is particularly useful both for generating and testing hypotheses. The iterative process of moving from intuition to theory, to gathering data and testing is enhanced through the use of multiple data sources, both of qualitative and quantitative nature. I employ the quantitative data in a 'medium-n' regression analysis to assess a

⁴⁹ Bermeo, N. G. (2003). Ordinary people in extraordinary times : the citizenry and the breakdown of democracy. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.

first cut of broad explanatory variables (see Chapter 3). These potential explanatory variables were tested in relation to a measurement of party system institutionalization for the universe of cases, 23 countries in Africa that meet the threshold of democracy within which we can speak of fairly similar competitive multiparty systems.

This statistical analysis forms the basis of case selection for the four in-depth case studies of Senegal, Ghana, Zambia and Benin. Within each country I select three sub-national locations based on development and ethnic demographic criteria, in addition to the capital city, to conduct interviews with party officials. The comparative analysis of the cross-national and sub-national locations are critical for flushing out the causal mechanism of the theory, as well as gathering data on the explanatory variable, authoritarian incumbent power, and to support the validity of my measurement of the dependent variable, party system institutionalization. Thus, the case studies fulfill two main goals. The first goal is to build confidence in my broad measures of party system institutionalization, and in particular to verify that it was equal across sub-national units to confirm a national-level focus of both the dependent and independent variable. The second purpose is to gather a new dataset for testing the causal mechanism of the theory, through multiple causal process observations. After testing the causal inference of the argument with this data, I expand the universe under consideration to include cross-regional testing and return to statistical analysis. I apply alternative measures and refined concepts to test the theory in new democracies in the developing world, demonstrating the generalizability of the theory and the extent to which this argument travels beyond Africa.

The comparative historical analysis is critical to my project to elucidate the causal mechanism, as well as to provide data about the self-reinforcing processes that the theory implies. In particular, one contribution that this study makes is to provide empirical data regarding the endogeneity of institutions. The development of specific institutional isomorphic processes of rule creation, organizational modeling, and competitive structure highlight the mechanisms that drive this process. The detailed empirical analysis highlights the unintended consequences and enduring impact of institutions that outlive the initial conditions under which they were constructed. Authoritarian incumbents meant to limit opposition challenges, but their dominating presence created a competitive context that over the long term fosters the cohesion and competitiveness of the opposition – *despite* the incumbent's continued attempts to co-opt, divide, harass, repress and otherwise weaken the opposition challengers. The case studies sequential analysis highlights the institutional logics that drive politics and the struggle for power.

Organization of the Dissertation

The goal of analyzing party systems in Africa's new democracies is three-fold: to provide a lens for evaluating democratic development on the continent; to explain the variation in the emergence, operation and implications of the new party systems; and to provide a theory of why certain party system configurations appear in particular places. To this end, I provide a detailed definition and measurement of party system institutionalization. Chapter 2 discusses cross-national measurement techniques, and employs multiple sources of data to assess validity of these measurements in the four

country case studies. Chapter 3 assesses rival explanations and provides a historical introduction to case material in Ghana, Senegal, Benin and Zambia.

This dissertation argues that the level of party system institutionalization in African democracies is a function of the extent of authoritarian power to control the transition dynamics. Isomorphic competitive pressures of the multiparty system shape the barriers to entry, organizational models and polarization of electoral competition that maintain the party system character over time (Chapter 6). Earlier strategies of authoritarian incorporation or modernization set the stage for either local elite support or defection and shape the amount of political space available for reform at the transition (Chapter 4). Authoritarian modes of power accumulation provides the foundation for either a narrow, elitist transition largely controlled by incumbent political leaders or a broad, participatory process that opens the political arena to new competitors (Chapter 5). This argument leads to some unexpected conclusions about the participatory nature of transitions and consequences for democracy in Africa and in new democracies of the developing world more broadly (Chapter 7). Strong authoritarian incumbents are able to maintain control over transition dynamics and limit the opening of the political arena from new areas of contestation – yet this results in *highly institutionalized competitive party systems*. The parallel conclusion is that weak incumbents and fragmented opposition must accept more open transitions that transform the existing rules of the game and make way for new players – which leads to *more fractionalized and fluid party systems*.

Chapter Two

Variations in Party System Institutionalization in Africa

This chapter provides a quantitative index measure of party system institutionalization across the universe of democratic countries in Africa, and further tests the validity of these measures through detailed survey analysis in the four country case studies of Senegal, Ghana, Benin and Zambia. Building on the measurement of party system institutionalization developed by Mainwaring and Scully for Latin America and applied to Africa by Kuenzi and Lambright, I use multiple sources of local and national level data to establish the large degree of variation in the way party systems have developed and currently operate across the continent.⁵⁰ Testing hypotheses about the determinants of party system institutionalization requires a reliable measure; this chapter defines the concept, provides a cross-national measure, and describes supporting evidence I collected in sub-national locations to ensure the validity of the quantitative index.

The variation I present is important to counter the prevailing conception of weak formal institutions of democracy in Africa, and by extension, the assumption of their irrelevance. This research demonstrates empirically that political parties are operating according to very diverse forms, and that a significant number exhibit high levels of institutionalization. Furthermore, because of similar trajectories of colonialism,

⁵⁰ Both of these works provide an important foundation for measurement of this concept, but do not discuss the potential causes for the observed variation. Mainwaring, S. and T. Scully (1995). Building democratic institutions : party systems in Latin America. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press.
 , Kuenzi, M. and G. Lambright (2001). "Party system institutionalization in 30 African countries." Party Politics 7(4): 437-468.

independence, economic crises, and pressures for democratization, many would expect that political party systems across Africa would have much in common. Instead we find cases like Ghana and Benin, regional neighbors that have developed completely contrary systems of party competition. This chapter establishes the differences in form and functioning of these party systems. An important contribution of this research is to document the fact that one can actually observe the institutionalization of formal party structures in Africa.

Party System Institutionalization: Definition and Measures

Political parties are broadly defined as “any political group that presents at elections.”⁵¹ The term ‘party system’ indicates that parties operate in a competitive, interactive arena. It is necessary to analyze the entire system of parties rather than a single party’s development because the rules and regularities of these competing entities shape their strategies relative to each other in a transactional arena. Parties’ operation according to and in contestation with the formal and informal rules defines their participation in the bounded system.⁵² The level of institutionalization of the system expresses how patterned the interactions are – that is, *the degree of stability or fluidity in repetitive strategic interactions between parties.*

⁵¹Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and party systems : a framework for analysis. Cambridge [Eng.] ; New York, Cambridge University Press. p. 64

⁵² See also Mainwaring, S. (1999). Rethinking party systems in the third wave of democratization : the case of Brazil. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press. p. 23.

Sartori refers to ‘consolidated’ party systems with distinction along the same lines. Sartori, G. (1976). Parties and party systems : a framework for analysis. Cambridge [Eng.] ; New York, Cambridge University Press. p. 244 – 248.

See also Staffan Lindberg for a discussion of institutionalization of party systems and an alternative measurement scale. Lindberg, S. I. (2007). "Institutionalization of party systems? Stability and fluidity among legislative parties in Africa's democracies." Government and Opposition 42(2): 215-241.

Institutions intrinsically equate with increased stability, which is evident from their definition as “sets of constraints on behavior in the form of rules and regulations; a set of procedures to detect deviations from the rules and regulations; and finally, a set of moral, ethical and behavioral norms which define the contours that constrain the way in which the rules and regulations are specified and enforcement carried out”.⁵³ Then institutionalization of the party system is a condition in which multiple political parties exhibit structured interactions; where expectations, orientations and behaviors can be premised on the idea that these practices will “prevail into the foreseeable future”.⁵⁴ According to Huntington, “institutionalization is the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability”.⁵⁵ When party systems have patterned interactions between lasting parties, and expectations and strategies derive from the rules and behaviors, the system is more highly institutionalized.

The systemic quality of multi-party competition means that highly institutionalized party systems exhibit low electoral volatility and important political parties are enduring. Parties represent a known ideology, constituency, and/or position in the political arena. In highly institutionalized party systems, party affiliation of

⁵³ This definition is derived from Douglas North and is cited by Caporaso, J. A. and D. P. Levine (1992). Theories of political economy. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

⁵⁴ See Mainwaring and Scully, where the assumption is that institutionalized or ‘consolidated’ party systems structure the political process to a high degree, whereas more fluid systems do not. Mainwaring, S. and T. Scully (1995). Building democratic institutions : party systems in Latin America. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press. p.4

See also Mainwaring: “An institutionalized party system, then, is one in which actors develop stable expectations and behavior based on the premise that the fundamental contours and rules of party competition and behavior will prevail into the foreseeable future. In such a system, there is stability in who the main parties are and how they behave. Institutionalization does not completely preclude change, but limits it”. Mainwaring, S. (1999). Rethinking party systems in the third wave of democratization : the case of Brazil. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press. p. 25

⁵⁵ Huntington, S. P. and Harvard University. Center for International Affairs. (1968). Political order in changing societies. New Haven,, Yale University Press.

candidates for elected office is very important and party competition shapes electoral fortunes to a significant degree. Membership in a party is relevant to how candidates define themselves, and is a significant tool for electoral competition. The citizenry and political aspirants alike value political party electoral competition as the route to power, and political elites devote resources to building a party organization. Parties also mediate the relationship between constituents and their political representatives. At the other end of the spectrum – for institutionalization is a matter of degree and not a dichotomy – party systems with low institutionalization exhibit great fluidity. They are characterized by high electoral volatility, shifting memberships and party affiliations among political elites as well as their followers, viable independent candidates, personalist appeals rather than party organization, and direct and localized campaigns linking candidates to their constituencies.

Party system institutionalization can be measured across countries according to the criteria established by Mainwaring and Scully, with some slight modifications. In their codification, a democratic party system must meet four conditions to be institutionalized. It must first have “stability in the rules and the nature of inter-party competition”, manifesting regularity.⁵⁶ This is not to say that party competition is frozen, but that inter-party relations have constancy in which parties exist, compete, win votes and endure. Second, “parties must have somewhat stable roots in society, structuring political preferences over time”.⁵⁷ Third, agents must “accord legitimacy to the electoral

⁵⁶ Mainwaring, S. and T. Scully (1995). Building democratic institutions : party systems in Latin America. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press. p. 5

⁵⁷ Ibid.

process and to parties”.⁵⁸ This allows “political elites to base their behavior on the expectation that elections will be the primary route to governing.... Thus, parties are key actors in determining access to power”.⁵⁹ Finally, party organizations must be relatively cohesive, independent from personal ambitions and have well-established structures, intra-party procedures, and resources of their own.⁶⁰

According to this codification, then, the first measurement of the regularity of patterns of party competition uses Pedersen’s index of electoral volatility in presidential and legislative competitions. Electoral volatility identifies the net change in the seat (or vote) shares of all parties from election to election. It is calculated by summing the net changes in the percentage of seats (or votes) won or lost by all of the parties from election to election and dividing by two.⁶¹ The presidential and legislative volatility scores can be averaged together for a mean electoral volatility for a ranking according to the following scale⁶²:

- 10% - 20% = 3.0
- > 20%-30% = 2.5
- > 30%-40% = 2.0
- > 40%-50% = 1.5
- over 50% = 1.0

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.


⁶⁰ The last element, party organization, is not included in the following measurement because of the difficulty of finding a good proxy measurement for this concept for all relevant parties across the set of countries. This element is left to fieldwork, discussed later in this chapter, to determine if it correlates with the other elements of the index of PSI.

⁶¹ Mainwaring, S. and T. Scully (1995). *Building democratic institutions : party systems in Latin America*. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press. p 6

Kuenzi, M. and G. Lambright (2001). "Party system institutionalization in 30 African countries." *Party Politics* 7(4): 437-468. p. 444.

⁶² This scale is a slight amendment from Kuenzi and Lambright 2001. I use 10% increments on the three point scale, as do Mainwaring and Scully and Kuenzi and Lambright, but begin at 10% in order to use the full range of the 5 tier scale to capture the existing variation.

Figure 2.1 PSI Criterion 1 - Distribution in African Democracies:



The second criterion, stable roots in society, can be measured according to a party’s ability to survive, which reflects its maintenance of support in the population. Mainwaring and Scully use several measures of this: 1.) the percentage of lower-chamber seats held by parties founded by 195, for Latin America; 2.) the age of the parties that have received more than 10 percent of the vote in the most recent legislative elections; 3.) and presidential/legislative difference, the “difference between the percentage of votes captured by a party in a presidential election and the percentage of lower chamber seats won by that same party in the corresponding legislative elections.”⁶³

While I maintain presidential/legislative difference, I have modified the remaining two measures to capture *only the dynamics since the transition to multipartism*, for two reasons. The first is because, as I argued in Chapter 1, it is necessary to separate

⁶³ These are criterion identified by Mainwaring and Scully. In their application to measuring the African cases, Kuenzi and Lambright include presidential/legislative difference in criterion 1, regularity of party competition (due to inter-item correlations). I follow Mainwaring and Scully’s conceptualization that presidential/legislative difference taps the linkages between parties and citizens, to the extent that parties must penetrate society deeply in order to mobilize votes beyond a particular candidate (p.9).

theoretically and analytically the nature of democratic party system competition and attachments from authoritarian era relations. The *nature* of citizen-party attachment is voluntaristic in the democratic era, and should not be conflated with earlier coercive strategies to garner affiliation. Secondly, in order to test my argument regarding the legacies of authoritarian power, the measurement of the outcome variable – party system institutionalization – must be completely separate from the dynamics of the prior regime type. Hence, I include measures of party system institutionalization that only reflect the nature of the multiparty system since the democratic transition. Thus, I have changed the first measure of ‘stable roots in society’ to represent the percent of the current lower-chamber seats held by parties that competed in the first multi-party elections following the democratic transition. For the second measure, in order to assess the age of parties in the most recent legislative elections, I calculate the parties’ average as a *percentage of time they have existed since the democratic transition*.⁶⁴ This allows me to measure the stability of the social roots of the party system only in the current democratic regime, which maintains the concept of depth of party attachment, and excludes the length of time the former single party held sway during the authoritarian period. The countries are scored on this indicator as follows:

⁶⁴ Inclusion of the ‘age of parties’ as a measurement in describing the outcome of institutionalization would automatically give greater weight to all countries in which an authoritarian incumbent party maintained itself through the transition and competed in multiparty elections, regardless of its relevance in the current system. This would create potential endogeneity for any historical argument that assessed the nature of the previous regime. This is a problem that plagues Mozaffar and Scarritt’s conclusion that party system institutionalization is determined to a significant degree by the number of years a country has experienced democracy. Bogaards and Lindberg offer a critique based on these issues.


Mozaffar, S. and J. R. Scarritt (2005). "The puzzle of African party systems." *Party Politics* 11(4): 399-421.

Lindberg, S. I. (2007). "Institutionalization of party systems? Stability and fluidity among legislative parties in Africa's democracies." *Government and Opposition* 42(2): 215-241.

Bogaards, M. (2008). "Dominant party systems and electoral volatility in Africa - A comment on Mozaffar and Scarritt." *Party Politics* 14(1): 113-130.

% of currently represented parties competing in first elections:	Presidential/ Legislative Difference	Average age of parties that received at least 5% of the vote in most recent legislative elections (as % of age since democratization):
3.0 = > 80%	3.0 = 0 – 20	3.0 = >90%
2.5 = > 60%- 80%	2.5 = 21 - 40	2.5 = > 80- 90%
2.0 = > 40% -60%	2.0 = 41 - 60	2.0 = > 70 – 80%
1.5 = >20% -40%	1.5 = 61 - 80	1.5 = > 60 – 70%
1.0 = 0% -20%	1.0 = > 80	1.0 = < 60%


Figure 2.2 PSI Criterion 2- Distribution in African Democracies



Criterion three is based on the perception of citizens, organized interests and major political players that parties and elections are the legitimate and normal means of determining who governs. Kuenzi and Lambright measure this criterion for the last two elections of each country based on whether (1) the opposition boycotted the elections; (2) the losers did not accept the results; and (3) whether the elections were deemed irregular (not free and fair) by international observers. I include all past elections since democratization, and I subtract one half point from a possible total of 3 points for each

time that any of these conditions occurred in any election. Furthermore, I have added an additional indicator to this measure: whether an elected government was disrupted by military intervention during its legal tenure. This did not happen in many countries, but where it did I subtract one half point, equal to the other indicators. When opposition forces carry out coups that unseat the democratically government, which must then be re-installed through international mediation, this is a sign that not all forces accept elections and political parties as the route to power, and should be included in the measurement.

Figure 2.3 PSI Criterion 3 - Distribution in African Democracies



The fourth criterion, of solid party organization, is difficult to measure across the full range of cases with existing data. It is necessary to know the party status and the extent to which they are carried out, and the degree of party structure, resources, autonomy, territorial reach, and routinized intra-party procedures. Other factors such as degree of factionalism, personalism and discipline are relevant in this measurement.

However, because there is no existing research on the party organizations comparable


across all of the democratic countries in Africa, this criterion is left out of the aggregate score of party system institutionalization for the full universe of cases. Instead, I will use it as a validity check on the aggregate measure for the four cases in which I carried out research and can assess the extent of party organization.

Given these measures, the 23 democratic countries in Africa can be compared using this metric of party system institutionalization (calculated from democratization through April 2008 elections), as displayed numerically in Table 2.1 and graphically in Figure 2.4.

Table 2.1 Party System Institutionalization Measured in African Democracies

Country	Regularity of Party Competition	Stable Roots in Society	Legitimacy of Party Competition	Party System Institutionalization
Madagascar	1	1	1.5	3.5
Mali	1	1.7	1.5	4.2
Lesotho	1.5	1.3	1.5	4.3
BENIN	1.5	1	2	4.5
Niger	1.5	2.3	1.5	5.3
ZAMBIA	2	1.8	1.5	5.3
Kenya	2	1.5	2	5.5
Mauritius	1.5	1.8	2.5	5.8
Guinea Bissau	1.5	2.5	2	6.0
Sierra Leone	1.5	2.7	2	6.2
Malawi	2.5	1.8	2	6.3
Sao Tome	2	1.8	2.5	6.3
Nigeria	3	2.7	1	6.7
Burkina Faso	2.5	2.3	2	6.8
Gambia	3	2.5	1.5	7.0
SENEGAL	2.5	2.7	2.5	7.7
Mozambique	3	3	2	8.0
Cape Verde	3	2.8	2.5	8.3
GHANA	3	2.8	2.5	8.3
Tanzania	3	2.8	2.5	8.3
Botswana	3	2.8	3	8.8
Namibia	3	2.8	3	8.8
South Africa	3	2.8	3	8.8

Figure 2.4 Party System Institutionalization in African Democracies Composite Measure



Party System Institutionalization in depth in Ghana, Senegal, Zambia and Benin:

Survey Data Measures

Given these broad measures provided above, we would expect that within the four case studies, Ghana and Senegal would consistently provide examples of high party system institutionalization – both across all effective parties in the system and across major regional blocks – and Benin and Zambia would likewise consistently provide indicators of low party system institutionalization. It is important that these measures hold both across the effective parties in the system as well as across sub-national regions,

so that we can effectively speak of “national systems of party competition”.⁶⁵ This does not deny obvious differences in electoral strength of certain parties by region; that is an expected pattern of party-citizen linkages common to countries in the developed as well as developing world. However, we would be interested in testing if there are significant regional differences in *the overarching rules of the game and understanding of party system competition*, which would influence whether we consider the ‘national’ party system as the relevant unit of analysis or whether there are regional patterns that must be explained in determining how the party system operates.

Without regional differences in the party system, the analysis can proceed to exploring systemic properties of each country to explain patterns of party competition and institutionalization (such as historical institutional legacies, electoral institutions, national levels of development and class structure, etc). If, however, there were significant regional variations, then it would suggest that factors unique to each region condition party competition and shape cognitive maps of party relations (affecting both citizens and politicians, which would be evident in both elite and mass survey data). If this is the case, other factors such as ethnic composition, urban/rural demography, and political geography might be at play as alternative hypotheses.

Using both my own survey data of political party members of all major parties in the national party system (those parties represented by at least 5% in the parliament) and Afrobarometer survey data of citizens, I provide further measurements to a). test the validity of the broad measure of party system institutionalization, and b.) test the across-party and across-department variation for significant divergences. We can assume that

⁶⁵ Kitschelt, H. (1999). Post-communist party systems : competition, representation, and inter-party cooperation. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press. Chapter 4

political party office holders are elites that have a different level of information about party competition than citizens, and so can be considered ‘experts’ in many ways.

However, their goal as party agents is to mobilize support among the citizenry, so mass perceptions are also important in assessing the effectiveness of parties as mobilizing agents and their ability to create downward linkages.

My survey research design allows for cross-national and sub-national comparisons by pairing structurally similar constituencies across all four cases. Within each country I selected three sub-national locations based on development and ethnic demographic criteria, in addition to the capital city, for a total of 4 cases within each country and 16 total research sites where I gathered data and interviewed over 260 party representatives. In each country I selected two rural locations, one ethnically heterogeneous, and one very homogeneous, as well as a third location of the major second city in the country in addition to the national capital. Therefore, across the 16 research sites there are paired constituencies that provide sub-national variation in ethnic composition (heterogeneous environment or homogeneous) and economic structure (rural and agrarian versus urban and somewhat industrial). Cross-nationally the cases provide two former British colonies and two former French colonies, which also vary by electoral system. I carried out focus group discussions and elite surveys in each locale, interviewing four members of each party with at least 5% legislative representation in the country, for a total of over 210 interviews.⁶⁶

⁶⁶ I carried out elite surveys in 4 country case studies which varied according to the incumbent ability to control the transition – Senegal and Ghana as cases of strong incumbents, with a high degree of patronage and repression capacity, who initiated a transition agenda and carried it out much as they proposed, ending with their victories in the founding multiparty elections. The variation in the capabilities of the opposition tests the model’s contention that in cases of high authoritarian power, the power and cohesion of the opposition is not a causal factor in shaping the transition – rather the opposition is shaped by the transition dynamics over time. Then Benin and Zambia present cases of weak incumbents who, to various degrees,

Across all of the various tests, two broad patterns emerge. The first finding is that national level assessments are consistent across multiple measures as validity tests for party system institutionalization. All survey responses confirm that Senegal and Ghana are highly institutionalized party systems (with Ghana consistently highest by a slight margin), evidenced by a high degree of coherence amongst party members and citizens alike in perceptions of party system competition. Similarly, Benin's indicators consistently affirm low party system institutionalization, with a lower level of party affiliation overall and a great deal of incoherence in assessments of party system competition. Zambia's indicators also affirm low party system institutionalization, yet show slightly more coherence than Benin's extremely fluid system. This is consistent with the theoretical argument of authoritarian incumbent power assets and opposition bargaining assets, which determine the nature of the democratic transition stage and the resulting structure of the party system. The data for this conclusion are detailed in Section I below.

The second finding is that national assessments of party system competition are upheld across regions and parties. This is examined both by looking at the significance of responses by region, as well as through two-part survey questions that ask respondents to assess the level of importance of political parties at first, the national level, and secondly, the local level. In general the responses were very similar, with Ghana and Zambia perceiving the national level activities of political parties as slightly more influential and Senegal and Benin perceiving the local level activities as being slightly

were displaced and defeated in the transition period. They also vary on the degree of opposition power and cohesion. Finally, the cases provide various comparisons using Mills Method of similarity and difference, on the variables of colonial power and levels of economic development.

more influential – all within .5 of the mean for both questions. This conclusion is discussed in Section II.

I. Importance of Political Parties

To assess the second and third measures of party system institutionalization developed by Mainwaring and Scully – that parties have stable and enduring roots in society, and that party competition and elections are seen as the legitimate route to attaining power – we want to know if parties are indeed *important* to citizens and elites in making their strategic decisions of affiliation. Do people *think* parties are important in influencing voters? Is party activity really central for determining who governs at the local and at the national level? Do citizens have a reason to affiliate with a political party? Are parties organized at the local level such that they are accessible and visible, even between electoral periods? These questions relate to the centrality of political party activity in both citizen and elite strategic calculations for maximizing their proximity to power.

In my survey data of political party representatives at the national and local level in the four cases, as well as in the Afrobarometer citizen survey data, the broad patterns of party system institutionalization reflected in the Index measure above are replicated in these survey data tapping the importance of parties. In the first question (Column A, Table 2.2), respondents rated the ability of political parties to influence the thoughts and positions of voters on a scale of 1-10, with 1 being very little importance or influence and 10 being a vast amount of influence. Countries with higher party system institutionalization would be expected to agree that parties play an important role, both at

the national and local level. This question approximates the idea of stable roots in society, to the extent that parties active in society are actually able to impact the citizenry they are linked to in theory. In the party members' responses, Ghana's parties exhibit the deepest connection, with a mean score of 8.22 whereas Benin's parties have a much lower level of influence at 5.45. Zambia and Senegal fall in the middle. The high standard deviation in Zambia also indicates an internal pattern; members of the ruling party tended to respond higher than those in opposition, reflecting differing perceptions of the party system in a less structured context (see also Figure 2.5).

Table 2.2 Elite Survey Responses on Party System Institutionalization

	To what degree do you think that the activities of political parties at the National Level influence the thoughts and positions of voters?	Do political parties play an important and influential role at the center of the political system?	Are political parties important for determining who will govern in this District?	Do you believe political party competition is legitimate? (National Level)	Do you believe political party competition is legitimate? (Local Level)
Country	A: Influence Voters MEAN (Std Dev)	B: Influence Politics - National	C: Determines Who Governs - Local	D: Legitimate National	D: Legitimate Local
Ghana	8.22 (1.62)	9.14 (1.03)	9.27 (0.99)	8.49 (1.69)	7.51
Senegal	7.33 (2.32)	9.05 (1.55)	8.55 (2.39)	8.91 (2.17)	8.86
Zambia	7.26 (2.68)	8.55 (1.87)	8.41 (2.08)	6.86 (3.05)	6.94
Benin	5.45 (2.17)	7.73 (2.04)	6.55 (2.91)	7.91 (2.18)	7.15


Similarly, survey questions that tap the importance of political parties in the system for determining who governs and who wields power are a useful measure of whether party competition through elections are perceived as the real route to power. The survey questions in Columns B and C gauge perceptions on whether parties are

actually influential in the ultimate struggle for power, phrased as the salient question “who governs”? Column B is a measure of the national level competition, and the primary focus on the central state as the critical level of competition. Column C reports whether parties are also operating in a similar manner at the local level, in the competition for positions within the respondent’s constituency. The same patterns are reflected at both levels of assessment – the national and local level – with party representatives in countries with high party system institutionalization valuing the influence of parties to a greater degree.

The importance of parties in governing is paralleled by direct perceptions of the legitimacy of political party competition. The responses reflect the cross-national patterns displayed in assessments of the importance of parties, with Senegal and Ghana at the high end of legitimacy. One important difference here is that Zambian party members consistently ranked the legitimacy of their party competition as very low – in fact, it is the only category in all the survey responses in which Zambia appears less institutionalized than Benin. This is consistent with the scoring of party system institutionalization applied to all 23 cases, where Zambia’s overall low-end score is quite affected by the low legitimacy indicators (due to election boycotting as well as international and domestic reports that elections did not meet the criteria for ‘free and fair’). The multiple measures of the criterion ‘legitimacy of party competition’ demonstrate the same patterns across a range of data sources, which accurately depict the varying levels of acceptance of party competition as the route to power in different countries. When taken together, the three criterion demonstrate that party system institutionalization is correctly assessed as a multi-dimensional construct, one which

encompasses inter-party competition, depth of party attachment and the legitimacy of party competition and elections (Figure 2.5).⁶⁷

Figure 2.5 Elite Survey Responses on Party System Institutionalization Combined



These patterns of elite perceptions regarding the connection of political parties to the society and their importance in both shaping mass perceptions as well as serving as a useful tool for competition over the state are reflected in citizen perceptions about

⁶⁷ It is also interesting to note that in the comparison of national and local level perceptions of the importance of party systems (Column B and C), only in Ghana did respondents consistently believe parties wielded greater influence at the local level, whereas the remaining three privileged the role of parties at the center. Yet, in Table D, Ghanaians felt party competition at the local level was significantly less legitimate than at the national level. This is a unique legacy of the controlled transition to democracy, which established ‘non-partisan’ elections at the local level prior to multi-party competition, in order to embed the authoritarian party in early electoral competition. The system has struggled with this legacy in the multi-party era, as parties are clearly important in local level politics, but must remain behind the scenes, and thus party competition is perceived as ‘illegitimate’ or obscured.

affiliating with a political party. In countries that are more highly institutionalized, where elites respond that parties are indeed the route to wielding power, we would expect that party membership has more to offer citizens and, therefore, we would see higher levels of affiliation. In addition to my survey measures of political party members, we can compare mass perceptions of political parties cross-nationally and sub-nationally collected by the Afrobarometer. There are interesting cross-national patterns that reflect the level of party system institutionalization. Citizens in Ghana, followed by Senegal and then Zambia are likely to affiliate with or feel close to a political party. In Benin, the pattern is exactly the opposite of the high level of affiliation in Ghana, where only 33% of Beninois claim that they feel close to a party (Table 2.3). Across all countries, the overwhelming majority who responded that they did indeed feel close to a party were then able to name a party they affiliate with in a second level question. Less than 2% did not choose a party name once they claimed an affiliation.

Table 2.3: Citizen Party Affiliation

Question: Do you feel close to a political party?

Country	No (not close)	Yes (feel close)
Ghana	34%	66%
Senegal	45%	53%
Zambia	47%	52%
Benin	66%	33%

Source: Afrobarometer Round 3

II. National Level Patterns

The measures of variation in party system institutionalization are valid across the range of national and local level responses of the elite survey data. To determine if differences by department (and thus, by social demographic variations) represent significant patterns that do not reflect national level results, I conducted an analysis of variance for the means of all responses to compare the response for the national level to each department of the elite survey responses. In all assessments, the t-test failed to reject the null: the mean of the department responses did not vary in any significant way from the national average. In all questions tapping assessments of the importance of parties, sorting survey responses by department reveals no significant variation.⁶⁸ While we must be cautious about interpreting these results because of the small number of observations, an analysis of variance is important to validate this project's focus on 'national' party systems rather than regional level characteristics. Differences in national means *are* significant (at the .05 level), whereas sub-national variation is not.

It is apparent, furthermore, that country level variations of public opinion data are statistically significant, whereas (sub-state) regional level differences are not apparent. The cross-national citizen survey data on interest in public affairs, presidential approval and confidence in opposition are all examples of parallel trends in significant country-level variation and a lack of regional divergence. Within these mass national patterns, the difference between 'urban' residents and 'rural' residents in their level of interest in public affairs was not statistically significant for any country. Further testing to assess if any of the districts where I carried out local level interviews with party members for the

⁶⁸ The same pattern was true by party affiliation – no party identity was significantly different from the national mean.

elite surveys also showed that only one of the 16 districts that I had selected had significant local patterns of divergence.⁶⁹ Obviously, survey responses on these topics reflect a range of factors but the parallel findings across each country and between national elites and the mass citizenry support the conclusion that the political party systems are operating within each country in a similar manner across the national territory.

Perception of Local and National Level Influences

Two sections of the elite survey data are also useful to assess the variance between perceptions of local level activities of parties and the national level. In the first set of questions, respondents were asked a two-step question – to first assess the degree to which activities of political parties influence the thoughts and positions of voters at the national level. They were then asked to indicate the influence of parties at the local level. This provides two separate questions to compare the influence of parties at these levels, where the mean of the national level question is not merely an aggregate of the department level responses. As discussed above in Table 2.2 Column A, the mean responses for the national level follow the patterns we would expect ranging from ‘high’ party influence in Ghana and Senegal, to mid and low levels in Zambia and Benin, respectively (also shown in Table 2.4 as ‘National Mean’). Party representatives responded with similar patterns *across each district*, when asked whether parties are influential to voters’ perceptions at the local level (Table 2.4).

⁶⁹ This district, Mumbwa in Zambia, had a significantly lower level of interest than the national score. However, there is no theoretical reason for this to be the case, given that the other districts with the same characteristics in the remaining 3 countries were not significant as well.

Table 2.4 Influence of Parties on Voters at the Local Level?

Question: To what degree do you think that the activities of political parties IN THIS DISTRICT influence the thoughts and positions of voters here? (1 = very little/ minimal influence; 10 = a great deal/ maximum amount of influence)

COUNTRY	DISTRICT	MEAN	Std Dev	Dispersion
SENEGAL				
(Compare to National Level Influence: Mean 7.33)				
	Senegal – Average of Local Level Influence	7.5	2.85	7
	Podor	7.2	3.05	5
	Tambakounda	7.9	2.64	2.5
	Ziguinchor	7.6	2.92	5
GHANA				
(Compare to National Level Influence: Mean 8.22)				
	Ghana – Average of Local Level Influence	8.3	2.32	4
	Tamale	8.4	2.2	3
	Takoradi	8.6	1.77	3
	Koforidua	8.0	2.56	4.5
ZAMBIA				
(Compare to National Level Influence: Mean 7.26)				
	Zambia - Average of Local Level Influence	7	2.28	5
	Kitwe	6.3	3.24	4.5
	Mumbwa	6.1	3.36	7
	Nyimba	8.1	1.75	3
BENIN				
(Compare to National Level Influence: Mean 5.45)				
	Benin – Average of Local Level Influence	6.0	2.73	4
	Kandi	6.5	2.48	3
	Parakou	5.3	3.16	5.5
	Coffou	6.1	2.96	4

An additional set of survey questions provides a similar test, regarding the importance of parties for determining who wields power. The survey first asks respondents whether parties play an important and influential role at the center of the political system on the scale of 1-10 to tap the national level importance (Table 2.2 Column B and Table 2.5 ‘National Mean’). A second question asks respondents whether

political parties are important in determining who governs in their district. This response, sorted by department, shows patterns across the regions that approximate the national level perceptions (Table 2.5).⁷⁰

Table 2.5 Importance of Parties in Determining Who Governs at the Local Level?

Are political parties important for determining who will govern in this District? (1 = very little/ minimal influence; 10 = a great deal/ maximum amount of influence)

COUNTRY	DISTRICT	MEAN	Std Dev	Dispersion
SENEGAL (compare to National mean: 9.05)	Podor	7.23	3.47	6
	Tambacounda	9.08	1.78	1.5
	Ziguinchor	9.19	1.22	2
GHANA (compare to National mean: 9.14)	Tamale	9.13	0.99	2
	Takoradi	9.63	0.74	0.5
	Koforidua	9.5	0.76	1
ZAMBIA (compare to National mean: 8.55)	Kitwe	7.88	2.09	4.5
	Mumbwa	7.69	2.81	3
	Nyimba	9	1.47	2
BENIN (compare to National mean: 7.73)	Kandi	6.53	2.82	6
	Parakou	6.2	3.32	5.5
	Coffou	6.3	3.37	6.5

These comparisons between the national and local level perceptions of party system influence and importance demonstrate in multiple combinations that elite party representatives view the system in the same way at all levels of competition and across the national territory.

⁷⁰ Two districts listed here seem to indicate a significant divergence from the national pattern – Podor in Senegal and Nyimba in Zambia. Even in these two cases, however, the t-test to analyze the significance of variance indicated no significantly different pattern in these two locations – the alternative hypothesis of the district mean was not significant at the .05 confidence level.

III. Citizen Support for Political Parties and Democracy

The Afrobarometer data on citizen level of support for democracy indicates that citizens in the four case study countries are consistently in favor of electoral democracy as the method of choosing leaders, averaging above 90% for all countries (Table 2.6). Similarly, over 50% of respondents in the four countries found that “many political parties are needed” (Table 2.7). The responses are very similar across countries, with similar percentages of citizens in countries with high and low party system institutionalization indicating their support for elections and multi-party democracy.

The cross-national patterns of the citizen level survey data belie two important points. First, regardless of the level of institutionalization of the party system, parties continue to play an important role in the polity and are critical elements in the ultimate competition for power and access to the state. Secondly, given the great deal of variation that we see in party systems at the national level, the equivalent levels of support that we see cross-nationally from the citizen perspectives suggests that citizens respond to what the party system has to offer. The variations in the percentage of the citizenry that affiliates with a party are more reflective of the level of institutionalization of the party system than characteristic of society’s broader view of democracy and party competition. All four countries espouse very similar levels of support for choosing leaders through elections, and for a multiparty system, but yet show different propensities to affiliate with a political party and maintain an enduring party identity. Slightly higher levels of support for multiparty competition are evident in Ghana and Benin, countries that both

experienced violence and repression under military rule, whereas the single party authoritarian regimes in Senegal and Zambia were less malevolent.

Table 2.6 Citizen Support for Democracy (Elections)

Country	We should choose leaders through elections [% Agree VERY Strongly] [% Agree]	OR:	We should choose leaders through other methods [% Agree] [% Agree VERY Strongly]
SENEGAL	88.33 [44.08] [44.25]		8.08 [5.58] [2.5]
GHANA	90.14 [56.56] [33.58]		8.02 [4.34] [3.68]
ZAMBIA	86.84 [54.92] [31.92]		11.91 [7.08] [4.83]
BENIN	94.15 [89.73] [4.42]		4.34 [1.75] [2.59]
Total	89.86 [61.31] [28.55]		8.09 [4.69] [3.40]

Table 2.7 Citizen Support for Democracy (Political Parties)

Country	Political Parties are Divisive [% Agree VERY Strongly] [% Agree]	OR:	Many Political Parties are Needed [% Agree] [% Agree VERY Strongly]
SENEGAL	38.03 [14.83] [23.2]		54.5 [33.92] [20.58]
GHANA	26.74 [15.04] [11.7]		68.84 [32.5] [36.34]
ZAMBIA	31.87 [13.17] [18.7]		63.25 [32.25] [31]
BENIN	27.97 [18.7] [9.27]		65.11 [25.88] [39.23]
Total	31.13 [15.43] [15.7]		62.92 [31.14] [31.78]

Source: Afrobarometer Round 3

From this survey data it is apparent that there is broad support for multiparty elections across the board, at all levels of party system institutionalization. Voter turnout and survey data reporting of electoral participation also do not correspond with party system institutionalization. In the latest voter turnout statistics, Benin and Ghana were extremely high at 81.7% and 85% of registered voters, respectively. Zambia's turnout in recent presidential and legislative elections was 70.8% and Senegal reported only 62.2% turnout. These nationally recorded statistics are consistent with the citizen survey data, which records 89% of respondents as having voted in Benin, 87% in Ghana, 60% in Zambia and 65% in Senegal.

The majority of citizens who reported not voting said they did so because they were not registered – up to 35% and 31% of respondents in Zambia and Senegal,

respectively. While political party representatives surveyed in all four countries claimed that a central role of political party activity was to mobilize their supporters, get their potential voters registered, and get them to the polls on voting day, it is clear that in Zambia and Senegal each party faces challenges to ensure that these tasks are fulfilled. In part, this could be because of the larger size of these two countries, or differential strategies of the incumbent to try to maintain their position by disenfranchising potential opposition votes through electoral registration list manipulations. However, across the four countries, all parties, regardless of their type (incumbent party, opposition, etc) were equally able to get their supporters to the polls.

The higher number of unregistered voters in Senegal and Zambia corresponded with a large drop in voting for candidates who are not affiliated with any political party. This could be evidence that political parties are fulfilling their central roles of registering and mobilizing their supporters in the areas that they can access (Table 2.8). In Benin and Ghana, 88 and 86% of people not affiliated with political parties voted in the last election, whereas only 55 and 44% of non-affiliated respondents voted in Senegal and Zambia, respectively. In a similar measure, *all types* of party affiliation have a significant correlation with higher levels of interest in politics (as compared to those who are unaffiliated, who have significantly lower levels of interest).⁷¹ So whether a citizen affiliates with the incumbent party, an opposition party or a major 3rd party, the relationship between interested citizens and parties increases a shared understanding of multiparty competition and acceptance of the same rules of the game.

⁷¹ A few parties in the study (3) are individually not significantly different from the country mean, but these do not present any pattern cross-nationally in party type.

Table 2.8 Voting Participation by Party Affiliation

Did you vote in the last election? (By Party)

Party Affiliation Type:

Country:	Incumbent	Major Oppos	3rd Party	Not affiliated
Senegal	72%	80%	81%	55%
Ghana	88%	86%	90%	86%
Benin	90%	89%	88%	88%
Zambia	73%	79%	72%	44%

Source: Afrobarometer Round 3

Furthermore, citizens across the four countries are highly coherent in their choices about party affiliation and voting patterns. In approximating citizen measures of coherence in party affiliation, cross-tabulation shows high correlation between party affiliation of survey respondents and their 1.) confidence in the ruling party; 2.) confidence in the opposition parties; 3.) approval of presidential performance. High coherence is indicated by those who affiliate with opposition parties giving lower approval ratings of presidential performance and lower confidence in the ruling party as well as higher confidence in the opposition parties and vice versa. After giving each country an ‘anchor point’ of their relative satisfaction with all of the parties and presidential performance, they vary by category to a similar extent. This suggests a high awareness on the part of the average citizen of the dynamics of their national party system, and an accordance with their positions.

The more highly institutionalized party systems, however, correlate with greater *overall* levels of confidence in the ruling party *and* opposition parties (Table 2.9). This

does *not* transfer into higher approval of presidential performance, necessarily. This suggests that the greater stability, organization and rootedness of the political parties in Ghana and Senegal create the foundation for higher levels of overall confidence *in political parties*, even among citizens who do not affiliate with that party.

Table 2.9: Cross-Tabulation of Party Affiliation and Confidence Assessments

% having confidence in the Ruling Party (a lot and somewhat)

	Major Opposition Party(ies)	Governing Party	3rd Party(ies)	Unaffiliated
SENEGAL	40	80	49	45
GHANA	44	86	58	58
ZAMBIA	16	56	22	32
BENIN	23	52	27	35

% having confidence in the Opposition Parties (a lot and somewhat)

	Major Opposition Party(ies)	Governing Party	3rd Party(ies)	Unaffiliated
SENEGAL	61	49	65	42
GHANA	68	45	56	49
ZAMBIA	41	34	54	29
BENIN	51	30	27	25

% approving of Presidential performance (a lot and somewhat)

	Major Opposition Party(ies)	Governing Party	3rd Party(ies)	Unaffiliated
SENEGAL	38	87	51	59
GHANA	47	91	62	76
ZAMBIA	23	70	27	40
BENIN	46	81	55	65

Source: Afrobarometer Round 3

At the mass level, the patterns reflected cross-nationally parallel the elite assessments, reflecting citizen choices and action vis-à-vis the party system. In the more highly institutionalized systems in Ghana and Senegal, a greater overall percentage of the

population affiliate with a political party, and even those who are unaffiliated know who they would vote for if elections were near. Citizen responses in assessing whom they would vote for if the elections were tomorrow signal the degree of uncertainty in the system. In the less institutionalized systems of Zambia and Benin, a greater number of all survey respondents were unsure of who they would vote for. Even more surprising is that in Benin, even among citizens who voted in the last election, 50% still were not sure of whom they would vote for in the future. This signals a clear fluidity of parties, a lack of party affiliation, and an overall uncertainty in the political system. Furthermore, while incumbent parties have an advantage in all countries, as the majority of unaffiliated voters would likely vote for the incumbent, the governing parties in highly institutionalized countries are stronger in pulling in the undecided voters. This is true despite the cross-national variation reported above in the ‘unaffiliated’ appraisals of the performance of the governing party and the President as well as the opposition parties in general (Table 2.10).⁷²

Table 2.10: Citizen Party Affiliation and Voting Reliability

	Ghana	Senegal	Zambia	Benin
% of survey that don't affiliate with a party	34	45	47	66
% unaffiliated that would vote majority for incumbent party	31	32	15	16
% unaffiliated that don't know who they would vote for (if elections were tomorrow)	55	51	61	62
% survey that don't know who they would vote for if elections were tomorrow	22	29	32	50
% of survey that voted in the last elections yet don't know who they would vote for if elections were tomorrow	22	26	23	50

⁷² Interesting to note is that Zambia's parties have a great capacity to get their ‘affiliated’ members to the polls, and to ensure that those supporters do, indeed, vote for the specified party.

Overall, these patterns reflect the national party system within which citizens can choose party affiliations. Choices of party affiliation are indicative of the degree of endurance of parties in the system, whether it is wise for an individual to remain neutral and treat each election as an independent event, or whether it is preferable to affiliate with a party organization that can provide a more lasting and interactive relation. Various levels of party system institutionalization offer different choices to the national constituency, and parties provide differing levels of organizational, mobilizational, social and material benefits to their followers. In this way, party systems have dramatic impacts on the ways in which citizens participate in the democratic game.

Conclusion

The elite survey data indicates that there are significant differences by country in how political party officials perceive their party systems. Senegalese and Ghanaian political party representatives agreed on the importance of political parties at both the national and local levels and their legitimacy. Benin represents the lowest end of party system institutionalization, where political parties are fluid and, therefore, have less influence on voters and the political system. Zambia falls in the middle but remains on the low end, with party representatives assessing the system as slightly more influential than in Benin, but ranking the legitimacy of parties as lower. Thus, there are distinct patterns among the elite responses. These patterns are reflected in citizen level data, with high overall levels of support for democracy and multiparty politics, but varying degrees of confidence in political parties according to the level of institutionalization of the party system.

The multiple sources of data presented here support the claim of significant variation in party system institutionalization across African democracies. Furthermore, the analysis of sub-national data does not suggest statistically significant differences by region and demographic, which increases our confidence in examining the nature of the party system according to national level characteristics.

Chapter Three

Historical Legacies, Economic Conditions and Ethnic Demography: Competing Explanations

“Because of Man’s imperfection, the state is somewhat authoritarian in nature...”

Zambian President Kenneth Kaunda 1974

Leading scholars of African politics have focused on the importance of prior domestic political institutions to explain patterns of state weakness (Young 1994) and the consolidation of democracy (Bratton and Van de Walle 1997). Other scholars have emphasized the significance of levels and patterns of economic development as a central determinant of democratic institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). Another set of literature has focused on the role of ethnic calculations in competitive electoral politics (Chandra 2004; Posner 2005; Wilkinson 2006). This chapter provides comparative-historical evidence suggesting that the types of wide variation in party system institutionalization detailed in the prior chapter cannot be explained by these factors. In comparing and contrasting the development of state institutions in Ghana, Senegal, Zambia and Benin, I demonstrate that the historical patterns of regime type and the associated domestic institutions for military and single party authoritarian rule do not explain either the degree of authoritarian power or the variations in the contemporary

multiparty system. Furthermore, I show that the democratizing forces, economic crises and ethnic demography do not influence the form of party system that has emerged in the democratic era.

Considering these historical, economic and social legacies provides the context to interpret the following empirical analysis in chapters 4, 5 and 6, as well as rule out alternative historical explanations. Here I consider these rival explanations in depth in Ghana, Senegal, Zambia and Benin and employ the economic and demographic data of all African democracies to demonstrate that these factors do not shape party system institutionalization.

Domestic Institutions

Historical Legacies


The first section presents an historical analytic comparison of Ghana, Senegal, Zambia and Benin to show that party system institutionalization was not simply pre-ordained according to prior domestic institutions. I assess the importance of colonial legacies, post-independence stability versus instability, and single party or military rule in relation to the ultimate question of party system institutionalization as well as the explanatory variable of authoritarian power on the eve of the democratic transition.

The matched pairs presented in Figure 3.1 demonstrate these arguments by showing two pairs with similar historical trajectories and extreme variation in the outcome. Ghana and Benin share a very similar history throughout the pre-democratic era. They both experienced extreme political instability following independence, with frequent alternations between military regimes and civilian governments. The countries

then both experienced stability under authoritarian rule for over a decade via ‘revolutionary’ military regimes. Facing cumulative pressures for political liberalization, the incumbents in Ghana and Benin had extremely different accumulated assets at the ready to help them shape the democratization process in their favor. Ghana’s highly institutionalized party system reflects the strong position of the incumbent on the eve of the transition, whereas Benin’s low party system institutionalization formed in the wake of the complete implosion of the feeble ruling party.

Senegal and Zambia present an alternative history. Both countries were hallmark cases of stable single party rule. The parties that were initially victorious in pre-independence elections were able to consolidate their rule, ultimately by installing authoritarian single party systems. While both incumbent parties reigned for decades, the pressures of democratization found them unequally equipped to oversee the transition process. Senegal’s ruling party maintained its strong position throughout the democratization process. Zambia’s ruling party was enfeebled and forced to react to changes it could not control. The incumbent’s varying capabilities to control the democratization process in their favor shaped the foundations for the extreme variation in party system institutionalization.

Figure 3.1: Parallel Historical Legacies and Varying Outcomes



All four cases also share some historical similarities, which cannot explain the divergent outcomes. In the run-up to independence, the nationalist movements of the four countries were fairly similar. Prospects of electoral competition shattered unified anti-colonial sentiment. Following divergent post-independence experiences, all four countries transitioned to stable authoritarian rule. Differences between military and single party systems at the outset were replaced by remarkable similarities in the extreme concentration and personalization of power around the executive. Furthermore, all four incumbents attempted to use mass parties to manage rural mobilization and elite incorporation (although the parties were obviously constructed at varying points in relation to the incumbent’s reign). Finally, the four countries transitioned to democracy

according to broadly similar domestic political, socio-economic, and international pressures. (See summary in Table 3.1).

Table 3.1: Country Summary of Historical Periods

PERIOD	Rival Hypoth. Predictions	GHANA (High PSI)	SENEGAL (High PSI)	ZAMBIA (Low PSI)	BENIN (Low PSI)	Data Supports?
Colonial Power	Colonial power → +/- PSI	British	French	British	French	No
Nationalist Period & Independence	History of electoral participation → High PSI	Tight & divisive competition for pre-independence elections	Tight & divisive competition for pre-independence elections	Tight & divisive competition for pre-independence elections	Tight & divisive competition for pre-independence elections	No
Post-colonial state formation	Instability → Low PSI Stability → High PSI	Extreme <i>instability</i> , civilian and military rule alternate	<i>Stable</i> multiparty competition driven by hegemonic party	<i>Stable</i> multiparty competition driven by hegemonic party	Ethno-regional tri-partite rivalry, extreme <i>instability</i> , civilian and military rule alternate	No
Authoritarian Regime consolidation	Military → Low PSI Single Party → High PSI	Revolutionary <i>Military</i> regime establishes control 1981 - 1992	<i>Single party state</i> as response to internal fragmentation and external opposition	<i>Single party state</i> as response to internal fragmentation and external opposition	Revolutionary <i>military</i> regime establishes control 1972 - 1990	No

The empirical trends in these four cases run against the expectations suggested by rival hypotheses. Scholarly work on colonial influence has suggested that British legacies of administrative transfer were more beneficial to building formal institutions (Lipset 1959). Africa-specific studies suggested that French colonialism actually established a longer and broader history of elections and electoral participation, which provided a greater opportunity to consolidate power through the development of an

electoral base and through the merger of major parties (Collier 1982). Both of these interpretations would predict more stability and more robust formal institutions as legacies of a particular colonial power.

Recent scholarship on colonial legacies argues that empires carried out different colonizing projects across their territories, creating varying but predictable legacies within the same colonial power (Wilkinson 2008).⁷³ While this logic certainly resonates in cross-regional studies, the generalized problem empires faced in projecting power across vast territories in Africa led to particular forms of delegating authority in order to minimize costs in these peripheral zones (Herbst 2000). Regardless of variations in colonial practices within each country, the similar calculations of extraction, and similar timing, tools and ideology across the African colonizing project left a pattern of violent rule and minimal institutional transfer across the continent (Young 1994).⁷⁴ While there were certainly differences in the British colonies of Ghana and Zambia (given a white

⁷³ Assuming that colonial powers impacted their colonies in particular ways according to the goals, strategies and capacity of the metropole. Various colonizers were active at different periods and thus had different tools and ideologies at their disposal to enforce their will, as the late colonization in Africa and Korea was seen to be particularly brutal and extractive with the advent of modern weapons of coercion. Young, C. (1994). The African colonial state in comparative perspective. New Haven, Yale University Press.

Diamond, J. M. (1997). Guns, germs, and steel : the fates of human societies. New York, W.W. Norton & Co.

Kohli, A. (2004). State-directed development : political power and industrialization in the global periphery. Cambridge, UK ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

Finally, because colonial powers had dissimilar goals and strategies across their territories, we must also consider the specific institutional and social legacies that were transferred unevenly, with the recognition that the metropole's rule is not a constant influence across continents. Wilkinson 2008 in particular has a focus on the length of pre-independence electoral experience; education and human capital formation for indigenization of administration; and ethnic imbalances and inequality between groups – economic, administrative and military. Wilkinson, S. (2008). How Colonial Legacies of Party Competition Affect Post-Independence Levels of Democracy. American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. Boston, MA.

⁷⁴ The exception being, of course, settler colonies, which had a much greater colonial presence followed by uniquely difficult struggles for independence. Bratton, M. and N. Van de Walle (1997). Democratic experiments in Africa : regime transitions in comparative perspective. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, NY, USA, Cambridge University Press.

settler population in Zambia and involvement in the regional struggle for independence) and in the French colonies of Senegal and Benin (given the longer history of electoral engagement in Senegal's *quatre communes* as the capital of French West Africa), the legacies of colonialism and independence shaped a nationalist movement followed by fragmentation and a patronage mode of operation that eclipsed the state in all four countries. The similarities of the African colonial experience and the post-colonial state consolidation challenges overshadow the importance of colonial power. Data from both the four country case studies as well as the all-Africa democracy data set also do not suggest a relationship between colonial power and the level of party system institutionalization in the contemporary period (see Table 3.2).

Independence and State Formation

As independence across Africa became a likelihood and political participation was expanded and became the obvious route to inheriting power, previously unified anti-colonial mass movements were threatened by internal fragmentation and external challenges.⁷⁵ Pre-independence elections required internal competition and the competition for power began to take precedence and shape new identities.⁷⁶ Following independence the new nationalists struggled to consolidate their power after inheriting it from the colonial masters. The logic of hegemonic force was one pillar of consolidating

⁷⁵ Zolberg, A. R. (1966). *Creating political order; the party-states of West Africa*. Chicago,, Rand McNally.


⁷⁶ Collier, R. B. (1982). *Regimes in Tropical Africa : changing forms of supremacy, 1945-1975*. Berkeley, University of California Press.

Posner, D. N. (2005). *Institutions and ethnic politics in Africa*. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

rule.⁷⁷ Neo- patrimonialism provided the second pillar upon which the nascent governments attempted to construct their position.⁷⁸ Patrimonial rule was based on a complex and shifting blend of personalized, centralized and charismatic authority. This was largely the case in Ghana, Senegal, Benin and Zambia. These shared conditions were the foundation from which various regimes struggled to stabilize their rule.

In Ghana and Benin, the decades following independence were marked by incredible political instability. Political regimes in Ghana cycled between civilian and military rapidly:

Figure 3.2 Ghana and Benin: Parallel Domestic Institutional Trajectories With Divergent Outcomes




⁷⁷ Young, C. (1994). The African colonial state in comparative perspective. New Haven, Yale University Press.

⁷⁸ Callaghy, T. (1987). The state as lame levitation: the patrimonial administrative state in Africa. The African state in transition. Z. Ergas. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire, Macmillan: xviii, 340 p.

BENIN: LOW Party System Institutionalization

Nationalist movement → Post-colonial State → Authoritarian Regime → Democratization & Multipartyism

POLITICAL INSTABILITY **CONSOLIDATION STABLE MILITARY RULE**



Among the civilian governments, which were consistently installed as democracies, practices tended to denigrate to restricted practice and authoritarianism until they were replaced through force. Military leaders claimed they were intervening out of necessity to “liberate” the population from the President who could no longer be removed through constitutional means (General Ankrah’s justification in the Feb 24 1966 removal of Nkrumah), or economic salvation (General Acheampong in January 13 1972), or restoring democratic rule and holding senior military leaders accountable (Rawlings in the June 4 1979 “Revolution”), or ending the arbitrary and unjust rule of a civilian government in order to transform the social and economic order through revolution, bringing popular participation, economic and social justice (Rawlings in the Dec 31 1981 “Revolution”).⁷⁹ These patterns of political instability, particularly in the inability of the

⁷⁹ Oquaye, M. (1980). *Politics in Ghana, 1972-1979*. Christiansborg, Accra, Tornado Publications.
 Oquaye, M. (2004). *Politics in Ghana, 1982-1992 : Rawlings, revolution, and populist democracy*. Osu, Accra, Ghana, Tornado Publications.

country to sustain multiparty competition, did not provide the foundations for what is now one of the most institutionalized party systems following the third wave of democratization.

In Benin the early years were also marked by a cycle of civilian governments and military incursions.⁸⁰ The tri-partite competition between three ethno-regional bloc leaders often led to deadlock and government paralysis, a fact which military leaders used to justify their interventions.⁸¹ In addition to the frustration caused by the blockages and stalemate caused by the nefarious three-way competition for power, another force of instability was at work. After a decade of instability and intra-elite struggle to monopolize power, generational rivalries arose as the newly educated found their route to converting cultural capital into power blocked.⁸² This hegemonic crisis laid the groundwork for yet another military coup.

Benin's instability throughout the 1960's ended in parallel fashion to Ghana's – via a military regime with a revolutionary discourse that was able to consolidate power and eliminate threats to their rule. In both countries the leftist military regimes created over time political parties to run the state and to incorporate the masses, and to serve as a justification for their rule. Benin and Ghana followed a very similar political trajectory –

⁸⁰ Méthinhoué, P. G. (2005). Les gouvernements du Dahomey et du Bénin : mai 1957 - février 2005. Porto-Novo, Centre National de Production de Manuels Scolaires.

⁸¹ The contending factions supported Hubert Maga, Sourou Apithy and Justin Ahomadegbe, who were the 3 regional leaders of the country, alternating in successive rotation.

⁸² Junior Officer Kerekou's coup ended the tripartite competition of the past system characterized by ethno-regional division, institutionalized clientelism and structural instability, and "transhumance politique" (frequent shifting of alliances and floor crossing), and increasing domination of political life by educated elites from the South to the detriment of the monarchy and merchants. Beyond the ethno-regional division, it was the hegemonic crisis of the next generation of educated elites that were blocked from accession to power that brought an end to the previous system of competition. The coup was led by a junior military officer, which indicates that the new regime was generationally aligned with this struggle. Banegas, R. (2003). La démocratie à pas de caméléon : transition et imaginaires politiques au Bénin. Paris, Karthala.

the instability of the early post-colonial years followed by a revolutionary military government that was able to impose its own continuity and profoundly shaped political identities and encouraged grassroots participation, organization and mobilization through the single party penetrating citizen life. These similar political pathways remind us that it is not the legacy of early instability nor the reach of authoritarian political parties nor the nature of a revolutionary military regime that can explain the divergent democratic party systems established in Ghana and Benin during and following the transition to multipartism.

Zambia and Senegal present the opposite picture, as hallmarks of stability on the continent from independence throughout the authoritarian period. Both are cases of a founding “father” and founding party. Presidents Kenneth Kaunda and Leopold Senghor were leaders in the anti-colonial movements, were elected president at independence and their parties – UNIP and PS - remained in power leading up to the democratic transition.⁸³ Both cycled through various attempts to consolidate their rule. In classic single party system trajectories, these parties had slight advantages in the nationalist era competition and used their initially marginal victories to solidify their position. They attempted to build mass parties, incorporated potential opposition into their fold, and eventually deconstructed democracy as they initiated single party systems to consolidate their authoritarian rule.⁸⁴


⁸³ Kenneth Kaunda remained the leader of UNIP through the democratic transition in Zambia; Leopold Senghor was the first African president to voluntarily step down, appointing his successor Abdou Diouf to lead the *Parti Socialiste*.

⁸⁴ Zolberg, A. R. (1966). Creating political order: the party-states of West Africa. Chicago,, Rand McNally.

Figure 3.3 Zambia and Senegal: Parallel Domestic Institutional Trajectories with Divergent Outcomes


ZAMBIA: LOW Party System Institutionalization

Nationalist movement & Independence → Post-colonial State Formation → Authoritarian Regime Consolidation → Democratization & Multipartyism



SENEGAL: HIGH Party System Institutionalization

Nationalist movement & Independence → Post-colonial State Formation → Authoritarian Regime Consolidation → Democratization & Multipartyism



Both of the incumbent parties in Senegal and Zambia – the *Parti Socialiste* (PS) and the United National Independence Party (UNIP), respectively - worked to set up the party apparatus across the national territory and foster membership and connection to the party among the country’s inhabitants. Kaunda stated that UNIP’s goal was to create “One Zambia, one nation”, making it the country’s official motto, with the dual aim to

⁸⁵ PDS was officially recognized August 8, 1974; the founding elections (of limited multipartism) were held in 1978.

⁸⁶ Abdou Diouf became President as Senghor’s constitutionally appointed successor on January 1, 1981.

lessen the political salience of heterogeneous ethnic identities and build a political identity among all citizens that was loyal to both country and party, in efforts to reify their following. In both countries, the party was constructed in order to consolidate power and ensure support, through organization of the rural population, patronage distribution, and prominent links with state administration. The construction of the single party state followed.⁸⁷ In Senegal, the overlap between party and state was noted to support the concentration of authority: “The organization of the state by the PS corresponds to Senghor’s vision of centralized power”.⁸⁸ While Senegal and Zambia had historically similar trajectories and served as prime examples of the stable single party state, the divergent multiparty systems following the third wave of democratization highlights that these legacies do not dictate the nature of the new political institutions.

Authoritarian Regimes and the Party-State Model

In significant ways, the military authoritarian regimes of Ghana and Benin resembled each other, particularly in the establishment of a revolutionary party to carry out the transformation the military had initiated. Furthermore, the military authoritarians significantly resembled the single party regimes of Zambia and Senegal as they created parties to rule. All four regimes were highly personalistic, and as a result fairly

⁸⁷ The battle against opposition parties was originally waged through a game of fusions and interdictions, which were ultimately unsuccessful in precluding challenges to the incumbent party. The tactic then changed to imposing the legal impossibility of opposing the government. The authoritarianism that emerged during this period prohibited the development of autonomous power. The army played an important role to support the ruling party through their ‘political pacification’ campaign in Senegal. The army was transformed into an organization of management of domestic relations, with the permanent tasks of maintaining order and mediating conflicts. Diop, M. C. (1992). *Sénégal : trajectoires d'un Etat*. Dakar, Sénégal. Paris, CODESRIA ; Diffusion, Karthala. p. 17

⁸⁸ Zuccarelli, F. (1970). *Un parti politique africain: l'Union progressiste sénégalaise*. Paris,, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence.

uninstitutionalized with rule centered around the extensive – almost unlimited - powers of the President.⁸⁹ All four party-states succeeded in achieving the party's supremacy over the state and the penetration of the party into requisites of citizens' daily life. The difference between forms of authoritarian parties does not predict the variations in party systems in the democratic era as all four parties were of the party-state model, organized and implanted at the local level to a similar extent. Neither does the variation in military versus civilian rule, with Senegal and Zambia serving as typical examples of single party regimes and yet with extremely divergent types of party systems in the democratic period. And Ghana and Benin were hallmarks of military regimes, and yet their contemporary party systems exhibit polar differences.

Beneath the similarities in military and single party regime structures were drastically different levels of capacity – from a lame leviathan pushing party membership in return for rewards (Benin and Zambia) to a strong and effective party-state that was capable of manipulating, repressing, incorporating and distributing in order to maintain its position and implement its agenda (Senegal and Ghana). The form of authoritarian regime and party-state model did not leave an imprint on the following democratic system. Rather, the legacies of social incorporation during the authoritarian period and on the eve of democratization created usable power that was effective in the democratic transition to shape the nature of the democratic system, as each regime faced the ultimate challenge of adaptation or extinction.

⁸⁹ See, for example, Geddes's coding of African regimes as personalistic rather than single-party or military. Geddes, B. (1999). "What do we know about democratization after twenty years?" Annual Review of Political Science 2: 115-144.

As Ghana and Benin both progressed from frequent upheavals to stable military regimes, the trajectories again were remarkably similar. In both countries the military leadership began with violent repression, but over time sought to justify their rule and create a governing logic that would provide a reason for their ongoing stay. They both attempted to do this by incorporating ‘the masses’ through their revolutionary appeals, by creating mass parties that would monopolize associational life, organize the patronage system, and provide entrée to local leaders.⁹⁰ The political parties established by the military governments – the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) in Ghana and the *Parti de la Révolution Populaire du Bénin* (PRPB) in Benin - were both successful in establishing new political identities through grassroots participation in the party (due in part to the necessity of belonging to the party organizations for advancement in the hegemonic system). The party bureaus over time composed a mix of military and civilian (leftist) leaders, and power was extremely concentrated around the executive in these personalist systems. While the strategies and party organizations constructed were very similar, they again do not predict the wide variation in the formation of the party system. Despite similarly structured authoritarian regimes, the PNDC and PRPB authoritarian regimes varied critically in their repression and patronage capacities – differences that widened as the regimes aged.

⁹⁰ While I have argued that ideological divisions do not strongly shape the nature of African politics, it is certainly true that there was some real commitment to socialist ideology in various regimes, which was particularly influenced by an anti-colonial model and foreign support from Russia. That said, ideologies even among the most committed self-described leftist regimes were often pretense for mobilizing the rural peasants (as in Ghana), an urban educated and leftist elite (as in Benin) or other important constituencies that could easily identify with the socialist discourse. The leftist models of governance gave way over time to pragmatic strategies for facing simultaneous economic and social crises; by the end of the Cold War there was little support remaining and the terminology faded from political communication.

Ghana

A significant change in the political landscape occurred during the Rawlings era of the PNDC military regime between 1981 – 1992. During this period the PNDC’s twin goals of mobilization and control of the population were carried out through the installation of new grass-roots organizations (e.g. Committees for the Defense of the Revolution) and the party machine. As Rawlings emphasized the participatory nature of the new regime, he claimed “The people’s defense committees are the democratic bedrock of the new people’s power that the Revolution is building... they are the mass organs of the oppressed sections of society”.⁹¹ Through decentralization and incorporation of the masses, the PNDC sought to create a new social base of support as a foundation for their rule. In doing so, the ‘revolutionaries’ encouraged a significant segment of Nkrumahists to come under the new mantle, and the opportunities available through state incorporation also persuaded some former Danquah-Busia leaders to join the regime. This significant but uneven co-opting of former politicians and administrators weakened the Nkrumahist following but did not eliminate the salience of that political identity. In short, the character, breadth and duration of the PNDC regime shifted the terrain to form a third significant political identity.⁹² And while the PNDC attempted to monopolize associational life, the Nkrumahist and Danquah-Busia identities were channeled as social networks, retaining their salience as social identities under a hegemonic regime.

⁹¹ Rawlings, J. J. (1983). *A Revolutionary Journey: Selected speeches of Flt. Lt. J.J. Rawlings, chairman of the Provisional National Defence Council*. Accra, Ghana, Information Services Dept. Vol. 1 p. 45.

⁹² Pinkney, R. (1997). *Democracy and dictatorship in Ghana and Tanzania*. New York, St. Martin's Press.

This overlapping tri-fecta of salient political affiliations illustrated how tectonic shifts of alignment can occur over time, particularly with the assistance of state power and resources. The emergence of the third force of the PNDC did not diminish the salience of the Nkrumahist political legacy but because of the PNDC's powerful position to incorporate challengers and its leftist discourse it severely weakened the potential for the Nkrumahists to re-emerge as a powerful political force via a united political party. Although several important leaders attempted to reclaim the Nkrumahist powerful legacy by forming parties, the power and position of the PNDC provided little space for the Nkrumahists to regroup around a socialist agenda. The Danquah-Busia legacy, in contrast, provided a very useful base of historical opposition experience and the 'liberal' position that was associated with the lawyers and private businessmen that formed its leadership. These ideological and economic positions not only fit into a discourse of ending the authoritarian 'revolutionary' leadership of the PNDC, but also provided its leaders with independent material resources and skills in the private sector that could not be completely controlled by the PNDC party-state in the authoritarian period. These resources and leadership networks were the basis of the opposition in the transition to democracy, and were an important factor in shaping their strength and negotiating power.

Rawlings's PNDC regime also changed in character over time, despite the consistency of revolutionary language. The early years were marked by the use of force, not only to gain power but also to repress potential opposition. The initial bloodletting of the June 4 1979 "Revolution" was to focus on abuses and corruption, the purpose behind the coup being to punish the injustices that were so detrimental to the economic and

social well being of the country.⁹³ The most public example of the use of force was the bloody public executions of retired and continuing top military rulers following their ‘midnight trials’, which was followed by a wider ‘house-cleaning exercise’ aimed at purging the armed forces and society of corruption and graft and restoring moral responsibility to public life.⁹⁴ As a transition to multipartism was already underway, Rawlings handed over power to the elected government of Hilla Limann, but intervened with a second coup in December 1981 to alleviate the deteriorating economic conditions and official corruption. This second coup also set a public example for violence and repression, as Rawlings took action against individuals who had allegedly “committed crimes against the Ghanaian people”.⁹⁵ The PNDC ordered many former members of the previous government and other opposition to be detained and the murder of three High Court of Justice judges.⁹⁶

Over time, the need for repression and the use of force decreased and the Rawlings regime could rely more on their reputation than the actual need to exert force to maintain power and control the population. As the PNDC regime matured, its revolutionary focus shifted from its more radical initial agenda to one of grass-roots participation in the political process and contribution to economic growth. By building a strong and ubiquitous party, by incorporating important elements of the pre-existing social landscape into the PNDC regime, and by transferring the regime’s revolutionary zeal from violence to economic progress, the PNDC built a strong base of usable

⁹³ Folson, K. G. (1993). *Ideology, Revolution and Development - The Years of Jerry John Rawlings. Ghana under PNDC Rule. Codesria book series.* E. Gyimah-Boadi. Senegal, Codesria: p. 75 – 77

⁹⁴ Chazan, N. (1983). *An anatomy of Ghanaian politics : managing political recession, 1969-1982.* Boulder, Colo., Westview Press.

⁹⁵ Rawlings, J. J. (1983). *A Revolutionary Journey: Selected speeches of Flt. Lt. J.J. Rawlings, chairman of the Provisional National Defence Council.* Accra, Ghana, Information Services Dept.

⁹⁶ The previous government being the Hilla Liman administration and the People’s National Party.

resources – political, social and economic – that justified its existence and consolidated its power. This strong position was key to the PNDC’s control over the democratic transition process.

Benin

The coup that catapulted Benin from a country of chronic political instability to one of the continent’s longest enduring military regimes presented a rupture with the past decade. In addition to bringing stability, the revolutionary regime installed in 1972 also ended the political hegemony of the colonial-educated elites, and transferred political power to a new civilian and military generation. The nature of this social revolution was to change the character of society and economy as well as the political structure. The young and weakly established military government made a tactical compromise to ally with the radical civilian contingent of trade unionists (known as *ligeurs*), “as a necessary component of social support in order to stabilize the regime’s power”.⁹⁷ The young militants who orchestrated the coup were politically isolated once installed at the head of state as the *gouvernement militaire révolutionnaire* (GMR). Their weak social position led them to seek alliance with the civilian *ligeurs*, and by 1974 Marxism-Leninism was declared as the official ideology of the state, launching the society into a vast project of *révolutionnarisation*.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Banegas, R. (2003). *La démocratie à pas de caméléon : transition et imaginaires politiques au Bénin*. Paris, Karthala. p. 43. The trade unionists were a very limited urban contingent, although significant to an isolated and weak military government. The *ligeurs* power declined as a result of the disastrous economic policies the government pursued, and the PRPB began shifting away from this base throughout the 1980’s.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

This path to authoritarian regime consolidation came at the expense of many important social groups: the previous political elite and their clientele, entrepreneurs and economic leaders as the economy was nationalized, superior military officers who were pushed out of service, traditional kingdoms who were severely attacked in an ‘anti-feudal’ campaign of the countryside, and eventually the rural masses who suffered from the regime’s control of farm production through agricultural cooperatives.⁹⁹

Despite the PRPB regime’s early efforts to bring about significant social, political, and economic change through a revolutionary redefinition of relations between subordinate and elite populations, they were ultimately unable to impose revolution and by the next decade had begun a strategic retreat to pragmatic socialism and a return of most social categories.¹⁰⁰ Compromise with former elites and social groups was attempted, but these compromises eventually led to the end of the regime and the democratic opening.¹⁰¹ By attempting a reconfiguration of the elite immediately after seizing power, the PRPB regime had neutralized potential assets from which it could have built a sustainable base of support. Instead, the regime was unable to capture the peasants and the traditional kingdoms. The old generation of political elites and economic leaders were so reduced by the revolutionary regime that their return marked

⁹⁹ Ibid. p. 58

¹⁰⁰ The regime underwent radicalization from 1974 to the early 1980’s. The pragmatic retreat occurred between 1982 – 88, leading to the open crisis and fall of the regime between 1989 – 90. During the 1980’s the regime preserved its repressive character but pragmatism replaced radicalism with the falling out of the *ligesurs* and civilians in the form of young technocrats began to take precedence over military elements within the regime. The regime retained its official ideology, however, while admitting the necessity of some reform and attempting to change its discourse and negotiate a relationship with the international financial institutions beginning in 1984. Under financial pressure, the regime sought reform, but had a limited ability to carry it out within the existing framework – in part because the ideology dictated who were permissible partners and had weakened ties to local traditional elites that could mobilize the population for change under the same leadership, which ultimately led to the crisis and fall of the regime.

¹⁰¹ Banegas, R. (2003). *La démocratie à pas de caméléon : transition et imaginaires politiques au Bénin*. Paris, Karthala. p. 63

only a heterogeneous base of social contestation; this mix of former elite was not loyal to the regime that had been their undoing.

The regime constructed its ‘mass’ party, the PRPB, in 1975 as a vehicle to further solidify their rule and penetrate the masses. The “PRPB rapidly put under its control the entirety of economic, social and political activities of the country... The Party rapidly became the obligatory passage for any career, selecting a new civilian and military elite”.¹⁰² Despite the centrality of the party for personal advancement, it was troubled by limited recruitment and weak to nonexistent local structures. Instead of serving as a true ‘mass party’ it remained a “private club within which factional battles were waged”.¹⁰³ In this respect, Benin’s authoritarian party was remarkably similar to most ‘single-party’ states, such as Zambia and Senegal as well as Ghana under the PNDC.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, they were all similarly personalized, as the party-state model allowed the executive to command the affairs of the state as well as the central committee of the party, creating a centralized system in which the ruler – President Kerekou – was the sole arbiter in the factional game.¹⁰⁵ As in all of these cases, the party was a key element in the revolutionary regime’s installation at the local level, and its operation was the face of the state throughout the authoritarian period. The PRPB and its satellite organizations carried out state administration, functioned in tandem with public enterprise and was the

¹⁰² Ibid. p. 47

¹⁰³ Most scholars agree the Marxist-Leninist ideological position was a façade within which the government hoped to incorporate a factionalized elite composed of military, former elites, and leftist syndicalists. Ibid. p. 44.

Doussou, F. C. *Les Forces Armees Dans La Vie Politique Beninoise sous le Regime de Matheiu Kerekou: 1972- 1990*. Codesria.: 9-10.

¹⁰⁴ The PRPB was much more similar to single party states of West Africa than real leftist parties of Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique. Banegas, R. (2003). *La démocratie à pas de caméléon : transition et imaginaires politiques au Bénin*. Paris, Karthala p. 51.

¹⁰⁵ Straddling the head of both party and state put the leader at the head of the reservoir of personal loyalties, political allocations and prebendals (jobs), the supreme decision maker in a battle of interests.

vehicle for the rupture of the former elite and new methods of social ascension. The party was a central institution of the authoritarian period, but its force was based completely on its overlap with the state. The PRPB was the extension of the state into private life, rather than a foundation of support for the regime; deprived of the regime's authority, the party immediately disintegrated. It could not serve as an autonomous buttress for the regime when facing the end of the system that sustained it.

The authoritarian consolidation in Benin began as a violent transformational social revolution, which suppressed the existing political, economic and traditional elite in the reconfiguration of hegemonic relations. In continual search of new compromises to assure stability, the PRPB moved from radical revolutionary regime to pragmatic socialist regime as it sought a new justification for rule. The shifting system of compromises were made to political elite without their own social following – from the radical civilian 'league' to the young technocrats that led the shift to pragmatic socialism. The PRPB focus on political corrosive practices of elite circulation and clientelism as mechanisms of political regulation became increasingly problematic and unsustainable in two ways. First, political elite incorporation at the expense of many important social groups exacerbated the regime's weak base of social support. Over time, the regime came under increasing domestic pressures from all sides of the population. This pressure was not unified or organized, as the regime had successfully neutralized most pre-existing networks and resources, but as the discontent multiplied across the population at large it became a wave made up of thousands of individual voices of frustration.

Secondly, the practices of elite circulation and clientelist regulation became such a drain on the government that the regime could no longer sustain its system of high-level

compromise. The extreme economic crisis and bankruptcy of the state only further killed the regime with the erosion of the process of elite assimilation. The PRPB was precariously positioned at the top of a narrow chain of elites, without a foundation in the masses. As the necessity of political reform became evident, the PRPB's new elite allies blazed their own path forward to capture power, leaving the *ancien* regime weak and formless – lacking both base and strategic partners.¹⁰⁶

Senegal

Senegal's authoritarian period was highly stable and marked little change in the country's politics from the post-independence period in which electoral competition was legally allowed but structurally discouraged. The continuity of the *Parti Socialiste* (PS) regime was the hallmark feature, and the construction of a single party system was conducive to the party's hegemonic control. Pre-independence parliamentary elections provided for the narrow triumph of the PS over the *Parti Africain de l'Indépendance* (PAI), and the gains to being in power accrued rapidly to shut out further potential challengers. "Initial gains proved to be an unbeatable combination of permanent advantages over their opponents".¹⁰⁷ Multiparty elections held in 1963 elected PS President Senghor unopposed, and parliamentary elections conferred all 80 seats to the PS with 86% voter turnout. The challenger party Senegalese Democracy and Unity received just 5.8% of the vote. From these highly participatory but severely constrained electoral experiences, the move to a single party system did not represent much change.

¹⁰⁶ Dossou, R. (1993). *Le Bénin: du monolithisme à la démocratie pluraliste, un témoignage. L'Afrique en transition vers le pluralisme politique: colloque, Paris, 12 - 13 décembre 1990. La Vie du droit en Afrique.* M. Alliot and G. Conac. Paris, Economica: 517 p.

¹⁰⁷ Zolberg, A. R. (1966). *Creating political order; the party-states of West Africa.* Chicago., Rand McNally.

Single party elections in 1968 and 1973 affirmed the PS's hegemonic status, with over 93% of registered voters participating, all casting their ballots in favor of the PS. Over this period, the PS built upon its strengths, in terms of party organization, the patronage at its disposal and the support of many prominent social figures, and its overlapping linkages with the state administration.¹⁰⁸

Over time, internal fragmentation began to plague the party, as splintering groups competed for positions and resources from within. In order to counter these tendencies the PS decided to allow a spin out from within the PS fold to create a party of 'contribution'. This presented "no apparent serious threat to the PS rule" and was interpreted as "a ruling class project intended to reorganize the state".¹⁰⁹ "The Senegalese ruling class expressed its hegemony by having exchanged force and authoritarianism as its method of governance for the politics of alliances and cooptation", leaving the structures of power remained fundamentally unchanged.¹¹⁰ The regime handled elite factions and circulation while maintaining its essence – the social networks of support that connected non-state leaders and their followers in the countryside to a loyal alliance with the PS regime. While all regimes faced elite factional challenges during their decades of rule, Senegal's authoritarian regime maintained its strength by nurturing a highly participatory (while restricted) political process, which reinforced the regime's strong connection to and following among the rural masses.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ Fatton, R. (1987). *The making of a liberal democracy : Senegal's passive revolution, 1975-1985*. Boulder, Colo., L. Rienner Publishers.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid. p. 12

¹¹⁰ Ibid. p. 53

¹¹¹ Recent literature has shown that certain African party-states were more deeply embedded in localized power relations than many earlier studies previously suggested. Boone, C. (1998). "State building in the African countryside: Structure and politics at the grassroots." *Journal of Development Studies* 34(4): 1-31.

O'Brien, D. B. C. (2006). "Between kinship and politics: development and clientelism in the Senegal delta." *Africa* 76(2): 278-279.

Zambia

Like in Senegal, Zambia's authoritarian period was a form of continuity for the United National Independence Party's (UNIP) rule, and was relatively mild in character.¹¹² President Kaunda desired to create consensus democracy, and eliminate all potential challengers by co-opting them into the UNIP fold. National leaders set out to build a top to bottom organization in part by adoption existing organizations and in part by using central political power to administer reforms to integrate rural participatory institutions into a centralized party state (e.g. Ward Development Committees). But UNIP was constructed as a national liberation movement, and despite its significant grass roots presence, it suffered over time from an uncontrolled membership and ineffective branch organization.¹¹³ "With the advent of independence [in 1964] UNIP began to lose peasant support and UNIP branch organization began to wither. Moreover, by the early 1970's the penetration of the dominant party was in doubt in those areas of rural Zambia, especially the South, West, and North, where opposition parties were able to garner support".¹¹⁴ Facing a sustained challenge from the African National Congress (ANC) as evidenced in the 1968 legislative elections (ANC receiving over 25% of the vote and 23/105 seats), UNIP declared an end to the First Republic in 1973 to manufacture unity via the supremacy of the party over the state.¹¹⁵ In creating a "Zambian one-party

¹¹² Posner, D. N. (2005). *Institutions and ethnic politics in Africa*. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

¹¹³ Bratton, M. (1980). *The local politics of rural development : peasant and party-state in Zambia*. Hanover, N.H., University Press of New England. p. 34

¹¹⁴ Ibid.

¹¹⁵ The introduction of the one-party state occurred in Zambia despite considerable opposition and in a situation where opposition parties were well entrenched and when the support for the ruling party UNIP was probably lower than ever since independence. Scott, I. (1980). *Party and Administration under the*

participatory democracy”, the party wanted to mobilize the population so that the state could implement UNIP’s agenda.¹¹⁶ By creating the party-state, UNIP consolidated political power and maintained stability.¹¹⁷

While popular sentiment in favor of UNIP remained high throughout the First Republic and early years of the Second Republic single-party state, institutionalization of grass roots party organization remained low and centralized control from party headquarters was weak. The very high turnover allowed within UNIP through local level and legislative elections was, in part, an opportunity for regeneration of the party, but also an indicator of the weakness of the party-state and its inability to control electoral outcomes.¹¹⁸ UNIP’s organizational weakness was further demonstrated in low turnout in local government elections throughout the Second Republic, and high votes against the

One Party State. Administration in Zambia. W. Tordoff. Manchester [Eng.] Madison, Wis., Manchester University Press ; University of Wisconsin Press: xi, 306 p.

Gertzel, C. J., C. L. Baylies, et al. (1984). The dynamics of the one-party state in Zambia. Manchester, U.K. ; Dover, N.H., U.S.A., Manchester University Press.

Rakner, L. (2002). From dominant to competitive party system : the Zambian experience, 1991-2001. [Lusaka, s.n.

Rakner, L. (2003). Political and economic liberalisation in Zambia, 1991-2001. Uppsala, Sweden Somerset, NJ, Nordic Africa Institute ; Distributor in North America, Transaction Publishers.

The initial *two-party system* was based on UNIP drawing support from the urban settlement and mineworkers on the Copperbelt and in the Northern regions while the African National Congress (ANC) drew its support in the South. As discontentment grew with UNIP and the Western region balked at what they regarded as Bemba domination of UNIP, they broke off to form the Lozi based United Party. As a consequence of unrest, UP was banned in 1968. Reforms between 1969 – 71 internal to UNIP were introduced to minimize the impact of sectional rivalries but this drove a new fraction of UNIP with a local base in the northern provinces to form the United Progressive Party (led by former UNIP VP Simon Kapwepwe). The formation of UPP posed a major threat to UNIP as the party’s majority position was now threatened in the North by the UPP and the ANC in the South. These pressures led President Kaunda to introduce a one-party state in 1972, outlawing existing opposition parties and banning all future initiatives to form opposition parties. “On the verge of becoming a minority party, UNIP secured its power through control of the government”. Bates, R. and P. Collier (1995). "The Politics and Economics of Policy Reform in Zambia." Journal of African Economies, Oxford University Press 4(1): 115-43.

¹¹⁶ Ollawa, P. E. (1979). Participatory democracy in Zambia : the political economy of national development. Ilfracombe, Stockwell.

¹¹⁷ Bratton, M. (1980). The local politics of rural development : peasant and party-state in Zambia. Hanover, N.H., University Press of New England. p. 7

¹¹⁸ Gertzel, C. J., C. L. Baylies, et al. (1984). The dynamics of the one-party state in Zambia. Manchester, U.K. ; Dover, N.H., U.S.A., Manchester University Press.

party in elections where voters had been mobilized to turn out (e.g. 1978 general elections).¹¹⁹ “While UNIP’s decline at the local level had begun in the earlier intra-party conflict of the [First Republic], in the one-party state it was compounded by the need to absorb the former opposition parties... The result was a vacuum in the party structure below the district level with the resulting loss in communication and control”.¹²⁰ In the first single party elections in 1973, voter turnout was only 33%. This was quite a difference from Zambia’s independence election of 1964 with 94.8% turnout. This low turnout also varied drastically from the Senegalese party’s ability to turn out 94% of registered voters in single party elections. And while President Senghor received 100% of votes cast in Senegal, in Zambia the ballot offered a referendum on Kaunda’s presidency – to which 11% of the voters responded “No” as a national average, as high as 80% in some districts.¹²¹ The combination of turnover at the local level and low levels of electoral participation and affirmation was due in part to the atrophy of the party organization at the local level.

These weaknesses were common across single-party states, faced with meager and ineffective performance, inherent institutional feebleness, and impotence as political organizations that could not fully penetrate the masses. Although the parties generally did not exert a highly centralized administrative apparatus that serviced as an effective state, the parties were useful in that they were continually at the service of the party leadership at the center in their enduring efforts to create center-locality ties and manage

¹¹⁹ Ibid. p. 96

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ In the Western province up 45.3% voted ‘No’ in some districts; the Southern Province ranged from 18.4 to 80.2% ‘No’. From 1978 - 1988 the trend improved, with only 20% voting ‘No’ in 1978 down to only 5% in 1988. Ibid. p.48

elite competition within the single party framework.¹²² Senegal and Zambia exhibit similarities on these fronts. Both demonstrate the ineffectiveness of the party-state in reaching the masses and weak centralized power, but in both cases the party served as an important mechanism to regulate elite conflict, to continually build linkages to connect to the population and to manage the state in a continued struggle to consolidate incumbent authority. While Senegal's *capacity* to carry out this project added to the authoritarian incumbent's power at the transition, the overlapping character and structure of the party state in these two countries does not explain their divergent party formations following the demise of the authoritarian era.

The authoritarian period in all four countries saw the construction or continuation of political parties that endeavored to organize nationally and engage locally. The party-state model certainly permitted the supremacy of the party's central committee for state administration. In Ghana and Benin, this bureau encompassed military leaders as well as civilians. The parties were contradictorily omnipotent – as the locus of state resources and the necessary conduit for jobs, permits and other perquisites – and impotent – often unable to become deeply embedded in citizen affairs. Whether these regimes were originally single party or military, the defining characteristic of all four was the neopatrimonialism, particularly evident through the personalist systems of rule. The institutional heritage of personalist regimes that created parties to run the party-state is similar across the cases, and these patterns do not predict the nature of the democratic multi-party system.

¹²² Bratton, M. (1980). The local politics of rural development : peasant and party-state in Zambia. Hanover, N.H., University Press of New England. p. 225

Formal Democratic Institutions: Electoral Rules

A prominent line of argumentation in the institutionalist literature focuses on the effects of the electoral system. Derived from Duverger's law, we would expect the most basic effect to be that proportional representation would encourage the proliferation of parties whereas single member district plurality or majority systems would strategically limit the effective number of parties, reducing competition down to two.¹²³ Therefore, countries with plurality systems would have lower electoral volatility due to the constrained set of choices and the stability engendered by the electoral system.

The regional voting patterns in African democracies make it unlikely that even where plurality systems reduce the number of competitors to two *in that district*, the relevant number of competitive parties at the national level may still be high.¹²⁴ This is particularly the case where different parties compete in distinct zones of the country and do not cover the entire national territory. Empirically, the cases of high party system institutionalization in Ghana and Senegal operate under both plurality and mixed proportional representation systems, respectively. And the cases of low party system institutionalization in Zambia and Benin also operate under both sets of electoral rules, plurality and PR respectively. Most interesting, interviews I conducted with key political leaders who were engaged in the rule making process of the democratic transition agreed separately that the choice of electoral system was based mostly on precedent and were

¹²³ Proportional Representation would encourage the proliferation of parties particularly where there is large district magnitude. Cox, G. W. (1997). Making votes count : strategic coordination in the world's electoral systems. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

¹²⁴ Boix describes India as a similar national structure. Boix, C. (1999). "Setting the rules of the game: The choice of electoral systems in advanced democracies." American Political Science Review 93(3): 609-624.

not highly contested issues.¹²⁵ We might expect this in cases where the incumbent was powerful and wanted to maintain the status quo rules that they were comfortable with, but it was echoed in Zambia and Benin where opposition elites were setting the rules and still preferred to institute rules that were likely to be well understood in the country. These opposition elites explained the decision as a means to increasing mass understanding of how votes translate into seats, and therefore adding legitimacy and reducing risks of conflict associated with contested electoral outcomes.¹²⁶ Professor and founding member of the opposition movement Theodore Holo described the ultimate goal as:

an understanding on the part of the population in general of how votes translate into seats, for the sake of transparency, comprehension, and most critically peace and stability following electoral competition, which would be best accomplished by retaining the existing electoral system. Theodore Holo, October 2005. UNESCO Chair at the Universite d'Abomey Calavi, Benin.


In the broader set of African democracies, there is no statistical relationship between type of electoral system and level of party system institutionalization. Both PR and plurality systems are found at the high and low ends of institutionalization, and the very highly institutionalized party systems of Senegal, Mozambique, Cape Verde, Namibia and South Africa all have PR rules. It is significant to note that there are many cases of plurality systems which, at the national level and even at the district level, have not conformed to Duverger's Law by reducing to two effective parties.

¹²⁵ Asante, D. N. S. K. B. (April 2006). Chairman of the Committee of Experts for the Draft Constitution of the Democratic Transition. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

Dossou, R. (November 2005). Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Member of Preparatory Committee for the National Conference. R. Interview. Cotonou, Benin.


¹²⁶ Dossou, R. (November 2005). Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Member of Preparatory Committee for the National Conference. R. Interview. Cotonou, Benin.

Figure 3.4: Electoral Systems in African Democracies



The alternative argument that I present focuses not on formal institutional legacies but rather on informal relations of clientelism that shape authoritarian power on the eve of democratic transition and provide the incumbent party the capacity to set the reform agenda and new rules according to their preferences. In order to test this argument against the competing hypotheses, I measure authoritarian power across the set of 23 African democracies according to their success in the founding elections (the % of seats the authoritarian incumbent party won in the founding elections) (see Figure 3.5). While this is a retrospective analysis, it captures at minimum the second stage of the argument: the competitive electoral pressures that shape the enduring nature of the party system according to the dominating presence or void created by the authoritarian incumbent party (see Chapter 4). It can be interpreted as an indicator of extent of local elite support for the authoritarian party on the eve of democratization, the thick measure that I use to quantify the explanatory variable in the four case studies (see Chapter 5).

Figure 3.5 Measure of the Explanatory Variable across all African Democracies



Using this measure of authoritarian power and categorical variables for colonial power (British, French, Portuguese) and Democratic Electoral System (Plurality, Proportional Representation), I assess the main institutional hypotheses in relation to the argument I present (Table 3.2).

Table 3.2 Rival Institutional Variables Compared

	Main Effects	
	β	(SE)
British Colonial Power	-0.22	(0.41)
Proportional Electoral System	0.69	(0.61)
Transition: Incumbents Control	3.28***	(0.91)
R Squared	0.50	
(n=23)		

Standard error in parentheses. *** Significant at $p < 0.01$. ** Significant at $p < 0.05$. * Significant at $p < 0.10$.

This analysis demonstrates that the central institutional explanations of historical domestic institutions and contemporary electoral rules do not explain either the empirical data from across Africa and, in some respects, do not theoretically provide substantive links to party system institutionalization on their own terms. We now turn to structural factors as alternative explanations.

Alternative Structural Factors: Economic Development and Ethnic Identity

Level of Economic Development and Extent of Economic Crisis

The economic features of a country could be expected to influence the level of party system institutionalization in two primary ways. First, with a greater level of economic development, we would expect more complex social structures, labor processes that require active participation and form new groups, out of which common interests would be defined (Lipset 1959). All of these processes would potentially allow for stronger linkages between parties and citizens, as they form constituencies, and thus, greater levels of party system institutionalization.

Secondly, with any given level of development, an extreme downturn in the economy could potentially influence the party system, particularly in new democracies where economic crisis was a defining feature of the transition. Haggard and Kaufman claim that countries facing economic crises were able to launch wide-ranging reforms, but that countries that had regime transitions without economic crisis exhibited more stability. They continue with the argument that centrifugal tendencies for the party system were greater in cases facing economic crisis, encouraging both party

fragmentation and polarization, whereas in non-crisis cases these pressures were more likely to be contained.¹²⁷ Thus we would expect countries experiencing greater economic crisis to show higher levels of electoral volatility and, therefore, lower levels of party system institutionalization. Furthermore, the robust literature on economic voting would lead us to expect that economic hardship can be expected to increase volatility by increasing anti-incumbent votes and preventing new party loyalties from emerging, encouraging voters to support a variety of opposition parties in search of new political alternatives. In contrast, in a positive economic climate, the population would be more in favor of the status quo.¹²⁸ Therefore, we would expect electoral volatility to be a linear function of the economic performance. This also conforms to the expectation that high levels of economic crisis would contribute to low levels of party system institutionalization.

In the data I accumulated for all African democracies, neither level of economic development nor economic crisis have a significant effect on party system institutionalization (see Table 3.3). Furthermore, incumbent governments in more developed African countries were just as likely to lose control of the transition as in poorer ones. Other scholars of African politics have noted the implausible and astonishing ability of authoritarian regimes in Africa to stay in power despite their destruction of the economy.¹²⁹ Rather than the predicted modernization of relations between political leaders and their followers to party candidates and autonomous voters,

¹²⁷ Haggard, S. and R. R. Kaufman (1995). *The Political economy of democratic transitions*. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press. p. 126

¹²⁸ Tavits, M. (2005). "The development of stable party support: Electoral dynamics in post-communist Europe." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(2): 283-298.

¹²⁹ Van de Walle, N. (2001). *African economies and the politics of permanent crisis, 1979-1999*. Cambridge New York, Cambridge University Press.

in all case studies practices of clientelism shape individual relations between parties and their followers regardless of very different levels of economic development and economic characteristics.

Table 3.3 Rival Structural Variables Compared

	Main Effects	
	β	(SE)
Economic Development	0.63	(.25)
Economic Volatility	1.37	(1.12)
Social Cleavages: PREG	1.67	(1.19)
Transition: Incumbents Control	3.39***	(.75)

R Squared **0.70**
(n=21)

Standard error in parentheses. *** Significant at $p < 0.01$. ** Significant at $p < 0.05$. * Significant at $p < 0.10$.¹³⁰

Economic Trajectories in Ghana, Senegal, Zambia and Benin

The economic history of the four country cases parallels much of the continent and provides evidence to demonstrate that the primacy of politics over economics continues to shape the new multiparty systems.¹³¹ For most of the post-independence and

¹³⁰ Economic development is measured as level of GDP per capita constant \$US 2000, logged, for the year in which multipartism began. Economic crisis is measured as the percent change in GDP between the founding year of the democratic transition as compared to five years prior. Social cleavages are measured as the politically relevant ethnic groups (PREG). Posner, D. N. (2004). "Measuring ethnic fractionalization in Africa." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(4): 849-863.

¹³¹ The primacy of politics over economic concerns has been well documented. Bates, R. H. (1981). *Markets and states in tropical Africa : the political basis of agricultural policies*. Berkeley, University of California Press.

authoritarian periods, Zambia, Benin, Senegal and Ghana all experienced economic decline or stagnation. The social malaise that accompanied the “permanent economic crisis” was underscored by a political logic.¹³² The political systems of patronage and personalism reinforced the use of the economy for the incumbent party’s benefit.¹³³ These practices sustained authoritarian regimes for a time, but ultimately contributed to the push for both economic and political reform that made up the third wave of democratization in Africa. Even in Ghana, where economic reforms were successfully initiated in the decade prior to democratization, the social repercussions of structural adjustment reflected the regime’s broader political policy of supporting traditional authorities in the rural world at the expense of urban, educated constituencies – which only reified the breakdown of support and opposition to the incumbent when the transition to multipartism began. In Senegal, Zambia and Benin the socio-economic crises forced simultaneous political and economic reform, leaving the incumbent party in critical need of mass support, and therefore, beholden to earlier modes of accumulating power.

In all four countries the economy was fundamentally based on patronage systems and the state was supreme over the market. The political implications meant that power was concentrated within the political elite. This meant for little class ideological development and the high stakes of the political arena – the focus of individual economic well-being was related to the political equation. The poor and vulnerable economies,

¹³² Van de Walle, N. (2001). African economies and the politics of permanent crisis, 1979-1999. Cambridge New York, Cambridge University Press.

¹³³ Bates, R. H. (1981). Markets and states in tropical Africa : the political basis of agricultural policies. Berkeley, University of California Press.

highly reliant on international public finance, and increasingly faced with crisis and financial dependency were “ubiquitous background features” which provides little leverage on the form of party system that developed.¹³⁴

Ghana

In Ghana the economic conditions of “stagnation and deterioration” from independence through 1979 reflected the country’s political instability.¹³⁵ In the 1970’s, the “political economy of Ghana experienced a systematic deterioration that affected every aspect of daily life in the country”.¹³⁶ The pattern of economic decay was consistent despite the variety of regimes and shifts in policy. “Interest focused predominantly on state-related needs, to the detriment of more broadly cast topics of economic growth or development”.¹³⁷ The economic destruction was primarily due to domestic policy decisions.¹³⁸ The economic crisis and the associated corruption were a large part of the justification for the 1981 Rawlings coup. The PNDC declared a revolution, and included populist and socialist rhetoric into a state-centered plan for

¹³⁴ Bratton, M. and N. Van de Walle (1997). Democratic experiments in Africa : regime transitions in comparative perspective. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, NY, USA, Cambridge University Press. p. 270

¹³⁵ Chazan, N. (1982). Development, Underdevelopment and the State in Ghana. Boston University, African Studies Center, Occasional Paper No. 59. p.1

GNP declined 11% between 1960 – 69 and over 20% in the 1970’s (2% per annum); The GDP declined 3.4 % annually. Inflation averaged between 70 – 100%. External debt was accumulating. The economy was declining steadily during this period, bringing a process of accelerated economic decay. “Ghana began independence in much better economic condition than most African countries. It had a relatively well developed infrastructure, large amounts of foreign exchange, and a civil service generally recognized as one of the best in Africa”. Herbst, J. I. (1993). The politics of reform in Ghana, 1982-1991. Berkeley, University of California Press. p. 17

¹³⁶ Chazan, N. (1982). Development, Underdevelopment and the State in Ghana. Boston University, African Studies Center, Occasional Paper No. 59. p. 2

¹³⁷ Three main problem areas could be identified: a lack of consistency between policy and implementation; inconsistency between alternative modes of implementation and outcomes; and gap between deteriorating pattern of results, the downward spiral of the political economy and both varying policies and implementation practices. Ibid.

¹³⁸ Herbst, J. I. (1993). The politics of reform in Ghana, 1982-1991. Berkeley, University of California Press. p. 17-27.

domestically driven development – which ultimately did not differ much from the state monopoly previous regimes had tried to establish.¹³⁹

Dismal failure and further breakdown in order and accountability led the PNDC regime to recalculate and begin liberal economic reforms in earnest in 1983 - 4, and the economic improvements were significant. National income increased by 10%, inflation fell dramatically, export volumes increased, the deficit declined and the monetary exchange rate was normalized.¹⁴⁰ The economic reform policies of adjustment brought real gains in macro-economic aggregates in output and rate of investment. In the course of these economic improvements, the regime did gain political constituencies in the rural world as conditions improved and the agricultural policies favored the peasantry.

While the rising tide of economic growth was assumed to correspond to overall prosperity, the retrenchment policy associated with the reforms brought dissatisfaction as well. Particularly the urban population, such as workers, traders, security forces and import-substitution business clientele, that had benefited from subsidies on public utilities, health, and education felt adversely affected.¹⁴¹ In addition to the urban dwellers another important group of losers in the economic reforms were the bureaucrats and politicians who had benefited from the controlled economic regime and the issuing of permits and licenses and operating the control system generally.¹⁴² The larger point of interest is to note that economic progress did not necessarily correlate with equal satisfaction with the incumbent. In the highly clientelistic political system of the PNDC

¹³⁹ Ibid. p. 28

¹⁴⁰ Ninsin, K. A. (1991). *The informal sector in Ghana's political economy*. Accra, Freedom Publications.

¹⁴¹ Herbst notes that as the economy had collapsed to such an extent these urban clientele were particularly weak; “a crucial aspect of Rawlings’s decision to adopt the reform program was the intellectual and financial bankruptcy of those who opposed it”. Herbst, J. I. (1993). *The politics of reform in Ghana, 1982-1991*. Berkeley, University of California Press. p. 33.

¹⁴² Ninsin, K. A. (1991). *The informal sector in Ghana's political economy*. Accra, Freedom Publications.

authoritarian regime, reforms towards economic rationalization meant less opportunity for key constituencies to be placated by patronage and more critics among the politically powerful and vocal sectors.¹⁴³

The Ghanaian regime established a critical rural following, which was an important and loyal constituency throughout the democratization period. In macro economic performance, the state also increased its resource base. However, the regime lost an avenue of state enrichment due to the rationalization of economic reform. It also lost urban support, which contributed in part to the resources of the potential opposition in the transition to multipartism.

Senegal

Senegal's mono-crop economy was stretched beyond its limits for more than three decades as the ruling party endeavored to cultivate and maintain a vast network of support in both the key urban constituencies as well as the dispersed rural agricultural world. The political logic ran the economy into the ground, despite several difficult

¹⁴³ This relates to Bratton and van de Walle's claim that demands for democratization may be linked to economic decline (due to discontent) OR to economic prosperity because economic growth and improvement in well-being in an autocratic political regime can provide grounds for the demand for an increase in political liberalization especially because economic liberalization changes the role of the state in the economy, and the removal of controls transfers the decision-making process concerning allocation of resources from the state to the market place – then individuals perceive they are increasingly responsible for their economic outcomes and it can fuel demands for democratization especially as the private sector generates wealth and wants increasing influence on how revenues are allocated and taxes levied, currently decided by a small ruling clique which is not the group producing the national wealth after reforms. Thus the demand for increased political liberalization may be based on the need for a widening of the decision-making process. Bratton, M. and N. Van de Walle (1997). Democratic experiments in Africa : regime transitions in comparative perspective. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, NY, USA, Cambridge University Press.

Herbst notes that public demonstrations against price increases were held in the days after they were announced, whereas there had been no previous demonstrations against the PNDC despite the deteriorating economy. Herbst, J. I. (1993). The politics of reform in Ghana, 1982-1991. Berkeley, University of California Press. p. 31

attempts at adjustment, but provided the incumbent regime with their utmost priority: the majority of local elite support.

Senegalese economic difficulties began immediately following independence in 1960, when the national leadership assumed the colonial heritage of economic dependence on groundnut production, a vulnerable one-commodity export structure.¹⁴⁴ The highly agricultural nature of the economic structure – with over 2/3rds of the active population in rural areas, primarily engaged in agriculture, and the regime’s goals of supporting village leaders - led the state to prioritize and expand peanut production from 1960 - 68.¹⁴⁵ However, following the withdrawal of French price subsidies for peanuts in 1968, retrenchment set in.¹⁴⁶ The incumbent regime also continued to subsidize the non-agricultural sector through taxation by parastatals and consolidated an urban economic agenda.¹⁴⁷ External borrowing and state expansion hid the costs of the urban bias while continuing to rely on the rurally-based ground nut economy. Throughout the 1970’s the strategy of broad incorporation correlated with a period of unprecedented access to state-

¹⁴⁴ The colonial economic legacy was not just in terms of production. It also meant a precedent of an alliance between peanut export interests, (foreign), and rural notables (especially the leaders of the Sufi brotherhoods active in the peanut-producing areas). The social and physical proximity of the religious leaders (marabouts) to the rural population “invested them with a real legitimacy and authority over farmers that went beyond purely spiritual ministry. From the standpoint of the state, they had to be part of the solution to any major rural problem”. Delgado, C. L., S. C. Jammeh, et al. (1991). The Political economy of Senegal under structural adjustment. New York, Praeger. p. 3

¹⁴⁵ World Bank. and World Bank. International Economics Dept. Development Data Group. (1989). World Development Report 1989. O. U. Press. New York.

Delgado, C. L. and S. C. Jammeh (1991). Introduction: Structural Change in a Hostile Environment. The Political economy of Senegal under structural adjustment. SAIS studies on Africa. New York, Praeger: xi, 219 p. p. 3.

¹⁴⁶ Youm, P. (1991). The Economy Since Independence. The Political economy of Senegal under structural adjustment. SAIS studies on Africa. C. L. Delgado and S. C. Jammeh. New York, Praeger: p. 31-2.

¹⁴⁷ “The glue that held the system together was export revenues from primary commodities, especially peanuts, supplemented in bad years with subsidies from France. The profitability of this system was sufficiently large that it was possible for Senegalese policymakers to provide incentives for rapid area expansion of peanuts in the 1960s; substantial production subsidies to rural notables; lucrative profit-margins to French-dominated oil-processing firms; and sufficient state revenue to fund an overly large civil service”. Delgado, C. L. and S. C. Jammeh Ibid. Introduction: Structural Change in a Hostile Environment.

controlled resources.¹⁴⁸ The expansion of state intervention in this period corresponded with a policy shift of broadly supporting the agricultural sector as a whole to direct policy interventions in favor of rural notables.

The transition to multipartism coincided with severe economic crisis. The single crop dependency was problematic when droughts and crop disease decimated production. This was followed by falling world prices for peanut oil, the crisis of the groundnut economy, petrol shocks and generalized economic decline.¹⁴⁹ The interventionist state became less able to maneuver as its own financial needs increased to an extent that the economy could not satisfy.¹⁵⁰ It was “evident that the peanut export system on which both the rural and urban clientelist political systems were built had lost its vitality”.¹⁵¹

The early political liberalization in Senegal corresponded with economic and social crisis, and a change within the authoritarian incumbent party to more technocratic leadership with the appointed succession from Leopold Senghor to Abdou Diouf.¹⁵² Personnel and ideological restructuring contributed not only to the move to political pluralism, but also to the initiation of structural adjustment programs. Conflicting interests between the young technocrats and the party “barons” led to difficulties in evolving a consensus on a new development strategy to replace the peanut export system.

¹⁴⁸ Boone, C. Ibid. Politics under the Specter of Deindustrialization: "Structural Adjustment" in Practice. C. L. Delgado and S. C. Jammeh. p. 127 - 147

¹⁴⁹ Kane, A. and A. Ka (February 1986). Responsabilisation des agropasteurs ou la dépérissement d'une structure d'encadrement: le Projet de développement de l'élevage au Sénégal-Oriental (PDES). Tambacounda. Report presented at the "Méthodes de recherche sur les systèmes d'élevage en Afrique intertropicale" workshop held in Mbour, ISRA. Dakar, 2-8.

¹⁵⁰ Diop, M. C. (1992). Sénégal : trajectoires d'un Etat. Dakar, Sénégal. Paris, CODESRIA ; Diffusion, Karthala.

¹⁵¹ Ibid. p. 3

¹⁵² As linked with the move from President Senghor to Abdou Diouf, the younger generation of politicians brought in were less beholden to the old patronage machine and were more committed to political pluralism. Mboji, M. (1991). The Politics of Independence: 1960 - 1986. The Political economy of Senegal under structural adjustment. SAIS studies on Africa. C. L. Delgado and S. C. Jammeh. New York, Praeger: xi, p.119 - 126

The *internal* party factional struggles was a large part of the impetus to undertake political reform, and economic decline forced simultaneous adjustment programs.¹⁵³ This early move to reform while sustaining the political logic of urban and rural clientelism meant that the incumbents maintained significant and loyal constituencies of support in both camps, despite the onset of economic decline.

Zambia

Zambia's vast reservoir of mineral resources presented unique opportunities and challenges to the incumbent party UNIP. At independence Zambia was one of the most industrialized and urbanized of Africa's new nation-states. "With a GNP of close to 2 US\$ billion at the time of independence in 1964, Zambia had one of the highest per capita incomes in independent Africa."¹⁵⁴ The economy experienced modest growth for over a decade while the government built a developmentalist state model, nationalized industry, and pushed state-led growth and social modernization. UNIP rapidly expanded the public sector as a strategy to reduce opposition to the establishment of the one-party regime, seeking to build support through pressure groups, the civil service, the army, and the party itself through direct redistribution in the form of spoils and benefits to targeted groups.¹⁵⁵ The government became the leading supplier and the competition to the

¹⁵³ Gulhati, R. (1988). The political economy of reform in sub-Saharan Africa : report of the workshops on the political economy of structural adjustment and the sustainability of reform : Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada, November 20-22, 1986, World Bank, Washington, D.C., December 3-5, 1986.

Washington, D.C., World Bank. p. 9

¹⁵⁴ At the time GNP was two times higher than South Korea's. World Bank. and World Bank. International Economics Dept. Development Data Group. (1991). World Development Report 1991: The Challenge of Development. O. U. Press. New York.

¹⁵⁵ The use of the state sector was a key mechanism for the process of building a new consensus for the continuation of UNIP's rule. Scott, I. (1980). Party and Administration under the One Party State. Administration in Zambia. W. Tordoff. Manchester [Eng.] Madison, Wis., Manchester University Press ; University of Wisconsin Press: xi, 306 p. p. 139

private sector businesses became a major constraint on private enterprise.¹⁵⁶ By the mid-1970's, 80% of the Zambian economy was state-controlled. This policy brought all sectors of political and economic life – specifically those groups representing labor, business and commercial agriculture – into a close although often conflictual relationship with the state.

Zambia's economy began its dramatic decline with the collapse of copper prices on the world market in 1974, in large part because of the government's lack of response.¹⁵⁷ The government continued its high rate of social spending, accumulating massive debt from private creditors and the international financial institutions.¹⁵⁸ Between 1975 – 1991 Zambia's average per capita income declined by 2.5 % / year and the country's external debt ballooned from \$627 million in 1970 to US \$ 7.2 billion in 1990.¹⁵⁹ Zambia's economy was drastically reduced over two decades of UNIP rule to become one of the poorest countries on the continent. In response, donors imposed conditionality that required economic reform for continued assistance.¹⁶⁰ Though the regime oscillated and resisted, when they began in earnest to dismantle state control by liberalizing the exchange rates and cutting subsidies, the country erupted in riots and the government capitulated and reinstated the subsidies. These economic difficulties were quite common

¹⁵⁶ Bates, R. and P. Collier (1995). "The Politics and Economics of Policy Reform in Zambia." Journal of African Economies, Oxford University Press 4(1): 115-43.

¹⁵⁷ At this time, copper was 90% of the state's export economy. Rakner, L. (2003). Political and economic liberalisation in Zambia, 1991-2001. Uppsala, Sweden. Somerset, NJ, Nordic Africa Institute ; Distributor in North America, Transaction Publishers. p. 59

¹⁵⁸ The economic situation was exacerbated by regional conflicts that cut vital export/import lines.

¹⁵⁹ United Nations Development Programme (Zambia) (1997). Zambia human development report. Lusaka, Zambia, United Nations Development Programme: v.

¹⁶⁰ These requirements created a division within the country between the 'socialists' who felt the externally imposed reforms were ideologically wrong and detrimental to the regime and a heterogeneous group who recognized their necessity. Rakner, L. (2003). Political and economic liberalisation in Zambia, 1991-2001. Uppsala, Sweden. Somerset, NJ, Nordic Africa Institute ; Distributor in North America, Transaction Publishers. p. 55

across the continent, and in Zambia as elsewhere, the government prioritized political survival over economic response to the crisis.¹⁶¹

Zambia's reliance on mineral resources and the centrality of the urban clientele and mining union likely shaped the government's choice of 'modernizing' strategy and the expansion of the public sector for regime consolidation, rather than allying with traditional authorities and other local elites. However, it proved an unstable alliance for the incumbent. UNIP continued to bankrupt the state for short-term political calculus without the ability to offer meaningful economic reform to counter the growing influence of the labor union and respond effectively to their needs. The economic crisis was the context that helped to shape the key constituencies that supported political liberalization and readily transferred their support away from the incumbent party; this group saw political reform as a precondition to economic reform, which morphed into an anti-incumbent cohesion. In Zambia, the ruined economy was directly attributed to the UNIP regime by their key 'modern' clientele, who saw the solution as not just regime change but also leadership change.

Benin

A primarily agrarian economy, Benin also experienced a dramatic economic crisis in the 1980's and, similar to Zambia, a large proportion of the population attributed the

¹⁶¹ In the months after the government announced it would no longer subsidize the price of maize in December 1986 and the deadly riots that erupted and the restoration of the subsidies, the government "wavered over whether to continue the reform or end it. External actors and small and isolated technocratic elements argued for the continuing of the adjustment program, while everybody else wanted to terminate it. An important background was the growing concern about the public response to the (one-party) elections scheduled for 1988". Callaghy, T. M. (1990). *Lost between state and market: The politics of adjustment in Ghana, Zambia and Nigeria. Economic crisis and policy choice: The politics of adjustment in the third world*. J. Nelson. Princeton, Princeton University Press. p. 296.

economic problems directly to the PPRB regime.¹⁶² As in Zambia and Senegal and Ghana prior to 1984, the prioritization of political logic over necessary economic reforms exacerbated the economic crisis. And also parallel to Zambia as well as Senegal and Ghana, the centralization of economic resources by the state reinforced the circulation of elites, clientelism and cooptation as mechanisms of political regulation that were extremely detrimental to the economy.

In Benin, the seventeen years of PRPB rule transformed the socio-economic structure as part of its Marxist-Leninist project. First, the nature of the regime required that the party control all economic management. The state sector rapidly expanded by nationalization after 1974. Secondly, the transformative agenda of the PRPB to give the “power to the people” as a strategy of legitimating the new regime empowered workers over managers and reconfigured hegemonic relations by creating new elites and neutralizing prior sources of influence.¹⁶³ The sudden reversal of social and economic relations led to confusion and inefficiencies. In effect, the state was not truly a revolutionary Marxist project, and the corrosive practices of generalized pillage brought the state to bankruptcy. The direct party control over the economy, however, reinforced the general belief that the government was the source of the crisis, and the overlap meant that an inability to pay civil servants and state functionaries brought both the state and economy to a screeching halt, paralyzing both formal and informal sectors.¹⁶⁴

¹⁶² Benin’s economy has remained largely unchanged from independence through democratization, characterized by high reliance on cotton production in the North, and over 50% of the total labor force employed in agriculture. World Bank. and World Bank. International Economics Dept. Development Data Group. (2007). World development indicators. Washington, D.C., The World Bank: v.

¹⁶³ Bierschenk, T. and J.-P. Olivier de Sardan (1998). *Les pouvoirs au village : le Bénin rural entre démocratisation et décentralisation*. Paris, Editions Karthala. p. 66

¹⁶⁴ With the commencement of structural adjustment, the post-colonial compromise to distribute state resources was broken. Civil servants were not paid, elites become opposition, and the regime is easily

These conditions led to the mass protests, strikes and other anti-incumbent demonstrations that were centered on simultaneous economic and political reform. The agricultural base of the economy did not provide an organizational infrastructure to unify the heterogeneous demands for reform. Benin's cotton-dependent agricultural economy was similar to Senegal's in character but the incumbent regimes in the two countries used their resources to relate to the rural peasants in drastically different ways.


In all four countries, personalism, centralization of economic power within the state, and the supremacy of political logics were features that contributed to the socio-economic malaise and disaffected constituencies. Given the broad similarities, differences are also of note: Ghana's economic advances in the years prior to democratization, Zambia's industrial and urban economy based on mineral resources, Benin's Marxist-Leninist ideology and Senegal's democratization prior to the commencement of structural adjustment programs. These individual country differences do not help us to understand the formation of the party system any more than the broadly similar economic features. The economic structure and resource endowments of each country serve as contextual factors, that authoritarian regimes and potential opposition alike had to draw from in shaping their strategies to maintain or gain power. Ultimately,

killed. This was a wider phenomenon in Africa. Herbst, J. (2001). "Political liberalization in Africa after ten years." *Comparative Politics* 33(3): 357-+.

In Benin the state financial crisis made it impossible to re-build stability through co-optation and continual compromise with various groups. The regime quickly lost support of key groups: elite technocrats, intellectual reformists; factions of the army which divided into hardliner and reformer; and the old-time Marxist coalition that had been losing influence and power tried to block state reforms and transition. Internal means of regulation could not withstand socio-economic crisis. Banegas, R. (2003). *La démocratie à pas de caméléon : transition et imaginaires politiques au Bénin*. Paris, Karthala.

however, the strategies authoritarians chose were neither determined by economic context nor overcome by economic factors in the transition period (Figure 3.6).

Figure 3.6 Comparative Assessment of Economic Trajectories Prior to Democratization



While these four cases shared a history of economic stagnation due to the political logic of the party-state, each country demonstrates unique characteristics as well. The economic growth experienced in Ghana and the industrialization and urbanization that shaped constituencies in Zambia provided specific opportunities and constraints to the authoritarian regimes as they sought to consolidate their rule. *How* the regimes reacted to these socio-economic factors shaped the extent of power they wielded over the democratic transition (see Chapter 5). By themselves, however, the economic structural factors do not help to explain the form of party systems that has emerged in the democratic era.

Ethnic Cleavages

The social cleavage literature forms the basis of an additional important rival hypothesis. Building on the early theories of party system structure, politicized cleavages may give rise to parties that have deep roots within social groups, and have distinct, collective identities.¹⁶⁵ We would expect these cleavages to form the basis of political parties that are particularly enduring, exhibiting little volatility. Following Lijphart, Rogowski and Weaver, the presence of cleavages can solidify the ties between parties and the public, increase the predictability of political outcomes, and hence, contribute to democratic stability.¹⁶⁶ Prominent theories of social cleavages are based on arguments about the *salience* of social cleavages leading to more stable party systems and more loyal electorates, such that well-defined and well-organized societal cleavages close off the electoral market place and constrain the electoral mobility of voters.¹⁶⁷

In general across Africa, ethnicity is an important social cleavage, whereas class and ideological divides are not highly developed. Given that ethnic cleavages are salient, and that social cleavages can contribute to stability, the ethnic fractionalization of society is hypothesized to contribute to the degree of volatility and social rootedness (or depth of partisan affiliation) of the party system. Where there is greater ethnic fractionalization, it creates the possibility of more fluidity in inter-group bargaining, the make-up alliances, and would at the same time necessitate temporary partnerships as smaller groups

¹⁶⁵ Lipset, S. M. and S. Rokkan (1967). Party systems and voter alignments: cross-national perspectives. [Contributors: Robert R. Alford and others]. New York, Free Press.

¹⁶⁶ Lijphart, A., R. Rogowski, et al. (1993). "Separation of Powers and Cleavage Management: Political Institutions and Cleavage Management". Do institutions matter? : government capabilities in the United States and abroad. R. K. Weaver and B. A. Rockman. Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution: xiv, 498 p.

¹⁶⁷ Bartolini, S. and P. Mair (1990). Identity, competition, and electoral availability : the stabilisation of European electorates 1885-1985. Cambridge [England] New York, Cambridge University Press.

maneuver to make up a segment of the plurality coalition.¹⁶⁸ The multiplicity of possible social identities that might be politicized for electoral support and the likely necessity of cross-party alliances would contribute to higher overall volatility.¹⁶⁹ Therefore, the social cleavages approach would predict lower party system institutionalization. By the same token, where there is less fractionalization, the majority of the population will have deeply rooted connections to a few main political parties and these parties will exhibit stable trends in electoral competition, and higher overall party system institutionalization.

While ethnic identities are certainly among the most salient cleavages in most African democracies, the hypothesis that ethnic demography shapes the nature of party systems fails in large part because of the constructed and shifting nature of these identity groups.¹⁷⁰ Recent research has shown how the kinds of social cleavages that matter in politics vary *in relation to the formal institutional structure* of political competition.¹⁷¹ Posner has shown that politics revolves around one axis of social cleavage instead of another in response to regime changes. My research does not measure the way that identity groups change, but supports Posner's conclusion through a different metric. I

¹⁶⁸ Ferree, K. (2004). Ethnic Demographics and Electoral Volatility in Africa. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 2004.

¹⁶⁹ Building on Heath 2005, Tavits 2005, and rooted in Lipset and Rokkan 1967, which finds the roots of modern party systems in historical social cleavages. Bartolini and Mair call this 'cleavage closure' and argue that strong party-cleavage linkages stabilize party politics by making cross-party alliances less likely and providing fewer viable alternatives to voters. Lipset, S. M. and S. Rokkan (1967). Party systems and voter alignments: cross-national perspectives. [Contributors: Robert R. Alford and others]. New York, Free Press.

Bartolini, S. and P. Mair (1990). Identity, competition, and electoral availability: the stabilisation of European electorates 1885-1985. Cambridge [England] New York, Cambridge University Press.

Heath, O. (2005). "Party systems, political cleavages and electoral volatility in India - A state-wise analysis, 1998-1999." Electoral Studies 24(2): 177-199.

Tavits, M. (2005). "The development of stable party support: Electoral dynamics in post-communist Europe." American Journal of Political Science 49(2): 283-298.

¹⁷⁰ Young, C. (1976). The politics of cultural pluralism. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press.

¹⁷¹ Posner, D. N. (2004). "The political salience of cultural difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas are allies in Zambia and adversaries in Malawi." American Political Science Review 98(4): 529-545.

Posner, D. N. (2005). Institutions and ethnic politics in Africa. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

find that extremely heterogeneous societies *aggregate* into broad coalitions with ease in cases where the transition dynamics force polarization into two main camps, and over time the ethnic categories that describe these coalitions morph to describe broader groups as having always had a natural affinity. Where, however, the transition dynamics did not force aggregation, the ethnic affiliations and political party bases have remained extremely localized –as in Benin – and fluid – as in Zambia.¹⁷²

Due to the nature of shifting ethnic identity groups, measuring the relevant ethnic identity in order to test the social cleavages hypothesis cross-nationally is difficult. For the African democracies, the dataset of Politically Relevant Ethnic Groups measures fractionalization according to groups that are important in the electoral mobilization of identities.¹⁷³ My analysis shows that ethno-linguistic social cleavages have no significant relation to the outcome of party system institutionalization in African democracies (Figure 3.7). Although ethnic identities remain critical in mobilizing constituencies and linking voters to parties, the fractionalization of society cannot explain why party systems become institutionalized to a greater or lesser extent. Whether parties are large, aggregated coalitions of many identities, or whether parties represent only a very localized tribe or particular kin group is related to systemic features of the party system. Whether parties are coherently linked to particular constituencies and enduring over time, or whether parties are extremely volatile and reshape fluid constituencies with every

¹⁷² For example, in Zambia the Bemba originally made up the support base of the opposition movement in part because of their strategic location in the copperbelt region and in part because of their affiliation for the MMD's presidential candidate, Frederick Chiluba (a Bemba). However, following the expiration of term limits and the MMD's succession to a non-Bemba presidential candidate, the Bemba have shifted their affiliation away from the MMD – a move which profoundly affected the 2006 presidential and legislative elections.

¹⁷³ Posner, D. N. (2004). "Measuring ethnic fractionalization in Africa." *American Journal of Political Science* 48(4): 849-863.

election (regardless of whether it is through an appeal to ethnic kinship or not) is reflective of the formal institutional features of the party system, determined according to the extent of power of the authoritarian incumbent on the eve of the democratic transition. The inability of ethnic fractionalization to explain the party system character is an important finding, given the centrality accorded to ethnic identity in relation to political competition across the continent.¹⁷⁴

By examining the four case studies of Ghana, Senegal, Zambia and Benin, we can see similar patterns of heterogeneity across the countries (see Figure 3.7). They all have a single dominant group that commands a *near* majority and at least 3 other sizable ethnic groups along with a mix of smaller groups. Despite these similarities, the ethnic groups mobilize and ally within their national party systems in very different forms. In Senegal, for example, despite the predominance of the Wolof ethnic group and their language as the national *lingua franca*, ethnic identities are not a major determinant of party affiliation. The Wolof belong to many different parties, and no major party is considered a party *for* the Wolof. In Benin, by contrast, party affiliation is directly tied to the ethnic identity of the party leader. Local level party officials, when asked what drives vote choice and party affiliation, responded overwhelmingly with the refrain *l'homme du*


¹⁷⁴ Because of the strength of patron-client relations in African politics, much of the literature on political parties in Africa relates the character of political parties to a reflection of ethnic demographics. If there are two principal ethnic groups in a country, we might expect a solidified two-party system, whereas a more heterogeneous country may be represented by multiple parties that operate largely in their respective ethno-regional blocks and could shift in their alliances to form a governing coalition. Ferree, K. (2004). Ethnic Demographics and Electoral Volatility in Africa. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 2004.

Posner provides a nuanced analysis that explains why and when politics revolves around one axis of social cleave instead of another and how formal institutional rules determine the kinds of social cleavages that matter in politics. Posner, D. N. (2005). *Institutions and ethnic politics in Africa*. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

terroir— a man of their soil. In Zambia, ethnic groups have partnered in different alignments depending on the party leadership at that moment, the likely rivals, and previous election results. In Ghana the shift from single party to multiparty competition dramatically redrew the ethnic identity landscape – social cleavages remain salient in political calculations but the relevant identity groups became broader in relation to the two main competing parties.¹⁷⁵ This does not deny obvious differences in electoral strength of certain parties by region – this is an expected pattern of party-citizen linkage in countries worldwide – developing and advanced democracies alike. Rather, it problematizes the way in which identity coalitions are formed into party systems and how parties build enduring connections to constituency bases. This favors an explanation of systemic properties that shape the nature of party competition at the national level.

¹⁷⁵ For example, the former President J.J. Rawlings was an Ewe, an ethnic group that encompasses less than 1/3rd of the population. In multiparty competition, the NDC built from this identity to reach out to all of the Eastern region (where the Ewes are concentrated) and Northern regions as ‘marginalized’ areas in relation to the Ashanti domination. The opposition NPP leadership was linked to the Ashanti tribe, but the NPP became associated with the broader ethnic group of the Akan, encompassing Ashanti, Fanti, Akuapim, Akyem and Kwahu, which provides a much larger base of affiliation.

Figure 3.7 Ethnic Cleavages in Ghana and Senegal (High PSI) & Zambia and Benin (Low PSI)



This section details economic and ethnic demographic alternative hypotheses that I argue do *not* shape the nascent multiparty system. In both cross-national statistical analysis as well as a detailed discussion of Ghana, Senegal, Zambia and Benin, it is apparent that the similarities of ethnic heterogeneity and generalized economic stagnation do not help to explain the form of party system that has emerged in the democratic era.

Democratization as Exogenous

The wave of democratization that swept across Africa at the end of the 20th century was exceptional in its breadth and rapidity. The cluster of regime transitions that occurred within a short time period across the continent were driven by similar pressures – state weakness, entrenched economic crisis, international dependency, and domestic dissatisfaction with authoritarian rule.¹⁷⁶ While the outcomes of regime transition varied and democratic consolidation remained elusive for many, similar democratizing pressures were at work across the continent.¹⁷⁷ In particular, because these were all neopatrimonial systems, the impetus for political liberalization arose from conflicts over access to spoils between insiders and outsiders to the state patronage system. The most critical shared feature of these neopatrimonial regimes is that through the systems of personal rule, the choices made by political elites were highly decisive in determining outcomes.¹⁷⁸ Across the continent, authoritarian leaders undertook democratic transitions that they hoped to

¹⁷⁶ Herbst, J. (2001). "Political liberalization in Africa after ten years." *Comparative Politics* 33(3): 357-+.

Diamond, L. J. and M. F. Plattner (1999). *Democratization in Africa*. Baltimore, Md, Johns Hopkins University Press.

¹⁷⁷ Diamond, L. J. and M. F. Plattner (1996). *The global resurgence of democracy*. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.

¹⁷⁸ Bratton, M. and N. Van de Walle (1997). *Democratic experiments in Africa : regime transitions in comparative perspective*. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, NY, USA, Cambridge University Press. p. 270

control and use to reconsolidate their power in a new formal regime. While they resisted changes to the informal rules that buttressed their authority to the greatest extent possible, they conceded legal reforms but tried “to manipulate the process of rule making in such as a way as to maintain their own best political advantage”.¹⁷⁹

While economic and international forces were certainly factors that influenced the context in each country in particular ways, they were not decisive. Economic crisis or international donor ultimatums were not the main catalyst of political reform in Africa. They often helped to create the conditions under which political regimes consolidated power or lost their grip, but alone they did not trigger democratization. Rather, domestic institutional legacies – particularly those that provided opportunities to expand political participation and competition – were critical to the nascent opposition forces.¹⁸⁰

The four case studies present the empirical details of the domestic, economic and international pressures for democratization. (Table 3.4)

¹⁷⁹ In this vein, authoritarians attempted to the best of their abilities to closely manage the process of reform, including political competition but also participation by building slowly from experiments with local elections as in Ghana and Benin.. Ibid.

¹⁸⁰ Ibid. p. 268 – 272.

Table 3.4 Pressures for Democratization

Democratic Transition Pressures:	GHANA (HIGH PSI)	SENEGAL (HIGH PSI)	ZAMBIA (LOW PSI)	BENIN (LOW PSI)
1.) Domestic	Counter-elite led push for political liberalization	Internal fragmentation of elite	Economic and academic leaders led push for political liberalization	Incapacity of state to further co-opt counter-elites and generalized institutional gridlock with state immobility
2.) Economic	Economic growth; SAPs painful to masses	Crisis, lack of growth	Crisis, riots; Urbanized and industrialized economy	Crisis, bankrupt state
3.) International	Intense due to economic collaboration	Minimal, Senegal as early democratizer; Socialist Party Intl. Federation benefit sought	Moderate, Example of Eastern Europe (Romania)	Minimal, Benin as early democratizer

Senegal presents an outlier in this categorizing of African democratization, as they made the transition to unlimited multipartism well before the common convergence across the continent. Senegal made its full opening in 1981, a decade prior to the majority of democratizations in Africa. Despite this early action, it was a realization of the *same pressures*, particularly domestic factionalism, which led Senegal to the pathway of political reform.¹⁸¹ Economic stagnation, a desire to maintain and improve international relations¹⁸², and most importantly a necessity of dealing with domestic challengers – both within and external to the incumbent party – were the factors driving

¹⁸¹ Guèye, S. P. (2003). *Du bon usage de la démocratie en Afrique : contribution à une éthique et à une pédagogie du pluralisme : essai*. Dakar, Nouvelles Éditions africaines du Sénégal.

¹⁸² Particularly because President Senghor was internationally networked to a great extent and wanted the PS to join the Socialist Party International federation, which required multipartism.

democratization in Senegal.¹⁸³ So while Senegal was ahead of its time in realizing and reacting to the pressures of domestic dissatisfaction, it provided an example of what was to transpire in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa a few years later.

The specific constellation of domestic political, economic, and international factors that influenced the transition in Senegal are similar to those in Ghana, Benin and Zambia. In Senegal, the domestic pressures of internal factions to the PS led President Senghor to allow a spin-off political party. Restricted competition was permitted until Senghor's successor, President Diouf, found the move to full multipartism politically valuable in his attempts to shore up his own legitimacy (as he had been appointed through constitutional fiat by the outgoing Senghor).¹⁸⁴ Diouf wished first to depart from his predecessor by initiating political liberalization as his own contribution. Secondly, he hoped to diffuse challenges to his first electoral competition by dividing the potential opposition. The political motives changed over time, and as the driving agents changed the degree of political reform allowed gradually expanded. The economic situation contributed to popular discontent; Senegal's flagging economy pinched patronage systems and made for more vocal critiques of the one-party system. Particularly because the PS had justified the single party system with the argument that unity was a necessary condition to achieve the ultimate goal of development, the party was at pains to continue

¹⁸³ The international factor was particularly important in President Senghor's calculation because he was highly engaged internationally and wished to join the Socialist Party International Federation, which required multiparty competition. Domestic challenges are described in Fatton. Fatton, R. (1987). The making of a liberal democracy : Senegal's passive revolution, 1975-1985. Boulder, Colo., L. Rienner Publishers.

Full multipartism was achieved mostly due to President Abdou Diouf's need to hold elections to legitimize his rule after succeeding to President by constitutional appointment engineered by President Senghor before his departure. In order to divide potential challenges and depart from his predecessor, Diouf proclaimed full multipartism.

¹⁸⁴ Diop, M. C. and M. Diouf (1990). Le Sénégal sous Abdou Diouf : Etat et société. Paris, Karthala.

the monopolistic regime in the face of economic decline. International affiliation played a minor role as well in Senegal's democratization. President Senghor had thick connections to France, having served as Senegal's deputy in the French parliament, and wanted the PS to be able to register in the international federation of socialist parties. This international affiliation – and potential benefits to his party – was blocked by the country's status as a single-party state; providing an additional incentive for political liberalization. These factors combined were sufficient to push the PS to initiate the transition, building on its strong support social support base to limit challenges to its complete control over the democratization process.

In Ghana, domestic sentiment and civil society agitation was an important factor to political liberalization.¹⁸⁵ The PNDC authoritarian regime was attempting to produce its own form of continued party-state system under the name 'participatory grass-roots democracy', while ultimately avoiding multipartism. While the middle class call for democracy had been a failure through the early 1980's due to its elite nature and lack of significant base, by the late 1980's the PNDC relationship with labor and radical political organization that had been allies began to sour. A new charge from the lower classes maintained that the government was expropriating wealth that the workers had created, and this swing realigned political forces in favor of the pro-democracy movement, providing the potential for attaining mass support.¹⁸⁶ And while Ghana was experiencing positive economic growth, the structural adjustment program was a painful process for a

¹⁸⁵ GyimahBoadi, E. (1996). "Civil society in Africa." *Journal of Democracy* 7(2): 118-132.

Gyimah-Boadi, E., M. Oquaye, et al. (2000). *Civil society organizations and Ghanaian democratization*. Accra, Center for Democracy & Development, Ghana.

¹⁸⁶ Ninsin, K. A. (1998). Civic associations and the transition to democracy. *Ghana: transition to democracy. Codesria book series*. K. A. Ninsin, Codesria. Dakar, Senegal, Codesria; p. 42 - 71.

large segment of the population. Strikes became frequent and politicized as anti-state.¹⁸⁷

And the lack of public forum for openly debating the government's economic austerity policies was a key reason for the agitations in favor of political liberalization.¹⁸⁸

Ghana's international relations also played a role in encouraging the PNDC regime to accept the multiparty option. Because the PNDC was in close collaboration with the donor community, their continued good graces were important to the regime. Significant inflows of foreign financial resources and the government's extreme dependence on external economic resources meant that the regime had to follow through on political liberalization.¹⁸⁹ Therefore, the international push for multiparty democracy shaped the PNDC's acceptance of the form of political liberalization that the domestic population was requesting. In Ghana as in Senegal, the incumbent party acquiesced to pressures for liberalization that they knew they could have resisted for longer, but they did so in order to further consolidate their power in a changing environment and effectively deal with some of the pressures at hand.

The transition to democracy in Zambia was also an inter-related mixture of political, economic and international factors. The political pressure to liberalize both politically and economically by the late 1980's was intense. Because the state had so much control over the economic situation, the wasteful parastatals, inefficient agricultural production and the end of food subsidies all pushed the economic elite and urban

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Economic reforms can serve as a catalyst to provoke people to fight for their democratic rights. Jebuni and Oduro in Ninsin, K. A. and Codesria. (1998). *Ghana : transition to democracy*. Dakar, Senegal, Codesria.

¹⁸⁹ Jebuni and Oduro; Bofo-Arthur argue that the donor community pushed against anti-democratic internal forces, such as the military regime's antipathy towards multipartism, to precipitate the crucial phase of the transition and to keep it on course. Jebuni and Oduro; Bofo-Arthur in Ibid.

industrialists to contest the regime.¹⁹⁰ Particularly because these were UNIP's core support constituencies, the political strains of economic reform were extremely costly. Food riots erupted when UNIP carried out World Bank and International Monetary Fund reform proposals to reduce food subsidies to urban areas.¹⁹¹

Ultimately, the incumbent party was caught in a vicious cycle: the political costs of economic reform were too great for the regime to bear and so the reforms were abandoned, and yet, the economic crisis was correctly diagnosed by these key constituencies as a political problem – one that demanded political liberalization as an avenue to changing leadership and addressing the national problems afresh. The increasing debt prohibited the regime from receiving additional assistance from the multilateral financial institutions, and thus the regime's resources plummeted drastically. These overlapping factors were foremost in the push for democratization: the solution to socio-economic crisis was to end one-party rule. Because UNIP's support among the urban and industrialized clientele depended on economic performance and subsidies, the ruling party became a captive to the process rather than its director.

In Benin the main cause of democratization was the waning ability of the regime to carry out its clientelistic practices, declining political legitimization based on elite circulation, and the subsequent manifest incapacity of the PRPB to execute the state's affairs.¹⁹² The breakdown of the political logic of the incumbent regime was related to

¹⁹⁰ Rakner, L. (2003). *Political and economic liberalisation in Zambia, 1991-2001*. Uppsala, Sweden Somerset, NJ, Nordic Africa Institute ; Distributor in North America, Transaction Publishers. p.12

¹⁹¹ The other international factor that was influential to Zambia was the example of Romania – as President Kaunda had relations with the dictatorship and was horrified by the example of their fate.

¹⁹² Noudjenoume, P. (1999). *La démocratie au Bénin, 1988-1993 : bilans et perspectives*. Paris, L'Harmattan.

Adamon, A. D. (1995). *Le renouveau démocratique au Bénin : la Conférence nationale des forces vives et la période de transition*. Paris, Harmattan.

the simultaneous and unprecedented development of collective mobilization by the masses, which – despite incredible heterogeneity – became quickly federated behind the banner of democratization.¹⁹³ Important groups in leading this charge were the clandestine communist party, the students and union of civil servants, the Catholic Church and the Diasporas and exiled opposition.¹⁹⁴ The political breakdown was intimately related to the complete fiscal meltdown of the regime, state bankruptcy and unpaid, striking state work force. External pressures were minimal, as the process was highly contingent upon the constellation of domestic forces and Benin was an early democratizer that set the example for the rest of the continent.¹⁹⁵

While democratization in any weakly institutionalized and poor country remains a low probability event, and there are many obstacles to overcome, the fact that so many African countries did democratize in this short period remains unprecedented. The countries under consideration in this study are all democracies; they have all undergone the liberalizing political reform in reaction to a combination of domestic and international pressures that made sustaining the authoritarian systems as status quo untenable. And with all of the successful transitions, there remains a great deal of difference in how democracy is practiced through the party system, which cannot be explained by the causes of democratization.

¹⁹³ Banegas, R. (2003). *La démocratie à pas de caméléon : transition et imaginaires politiques au Bénin*. Paris, Karthala.

¹⁹⁴ The diaspora and opposition in exile were not influential during authoritarian period and exerted only a weak influence to create transition but they were influential in trying to come to power in new system via contestation within the national conference. Because the situation was so fluid and not operating according to a pre-established model, the exiles returned to take front stage. Ibid. p. 113

¹⁹⁵ Former President of Benin, Nicephore Soglo, however, emphasized the influence of the French over all Beninois politics. Soglo, N. (2005). Former President of Benin and Mayor of Cotonou. R. Interview. Cotonou, Benin.

Conclusion

This chapter demonstrates that the nature of the independence era politics, post-colonial state formation, authoritarian regime types, and economic conditions do not explain the divergent party systems of Ghana, Senegal, Zambia and Benin. Furthermore, the economic growth experienced in Ghana, the early democratization of Senegal, and the ethno-regionally unstable competition of Benin's post-independence elections are examples of country-specific factors that do not ultimately impact party system institutionalization. These histories are important, however, because they provide the context in which authoritarian incumbents maneuvered in their continual quest for regime consolidation. The strategies authoritarian incumbents pursued – broad incorporation or transformative modernization – determined the extent to which they could count on the support of local elites to mobilize mass backing in their favor during times of challenge. Chapter 4 examines the modes of authoritarian power accumulation and the extent of attendant local elite support, which lays the foundation for control over the democratic transition and the character of the multiparty system. The following chapters show how the specific historical legacy of modes of authoritarian power accumulation and the associated ability to control the democratic transition create particular competitive and electoral pressures that establish the enduring character of the multiparty system.

Chapter Four

Modes of Authoritarian Power

I argue that where authoritarians were powerful, they were able to control the transition and establish the rules of the game, that paradoxically leads to stable and competitive party systems of alternating majorities. The democratic transition is a critical window of opportunity for setting eligibility rules, shaping expectations of party activity and creating a logic of inter-party competition (as will be discussed in Chapters 5 and 6). As demonstrated through cross-national statistical analysis in Chapter 3, where authoritarian incumbents were able to win the majority of legislative seats in the founding elections, the party system remained highly institutionalized in the democratic era whereas where the incumbent was not present in the transition or was swept out of power with the founding elections, the party system exhibited continually low levels of institutionalization. This begs the question of what makes authoritarians powerful and, therefore, capable of controlling the transition in their favor?

The central factor determining authoritarian power is their relationship to local elite powerbrokers, who command the following of the masses due to their traditional authority and/or socio-economic status within the village.¹⁹⁶ The breadth and depth of support of local elites is crucial because they are capable of mobilizing their clients in

¹⁹⁶ See Migdal, Kohli and Shue for discussions regarding the challenges that regimes face in consolidating power in the generally weak states of the developing world. Migdal, J. S., A. Kohli, et al. (1994). State power and social forces : domination and transformation in the Third World. Cambridge [England] ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

support of the authoritarian regime.¹⁹⁷ Across Africa, power at the national level is dependent upon relations with local elites.¹⁹⁸ These local leaders, while managing their clients, continue to try to maximize their position by seeking access to the state and its resources. Therefore, the regime's strategies for accumulating power - and how they choose to relate to the pre-existing social structure - ultimately shape local elite decisions about whether to support the ruling party in times of challenge. Both local elites and party leaders alike readily acknowledge the centrality of patron-client relations in consolidating regime power:

What matters is the individual leader and his relations with the population. I have my own following here, and I contribute to their well being. The [ruling party's] power is dependent on the quality of links, their networks. You have to have relations with major families. These relations are key to party success because local leaders are important behind it all. If I were to leave the *Parti Socialiste*, for example, and switch to another party, the region would vote for my new party because their link is through me, the leader they associate with.
Souty Toure PS, Mayor of Tambacounda, Senegal. Interview August 2005, Dakar.

During the authoritarian era, the ruling party tends to be the only game in town and thus it is difficult to measure the extent of local elite support the regime commands. However, the onset of democratization provides local elites a window of opportunity in which they can decide to either support the incumbent or defect to the nascent

¹⁹⁷ Local elites have the potential to mobilize the acquiescence and even the support of the masses due to their religious, socio-economic or traditional authority over their followers. Their status often overlaps in these domains. These local elites command the following of large numbers due to their own personal patronage and social authority, but they also build upon historical links that tie identity groups together and legitimate their personal status through a deeper communal relation. Young, C. (1976). The politics of cultural pluralism. Madison, University of Wisconsin Press.

Bayart, J.-F. (1989). L'Etat en Afrique : la politique du ventre. [Paris], Fayard.

Hydén, G. and M. Bratton (1992). Governance and politics in Africa. Boulder, Colo., L. Rienner.

¹⁹⁸ Intermediaries are particularly necessary in Africa where chronically weak states and fragile regimes are often incapable of projecting authority over the entire territory and penetrating society. Hydén, G. (1980). Beyond ujamaa in Tanzania : underdevelopment and an uncaptured peasantry. Berkeley, University of California Press.

Herbst, J. I. (2000). States and power in Africa : comparative lessons in authority and control. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.

opposition.¹⁹⁹ The local elites' decisions to remain loyal to the regime or to side with the opposition at this critical moment are a function of the modes of power accumulation pursued by the ruling party during the authoritarian period.

Authoritarians generally pursued one of two strategies of regime consolidation during the decades of military or single party rule: *Incorporation* of broad swaths of society through existing traditional elites *or* the replacement of traditional linkages to society and a state-centered *Modernization* approach, neutralizing existing ties in favor of state and party organs. These contrasting strategies produced highly unequal reservoirs of local elite support for the authoritarian incumbent. Where authoritarians pursued extensive and encompassing *incorporation* of traditional authorities, they built broad and durable bases of support among the local elites. Local elites built on links to the state to maintain their clientele and, in times of regime challenge could mobilize support for the authoritarian regime. With the onset of democratization, local elites used their position to secure the acquiescence of the masses to the incumbent's transition agenda for controlled reform.


In contrast, where authoritarian incumbents pursued *modernizing* modes of power accumulation, they attempted to neutralize and repress traditional authority figures and replace them with state-sponsored organizations. Modernization strategies created only an appearance of authoritarian societal penetration while local elites judged the ruling party to be the only feasible option to access the state. The façade was shattered with the onset of democratization and massive local elite defection. In attempting to repress and neutralize traditional sources of authority at the local level and replace that authority with

¹⁹⁹ Democratization itself is treated as an exogenous variable, occurring simultaneously according to broadly similar domestic social, economic and international pressures (see Chapter 3).

the state, incumbents constructed a precarious base for their rule. In the absence of *economic* modernization and the emergence of class relations, *political* modernization strategies for consolidating power will necessarily fail to build lasting, durable support for the authoritarian incumbent because it alienates the local elites, who serve as the basis of social network power in pre-modern societies.

Alternative modes of power accumulation could produce parallel levels of support through divergent routes. Furthermore, authoritarians do not always set the agenda. Revolutionary movements, for example, could build support through grass roots organization among the rural peasantry and local elites, generating a majority base of followers. Namibia and South Africa exemplify this route. Although through different means, violent revolutionary parties that eschew the status quo and authoritarian dictatorships that build upon traditional authorities are both capable of mobilizing mass support. Particularly in times of challenge, when local elites organize their followers to support the regime, the regime has significant power to set the agenda. With the onset of democratization, agenda-setting power is used to shape the character of the new multiparty system. Given different modes of accumulating power, the extent of local elite support determines the authoritarian regime's position on the eve of the democratic transition. It is this position of strength or weakness that creates parallel incentives facing the prospects of party creation and competition (Figure 4.1).

Figure 4.1: Modes of Power Accumulation



It is difficult to predict which strategies ruling parties pursue to accumulate power in the authoritarian period, particularly because agency, contingency and social structure all contribute in myriad ways. Individual agency influences how powerful executives pursue the accumulation and centralization of power. Contingency contributes to the waxing and waning of alliances between the incumbent and particular social groups in a competitive environment.²⁰⁰ Different social maps feature unequal opportunities to

²⁰⁰ Similar to Bratton and van de Walle’s discussion of economic and international forces in regime transition (onset and subsequent trajectory): “They helped to create the conditions under which political change became possible, but they did not in and of themselves trigger or sustain regime transitions or determine the directions the transitions took”. Bratton, M. and N. Van de Walle (1997). *Democratic experiments in Africa : regime transitions in comparative perspective*. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, NY, USA, Cambridge University Press. P. 272.

ruling parties seeking to build a social base and legitimize their rule.²⁰¹ Structural conditions present different reservoirs of available and suitable alliances, presenting unequal opportunities for symbiotic relations given the identity of the authoritarian regime. Given these variations, and sometimes in spite of them, authoritarian regimes pursued a range of strategies to consolidate their power. What remains central to determining authoritarian power is how local elites *interact* with the regime; local elite calculations at the onset of the democratic transition regarding the extent of support they will mobilize for either the incumbent or the opposition take into account the authoritarian strategies for consolidating their rule in the prior era.

Local elites, such as chiefs and other traditional or religious authorities, are not the initiators of democratization.²⁰² Rather, they are the pivotal group that commands the following of the masses. While traditional authorities are generally conservative forces that uphold the status quo, when the option of political liberalization becomes available they must make a choice of whether to support the incumbent regime or whether to

²⁰¹ The political, economic and social milieu provided a range of opportunities and challenges to authoritarians seeking to consolidate their power and opposition wishing to challenge it. In particular, the authoritarian regime's relationship to pre-existent social groups always holds the paradoxical potential to either bolster or weaken the regime's power. Migdal, J. S. (1994). Introduction: Developing a state-in-society perspective. State power and social forces: domination and transformation in the Third World. J. S. Migdal, A. Kohli and V. Shue. Cambridge [England] ; New York, Cambridge studies in comparative politics. Cambridge University Press: x, 333 p.


Potential allies and adversaries vary in each country, from religious, ethnic, or traditional groups to ideological and economic organizations. Pre-existing social maps contain different reservoirs of available and suitable alliances, presenting unequal opportunities for symbiotic relations. Some potential alliances are more influential than others, and their degree of autonomy from the state shapes the extent to which they could be used to consolidate or weaken the regime's power. Some partners may be precluded by the incumbent regime's ideology or ethnic identity. Inter-group hostility may make it difficult to construct cross-cutting alliances and limit possible coalitions of support. Predispositions towards the regime or opposition vary further; no single group is always responsible for supporting the incumbent or the opposition.

²⁰² Schraeder, P. J. (1994). "Elites as facilitators or impediments to political-development - Some lessons from the 3rd wave of democratization in Africa " Journal of Developing Areas 29(1): 69-89.

support the nascent opposition.²⁰³ What they decide depends on a calculation of both how likely they think the incumbent is to succeed in its agenda (e.g. based on the authoritarian regime's prior strategies for accumulating power, what they think the majority of *other* local elites are likely to do) and their current relation to the regime (e.g. perception of relative marginalization, which affects their utility of supporting or defecting). Because these local elites are driven by a continual calculation of how best to access the state, they will weigh these two factors and make their best guess of which route will maximize their position in the new regime. Whether the majority of local elites decides to support the incumbent or defect to the opposition ultimately determines the extent of influence both the authoritarian regime and the opposition have in shaping the democratic transition agenda in their favor and creating the rules of the new multiparty system (Figure 4.2).

²⁰³ Local elites serve as conservative forces and support the status quo due to patronage links with the state.

Figure 4.2: Determinants of Party System Institutionalization



The modes of authoritarian power accumulation determine the response of local elites at the critical point of the democratic transition. Where incumbents are supported by the local elites and their followers, they are able to control the transition participants and set the rules to reflect their preferences. Where incumbents are deserted by local elites and their clients, they are unable to control the transition – which becomes open to participation by all of the heterogeneous local elites, each representing their own particular group interests. In these various transition dynamics, the nascent party system is formed and mechanisms are developed for its endurance.

The argument presents some important implications for theories of democratization and our underlying assumptions about politics in the developing world. First, this theory of authoritarian power does not lend support to the civil society literature that relates democratic success to the replacement of clientelistic networks by autonomous and pro-democratic civic activism.²⁰⁴ I argue that while the relations between state and society are central to the accumulation of authoritarian power, it is not the weak civil society that defines state-society relations but patronage linkages that bring society into the equation through mass following of local elites. *Patrons and clientelism play a critical role in shaping the formal institutions of democracy.*²⁰⁵ Secondly, while authoritarian regimes are constantly in search of assets to consolidate their rule, these are *not material per se; rather, they are social networks of patron-client relations from the state to local elites to the masses.* This explains in part why regimes in Africa have been able to withstand seemingly 'permanent' economic crisis, and challenges the notion that

²⁰⁴ See, for instance, Victor Perez-Diaz, *The Return of Civil Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993); Gordon White, "Civil Society, Democratization, and Development," *Democratization*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (1994), pp. 375-90; and Nancy Bermeo and Philip Nord, *Civil Society before Democracy: Lessons From Nineteenth-Century Europe* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000). Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1999), pp. 218-60. Alfred Stepan, "State Power and the Strength of Civil Society in the Southern Cone of South America," in *Arguing Comparative Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Valerie Bunce, "Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience," *World Politics*, Vol. 55, No. 1 (2003), pp. 167-92; "Strong State and Contentious Society," in Koo (ed), *State and Society in Contemporary Korea* (New York: Cornell University Press, 2000); P. Lewis, "Political Transitions and the Dilemma of Civil Society in Africa," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (1992), pp. 31-54. Freedom House, *How Freedom is Won: From Civic Resistance to Durable Democracy*, Special Report, May 2005 <<http://www.freedomhouse.org/research/specreports/civictans/index.htm>.

²⁰⁵ See also examples of ways that formal institutions of democracy may be corrupted or manipulated. Sidel, J. T. (1999). *Capital, coercion, and crime : bossism in the Philippines*. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press.

material resources alone can sustain ruling parties that eschew alliances with traditional authorities in favor of modernizing agendas.²⁰⁶

This chapter describes and measures the explanatory variable of authoritarian incumbent power at the onset of democratization, where power is based on local elite *support* prior to founding elections. I assess local elite patterns in supporting the incumbent or defecting to the opposition through interviews I conducted across each country with current local party representatives. The empirical analysis will also consider the strategic decisions for incorporation or modernization by the regime during the authoritarian period. The macrohistorical processes in Ghana, Senegal, Benin and Zambia are evidence of the importance of authoritarian strategies in accumulating power through durable alliances with traditional authorities. This chapter also analyzes evidence from primary interviews with key incumbent leaders from the authoritarian regime, as well as secondary sources regarding the nature of the authoritarian period and the modes of power accumulation pursued. This evidence presents a detailed picture of the extent of authoritarian power on the eve of the democratic transition.

Incumbent strategies of Incorporation and Modernization

Authoritarian regimes had different methods of consolidating their rule and established different partners in their quest.²⁰⁷ Where authoritarian regimes used broad

²⁰⁶ For a detailed discussion of how African regimes have been able to sustain endless economic decline, see Van de Walle, N. (2001). *African economies and the politics of permanent crisis, 1979-1999*. Cambridge New York, Cambridge University Press.

For the literature on how authoritarian regimes endure when benefitting from material / natural resources, see Ross, M. L. (2001). "Does oil hinder democracy?" *World Politics* 53(3): 325-+.

²⁰⁷ Authoritarian regimes in weak states continually faced the problem of establishing a new consensus for the continuation of their rule. In all societies there exist economic, religious, ethnic or political identities that form the basis of autonomous social groups – the nature of these groups vary but are similar in that they provide a sense of connection, resources, language or other means of relating to one another at the

'incorporation' tactics – of prominent local elites that could then mobilize their following – they were able to garner mass support in times of challenge. In Ghana and Senegal, the incumbents were able to build durable affiliations through these forms of partnership, which ultimately contributed to the incumbent's power even as the party-state was formally dismantled through democratization.

Where authoritarian regimes pursued *'modernizing'* tactics they eschewed traditional authorities in favor of urban and business elite, and attempted to repress chiefly or religious power, and replace it with modern, state-controlled organizations, such as unions, state-sponsored development associations, and of course, the ruling party. While *'modern'* organizations served the regime's purposes while they were the only game in town, this strategy held two potential challenges for authoritarian regimes when faced with the onset of democratization. First, repressed traditional authorities could possibly reemerge with the advent of democratization to command their following to side with the opposition. Secondly, the modern organizations constructed by the regime could be less durable in their support of the incumbent, particularly because their very nature

individual level that is beyond the reach of the state and any particular regime. While the authoritarian regimes of Ghana, Senegal, Zambia and Benin all attempted to construct political parties to reach individual loyalties, the party's in the weak states were generally unable to broadcast authority over their full terrains and unable to penetrate the masses of their own accord. Hydén, G. (1980). Beyond ujamaa in Tanzania : underdevelopment and an uncaptured peasantry. Berkeley, University of California Press.

Herbst, J. I. (2000). States and power in Africa : comparative lessons in authority and control. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.

Authoritarian regimes generally sought to use patronage resources distributed through particular channels to co-opt and pacify potential rivals, buying off enough support to consolidate its control base. Modes of Authoritarian Power Accumulation can take a variety of forms, but they can be broadly grouped into incorporation and modernization: incorporation of powerful individuals and cooptation of entire groups, building alliances with groups that cannot be subsumed into the regime - these strategies represent forms of incorporation that incumbent's could use to penetrate society at a critical moment while keeping the local elites strong enough to be able to mobilize their following when it was necessary. In contrast, attempting to neutralize or repress pre-existent local elites could be effective in wiping out their power, leaving regimes precariously perched at the helm. Or the repression option could be ineffective in replacing the local elites, leaving an arsenal of enemies waiting for the right opportunity to react against the regime.

makes them more dependent on state resources in order to maintain their particular following through patronage. These new leaders could potentially use their base as a foundation from which to contribute to the opposition. In Zambia, the government built up the trade union by centralizing its power into a single federation and secured funding through mandatory affiliation. This strategy greatly increased the power of the union leadership, yet ironically created the infrastructure, organization and resource base that contributed to a uniquely strong democratic opposition movement. In Benin, the incumbent party's modernizing anti-*vooodoo* campaign against ancestral kingdoms and traditional priests attempted to neutralize these powerful authorities. This strategy ultimately left the regime devoid of allies amongst the rural peasantry. While differences in the nature of local elites are natural across cases, they are salient in retrospect due to the modes of power accumulation the authoritarian regime pursued.²⁰⁸

Senegal's authoritarian incumbents were able to garner the support of the rural masses through their alliance with the country's powerful and autonomous Islamic brotherhood leadership and traditional chiefdoms. The religious organization of the country offered the incumbent party the option of partnering with *marabout* leaders who had significant spiritual and patronage influence over the majority of the peasants in the rural countryside, and could command their loyalties to the ruling party.²⁰⁹ The ruling

²⁰⁸ Zambia's heavily urban population perhaps precluded a strategy that could create cross-cutting alliances and satisfy both the rural peasants as well as the urban industrialists. The early ideological compromise of the Beninois military dictatorship to ally with a radical Marxist-Leninist faction to consolidate their rule had implications for acceptable allies in the rural world. Senegal's integrated network of religious brotherhoods provided an obvious focus that did not require choosing one group over another. Ghanaians' commitment to independence era political identities provided the regime a network of political leaders already connected to the traditional authority structure.

²⁰⁹ The Islamic brotherhood support was powerful in both spiritual and economic realms. Because the Islamic brotherhoods had the religious authority to issue dictates regarding how their followers should vote,

party, the PS, utilized its strong links with the marabouts and their control over peanut production to assure the regime's hegemonic position.²¹⁰ The ruling party PS also focused on partnerships with traditional leaders, forming a tripartite relationship between chiefs, 'saints', and the state.²¹¹ The PS calculus to ally with the rural producer through powerful traditional authorities supported the regime for over four decades, despite challenges of internal party factional disputes and economic crises.²¹² The broad incorporation tactics covered the geographic expanse of the country, and integrated heterogeneous identity groups of tribe and religious sect. These tactics of incorporation contributed significantly to the incumbent regime's support among local elites and their influence over the majority of the population.²¹³

they could marshal the loyalty and electoral turnout of a very large segment of the population. The marabouts – the Mouride sect in particular - also acted as rural entrepreneurs because of their role in peanut production, that state's main export crop, so that their economic status reinforced their spiritual leadership as well as their patronage capacity. Fatton, R. (1987). The making of a liberal democracy : Senegal's passive revolution, 1975-1985. Boulder, Colo., L. Rienner Publishers. p. 58

²¹⁰ These marabouts held a religious authority as well as economic authority over the rural peasants due to their spiritual and patronage leadership positions. The marabouts held a privileged negotiating position, having served as interlocutors with both colonial and independence era governments. Rather than direct incorporation into the regime, the marabout's religious position encouraged economic and social alliances with the regime to provide autonomy and resources to the religious leaders. The marabouts could issue a religious dictate on matters of politics, a tool they used to mobilize the peasantry in support of the authoritarian incumbents when necessary. Mboji, M. (1991). The Politics of Independence: 1960 - 1986. The Political economy of Senegal under structural adjustment. SAIS studies on Africa. C. L. Delgado and S. C. Jammeh. New York, Praeger: xi, 219 p.

²¹¹ Cruise O'Brien, D. B., M. C. Diop, et al. (2002). La construction de l'Etat au Sénégal. Paris, Karthala p. 17 – 27.

²¹² Mourides and their control over the peasant producers of the peanut crop (50% of Senegal's exports) is critical and decisive in providing power and support. Fatton, R. (1987). The making of a liberal democracy : Senegal's passive revolution, 1975-1985. Boulder, Colo., L. Rienner Publishers. p. 100- 102

As the alliance with the marabouts wavered, the PS regime became more vulnerable to challenges from the consolidating power of the opposition party, the PDS. So these alliances changed over time, and with it the population's loyalty to the PS shifted. Diop, M. C. and M. Diouf (2002). Senhor, Diouf, Wade, et Apres? . La construction de l'Etat au Sénégal. D. B. Cruise O'Brien, M. C. Diop and M. Diouf. Paris, Karthala: p. 128.

²¹³ Diop, M. C. and M. Diouf (2002). L'administration, les confreries religieuses et les paysanneries. La construction de l'Etat au Sénégal. D. B. Cruise O'Brien, M. C. Diop and M. Diouf. Paris, Karthala: p. 29 - 47.

The authoritarian ruling party in Ghana, the PNDC, pursued broad incorporation in a similar manner, although with a greater focus on powerful individual local elites. The PNDC was open to all who wanted to join the ranks, and encouraged direct party membership as part of the grass-roots participation the party espoused rather than autonomous partnerships as in Senegal. This strategy worked well in the politically oriented traditional authority landscape in Ghana. The Ghanaian independence era competition established two powerful political identity groups that mapped onto chiefly families by region and ideology – now defined as the ‘socialist’ Nkrumahists and the ‘liberal’ United Party tradition.²¹⁴ “Beginning with nationalist competition, politics has been infused with chieftancy, through the links of the CPP (Nkrumah) and the UP”.²¹⁵ These salient divides endured through the instability of the post-colonial era and continue to shape family lore, personal allegiances, social networks, business connections and, to some degree, political affiliation. The PNDC era tapped these socio-political identity

²¹⁴ The nationalist movement in Ghana began with the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) which abdicated revolutionary tactics and advocated for self-government “in the shortest possible time”. Founded and led by “The Big Six”: Dr. Ebenezer Ako-Adjei; Edward Akufo-Addo – later President of Ghana; Dr. Joseph Boakye Danquah; Dr. Kwame Nkrumah - later first prime minister and first president of Ghana; Emmanuel Odarkwei Obetsebi-Lampitey; and William Ofori Atta. This approach was countered by the Convention People’s Party (CPP), led by Kwame Nkrumah who broke away from the UGCC and advocated for “self-governance now”. The intense competition between these two movements materialized into political parties in the run up to independence, and led to the politicization of the Ghanaian society. (The opposition to the CPP became fragmented between the National Liberation Movement and the Northern People’s Party. The elections held of July 1956 were very close (the British agreed that if the CPP demand for immediate independence was publicly supported through a 2/3rd majority victory in the legislature, then independence would be granted). In keenly contested elections, the CPP won 57 percent of the votes cast, but the fragmentation of the opposition gave the CPP every seat in the south as well as enough seats in Asante, the Northern Territories, and the Trans-Volta Region to hold a two-thirds majority of the 104 seats.) While the political map changed significantly over time, this deep historical divide still shapes family lore, personal allegiances, social networks and business connections. Through each cycle of regime change in Ghana the importance of the Nkrumah / UP divide remained a salient identity that shaped affiliation and influenced competitions marking the return to civilian rule. These salient political identities shaped voting patterns throughout the 1960’s and 70’s by both mobilizing high levels of voter turnout and contributing to strong affiliations between citizens and their parties.

²¹⁵ “...and the PNDC had both groups here in Tamale as it formed”. Salam, A. (2006). NDC Constituency Representative. R. Interview. Tamale, Ghana.

groups disproportionately. While the PNDC endeavored to infiltrate and incorporate local elites from both camps, the ‘socialists’ of the Nkrumah group felt a more direct link to the grass-roots participation and revolutionary rhetoric the new authoritarian regime was espousing and were more accessible to PNDC incorporation.²¹⁶ The PNDC continued to be open to individual incorporation from both camps, and saw the incorporation of both groups as a solution to the previous decades of instability.²¹⁷ As the minority leader of Parliament recalled:

a lot of integration occurred during the PNDC era, which succeeded in eliminating a lot of political fighting and bitterness between people who saw themselves as historical enemies. There was a concerted effort to solve problems between the two groups by giving position to both sides within the PNDC. So not everyone who became part of the PNDC actually believed in the social democratic position, but they stayed within the regime because they were given high positions.²¹⁸

The PNDC successfully co-opted a significant portion of the socialist Nkrumahist camp, a few important liberal UP leaders, and simultaneously linked these leaders and their followers into the party through mass revolutionary organs operating as agents of the state. These strong linkages were the key to mobilizing support for the regime, as well as channels of communication for the PNDC to assess and respond to public opinion.²¹⁹

²¹⁶ The regime encouraged alliances with many different forms of authority, and was open to incorporation of opposing groups. The particular history of salient independence-era political identity groups meant that the largest pool from which to draw was the socialist core of the Nkrumah dynasty. The incorporation of the majority of these leaders into the PNDC allowed for rural penetration through pre-existing traditional authority networks. See *Ghana Under the PNDC*.

²¹⁷ Some big names from the UP tradition transferred early to the PNDC, such as Obed Asamoah.

²¹⁸ Alban SK Bagbin NDC MP from Nadowli West (Parliamentary Minority Leader). Interview March 2005.

²¹⁹ The PNDC pursued general attempts to incorporate the masses through the decentralization agenda, as well as administrative structures at the grass-roots. The PNDC sought to incorporate political opposition, local elites, and business elites, but did not specifically target ‘labor incorporation’. Their main focus was the ‘masses’ writ large, as part of their “search for a social base as a foundation for their rule”. Gyimah-Boadi, E. (1993). *Ghana under PNDC rule*. Senegal, Codesria. p. 109 – 130

In contrast to the broad incorporation tactics pursued in Senegal and Ghana, in Benin the authoritarian incumbent regime deliberately neutralized the strength of the traditional chiefdoms in their attempt to consolidate rule, which provoked the disintegration of the monarchy and left the regime without socially rooted partners. Instead, the regime attempted unsuccessfully to completely overturn existing political, economic and social structures, and substitute them with the control of the revolutionary party.²²⁰ The PRPB effectively neutralized the political organizing capabilities of the traditional kingdoms that had been a basis of social and religious identity in the prior decades.²²¹ By launching a highly repressive anti-feudal campaign, President Kerekou selectively eliminated religious and spiritual leaders, voodoo priests, and influential sorcerers.²²²

By attacking traditional kingdoms and spiritual leaders as well as their followers, the PRPB's only option was to replace one type of clientelism with another, an instrumental and material form of clientelist co-optation. This strategy made the regime highly reliant on their continued ability to provide material benefits and co-opt

²²⁰ Despite the party's reach and control over state resources, it remained a private club rather than a true mass party, and the incumbent's power reflected this lack of social rootedness. Unable to capture the peasants, the traditional religious and chiefly kingdoms, the previous commercants, and the old evolues. Banegas, R. (2003). La démocratie à pas de caméléon : transition et imaginaires politiques au Bénin. Paris, Karthala.

²²¹ The authoritarian PRPB wanted to overcome the ancestral feuding that had been the source of the instability of the previous decade and initiated an anti-voodoo campaign to target traditional and religious authorities. This tactic was in conjunction with the construction of a Marxist-Leninist regime that attempted to replace the traditional and religious authorities with the organs of the state at the local level. The goal of many of these organs was to upend the hierarchical nature of society, empowering the peasant over the local elites. Bierschenk, T. and J.-P. Olivier de Sardan (1998). Les pouvoirs au village : le Bénin rural entre démocratisation et décentralisation. Paris, Editions Karthala.

Magnusson, B. A. (2001). "Democratization and domestic insecurity - Navigating the transition in Benin." Comparative Politics 33(2): 211-+.

²²² Bako-Arifari, N. (1998). La démocratie à Founougo (Borgou): paysans et 'descolarisés' en compétition pour le pouvoir local. Les pouvoirs au village : le Bénin rural entre démocratisation et décentralisation. T. Bierschenk and J.-P. Olivier de Sardan. Paris, Editions Karthala: 296 p.

challengers. Rather than foster a deep alliance with pre-existing traditional authority, the PRPB attempted to displace it and install its own organization at the local level across the country. Despite significant activities and related organs in the districts, the party could not develop an equivalent loyalty and reach to replace the social fabric it tried to thwart.

In the run-up to Benin's democratic transition, the incumbents and opposition alike lacked a pre-existing foundation comparable to the social, religious and economic structures that were utilized in different ways in Ghana, Senegal and Zambia.²²³ In the run-up to democratization in Benin there was no comparable historically salient social group that either the incumbents or opposition could turn to in order to coalesce and strengthen their support. While the PRPB was the sole authority, the party-state reigned. However, with the prospect of political liberalization, local elites rapidly rejected the incumbent.²²⁴

In Zambia, the authoritarian incumbent also pursued a modernizing agenda to minimize and reduce the power of sectional leaders rather than empower and ally with them, causing disenchantment and defections.²²⁵ The incumbents lacked a deep connection with traditional authorities that could penetrate the countryside, and focused

²²³ The leaders of opinion – from the clandestine communists (Parti Communiste du Dahomey), the Churches, and the Diaspora - did not have the national reach, deep organization, or historical legacy of autonomous leadership that could serve as a parallel in Benin.

²²⁴ “The PRPB was disposed against traditional and religious leadership, but these leader remained powerful socially because the political ideology could not touch their connection between God and the people. In general, the opposition elements were smashed, dispersed, driven underground. No frontal opposition was really possible during the PRPB era, and no communication was allowed. There was no hesitation to support the democratizing movement in order to rid ourselves of the PRPB.” Adande, J. K. (2005). Directeur de la Cooperation Technique du Ministre de l'Analyse Economique de la Statistique et du Plan. R. Interview. Cotonou, Benin.

²²⁵ This early strategy led to the creation of the UPP as a faction of the incumbent ruling party, and forced the regime to declare a one party state in 1972 to eliminate these challenges. P. 52 Scott, I. (1980). Party and Administration under the One Party State. *Administration in Zambia*. W. Tordoff. Manchester [Eng.] Madison, Wis., Manchester University Press ; University of Wisconsin Press: xi, 306 p.

instead on a modern economic base of urban and industrialized constituency support. In minimizing the power of sectional leaders, the regime built a modern leadership that could easily shift its alliances. The continual challenge of establishing a consensus for its rule led the ruling party to use patronage distribution to build up “modern” groups of economic elite, business pressure groups, and urban clientele.²²⁶

These modes of power consolidation represented the regime’s new ‘Humanist’ developmental agenda that eschewed traditional authorities in favor of constructing the new nation from urban, industrialized support. The incumbent built a strong, centralized labor union. These economic organs ultimately became the foundation for the opposition movement, particularly because they had the ability to financially strangle the state rather than being dependent on the state. UNIP’s search to expand its control base brought modern economic interests into relation with the party, but these groups rapidly defected with the onset of economic crisis.²²⁷ Through modernization strategies of nationalization, prioritizing a single federated union and privileging manufacturing and large businesses over farming and small businesses, the ruling party supported the growth of the very agents of opposition rather than the bulwarks of status quo that they were seeking.

The incumbent party UNIP worked within the highly urbanized constituencies to build a following, promoting a modern nationalism as a base for regime power and while

²²⁶ Ibid. p. 139

²²⁷ The modern, urban economic interests focused on business leaders, commercial farmers, the urban middle class and the union, particularly the copper mining sector. Economic crisis beginning in 1974 made these groups the basis for the opposition rather than continuing support for the regime. During the Second Republic “Unip Rule began to rot from within”. P. 48 Gulhati, R. (1989). *Impasse in Zambia: The Economics and Politics of Reform*. T. W. Bank.

Burdette, M. M. (1988). *Zambia : between two worlds*. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press. p. 26

eschewing traditional authorities in the countryside.²²⁸ The industrial agenda, nationalization and policy of ‘Humanism’ favored large (foreign) industry over small manufacturers, commercial farmers over rural producers and urban business over rural agriculture.²²⁹ UNIP found incorporation of diverse traditional authorities troublesome in the early years, and sought alternative means to consolidate their power.²³⁰ The ruling party UNIP pursued a labor policy that created a uniquely strong union base. By centralizing and federating union membership, the ruling party meant to harness the powerful, organized trade union to support the regime, but paradoxically provided the trade union the financial and communication resources necessary to become an autonomous power due to their negotiating position and national infrastructure.²³¹ Ultimately, the focus on building up the trade union left the authoritarian regime without enduring allies, and created a strong base for the opposition movement.²³²

²²⁸ Zambia is the most urbanized country south of the Sahara, excluding South Africa and has a significant formal sector labor force. Simmance, A. J. F. Z. (1973). *Urbanization in Zambia. An International Urbanization Survey Report to the Ford Foundation.*

²²⁹ Scott, I. (1980). *Party and Administration under the One Party State. Administration in Zambia.* W. Tordoff. Manchester [Eng.] Madison, Wis., Manchester University Press ; University of Wisconsin Press: xi, 306 p.

²³⁰ “The divisions within UNIP were due to tribalism, it was a struggle to keep it together. Kaunda and I were both about to resign in 1969. But we were persuaded to stay, and pursued alternative routes”. Zulu, G. (2006). Former Secretary General of UNIP (Vice President of Zambia). R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia.

²³¹ The trade union became a rising alternative power source. Mwanakatwe, J. M. (1994). *End of Kaunda era.* Lusaka, Zambia, Multimedia Zambia. P. 109 – 110, 179-192.

UNIP’s close relationship with the state’s material and financial resources led to its undoing because it negatively affected party mobilization and organization. As a result of the party’s heavy reliance on government funding and structure, the party’s organization atrophied. The one-party state was largely intolerant of political dissent, harassed or victimized opponents, and marginalized the population from political participation by limiting choice.... The extension of these policies was to drive the once aligned labor union into opposition as the necessity of political and economic reform demanded. Simutanyi, N. R. and N. Mate (2006). *One Party Dominance and Democracy in Zambia.* Maputo, Mozambique, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

²³² Two elements of labor policy were key in creating this uniquely strong union base. First, legislation in 1971 provided for automatic affiliation of any labor union registered to the Zambia Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU). This overarching organization had national reach in membership, organized networks throughout the country, and a national platform for the leadership. The ZCTU saw to it, for example, that labor dues were automatically deducted from employees’ paychecks. By negotiating directly with government they were able to strengthen their own resources and autonomous bargaining position, due in large part to their ability to call strikes that would cripple the nation’s mining economy. Secondly, the

The union's voluminous membership, national leadership experience, and control over the state's key export commodity provided a foundation that over time became a challenge to the government. As the incumbent authoritarian government, UNIP, saw potential threats from the power of the union, they took steps to change the labor laws.²³³ But at this late stage the union infrastructure and resources had already been put to use in the service of the opposition movement, providing them with an ideology that appealed to the workers, financial resources and communication channels independent of the state, and experienced leadership that had gained a national following due to their bargaining experience, speaking for the masses. This uniquely urbanized, unionized population in Zambia was a key element in contributing to a strong opposition facing a weak incumbent government. The union support quickly fractured and joined multiple new opposition parties following the defeat and effective demise of the authoritarian incumbent party, UNIP because they then lacked a cohesive focus following the transition and the new laws allowed for more heterogeneous representation.

ZCTU constitution stipulated that no trade union could be registered if another union existed in that industry. This "one industry, one union" policy gave the ZCTU's affiliate exclusive bargaining power in each sector of the economy. In addition to strengthening trade unions by limiting proliferation, it avoided inter-union conflict due to the problems of multiple representation and overlapping memberships. Support for this concentration of power came from the highest levels of government. Kenneth Kaunda stated in his opening address to the National Assembly of 7th January 1979: "our policy still remains one of supporting one union for one industry, for we are convinced that a proliferation of trade unions weakens the bargaining strength of the workers". Banda, D. A. (1997). *The trade union situation in Zambia : an overview of the law, practice and the way forward ; a monogram*. F. E. Stiftung. Lusaka, [Electronic ed.]. - Lusaka, 1997. - VIII, 36 S. = 125 Kb, Text Electronic ed.: Bonn: FES Library, 1999.

Bates, R. H., Foreign Area Fellowship Program., et al. (1971). *Unions, parties, and political development, a study of mineworkers in Zambia*. New Haven., Yale University Press, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.: xi, 291 p.

²³³ The most serious change was to use the advent of political pluralism in 1990 to justify liberalization of the labor movement to allow the proliferation of trade unions, to make them compete for membership, which was no longer mandatory. This move had profound effects on the strength and cohesion of the labor union in the multiparty era. Banda, D. A. (1997). *The trade union situation in Zambia : an overview of the law, practice and the way forward ; a monogram*. F. E. Stiftung. Lusaka, [Electronic ed.]. - Lusaka, 1997. - VIII, 36 S. = 125 Kb, Text Electronic ed.: Bonn: FES Library, 1999.

The religious groups in Senegal, nationalist era political identities in Ghana, traditional kingdoms in Benin, and economically based trade union groups in Zambia underscore the variability of pre-existing social landscapes, and the potential range of relations with the ruling regime. These social groups are not systematically related to incumbent or opposition power and, therefore, are not the focus of the dissertation. However, the strategies incumbents pursued to accumulate support help us to understand local elite calculations in the run up to the democratic transition and therefore, the extent of authoritarian power.

Effects of Mobilization Strategies on Local Elites

Local Elite Calculations Model

Local elite calculations on the eve of democratic transition can be reflected in a simple model (Figure 4.3). In this decision matrix, the authoritarian incumbent's previous strategies to consolidate power shapes all local elites' likelihood to challenge the regime and defect to the opposition, such that $A = \{a_1, a_2, a_3, \dots, a_n\}$ is each local elite's calculation contingent on what they believe others are doing. Because the incentives are high to pick the right side to support, and the costs of being wrong are even higher, the local elites use their knowledge of prior authoritarian strategies towards their peer group to approximate whether there will be a tip away from the incumbent. $B = \{b_1, b_2, b_3, \dots, b_n\}$ is each local elite's perception of their own particular preferential or marginalized position in relation to the incumbent. First, assume that local elites are risk averse and will support the incumbent as the only game in town until the onset of democratization

makes nascent opposition seem potentially viable.²³⁴ Secondly, assume that with democratization, all local elites want to support whichever side they believe will offer them the most access to the state. Payoffs for individual choices are related to how many others make the same choice, so that, in general, where authoritarians try to modernize or transform social relations, local elites see this as a signal to challenge the regime.


Local elites that (a_1) believe that the incumbent has sufficiently incorporated their peers to be able to maintain their support, and therefore, stay in power, and (b_1) find their own position to the incumbent to be one of favorable relations will support the incumbent. Local elites that (a_n) believe that the incumbent's modernizing strategies vis-à-vis their peers created tenuous links and general discontent and (b_n) perceive their own marginalization in relation to the incumbent will be ready to defect and transfer their support to the opposition in democratization.²³⁵ These calculations have an important implication – incumbent strategies to build broad cross-cutting alliances will increase their likelihood of gaining support on both fronts, because local elites will generally perceive their own inclusion and also estimate that their peers are included and, therefore, more likely to stay loyal to the incumbent. Reflected in the model, a minority of local elites will always support and defect according to their personal position. The pivotal local elites 'z' determine the majority position, which is a function of their position of on

²³⁴ Authoritarian power requires a means of social penetration and methods of building support for the regime's initiatives. This ability can come in many forms: through integration of existing social forces, through the destruction and subsequent transformation of local social forces that allow state domination, through alliances with social leaders that maintain their autonomy but mobilize their constituencies to support the regime at key intersections, etc. In externally grafted, weak, African states, total transformation was rarely an option. Rulers generally sought to base their authority in social institutions that transcended the domain of state power and control, in the pursuit of regime consolidation. These were patrimonial relations in all cases.

²³⁵ Opposition headed by a small group of intellectuals, clandestine political activists, etc at the outset).

the x-axis, or the extent to which incumbents pursued incorporation over modernization, and will therefore reap the support of the majority of local elites.

Figure 4.3: A Simple Model of Local Elite Decisions



Using interview data of local elites' calculations to support or defect from the authoritarian incumbent at the onset of democratization, I provide evidence to support the categorization of Senegal and Ghana as powerful authoritarian regimes and Zambia and Benin as weak at the end of the party-state era. The incorporation strategies used by the authoritarian incumbents in Ghana and Senegal proved successful in maintaining local elite support in times of challenge, whereas the modernization strategies in Benin and Zambia made local elites ready to support the opposition when the opportunity arose with political liberalization. This support or lack thereof determined the extent to which the ruling party could set the agenda and control the players in the new multiparty system.²³⁶

These data were gathered from surveys I conducted of equal numbers of local elites representing all of the effective political parties in the contemporary democracy (N = 261). In each country, the local elites are geographically representative of four

²³⁶ See Chapter 5.

dispersed regions: two rural communities, one major urban center, and the capital region.

The two rural communities represent further variation, with one being primarily

ethnically homogeneous region and the other being a very heterogeneous region. I

conducted the surveys using structured, open-ended questions with specific follow-up

questions as necessary, such as: “Please tell me about the political affiliations you have

held in your lifetime. Were you a member of or affiliated with [X authoritarian

incumbent party] (during what time periods, what was the exact nature of your relation,

and if you were not affiliated, why not)? Did you ever leave a party and join another

party (and when, how many times)? What led you to make the decision to switch parties?

Were you involved in the democratization process, and, if so, how? Have you joined

another party or made any changes to your political affiliation since the democratic

transition?”

In Ghana and Senegal, the overwhelming majority of local elites remained loyal to the ruling party in the face of political liberalization (Table 4.1). In Senegal, of the local elites that *had been supporters of the authoritarian incumbent party, none defected to the opposition prior to the founding elections*. Furthermore, only 39% of former *Parti Socialiste* supporters ever defected to the opposition. In Ghana, *only 14%* of local elites that had supported the PNDC defected to the opposition prior to the founding elections, and another 14% joined the opposition at some later point. In contrast, in Zambia the majority – 55% - of local elites affiliated with the authoritarian incumbent party UNIP defected prior to the founding elections. Over time, another 16% defected to the opposition, leaving only 29% that continued to support the former authoritarian party UNIP. And in Benin, an overwhelming 80% of local elites that had supported the

authoritarian PRPB defected to the opposition prior to the founding elections, and following the implosion of the authoritarian party, the remaining 20% joined new parties at a later point. These drastically different patterns of support and defection provide a measure of the extent of power the ruling party had at the critical window of opportunity of the democratic transition.

Table 4.1: Local Elite Calculations

	% LE supporting the authoritarian incumbent party that...		
	1.) defected at the onset of democratization (prior to founding elections)	2.) defected after the democratic transition and founding elections	3.) never defected
Senegal	0%	39%	61%
Ghana	14%	14%	71%
Zambia	55%	16%	29%
Benin	80%	20%	0%

source: Riedl Interviews in Senegal (Podor, Tambacounda, Ziguinchor, and Dakar); Ghana (Koforidua, Takarodi, Tamale and Accra); Zambia (Kitwe, Mumbwa, Nyimba and Lusaka); and Benin (Djakotomey (Mono/Couffo), Kandi, Parakou and Cotonou/Porto-Novo). N = 261.

The model of elite calculation presented above assumes that local elites make their decisions based on both their individual position of access or marginalization vis-à-vis the regime, and their perception about the regime's overall popularity and likely ability to maintain support. We can assess the local elite interview data to evaluate the evidence for these claims. When breaking down local elite responses by region, we find that regions favored by the incumbent tend in all countries to have a lower rate of defection than the averages calculated above (Table 4.2). Whereas in Zambia 55% of local elites affiliated with the ruling party in the authoritarian period defected prior to the

founding elections, in the privileged Eastern town of Nyimba, only 30.8% defected at the same moment. Similarly in Benin, 80% of local elites defected in the overall sample, but only 58.8% made the same calculation in the favored Northern town of Kandi.²³⁷

Table 4.2: Stronghold Region For Incumbent

PRIOR to founding elections...	% LE that joined opposition	% of opposition LE that were previously in the incumbent party	% of LE that defected from the incumbent party to join the opposition
SENEGAL (Podor)	20.0%	0.0%	0.0%
GHANA (Tamale)	22.2%	0.0%	0.0%
ZAMBIA (Nyimba)	38.5%	80.0%	30.8%
BENIN (Kandi)	64.7%	90.9%	58.8%

N = 55 (Podor 15; Tamale 9; Nyimba 14; Kandi 17)

Similar patterns are evident in regions marginalized by the authoritarian regime (Table 4.3). For example, in Senegal, the separatist region of the Casamance had a difficult relationship with the ruling party, and 25% of the local elite in this region defected to the opposition prior to the founding elections. In Ghana, whereas none of the local elite affiliated with the authoritarian party defected to the opposition in the regime's home region of Tamale, 22% defected in the Western coastal town of Takoradi, a heterogeneous and independent region.

²³⁷ Both Nyimba and Kandi are affiliated with the 'home' regions of the former authoritarian presidents, Kenneth Kaunda and Matthieu Kerekou in Zambia and Benin, respectively.

Table 4.3: Marginalized Region For Incumbent

	% LE that joined the opposition	% of opposition LE that were previously in the incumbent party	% of LE that defected from the incumbent party to join the opposition
SENEGAL (Ziguinchor)	25.0%	0.0%	0.0%
GHANA (Takoradi)	55.6%	40.0%	22.2%
ZAMBIA (Kitwe)	56.3%	66.7%	37.5%
BENIN (Mono)	95.0%	47.4%	45.0%


N = 60 (Ziguinchor 15; Takoradi 9; Kitwe 16; Mono 20)

While showing the expected differences among regions, these data maintain a general pattern across the board that supports the general local elite calculation regarding regime mobilization strategies. The patterns of higher rates of support for the incumbent in Ghana and Senegal hold across all regions, and massive defections occur in both Zambia and Benin in both privileged and marginalized regions. An additional question taps the same central concept: the share of local elites that are currently affiliated with a political party *other than* the authoritarian incumbent party that *belonged to the single party during the authoritarian party*? In Zambia and Benin, 73% and 59% of local elites affiliated with a new party belonged to the previous authoritarian party, whereas only 23% in Ghana and 32% in Senegal were affiliated with their respective authoritarian incumbents. The higher percentage in Zambia and Benin reflect that the new political parties are made up of defectors from the former authoritarian party. In Senegal and Ghana, the lower percentages reflect that the majority of new party representatives are

constructed with the help of previously unaffiliated local elites at the time of democratic transition.²³⁸


These data support in multiple ways the local elite decision matrix presented above, and the claim that authoritarian regimes in Ghana and Senegal benefited from high levels of support, and Zambia and Benin did not. We can imagine from this interview data that the aggregate decision calculus of local elites looks similar – although undoubtedly with slight differences for each case - in Senegal and Ghana (Figure 4.4) and in Zambia and Benin (Figure 4.5).

Figure 4.4: Estimate of Local Elite Decisions in Senegal and Ghana



²³⁸ Local elites unaffiliated with the authoritarian party would likely be less powerful at the time of democratization, because they would have had restricted access to state resources during the single party era.

Figure 4.5: Estimate of Local Elite Decisions in Zambia & Benin



These interviews also provide evidence of the calculation that was taking place, as local elites spoke about their intimate knowledge of the time of the degree of the support the incumbent was commanding and the strategies the incumbent had pursued to mobilize that support. In Ghana, a Northerner who was a member of the national board of the cocoa farmers association at the time of the transition recalled the ways in which the PNDC used their links with local powerbrokers to gather information and prepare themselves and their followers for the challenge of democratization:

In the early 1990's when the transition was taking shape, the PNDC was deciding whether or not to build a democratic party, what path to take going forward. They looked to 'friends on the ground' in each region who had working relations with the PNDC, but independent enough to give the government a genuine assessment of the population. We each carried out a survey in our regions - would the PNDC be accepted as forming a political party? We realized in the field that people wanted the continuity of PNDC leadership. Eight other regions all came in with the same report as us in the North. Only the Ashanti region really opposed the PNDC forming its own party. Thus the survey results and our findings convinced Rawlings that it was possible for the PNDC to command tremendous support of the population even in the new system, and therefore he would be able to continue his agenda despite regime change. The breakdown of support and opposition to the PNDC becoming the NDC was the same across the country. The majority of the population supported it - farmers, artisans, market women, government office holders - whereas economic elites of the business community and university educated opposition leaders opposed it. (Umar 2006)

In Senegal, the government's incorporation of the religious leaders, as well as traditional authorities and 'grand families' was widely acknowledged. The reciprocal relations of exchange and strategies to maintain authority in the political and social sphere were "designed to ensure loyalty at the local level".²³⁹ The ruling party was also "open to all traditional chiefly families and all (religious) brotherhoods – we couldn't divide because we would lose more than we would gain".²⁴⁰ The PS incorporation of the local elites was meant to "take care of us [the local patrons] so that people would follow them [the ruling party]".²⁴¹ A chief in Northern Senegal described the authoritarian regime's strategies in coordination with the traditional elites:

During that period, we worked via the *marabouts* – to recruit nationally and here locally. We had followers via individual local leaders - supporters of Person A and Person B. Senghor and the PS created an administrative state and linked it to society. During the single party system people would follow the recommendations of their party in choosing who to vote for because party members were always with you, in your life, they had lasting relations and continued contact because it was a dominant party and all the resources were concentrated within the PS... All of the '*grand electeurs*' - local leaders in the traditional arena, religious leaders, economic leaders, social development organization leaders - were all allied with the PS. Since we were there, services would continue to the society. Podor was helped by the state.
(Keneme 2005)

The local elites in Benin and Zambia recognized the same importance of traditional authorities to bolster the regime, but acknowledged that the ruling parties lacked their support. In Benin, the leader of the Communist Party of Dahomey, which was the only clandestine party operating underground during the authoritarian era, noted that:

Religious, traditional chiefs, spiritual healers and the like are all local forces of power. They are powerful and important because parties must work with them to build a following... With the prospects of democratization, traditional chiefs and religious leaders wanted to create their own parties. They no longer supported Kerekou and the PRPB. The ruling party was not powerful in the sense that it was not integrated in society. It always had its own representatives that were in

²³⁹ Pathe Gueye, S. (2005). Founding member of Parti de l'indépendance et du travail (PIT). R. Interview. Dakar.

²⁴⁰ Deme, I. (2005). Constituency Representative, Alliance des Forces de Progrès (AFP). R. Interview. Podor, Senegal.

²⁴¹ Negri, J. B. (2005). Constituency Representative, PDS. R. Interview. Podor, Senegal.

touch with the population, but the associations of the PRPB were a farce. People were in them, but they were not interested. They didn't connect the power of the traditional authorities to the regime.
(Fatodji 2005)

In Zambia, the local elites estimated that 80% of UNIP support left the party once they saw the prospects of multipartism.²⁴² A founding member of the opposition MMD recalled how easily they were able to attract support, at the incumbent's expense:

We built the movement from three founding members to open it up to all the old political players and local leaders, trade unions, parastatal managers, and professional associations. UNIP thought its strategy was sufficiently garnering support, that it was a force, and had structures at the grass-roots, but we knew how readily the defections were occurring.
(Sichinga 2006)

These portraits depict the perception of local elites as they faced the prospects of democratization. Their calculations were due in large part to the strategies of mobilization that incumbent regimes had pursued over the authoritarian era Incorporation or Modernization.

Effects of Authoritarian Mobilization Strategies on the Strength of the Opposition

What factors make the opposition powerful at the onset of democratization is theoretically different, and relies primarily on organizational capacity and resources outside of the state. In Senegal and Ghana, the incorporation strategies of the authoritarian regimes left little space for a robust opposition to be waiting to spring into action. However, the more developed private sector resources and professional associations in Ghana as well as political connections to the historic 'UP' tradition allowed for a network of regime opposants to remain in contact and challenge the

²⁴² General, U. D. S. (2006). R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia.

powerful authoritarian party in the transition period.²⁴³ In Benin, the regime's repressive modernizing strategy forced powerful political figures and traditional elites into exile and the Marxist-Leninist regime made professional and private associations difficult to maintain. The opposition was disparate and unconnected, waiting for an opportunity to oppose the PRPB ruling party but with no cohesion to force united action. Only in Zambia did the incumbent strategies for modernization actually lay the foundations for the opposition movement, creating the trade union that provided financial resources, a national communication infrastructure and a cohesive agenda to what would become leaders of the opposition.

Conclusion

This chapter has claimed that while we likely cannot predict the strategies authoritarian incumbents pursue to consolidate power, we can predict how local elites are likely to respond. In turn, local elites can use their social networks to either mobilize their followers in support of the incumbent or the opposition.

Theories of democratization and party formation in Africa must take these clientelistic relations into account in order to understand the ways in which institutional design reflects the power relations between state leaders, local elite and the citizenry at

²⁴³ In the democratization period, the historical socio-political identities served as important modes of communication and readily mobilized communities. "The role of political traditions became important in the democratization process" as those identities provided a haven to reformers in their struggle for democracy. These identities were maintained during the authoritarian period as personal networks, fostered through social gatherings, funerals, and professional interactions; key to avoiding persecution from the regime that attempted to suppress organizations it had not been able to co-opt and that could "potentially be mobilized by social forces to influence the content and direction of the reform process". Both the incumbent authoritarians and the opposition endeavored to build upon these historical identities, defining themselves in historical terms or using their symbols and language to a greater or lesser extent, in order to use the Nkrumahist or UP following as a source of support, a reason for cohesion, and ultimately, to contribute to their power. Ninsin, K. A. and Codesria. (1998). *Ghana : transition to democracy*. Dakar, Senegal, Codesria.

large. Democratization theory must also account for how new formal institutions at once reify the clientelistic relations, and yet constrain new strategies in the search for power. Africa may be distinct in the way that clientelistic relations shape the basis of the formal institutions of democracy, but they are then comparable in their effects – democratic institutions matter for calculations about how to pursue power in the future.

In chapter five, we will see how the strength of incumbents in Ghana and Senegal allowed them to carry out their proposed transition agenda, whereas the weakness of incumbents in Zambia and Benin force significant alternatives through negotiation with the opposition. These differences in power mean different transition possibilities. The open reform environment in Zambia and Benin ultimately sets the stage for volatile and weakly institutionalized party systems in the democratic era, whereas the highly controlled party formation in Ghana and Senegal provides a foundation for stable and nationally institutionalized party systems, as described in Chapter Six.

Chapter Five

Authoritarian Power and Transition Control

The central claim of this dissertation is that the support of local elite for the authoritarian incumbent party allows for control over the transition and shapes the characteristics of the multiparty system in enduring but unanticipated ways. The context of the transition is critical for establishing the nascent party system, because it determines ‘who is in’ and ‘who is out’ of the new rule making process and, to a large extent, future competition. Based on the driving assumption that each player seeks to gain access to state power while limiting other challengers, it follows that a greater expansion of participants in the transition process contributes to reforms that provide broader participation in the multiparty era.²⁴⁴ That is, where the transition is not highly controlled by the authoritarian incumbent, the heterogeneous and often uncoordinated *individual* interests of the opposition to seek power translate into incentives to push for more participatory and far-reaching reforms. In general, opposition members seek to transform the status quo system that privileges the incumbents in order to be able to compete effectively in the founding elections, and they seek to open participation far enough to ensure their own entry. *In the window of opportunity of the democratic transition, the*

²⁴⁴ A key assumption of this theory is that all authoritarian incumbents *want* to maintain power, and their liberalization agenda reflects their assessment of how to do so. Similarly, opposition challengers want to gain state access, by creating favorable conditions for their participation in multiparty competition. Clearly their assessments of how to maintain or gain power could be flawed, due to hubris and an inaccurate calculation of the incumbent’s support. This chapter will assess the degree to which initially proposed strategies were altered, the extent to which incumbents were incapable of carrying out their various agendas for maintaining control. The initial agendas may not accurately reflect capacity because incumbents had different conceptions of how to best control the liberalization process given their own perception of their strength (often overestimated), but the extent of forced change should correlate to the independent variables of incumbent and opposition power.

power of the incumbent authoritarians and opposition challengers create more or less opportunity to reform, providing greater or lesser possibility for new participants to enter the political system and shape the rules of the game for the multiparty era.²⁴⁵

This chapter details the logic of incumbent and opposition strategies in pursuing a regime transition that would facilitate their own route to attaining or maintaining power, and provides evidence of the democratic transition context. In each country case I detail the initial incumbent agenda to control the transition in its own favor, the pushback from the opposition, and the final outcome of the democratic opening, categorized as controlled, contested or open (Figure 5.1).

A controlled transition occurs where authoritarian incumbents have a great deal of power. They are capable of *limiting* the amount of political space for reform dialogue and initiatives, by controlling the agenda and restricting participation in forging the new system. Incumbents singularly propose and implement their own vision of the new democratic regime, and maintain control over state repressive and bureaucratic agents. A controlled transition inhibits broader debate about what the multiparty democracy should entail and what changes to the system are possible.

Contested and open transitions occur where the authoritarians are weak. Because the incumbent does not have the power to push through its preferred agenda, there is greater contestation over, and ability for new players to shape, the form of new institutions. Informal advantages are stripped from the incumbent position, including

²⁴⁵ In particular, the democratic transitions were due to broadly similar causes of external and internal pressures, which led to a wave of multiparty systems across the continent in the late 1980's and early 1990's. See this discussion in chapter 3. Bratton, M. and N. Van de Walle (1997). Democratic experiments in Africa : regime transitions in comparative perspective. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, NY, USA, Cambridge University Press.

legal and parastatal avenues of influence. In these cases, the transition is *accessible* to heterogeneous participation. Because there are competing individual interests, the negotiation over rules generally promotes the rise of institutions that favor no player *ex ante*.²⁴⁶ An open transition occurs where both the incumbents and opposition are weak; in the case of the opposition this generally means lacking private resources and incohesive. An open transition provides for an entirely new set of contributors, new agendas to change the system, and much debate ultimately crafting the new set of rules. Where authoritarian incumbents were weak, the assets of the opposition matter more for shaping the nature of the transition. A contested transition occurs where opposition has historic unity or material resources to draw upon, and is therefore more cohesive in their own strategies for accessing power. In these cases, the opposition is able to act as a more united entity, and their *interests as a group* in limiting other challengers can impose an outer limit on the extent of openness and reform possible.

The power of the authoritarian incumbent is the primary driver in shaping the context of the democratic transition. Incumbents are in a privileged position to shape the democratic transition for two reasons. First, they are the inevitable negotiation partners. Whereas opposition takes many forms, in all cases they have to face the incumbent. Secondly, incumbents obviously have key advantages. Through coercive, material and organizational resources drawn from the state, incumbents are never completely powerless to mobilize some degree of public support.²⁴⁷ The informal advantages

²⁴⁶ This logic is also at play in Grzymala-Busse, A. (2006). "Authoritarian determinants of democratic party competition - The communist successor parties in East Central Europe." *Party Politics* 12(3): 415-437.

²⁴⁷ This is the case even where incumbent were swept out of power, for example in the Eastern European context. Ibid.

accrued to the ruling regime gives them greater potential to influence the transition agenda and design of new institutions in their favor.

Opposition resources matter for shaping the agenda *only where incumbents are weak*. In these cases, the material and ideological resources, communication networks and overall cohesion of the opposition shape their transition strategies. If the opposition forces act in concert, they may pursue strategies to impose their own limits on participation and formal institutional reform. If the opposition forces lack significant cohesion, independent material and communication resources, they will generally act in the most ‘pro-democratic’ sense, encouraging a participatory and open dialogue aimed at transformational regime change in order to open the playing field as wide as possible to ensure their own entrance as individuals.

The only exception for the role of opposition is when transitions occur through the ‘revolutionary’ model, as in South Africa and Namibia. In these cases, we would expect theoretically that prolonged revolutionary struggles create strong linkages between broad-based opposition movements and local elites that are otherwise rejected by the occupying government. Following a successful revolution that terminates the previous political order, the opposition movements become parties and influence the system in ways parallel to a strong incumbent authoritarian party, attempting to control the transition and accede into power.

Given the desire by each side to maintain or gain power, I look to the agendas initially proposed by the incumbents and the extent of modification forced by opposition pressure in Ghana, Senegal, Zambia and Benin to detail *the process through which authoritarians are able or unable to control the context of the transition*. The empirical

analysis in these four cases details the calculations of the incumbents, including their transition agenda and timetable, pressures for modification and the incumbent ability to resist or acquiesce to necessity of reform in each case. The *relative movements from the starting point* – the initial agenda – are important because the extent of negotiation and reform demonstrates how varying degrees of incumbent power determine which players and preferences will form the basis of the new multiparty system.²⁴⁸ To conduct this detailed analysis, I use multiple sources of evidence, including interviews I conducted with incumbent political leaders and key opposition players at the time of democratization, transcripts of conference proceedings, internal party documents and archival news sources. This evidence supports the centrality of the transition, as a process both incumbents and opposition sought to manage or influence to better their own position and limit other entrants.


In Senegal and Ghana, the broad public support the incumbents commanded allowed them to dictate the democratization agenda (including when new parties would be registered and when the elections would be held), maintain the repressive agents of the party-state under their control throughout the transition and campaign process, and ultimately determine *which* challengers would be allowed to compete. In Benin and Zambia the lack of support among crucial local elites left the incumbent regimes unable to carry out their transition proposals, and finally at the behest of opposition demands for reform. These contrasting examples of ‘controlled’ and ‘open’ transitions correlate with founding election results: in Senegal and Ghana the incumbent parties dominated the

²⁴⁸ Where incumbents are weak, the open transition is characterized by negotiations, bargains, constraints and accepted reforms. Where incumbents are strong, they control the process, propose and carry out their agenda, and resist calls for alternative reforms.

founding elections and won solid majorities. In Benin incumbent party was removed from power *prior* to the elections through the national conference, and in Zambia the incumbent party was demolished in the founding elections that brought sweeping victories for the opposition party across the country. The transition – controlled or open – serves as a link between the local support of the incumbent party in the authoritarian era and the establishment of the competitive party system in the democratic era.

The first section of this chapter briefly provides the theoretical framework that results in three possible contexts of democratic transitions: *controlled*, *contested*, or *open* (Figure 5.2). The second section gives an empirical analysis of Ghana and Senegal, cases where strong authoritarians presided over controlled transitions and set the foundation for highly institutionalized party systems. The third section analyzes the evidence from Benin and Zambia, cases where weak authoritarians could not avoid pressure for reforms and had to submit to negotiations with the opposition. These cases resulted in open or contested transitions, initiating the cycle of competition in volatile and incoherent party systems. The following chapter provides this final link from the transition context to the shape of the enduring party system.

Figure 5.1: Determinants of Party System Institutionalization



Power and Democratic Transition Control

The power of the incumbent, and the cohesion and resources of the opposition in cases where the incumbent is weak, determine the character of the democratic transition (e.g. the extent of reform and participation). Where incumbents are lacking local elite support, they need political liberalization to legitimize and shore up their position but the route to achieving their aims is more difficult. The general problem facing weak authoritarians is that for the democratization process to achieve their aims of re-consolidation of their power, it requires the participation of forces they cannot fully control. Therefore, their capacity to successfully implement their complex strategy is severely diminished. The necessity of reform provides an opportunity to the opposition forces to shape the nature of contestation, to push the transition in new directions.

In contrast, where incumbents are strong and coherent, they require little from the transition in terms of consolidating authority, and relatively free and fair multiparty electoral competition is sufficient to satisfy domestic and international pressures for democracy. In these cases, the opposition has little room to shape the transition; rather, the opposition is *shaped by* the forces it must compete against in order to ensure its own participation in the political arena.²⁴⁹

A controlled transition carried out by powerful and cohesive incumbents will result in a very limited degree of political space – there will be few new entrants allowed and thus little opportunity to shape new rules to reflect anything other than the status quo interests. In contrast, where the incumbent party is less powerful and lacking support, the opposition plays a role in determining the context of the democratic transition. Where the opposition has significant private resources or a historical reason for coherence, they will attempt to push reform and participation only so far as to guarantee their own inclusion and victory, resulting in a ‘contested’ transition. Where the opposition is nascent and incoherent, the multiplicity of individual interests pushing for participation and reform and the uncertainty of each actor will allow for more transformative, participatory reform, categorized as an ‘open’ transition (Figure 5.2). Contested and open outcomes provide a significant opportunity to negotiate, bargain and open the political arena to new actors via expanded participation, as the transition agenda of the incumbent is thwarted and new forces become involved in setting the multiparty system in motion. The context of the transition is critical to determining the character of the

²⁴⁹ The incentives and preferences of both the incumbents and opposition shape their ‘best guess’ in formulating strategies, which are updated as events unfold. This analysis does not assume rational actor efficiency, rather it expects hubris and information gaps will cloud judgment of these strategies, but it is the process of negotiation, or whether the initial strategies are carried out or require adaptation, that is indicative of the context of the democratic transition.

nascent party system, because it occurs either in a void of authority or in the hands of embedded interests – and these differences are fundamental in creating the rules and competitive structure of the multiparty system.

Figure 5.2: Independent Variables and Transition Context

		AUTHORITARIAN	INCUMBENTS
		Strong / Supported	Weak / Fragmented
OPPOSITION CHALLENGERS	Strong / Supported	Controlled Transition	Contested Transition
	Weak/ Fragmented	Controlled Transition	Open Transition

Case Comparisons: Authoritarian and Opposition Power

The four country cases vary according to the independent variables of authoritarian incumbent and opposition power. From the larger set of 23 African democracies, Ghana and Senegal present cases of strong authoritarians during the transition period; Zambia and Benin are cases of weak authoritarians, but vary on the capabilities of the opposition (Figure 5.3).²⁵⁰

²⁵⁰ See measurement of these variables in Chapter 3.

Figure 5.3: Case Selection

		AUTHORITARIAN INCUMBENTS	
		Strong and Cohesive	Weak/ Fragmented
OPPOSITION CHALLENGERS	Strong and Cohesive	Controlled Transition Ghana	Contested Transition Zambia
	Weak/ Fragmented	Controlled Transition Senegal	Open Transition Benin

These initial differences in capabilities and cohesion in Ghana and Senegal at the high end, and Zambia and Benin at the low end, shaped the incumbent strategies as they set forth their liberalization agendas. The next section will detail how the initial calculations of the incumbent and the negotiations pursued by the opposition were reflective of their power and cohesion, respectively. Incumbent reform strategies vary in the four cases presented. Where incumbent power was high, they sought to maintain restrictive laws and a repressive state apparatus while legislating a limited transition to multipartism. Where incumbent power was low, the reforms reflected a more drastic attempt to rebuild support for the regime and offer some real signs of incumbent-led solutions. These strategies included initiating the separation of party and state, and holding a participatory national conference to encourage diverse social representatives to become part of the incumbent’s reform agenda. Given the incumbent position as primary, the opposition played a greater role in shaping the reform agenda where the incumbents were weak. The opposition’s goals and strategies were likewise dependent on their support and cohesion. Analyzing the negotiations that took place provides a window into

the process of transition *positioning* in order to be involved in *rule crafting* for the formation of the multiparty system. The amount of political space that was ultimately created from these strategies and negotiations is critical in the formation of highly institutionalized party systems in Senegal and Ghana, and the low party system institutionalization of Zambia and Benin.²⁵¹

CONTROLLED TRANSITIONS: GHANA and SENEGAL

GHANA

The incumbent regime in Ghana had the necessary support and, therefore, power to determine the timing, restricted participation, and the extent of reform that democratization encompassed. According to Kwame Ninsin, the University Teachers Association's selected participant in the Consultative Assembly (formed to chart the course for a constitutional framework for the democratic Fourth Republic), the ruling party was firmly in control of the democratization process:

The PNDC regime could not ignore demands for political reform, but it could control the process, rejecting opposition demands to negotiate the transition – creating its own path towards constitutional rule. The government felt it was losing ground by stalling and searching to implement its own vision of a 'grass-roots, populist' democracy, and had to concede to constitutional democracy to maintain its credibility and control, but it did not have to include the opposition in the crafting of this new system, only respond to its ultimate demand, thus the PNDC conceded the need for political reforms.²⁵²

The move to multipartism was a reluctant but strategic decision to respond to external pressures and pre-empt broad opposition to the monolithic regime in order to maintain its position.²⁵³

²⁵¹ This link is detailed in chapter 5, showing how the scope of participation and the extent of new entrants in the transition window of opportunity influence the formation of new institutions – namely, the eligibility rules and the structure of political competition.

²⁵² Ninsin, K. A. and Codesria. (1998). *Ghana : transition to democracy*. Dakar, Senegal, Codesria.

²⁵³ Such sentiments were reflected in interviews with Obed Asamoah and PV Obeng, among others.

Asamoah, O. (2006). Foreign Minister and Attorney General of Ghana under Jerry Rawlings from 1981 to

Initial Strategies of the Incumbent

The PNDC plan to ensure its continued dominance had 3 main elements that were the result of vigorous internal party debates over the most pragmatic course of action. First, they sought to establish local district agents loyal to the regime. Second the PNDC decided to maintain the authoritarian party-state through democratization and founding elections (so that the multiparty constitution would not be promulgated until after the founding elections, ensuring the loyalty of the administrative and coercive state apparatus would be in the service of the incumbent authoritarian party). Finally, the party deliberated and ultimately decided to maintain the authoritarian incumbent party in its entirety, transporting the organization wholesale into the multiparty era as *the* vehicle for garnering victory, rather than attempting to construct a new party and a new identity for multiparty competition.

The PNDC agenda to create local district assemblies with agents loyal to the party-state centered on maintaining control and stability, as part of the strategy to “succeed itself”.²⁵⁴ The decentralization plan was first conceived as a substitute for – and in aversion to – multiparty competition. The PNDC plan for reform actually bypassed multiparty competition by proposing instead a ‘non-partisan constitutional democracy’ from the basis of district assemblies. This was part of an intense effort to avoid

1997. 2002 head of the NDC. Founding member of the NDC, leading PNDC to NDC transition. R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia.

Obeng, P. (2006). Former Presidential Advisor on Governmental Affairs. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

²⁵⁴ Ninsin, K. A. and F. K. Drah (1987). The Search for democracy in Ghana : a case study of political instability in Africa. Accra, Asempa Publishers.

Bluwey, G. (1998). Extent of Authoritarian Regime. Ghana: transition to democracy. K. A. Ninsin. Dakar, Senegal, Codesria. **Codesria book series.**: x, 252 p.

multipartism in order to ensure the PNDC's continued reign.²⁵⁵ According to Kwamena Ahwoi, the PNDC Minister for Decentralization (in charge of the District Assembly plan), “while it could not stem the tide of international and domestic pressures for true multipartism, the local district elections of 1988 provided the incumbent party with experience overseeing elections and installed loyal regime agents at the district level, ultimately raising their confidence in their abilities to oversee the electoral process”.²⁵⁶ The PNDC learned from this process that the district assemblies were not considered satisfactory substitutes for pluralist politics, and that they would have to oversee a transition to multiparty politics in order to continue to maintain economic support internationally and social support domestically.²⁵⁷ However, according to P.V. Obeng, the Presidential Advisor on Governmental Affairs and considered the PNDC second in command behind Rawlings, they also gleaned from this process the knowledge that “we could have resisted the pressures to a greater degree, but we took the decision at the time necessary to be able to *control the process*”.²⁵⁸

²⁵⁵ “The PNDC was not sure to be able to control multiparty elections and did not want to risk the possibility of losing”. Jonah, K. (2006). Acting Head, Governance Center at the Institute for Economic Affairs in Ghana. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

The non-partisan local assemblies would ensure the dominance of the PNDC and Rawlings as President by selecting a Parliament who would endorse the party and its leadership. Rawlings, J. J. (1996). Address by the Chairman of the PNDC, Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, at the Opening Session of the Seminar for Presiding Members and Assemblymen and Women, District Secretaries, CDRs, etc, Organized by the NCD at Sunyani on Thursday, 5 July 1990. Ghana's political transition, 1990 - 1993: selected documents. K. A. Ninsin. Accra, Ghana, Freedom Publications: xi, 177 p.

²⁵⁶ Ahwoi, K. (2006). PNDC Minister for Decentralization (charged with the District Assembly Election Process implementation). R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

²⁵⁷ Ahwoi, K. (2006). PNDC Minister for Decentralization (charged with the District Assembly Election Process implementation). R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

Information was gathered through the local district agents and the officials of the NCD holding regional fora. National Commission for Democracy (Ghana) Annual report. Blue Book Report. [Accra, Ghana, PNDC Internal Report. National Commission for Democracy: v.

²⁵⁸ The PNDC was committed to pursuing the most pragmatic path to ensure their continued dominance. According to P.V. Obeng, the PNDC needed to stay in power “... in order to carry out our unfinished economic and social agenda... We feared any victory by the opposition would make all that we stood for illegitimate; if they took control, what we had done would not be valued and our role would be diminished,

Once the ruling party accepted the necessity of a transition to multiparty democracy, it left the most critical question of how to carry it out in order to ensure their primacy. There were ultimately two key decisions made: 1.) to maintain the authoritarian regime until after the founding elections (rather than abide by a new constitutional framework during the electoral campaign); and 2.) to maintain the PNDC as the vehicle through which they would pursue continued power.

By maintaining authoritarian rule throughout the constitutional crafting process and electoral competition, the PNDC endeavored to leverage the advantages of incumbency, and avoided encumbrance by new constitutional limitations on power in the run-up to the founding elections. Furthermore, PNDC leaders acknowledged that they sought to “use our high capacity to convert our power into the multiparty period by... appropriating our foot soldiers in the field and vibrant links with the community”, as well as state organs to mediate the politics of the transition as institutions of incumbent control.²⁵⁹ The district assemblies were used as pro-regime organs established across the rural national territory, to construct loyal regime agents capable of running the elections and co-opting local leadership.²⁶⁰ “The non-partisan local elections set up an infrastructure of electoral officials and elected district representatives that were agents of

and ultimately we would be abused for it”. By equating their unfinished business to the socio-economic development of the country, the PNDC’s continued rule could be justified for perpetuity. The parallel sentiments expressed reflected another reality, the fear of retribution for the violent and repressive elements of the regime, contributed to the PNDC’s desire to successfully manage the transition to maintain power. Obeng, P. (2006). Former Presidential Advisor on Governmental Affairs. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

²⁵⁹ Bluwey, G. (1998). Extent of Authoritarian Regime. *Ghana: transition to democracy*. K. A. Ninsin. Dakar, Senegal, Codesria. **Codesria book series.**: x, 252 p.

...“to obstruct the demands for liberal democratic reforms”. Obeng, P. (2006). Former Presidential Advisor on Governmental Affairs. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

²⁶⁰ Jonah, K. (2006). Acting Head, Governance Center at the Institute for Economic Affairs in Ghana. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

the incumbent regime...”.²⁶¹ The district assemblies also provided an important conduit of information from the population to the regime as a tool for continued control”.²⁶²

Moreover, the continued command of the military and intelligence services were important elements in the PNDC’s ability to keep the opposition forces in line with the incumbent’s dictates for democratization. Not only was there no transitional government, the entire campaign and voting process was held under the context of authoritarian laws and repressive state machinery. Political parties were banned throughout the constitution crafting process, and were legalized only months prior to the election.²⁶³ While PNDC leadership claimed that the ban was meant “to ensure that the process of constitutional deliberation [was] non-partisan”, the short time frame allowed the PNDC to dictate the extent of time that campaigning would be allowed, limit the amount of information the public could receive about the viable electoral options, and monitor the nature of the emerging opposition forces.²⁶⁴ Essentially, authoritarian rule was maintained throughout the constitutional crafting process and electoral competition, and the new constitution was not promulgated until after the PNDC was assured of their victory – after the

²⁶¹Boateng, E. A. and Institute of Economic Affairs (Ghana) (1996). Government and the people : outlook for democracy in Ghana. Accra, Ghana, Institute of Economic Affairs. p. 128

²⁶²“The PNDC responded to the population’s deep desire for political pluralism with an agenda to maintain their control and establish an electoral network across the country ... a democratization program actually inconsistent with liberal democracy”. Ninsin, K. A. (1998). Civic associations and the transition to democracy. Ghana: transition to democracy. Codesria book series. K. A. Ninsin, Codesria. Dakar, Senegal, Codesria: p. 42 - 71.

Both domestic and international climate required the PNDC to move to multipartism. The external pressures were early warning, due to Ghana’s Economic Recovery Program (SAPs working in tandem with the World Bank and other donors), which gave Rawlings time to conceptualize “his own system of transformation to meet the concerns the international community was expressing – so he came up with his own idea of what the ‘political reforms’ would constitute to meet their demands”. Jonah, K. (2006). Acting Head, Governance Center at the Institute for Economic Affairs in Ghana. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

²⁶³ The Consultative Assembly finished March 31, 1992; the national referendum was held April 28, 1992; the political party ban was lifted May 15, 1992; and general elections were held in November and December 1992.

²⁶⁴ (1992). Report on the Consultative Assembly. Daily Graphic. Accra, Ghana.

multiparty campaigning was over, elections held, votes counted, and the incumbent regime was sure of its victory.²⁶⁵

The second key strategic decision the incumbent made was whether or not to maintain the PNDC as a party – as *the* vehicle through which they would pursue continued power”.²⁶⁶ This early debate within the party was intense, with some feeling that it would be more beneficial to give up the PNDC and all of its public association with authoritarianism, and to instead “take over” a historical party identity.²⁶⁷ Despite the negative associations of general ‘authoritarianism’ the party was necessarily linked to, ultimately the decision was taken to maintain the party “in order to be firmly in control of the party, its ideology and its actions”.²⁶⁸

The decision to maintain the PNDC (as the renamed NDC) was taken following consultation with chiefs, constituency leaders and other social forces that convinced the

²⁶⁵ Statement by Flt. Lt. J.J. Rawlings in Ninsin, K. A. (1996). Ghana's political transition, 1990-1993 : selected documents. Accra, Ghana, Freedom Publications.

²⁶⁶ “The PNDC also considered the possibility of dissolving, to protect their prerogatives within the military, and each member going into whatever new or existing currents they felt appropriate, but no specific group or faction wanted to ‘opt out’ as a whole. There was much more internal desire to *stay coherent enough to ensure continuity*”. Ahwoi, K. (2006). PNDC Minister for Decentralization (charged with the District Assembly Election Process implementation). R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

On the issue of declining military influence, see Wendy Hunter, on military’s declining influence over time in Latin America. Hunter, W. (1997). "Continuity or change? Civil-military relations in democratic Argentina, Chile, and Peru." *Political Science Quarterly* **112**(3): 453-475.

²⁶⁷ This debate related to the historic / independence era political identities of Nkrumah and the CPP in opposition to the Danquah- Busia/ UP legacies, to which a significant group of important government members had links, particularly the Nkrumahists/ CPP group who imagined their return to power through this route. Asamoah, O. (2006). Foreign Minister and Attorney General of Ghana under Jerry Rawlings from 1981 to 1997. 2002 head of the NDC. Founding member of the NDC, leading PNDC to NDC transition. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

²⁶⁸ PV Obeng continued on to say: “A mix of leadership within the PNDC debated about whether to join / take over an existing party identity or build our own. There were various reasons to create our own, the main argument being that we hadn’t yet consolidated the gains of the Revolution, and we wanted to continue working on what we had fought for. Given our main economic and social progress agenda, we decided it was best to form our own party, because the PNDC was itself an amalgamation of the previous traditions... Both the UP and CPP had been co-opted within the regime to some degree. So even if our intention had been to join or take over an existing political tradition, it wouldn’t have been easy to execute, particularly with our goal of continuing the Revolution and *making the party fulfill our agenda* within a short time frame.” Obeng, P. (2006). Former Presidential Advisor on Governmental Affairs. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

leadership of their likelihood of winning with their own party.²⁶⁹ In particular, the party leaders had to be convinced that the PNDC could effectively establish its own base. The Minister of Foreign Affairs Obed Asamoah was instrumental in arguing that three factors of the incumbents' strength would allow this agenda to succeed:

“First, the PNDC could use their political experience as a fulcrum around which their new party could form; Second, the length of time that they had been in power was sufficient to alter past loyalties and consolidate their own power; and, Third, the competing historical ‘left’ party attachment of the ‘Nkrumahists’ had lost significant influence [through their incorporation into the PNDC] and was too divided to be a threat or to be useful as a new base upon which to build”.²⁷⁰

These arguments reflected a majority opinion within the party, which argued that the PNDC as a party should continue to propagate in order to preserve the incumbent's position, satisfying the “the social demands for pluralism, but *win power anyway*”.²⁷¹ Most important to the decision, was the feeling held by the party leaders that “we had a high capacity to *convert our power* into the multiparty period, because the PNDC was well-structured and well-implanted. We had many foot soldiers in the field, and vibrant links with the community”.²⁷² The internal debates reflect the regime's majority opinion that, upon assessing the regime's position, felt strongly that they had the resources and vehicle (the party) through which they could implement the transition to multipartism and maintain control over the process.

²⁶⁹ Ibid.

These sentiments echoed by many others, including Jonah, K. (2006). Acting Head, Governance Center at the Institute for Economic Affairs in Ghana. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

²⁷⁰ Asante, D. N. S. K. B. (April 2006). Chairman of the Committee of Experts for the Draft Constitution of the Democratic Transition. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

²⁷¹ “... The transition was about allowing electoral competition and political pluralism rather than our departure as government.” Asamoah, O. (2006). Foreign Minister and Attorney General of Ghana under Jerry Rawlings from 1981 to 1997. 2002 head of the NDC. Founding member of the NDC, leading PNDC to NDC transition. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

²⁷² Obeng, P. (2006). Former Presidential Advisor on Governmental Affairs. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

PNDC Organs of Implementation

Once these broad agenda decisions were made from within the PNDC, they were able to realize their strategies without difficulty by using their broad rural support (cultivated through local elites) to push through the incumbent agenda in government-created ‘representative bodies’. The PNDC designed three new critical state organs to facilitate the transition: first, a commission to gather public sentiment for how the transition should be envisioned and carried out, second, a committee to draft constitutional proposals that would reflect the will of the government, and third, a constituent assembly that would provide a participatory yet conservative social endorsement on the process. These organs transferred the ruling party’s social power into the ability to set the democratizing agenda and carry it out because they drew upon their local support as participants.

The first state organ of democratization, the National Commission for Democracy, held regional fora to gather input at the local level about how to further realize ‘true democracy’ in Ghana.²⁷³ As a creation of the PNDC regime, the regional seminars were extremely limited in their gathering of social views. The biased leadership and partial conduct, held in the context of authoritarian laws and a generally repressive environment, excluded the full range of opinions and issues.²⁷⁴ The monopolization of the process through techniques that excluded a significant sector of the population from participation rendered it an institution of control of the incumbent government – an instrument for

²⁷³ National Commission for Democracy (Ghana) Annual report. Blue Book Report. [Accra, Ghana, PNDC Internal Report. National Commission for Democracy: v.

²⁷⁴ The original intent was to make District Assemblies as a basis for constitutional government; in pursuing this agenda, the main issues were not discussed and opposition was excluded p. 45 – 8. “The NCD did not gather a full spectrum of social views” p. 58 - 9. Ninsin, K. A. and F. K. Drah (1991). Ghana's transition to constitutional rule : proceedings of a seminar organised by the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon. Accra, Ghana Universities Press.

rural incorporation and gathering information useful to the regime devising limited reform strategies.²⁷⁵ Rather than establish a transitional government, authoritarian rule was maintained during the entire democratization period and founding election, and the National Commission for Democracy was charged with the dual function of an electoral commission and also to assist in “developing a program for a more effective realization of democracy in Ghana”.²⁷⁶ It was meant to institute and oversee the transition, as an instrument of the PNDC regime.

The second organ established was the Committee of Experts, a PNDC appointed group in charge of drafting the constitutional proposals. The PNDC appointed committees was left to draft the constitutional proposals according to their preferences, while claiming to represent the national project of constitutional reform by incorporating the views of the masses gathered in the regional forum.²⁷⁷ The goal for constitutional

²⁷⁵ The report of the National Commission for Democracy stated that there was a clear consensus among the population in favor of a National Assembly and an Executive Presidency, but there was a “division on whether entry into the National Assembly should be through the District Assembly (non-partisan, as the incumbent party had originally favored) or through the direct election system; and whether the new constitutional order should be partisan or non-partisan”. National Commission for Democracy (Ghana) and Provisional National Defense Council (Ghana) (1991). Evolving a true democracy : summary of NCD's work towards the establishment of a new democratic order : report presented to the PNDC. Accra, Republic of Ghana, National Commission for Democracy.

²⁷⁶ PNDC (1991). Government's Statement on the NCD Report on Evolving a True Democracy. Accra May 1991. Document 13. Ghana's transition to constitutional rule: proceedings of a seminar organised by the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon. K. A. Ninsin and F. K. Draah. Accra, Ghana Universities Press: p. 99.

²⁷⁷ The government packed the drafting committee of the 1992 Constitution with representatives of its design. Ninsin, K. A. and Codesria. (1998). Ghana : transition to democracy. Dakar, Senegal, Codesria. “The drafters of the 1992 Constitution certainly had an agenda, reflecting certain key issues to Rawlings: for example, the restrictions on Freedom of Association, in order to limit many potential competitors, especially start-up populist leaders with no national organization networks; establishing an Executive Presidency to centralize the utmost power under his command; other powers of the Executive, such as drawing 51% of Ministers from the parliament to ensure substantial presidential control over the legislative body; severe penalties for carpet-crossing (legislative seat forfeited requiring a by-election); and uniformity in local government structure to give the executive the greatest extent over control over the localities. These things were planned, consciously, due to the incumbent’s desire to maintain power and control the system”. Pratt, K. (2006). CPP Secretary General and Communications Director. Founding Member of the Movement for Freedom and Justice, a democratization pressure group. Editor of the Weekly Insight. . R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

deliberation was to “maintain stability”; rather than an emphasis on liberty and freedoms associated with the transformative transitions, the Ghanaian constitution was crafted to “avoid coups and further interventions in Ghana; the chief objective of the new constitution is to marshal all the people under a common discipline”.²⁷⁸ Following the PNDC Law 259 establishing the Committee of Experts, which contained specific provisions important to the incumbents, the draft constitution then included almost all of the ideas favored by Rawlings and the PNDC.²⁷⁹

Finally, the Consultative Assembly was created to debate the constitutional recommendations, with a membership of ‘representative’ associations, heavily weighted to favor the incumbent’s preferences. The use of a public Consultative Assembly was based on historical precedent in Ghana.²⁸⁰ It offered the regime the opportunity to promote the process as ‘participatory’ and inclusive, particularly to the rural population it sought to cultivate as a continued support base. Yet the Assembly’s over-representation of local government agents, revolutionary organization committee members, and military officials empowered the status quo and preserved continuity on the issues most central to the incumbent’s agenda, such as: the guarantee of amnesty to members of the PNDC government, creating an executive presidency, ensuring that nationality criteria would not restrict Rawlings’s candidacy, a Council of State and Public Tribunals system that would

Opoku, N. K. (2006). General Secretary of the National Reform Party; NGO Coordinator of the Civic Response. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

²⁷⁸ Editor (March 6, 1992). Report on Government's transitional programme for the restoration of democratic rule (following March 5 broadcast of Chairman of PNDC, Flt. Lt. Rawlings, outline of the programme). *Daily Graphic*. Accra.

²⁷⁹ Bluwey, G. (1998). State Organisations in the Transition. *Ghana: transition to democracy*. K. A. Ninsin. Dakar, Senegal, Codesria. **Codesria book series.**: x, 252 p.

²⁸⁰ Ninsin, K. A. and F. K. Drah (1991). *Ghana's transition to constitutional rule : proceedings of a seminar organised by the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon*. Accra, Ghana Universities Press.

“The Consultative Assembly is to be composed of elected representative of the District Assemblies and identifiable bodies as well as some appointed person following the same principles used in 1968 and 1978”. (1992). Report on the Consultative Assembly. *Daily Graphic*. Accra, Ghana.

keep the Justice Department firmly in the hands of the PNDC and their traditional, local elite allies, and the maintenance of the District Assemblies as a locus of government at the local level and the majoritarian electoral system.²⁸¹

It is justified to characterize the Consultative Assembly composition as overly pro-incumbent, given that the most recognized bodies of opposition at the time made passionate appeals against the heavy influence of state-incorporated organizations, military officials, and PNDC-created civic associations as the selected participants who would ensure “an almost pro-regime consensus”.²⁸² This explicit control was contested by the Ghana Bar Association and the National Union of Ghanaian Students, who refused to take up their seats, allocated 1 each, because of such overt attempts to control the progress and content of the transition process.²⁸³

The earlier incorporation strategies of the government had created indigenous business councils, local state organs, and churches as pro-government conservative forces

²⁸¹ (1992). Report on the Consultative Assembly. Daily Graphic. Accra, Ghana.

These debates did not reflect a transformative agenda or focus on any goals of providing freedoms and liberty to the population. The organs of the revolution, such as the Council of Elders, the District Assemblies, and the revolutionary committees and ‘movements’ (Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, 31st December Women’s Movement, etc) were called upon to participate actively in the Consultative Assembly, ultimately with the effect of supporting the status quo and supporting the incumbent government agenda. See statements by National Union of Ghanaian Students and the Ghana Bar Association 1992. Ninsin, K. A. (1996). Ghana's political transition, 1990-1993 : selected documents. Accra, Ghana, Freedom Publications.

²⁸² The over-representation of military and government occurred through the appointment of government-sponsored civic associations such as the December 31st Women’s Movement, Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, Mobisquads, Civil Defense Organizations, and other state-created organizational bodies. Archives., L. (1991- 2). Register of Consultative Assembly Members. Accra, Ghana.

Makeup of the Constituent Assembly as per Assembly Law 1991 - July 31.

Whereas, historically, military leaders had appointed about 30% of the members of previous Assemblies, the PNDC exceeded this norm with purely military appointments for the makeup of the Constituent Assembly, in addition to the affiliated associations. Hansen, E. (1991). Ghana under Rawlings : early years. Lagos, Malthouse Press. p. 55 – 90

Ninsin, K. A. and F. K. Drah (1991). Ghana's transition to constitutional rule : proceedings of a seminar organised by the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon. Accra, Ghana Universities Press. p. 27

²⁸³ See Statement of the National Union of Ghanaian Students in Ninsin, K. A. (1996). Ghana's political transition, 1990-1993 : selected documents. Accra, Ghana, Freedom Publications.

that were, at the time of democratization, intent on ‘preparing and educating the masses’ on the goals of political changes, which emphasized maintaining stability. These organs linked the local elite, their followers and the ruling party together in a concentrated strategy to influence the democratization process, reflecting the power of the incumbent regime.²⁸⁴ In this context, “given the extensive political support which the government enjoyed almost throughout the country, it was easier for it to maintain a firm grip on the transition process through to election day”.²⁸⁵ The Consultative Assembly reflected this power, and the appointed ‘social representatives’ allowed the government to “resist broad demands for inclusion and dialogue in the transition politics”.²⁸⁶ From the fact-finding National Commission for Democracy charged with overseeing the transition, to the Committee of Experts in charge of drafting the constitution, to the Consultative Assembly meant to provide the public stamp of approval for the process, *the organs of the transition were carefully crafted by the incumbents to “manage their victory”*.²⁸⁷

²⁸⁴ Archive – Daily Graphic Newspaper April 1991. These tactics built on the regime’s established strategy of co-opting associations of the informal sector and creating an ‘alternative’ civil society to counter the pro-democracy forces and generally support the regime. Examples include messages from Church Services that were informed by the Government as well as seminars held by the revolutionary organs themselves, such as the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution. (1992). Report on the Consultative Assembly. Daily Graphic. Accra, Ghana.

²⁸⁵ Ninsin, K. A. and F. K. Drah (1991). Ghana's transition to constitutional rule : proceedings of a seminar organised by the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon. Accra, Ghana Universities Press. p. 70

²⁸⁶ Bluwey, G. (1998). State Organisations in the Transition. Ghana: transition to democracy. K. A. Ninsin. Dakar, Senegal, Codesria. **Codesria book series.**: x, 252 p.

²⁸⁷ Jonah, K. (2006). Acting Head, Governance Center at the Institute for Economic Affairs in Ghana. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

The PNDC did not want to give up power both because they saw themselves as beneficial for the country and because they feared the (security) consequences for themselves if they did lose power. Thus, they were united in their focus of institutional crafting to maintain their position. Ninsin, K. A. and F. K. Drah (1991). Ghana's transition to constitutional rule : proceedings of a seminar organised by the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon. Accra, Ghana Universities Press. p. 35-7

Pushback from the Opposition

The opposition endeavored to push for a more equal playing field, and given their independent sources of material resources from private enterprise and their unique historical coherence, they had good reason to push forward to get elections at all costs – elections they suspected they could win. Given the primary focus on electoral strategies, the negotiation between incumbents and opposition was limited and did not reform the initial incumbent transition agenda. Neither the incumbent party nor the coherent opposition, the NPP, had an incentive to welcome new competitors or push for reforms beyond the realm of legalizing electoral competition.

The opposition in Ghana was uniquely strong despite the continuing presence of a repressive authoritarian regime. The opposition was based upon the pillars of the middle class and professional networks, and united by their ‘liberal’ philosophy, which provided a coherent foundation demanding political pluralism and continued economic reform.²⁸⁸ The political and economic agenda was a natural extension of the interests of the opposition leadership: educated elite and private business owner. Furthermore, it corresponded with a global turn away from ‘revolutionary’ and ‘socialist’ governments, which gave the movement credibility domestically.²⁸⁹ The opposition was harassed and repressed during the long period of authoritarian rule, but they were able to maintain a

²⁸⁸ The opposition was embodied prior to liberalization through organizations such as the Association of Recognized Professional Bodies, and in particular, the Ghana Bar Association, which provided networks of regular communication. The National Union of Ghana Students, the 14 congregations making up the Christian Council of Ghana and the Ghana Trade Union Congress were important in their large memberships and national infrastructure which gave the potential for attaining mass support and organizing quickly across the national territory.

²⁸⁹ “First, even though we were not in power and not allowed to voice our political concerns, the party always stood for something – a liberal economic agenda that would benefit its middle class core leadership as well as the rest of the population, so even when we were not in power, it had relevance. Secondly, global events made our tradition and philosophy dominant, people wanted to relate to ‘liberalization’, and the revolutionary government and socialism were rapidly becoming discredited on the world stage”. Oquaye, M. (2006). Founding member of NPP and Minister of Energy. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

coherence in their commitment to political pluralism through civil society projects, lectures, professional, student and social networks that dated historically to independence-era political affiliations (a feature rather unique to Ghana). Most critically for the opposition, these social foundations allowed them to “maintain and connect to an enduring support base”.²⁹⁰ The opposition broadened and became more unified following the government sponsored ‘no-party’ elections for the district assemblies.²⁹¹ These inter-linked groups led first to the Movement for Freedom and Justice while official parties were still banned, and the more ‘liberal’ element of this group quickly translated into a formalized political party, the NPP, in the run-up to elections.²⁹²

The opposition came together to challenge the government’s monopoly to be the exclusive representation of the people, but their agenda stopped at achieving multi-party constitutional rule rather than pushing for broad reform to dismantle the party-state system, for two main reasons. First, due in large part to the strong position of the opposition, they shared with the incumbents a preference for stability, and limited reform.²⁹³ Elites on both sides of the divide overlapped in professional networks and

²⁹⁰ Ibid.

²⁹¹ District Assembly Elections held from December 1988 through February 1989.

²⁹² Oquaye, M. (2006). Founding member of NPP and Minister of Energy. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

“The lectures by Boahen in particular were a catalyst for anti-regime opposition to coalesce. We presented the ‘Relevant Alternative’, and the return of multi-party democracy vindicated our cause. The Movement for Freedom and Justice was formed in August 1990 as a group of various leaders who came together to fight against the military regime. It was led by a combination of left-wing forces, Nkrumah’s followers, and right-wingers (what became the NPP). Neither of these groups fit into Rawlings’s camp. In 1991, we decided that for cosmetic purposes we would invite all faces within to be the focal point of pro-democratic mobilizational activities, but we never worked to build a following out of this organization, we did not get involved in creating party bases, no links to social organizations, etc. At the outset we were conscious of our differences and we knew that we couldn’t work together. The NPP emerged with strength out of this initial group because from our rallying cry, the Danquah Busia tradition had a personality (Boateng) and history upon which to draw and organize and mobilize (whereas we, the left wingers, did not have a cohesive leader at that time”. Pratt, K. (2006). CPP Secretary General and Communications Director. Founding Member of the Movement for Freedom and Justice, a democratization pressure group. Editor of the Weekly Insight. . R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

²⁹³ In addition to limited political reform of the party-state system, the policy platform was limited and surprisingly similar on both sides. The campaign rhetoric was largely pro-government (achievements and

other social linkages, and benefited from the status quo. The professional and private connections between the opposition and incumbents facilitated cooperation to some degree.²⁹⁴ They were continually connected through informal networks of communication as well as formal professional circuits.²⁹⁵ The return to constitutional rule and the stability of rule of law satisfied the demands of many in this interlinked community.²⁹⁶

Secondly, the opposition's strong assumption of victory in electoral competition obviated the need to push for further reforms to achieve more extensive transformation. Once the PNDC had accepted pluralist politics, the "struggle quickly changed from opposition calling for political freedom to a struggle among political parties for state power. Parties actively campaigned for the mandate of the electorate to rule rather than contend over the nature and direction of the democratization process... The struggle for power, via elections, became the primary pre-occupation of leading political entrepreneurs".²⁹⁷ Following the April 1992 legalization of political parties, politics transformed to an electoral contest between two limited, competing camps, which

stability) versus anti-government (anti - authoritarianism and change) but policy differences between the incumbent authoritarian government and the challenger, the NPP, were negligible. "The extent of ideological position difference between the two camps is exaggerated... it has largely been about groups organizing to take power". Neither side wanted to challenge market-oriented strategies of development adopted by the PNDC. The government party campaigned on continuity, and the opposition offered its own version of continuity – to promote a liberal economic agenda, free enterprise and rural development. "All Ghanaian parties are centrist (maybe slightly center-left and center-right. This configuration leads to a 2 party division, because the business of parties is to structure political competition, it is not about platforms or ideas, as they would all implement essentially the same agenda". Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2006). Executive Director, Centre for Democratic Development. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

²⁹⁴ Gros, J.-G. (1998). *Democratization in late twentieth-century Africa : coping with uncertainty*. Westport, Conn., Greenwood Press.

²⁹⁵ Ahwoi, K. (2006). PNDC Minister for Decentralization (charged with the District Assembly Election Process implementation). R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

²⁹⁶ Asante, D. N. S. K. B. (April 2006). Chairman of the Committee of Experts for the Draft Constitution of the Democratic Transition. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

²⁹⁷ Ninsin, K. A. and F. K. Drah (1991). *Ghana's transition to constitutional rule : proceedings of a seminar organised by the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon*. Accra, Ghana Universities Press. p. 76.

simultaneously had the effect of decreasing any extremism of social mobilization. The focus on all sides confirmed the acceptability of a transition that achieved only a formalization of pluralist politics – in this the incumbents and opposition were in agreement. A more extensive agenda of rights and liberties – encompassing economic, social, environmental, and cultural – “were given up in the elite rush to get to competition for power”.²⁹⁸

The democratic transition, therefore, was characterized in Ghana by both the incumbent and the opposition satisfied with a formal transition to constitutional multiparty politics, leaving aside civic rights and political liberties more generally.²⁹⁹ The “political elite was in a hurry to get to power, so the broader issues of democratization such as human rights, social justice and freedoms were dropped – or never really raised. The opposition brought up these issues briefly as a way to weaken the incumbent in their effort to get to power, but once it was clear that elections were going to be held and they could contest them, the transitional issues of broader democratization were not the focus”.³⁰⁰ While the Movement for Freedom and Justice was active, they called for a transitional government to be installed so that the incumbent government couldn’t control the agenda and limit the amount of political and social freedom. The entire opposition supported this at first, in part to make the administration unpopular and try to unseat them, “but as we drew closer to elections and the possibility

²⁹⁸ Ninsin, K. A. (2006). Professor of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon. R. Interview. Legon, Ghana.

²⁹⁹ Ninsin, K. A. and Codesria. (1998). *Ghana : transition to democracy*. Dakar, Senegal, Codesria.

³⁰⁰ Opoku, N. K. (2006). General Secretary of the National Reform Party; NGO Coordinator of the Civic Response. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

for capturing power became greater, the main contenders dropped all demands”.³⁰¹ The struggle changed dramatically as elections became a certainty, from the opposition calling for political freedoms to a struggle among political parties for state power. “Parties actively campaigned for the mandate of the electorate to rule rather than contend over the nature and direction of the democratization process”.³⁰² As the energies of the new political parties were channeled into the struggle for state power, opposition had minimal contribution to the debate about the future of democracy in Ghana.³⁰³

Outcome: The Controlled Transition

The incumbent strength and opposition organization contributed to a *shared agenda for limited reform*, and thus, little contestation over the transition agenda or participation. Because the opposition’s main goal was merely to arrive at multiparty competition that they assumed they would win, they wanted only to assure their own inclusion in the system. There were crucial remaining issues left unaddressed in the democratization period, such as repealing repressive laws of the authoritarian period, granting amnesty to exiles and political prisoners, and disbanding revolutionary organs that had influence at the local level.³⁰⁴ These issues were abandoned, as was the drive for an interim transitional government to oversee the reforms.

³⁰¹ Pratt, K. (2006). CPP Secretary General and Communications Director. Founding Member of the Movement for Freedom and Justice, a democratization pressure group. Editor of the Weekly Insight. . R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

³⁰² Ninsin, K. A. and Codesria. (1998). *Ghana : transition to democracy*. Dakar, Senegal, Codesria. P. 76.

³⁰³ Ninsin, K. A. and F. K. Drah (1991). *Ghana's transition to constitutional rule : proceedings of a seminar organised by the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon*. Accra, Ghana Universities Press. p. 77-82.

³⁰⁴ According to the National Union of Ghanaian Students: (1) repealing the repressive laws (PNDC Law 4, 78, 91, etc); (2) granting of unconditional amnesty to political exiles; (3) release of all political prisoners; (4) disbanding of the revolutionary organs such as the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution, the militia/ Mobisquads and the 31st of December Women’s Movement which are financed out of public funds;

The elite preference for maintaining stability around the struggle for power was evident as well in the form that challenges took. Most pre-election disputes between the contenders took place through appeals to the judiciary. Disputes over the electoral provisions and the tilted playing field took place not through street action, but by addressing certain provisions of PNDC Law, representing an “emerging political attitude that preferred the use of peaceful and established rules and procedure to resolve disputes”.³⁰⁵ The shock and disbelief that the opposition NPP exhibited following their 1992 electoral loss was evidence not only of the remaining incumbent advantages in the system, but also of the extent to which the NPP had been confident of their impending victory.³⁰⁶ Prior to the elections the opposition had overestimated their ability to win in the authoritarian context. Their electoral focus, and parallel lack of emphasis on broader reforms, represented the NPP’s calculation of winning power for themselves, without a need for extensive democratization and transformation of the political arena.

The incumbent and opposition’s shared preference for limited reform was also reflected in the limited use of mass mobilization to push for advantage in the transition process. Both sides desired to further assimilate and incorporate key constituencies to build their respective followings and establish hegemony.³⁰⁷ “This strategy was evident

and (5) the establishment of an Interim Government. “NUGS Statement on the PNDC’s Timetable on the Return to Constitutional Rule”. Ninsin, K. A. (1996). Ghana's political transition, 1990-1993 : selected documents. Accra, Ghana, Freedom Publications.

³⁰⁵ Ninsin, K. A. and Codesria. (1998). Ghana : transition to democracy. Dakar, Senegal, Codesria.

³⁰⁶ See a detailed analysis in the NPP’s internal party post-election report: “The Stolen Verdict”. While the realization of the extent of government manipulation and incumbent advantage led the NPP to boycott the following legislative elections, the extensive inter-party relations continued following the highly disputed 1992 elections, as both the incumbents and opposition negotiated on the rules and procedures for the 1996 general elections. New Patriotic Party (Ghana) (1993). The stolen verdict : Ghana, November 1992 presidential election : report of the New Patriotic Party. Accra, Ghana, The Party.

³⁰⁷ Ninsin, K. A. and F. K. Drah (1991). Ghana's transition to constitutional rule : proceedings of a seminar organised by the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon. Accra, Ghana Universities Press. p. 21 -3.

in the incumbents from the very inception of the idea to accept political reform. The goal of undertaking the transition was in many ways a tactic to maintain control over the mass population and further bolster support for the regime”.³⁰⁸ Rather than mobilize the masses around broad transition issues, which could easily expand beyond the intentions of the leaders that initiated it, or use revolutionary energy to sweep aside social pressures, both the opposition and the incumbents endeavored instead to continue to incorporate and assimilate social forces.³⁰⁹ Following the legalization of political parties in May 1992, civil society was drastically reduced, “sapped of its energy; superseded by political parties and party politics which sought to co-opt or metamorphosize the leading social forces”, centered around the competition for access to the state.³¹⁰

This shared agenda for limited reform was facilitated by the context of PNDC control, as the repressive state machinery of the authoritarian regime remained in place during the entire electoral period; all repressive laws, decree power, and state institutions combined to implement the transition and run the elections in an extremely controlled

³⁰⁸ Ahwoi, K. (2006). PNDC Minister for Decentralization (charged with the District Assembly Election Process implementation). R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

“The PNDC felt the need to further incorporate the core constituencies, the students, workers and farmers, to carry out their agenda”. Various strategies of control had been attempted that reflected this desire, beginning with the District Councils, and the effort to incorporate business elite and opposition elements, and further attempts to incorporate the general masses. The decentralization agenda, with the creation of non-partisan District Assemblies in 1988, was a further attempt to incorporate, establish PNDC control and legitimize the regime, as well as establish administrative structures at the grass roots. These attempts, culminating in the acceptance of a transition to multipartism, were all quests for a ‘social base’ as the foundation for rule, a continuing attempt to incorporate the masses by the PNDC. Gyimah-Boadi, E. (1993). *Ghana under PNDC rule*. Senegal, Codesria. p. 103 – 130

³⁰⁹ Rather than use revolutionary energy to sweep aside social pressures, the PNDC endeavored to incorporate and assimilate social forces. “We decided we could use *our control* instead to allow transition and maintain our power to carry out revolutionary goals also didn't need to use force to sweep aside opposition because the revolution had begun an *assimilation* process, bringing in new elements to help us to carry out our goals, to contribute from various sectors of the society”. Obeng, P. (2006). Former Presidential Advisor on Governmental Affairs. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

³¹⁰ Ninsin, K. A., F. K. Drah, et al. (1993). *Political parties and democracy in Ghana's fourth republic : proceedings of a seminar organized by the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon on 2nd and 3rd July, 1992*. Accra, Woeli Publishing Services.

atmosphere – one which dictated who could be involved and to what extent the existing system would change.³¹¹ The limited reform agenda, the lack of broad mobilization for change, and the maintenance of authoritarian control reflected the interests of a strong incumbent and the parallel interests of a coherent opposition. “As usual the parties became preoccupied with winning political power and much less concerned than before with liberalizing the military regime”.³¹²

SENEGAL

In Senegal, similar to Ghana, an extremely controlled move to limited liberalization followed by full multipartism was a calculated strategy by the incumbents to respond to domestic tensions and international pressures. These factors were sufficient to push the ruling party to envision a controlled liberalization as a beneficial strategy to their goal of continued reign. As in Ghana, the incumbent party determined internally the amount of liberalization it was willing to concede, and how that would be allocated to maximize their own position on the political scene. The transition was conceived of and implemented via the existing organs of the state, using the single-party legislature to pass the necessary constitutional amendment and party legislation law. Only opposition parties that would accept this ruling party framework and mandate of their ideological position could be legalized, ensuring the character and leadership of the opposing party would be acceptable to the incumbents.

³¹¹ Oquaye, M. (2004). *Politics in Ghana, 1982-1992 : Rawlings, revolution, and populist democracy*. Osu, Accra, Ghana, Tornado Publications. p. 491-6; 530-2; 308-9

³¹² The parties were formed following the lifting of the ban on political parties May 18 1992. Ninsin, K. A. (1996). *Ghana's political transition, 1990-1993 : selected documents*. Accra, Ghana, Freedom Publications. p. 130.

This limited opening established a highly regulated system of cohabitation between the government and opposition. The highly controlled transition was mandated by the incumbent party, accepted by the opposition ordained as the legal alternative party, and linked their fates through their embedded interests in the system of highly structured electoral competition and state institutional channels as mechanisms of dispute resolution rather than broad reform.

Initial Strategies of the Incumbent

The incumbent *Parti Socialiste (PS)* in Senegal consistently sought to incorporate divisive elements within itself, with policies of unification, integration and consensus-building that were summed up as the project of national unity.³¹³ This integration (notwithstanding exclusion and marginalization in cases of resistance) was a successful strategy for achieving one party rule for over a decade, by systematically neutralizing the articulation of an alternative project by opposition.³¹⁴ However, as the ruling party strategy of unification became more difficult due to rising domestic pressures, the incumbent regime sought an alternative, though complementary, strategy. At this time, the “rulers were strong enough and sufficiently skillful to elaborate and to carry through a passive revolution”, replacing the authoritarian single party system with a restricted

³¹³ The period of one-party rule in Senegal was the first implementation of the incumbent’s strategies for domination and control, through the establishment of a ‘unity project’ to guarantee their own hegemony, “No real challenge to the ruling party could be expressed within a legal framework”. Hessling, A. G. H. J. A., Gerti Hesselting (1985). *Histoire Politique du Senegal - Institutions, Droit et Societe*. Paris, Macmillan.

The incumbent party was successful through the mid 1970’s in preventing opposition challenges through the “creation of a single, nation-wide constituency in a winner-take all system based on a party list, thereby ensuring one-party rule”. Vengroff, R. and L. Creevey (1997). *Senegal: The Evolution of a Quasi-Democracy. Political Reform in Francophone Africa*. J. F. Clark and D. E. Gardinier. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press: p. 206

³¹⁴ Diaw, A. and M. Diouf (1998). *The Senegalese Opposition and its Quest for Power. The politics of opposition in contemporary Africa*. A. O. Olukoshi. Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet: p.117

multiparty system.³¹⁵ The PS determined that a limited liberalization was the best path to mediate the domestic social pressures of the rural peasantry, international pressures, and the internal divisions within the ruling party. These constraints led the incumbents to “initiate incremental changes designed to expand the democratic option without seriously threatening the ruling party”.³¹⁶ By allowing two ‘parties of contribution’ to form legally and compete in elections, the incumbents retained hegemonic control and left the “structures of power fundamentally unchanged”.³¹⁷ The incumbent agenda to engineer a limited pluralism judged which contributors were acceptable. The process fundamentally allowed the government to control which parties (and leaders) could be registered as legal competitors.

This agenda had several major advantages to the incumbents seeking a vehicle to preserve their ruling power. First, it decreased internal factions within the ruling PS party, by allowing an outlet for those feeling thwarted within the hegemonic party. Secondly, it conferred the most desirable ideological space of ‘socialism’ to the incumbent PS, leaving the ‘neo-colonial’ connotations of liberalism and the more extreme Marxist positions to the opposition. Thirdly, limited pluralism was meant to mediate the domestic social pressures of the rural peasantry and urban union and student groups that were increasingly agitating against the government. Fourth, it would forge a stronger international link, meeting pressures from liberal allies and encouraging greater assistance to the incumbent regime. Finally, it allowed the regime to de-legitimize

³¹⁵ Ibid. p.119.

³¹⁶ Vengroff, R. and L. Creevey (1997). Senegal: The Evolution of a Quasi-Democracy. Political Reform in Francophone Africa. J. F. Clark and D. E. Gardinier. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press: p. 206

³¹⁷ Fatton, R. (1987). The making of a liberal democracy : Senegal's passive revolution, 1975-1985. Boulder, Colo., L. Rienner Publishers. p. 53.

popular and potentially more threatening sources of underground opposition.³¹⁸ By allowing only two approved competitors – those that implicitly accepted the political configuration in the country – into the legal opposition, the ruling party created a new agenda for pursuing the logic of unity. The limited “plurality of discourse now tolerated did not allow the emergence into the political domain of the logic of competition or a logic of autonomous projects which could serve as a basis for popular mobilization”.³¹⁹

Directing a Transition in Senegal

The *Parti Socialiste* dictated the legal existence of a ‘party of contribution’ rather than ‘opposition’ at the outset. The ruling party, facing domestic and international incentives to liberalize, conjured up a strategy to allow a young PS militant who was dissatisfied with his own rise within the party – blocked by the dominating presence of party elders – to spin off from the ruling party with the stringent agreement that the incumbents would decide what constitutes an appropriate contribution.³²⁰ Those who became early members of the opposition leadership were already members of the political elite with a certain access to the state, but sought new routes for their own participation - they *did not seek a democratic opening for the sake of political liberalization*, but rather a means of improving their personal trajectory. This solution absolved the ruling party of internal pressures from the ‘next generation’, and allowed for a controlled reform that did not change “the nature of authority but the institutional structure to further uphold their

³¹⁸ In particular, the RND led by Cheikh Anta Diop, but included others as well.

³¹⁹ Diaw, A. and M. Diouf (1998). *The Senegalese Opposition and its Quest for Power*. The politics of opposition in contemporary Africa. A. O. Olukoshi. Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet: p. 127

³²⁰ Dioh, T. (2002). "Sous l'étiquette libérale", *Jeuneafrique*, 21 October 2002

authority”.³²¹ The limited agenda of reform as well as the circumscribed scope of participation was captured in the national discourse of unity.

The political configuration in the country, initiated as it was by the ruling PS, and accepted by the PDS... was based on the logic of unity which had been constructed during the first decade of independence with the process of unification, integration and consensus-building, which did not seem to have been completely removed from the Senegalese political domain. The opposition recognized and authorized by the PS and enshrined in its official role, did not fundamentally challenge this logic. The plurality of discourse which was tolerated did not allow the emergence into the political domain of the logic of competition or a logic of autonomous projects which could serve as a basis for popular mobilization.³²²

The incumbents used the most direct path to initiate their preferred agenda by simply legislating the change to the constitution in the single party National Assembly.³²³ As the framework had already been determined by the PS leadership, the legal passage was a *fait accompli*. “The constitutional adaptation and the associated party law were easily facilitated by the ruling party’s control over the legislature”.³²⁴ The critical aspect of the limited liberalization agenda that guaranteed an extremely controlled process was the mandate of the 1976 ‘law of three’ which established the maximum number of parties, their required ideological positions, and their overall acceptance of the framework of domination by the ruling bloc.

The law of three trends under which only three ideological political trends were recognized in the country had the effect of determining the nature of the opposition acceptable to the [PS] oligarchy. ... This selective recognition was to again divide the Senegalese opposition into two: the legal opposition which consisted of those parties willing to find a place within the political framework authorized by the ruling oligarchy,

³²¹ Diop, O. (2006). *Partis politiques et processus de transition démocratique en Afrique noire : recherches sur les enjeux juridiques et sociologiques du multipartisme dans quelques pays de l'espace francophone*. Paris, Publibook. p. 103

³²² Diaw, A. and M. Diouf (1998). *The Senegalese Opposition and its Quest for Power. The politics of opposition in contemporary Africa*. A. O. Olukoshi. Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet: p. 127

³²³ Senegal has had the same fundamental constitution since 1960 – which did not institutionalize the single party system, but allowed the dominance of the party-state through the ruling party’s ability to control the system. Diaw, A. (2005). Professor of Political Philosophy, Faculté des Lettres, UCAD, Dakar. General secretary of Senegalese National Council of Women. R. Interview. Dakar, Senegal.

³²⁴ Ibid.

and the illegal opposition which continued with a policy of non-cooperation in the face of the attempt by the state to strait jacket political thinking and expression in the country.³²⁵

In this method, the incumbent authoritarians defined the position of the opposition, determined the nature of this opposition in a way that would be acceptable to the ruling party, and required their acceptance of the fundamentals of the system in order to participate in the quest for power.³²⁶ This divided the opposition to the regime into the legally recognized, formal channels that accepted the terms of the game, and the subverted voices of dissent that were critical of this compact. The strategy of legislating the necessary constitutional change was effective for the incumbent's agenda of dictating the terms of a limited pluralism.

Pushback from the Opposition

While incumbents set the system to their own advantage, the legalized opposition readily joined despite the limited evolution of liberalization, “because they had the same incentive – to control the state.... Power is the game. Both search to control the machinery of the state. Those who are in power seek to maintain it and those who want to take it manifest the same incentives”.³²⁷ To this end, the opposition negotiated only to gain their formal recognition, and even stressed that they were “seeking to win democratic but not systematic power”.³²⁸ While they were aware that a full victory was not likely given the PS position of strength and remaining popularity, the opposition

³²⁵ Diaw, A. and M. Diouf (1998). The Senegalese Opposition and its Quest for Power. The politics of opposition in contemporary Africa. A. O. Olukoshi. Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet: p. p. 124.

³²⁶ Ibid. p. 124

³²⁷ Diop, S. (1990). La Transition Democratique: L'Exemple du Senegal. Les processus democratiques. p. 385-6

³²⁸ Thiam, L. (2005). PDS Responsable du parti. R. Interview. Dakar, Senegal.

hoped that a strong showing of public support would increase their bargaining position and access to the state.

In this context the meaning of electoral success for the opposition was less in winning (which did not seem to be in the cards given [PS President] Senghor's popularity and accomplishments), but in the demonstration of mass support. If one were successful in the latter, access to power for both the elite and their supporters was almost certainly assured.³²⁹

The weak and compromised position of the opposition ultimately meant that they accepted the game as the incumbent dictated it, recognizing that they (the PDS) were becoming the building block around which opposition would evolve. Those that did not accept the incumbent's agenda or were too potentially threatening were not allowed registration and were exceedingly marginalized. In reality, the opposition had little effective negotiating room, given their position vis-à-vis the incumbent.

The contestation that the opposition did endeavor to push over time was generally limited to challenges on specific political rights and electoral reform, and these challenges were directed to state organs – specifically the Courts - as formal mechanisms for dispute resolution. These tactics of focusing on a juridico-political battle further reinforced the stature of PDS as a public voice, the credible alternative, and an institutionally responsible presence within Parliament and society in general. The use of legal channels to increase their own standing against the ruling party did not challenge the fundamental structure.

The opposition and incumbents continually make bargains to ensure their own participation and limit the democratic opening. In particular, opposition just want to participate in power in order to share the cake. Incumbents want to include opposition to

³²⁹ Hayward, F. M. and S. N. Grovogui (1987). Persistence and Change in Senegalese Electoral Processes. *Elections in independent Africa*. F. M. Hayward. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press: xvii, 318 p. p. 264

increase control, stability, and opposition are quite willing to participate in governmental majorities even when they claim elections are unfair.³³⁰

The opposition party employed methods of incorporation, recruitment and operation similar to those of the ruling party, and in this way gained capacity to limit more radical opposition, subordinating popular calls for greater reform.³³¹

The push for a greater democratic opening came from the opposition forces that were not allowed legal registration. The Coordinating Association for the Unified Senegalese Opposition (COSU) was formed in 1978 to articulate demands for greater democracy, and the PDS was notably absent.³³² Once again, the initiative for full multipartism came primarily to meet the needs of the incumbent regime, this time to solidify the authority of the incumbent PS following a leadership change at the helm, and to fragment the growing forces of the opposition that were becoming increasingly cohesive by the 1980's under the banner of the PDS in the limited multipart system.³³³ The circumscribed liberalization of 'the law of three' was followed by a second stage of democratic opening to full multipartism in 1981. The legalization of more radical parties of the left, which did not accept the co-habitation of the PS and PDS in upholding the ruling elite hegemony, only further "displaced the dividing line between the ruling

³³⁰ Diop, O. (2006). Partis politiques et processus de transition démocratique en Afrique noire : recherches sur les enjeux juridiques et sociologiques du multipartisme dans quelques pays de l'espace francophone. Paris, Publibook. p. 433 -4.

³³¹ Diaw, A. and M. Diouf (1998). The Senegalese Opposition and its Quest for Power. The politics of opposition in contemporary Africa. A. O. Olukoshi. Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet: p. . 134, 121

³³² An absence that ultimately weakened the negotiating position of the COSU.

³³³ "The fragmentation of the opposition (the legally registered PDS versus many illegal, underground sources pushing for greater democracy) increased with the 1981 move to unrestricted multipartism recognizing all opposition parties. The ruling power bloc was able, initially at least, to weaken them as they struggled to find their footing under the new dispensation.... The ensuing cacophony suggests that the ruling power bloc wished to continue to control democracy, even if the means and context for doing so had fundamentally changed". Diaw, A. and M. Diouf (1998). The Senegalese Opposition and its Quest for Power. The politics of opposition in contemporary Africa. A. O. Olukoshi. Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet: p. 113 -43. p. 129.

power's space and that of the opposition [PDS]".³³⁴ The new left parties challenged the system with more radical mobilization strategies, but the established positions of the PS as the ruling party and the PDS as the credible alternative meant that others remained marginalized, lacking general public appeal and electoral support.

Both the incumbent PS and the opposition PDS shared the goal of limited electoral competition, which would ensure them both stability and continued access to the political arena. The move to full multipartism consolidated the PS position against internal factional threats as well as more radical political movements. The experiment in controlled democracy offered advantages to both sides, and kept contestation limited to state-approved channels.

Outcome: The Controlled Transition

The Senegalese status quo prior to the democratic transition was a hegemonic single party which maintained its position, in large part, through a 'project of national unity'. The democratization agenda was in line with this approach – creating a dominant party state, which rival forces not recognized into the legal opposition would describe as “a totalitarian project aiming to stifle their effort to contest for power”.³³⁵ “The building and consolidation of state power through the taming of the diverse social forces... bore witness to the readiness of the ruling party to embark on a negation of rights, both in theory and in practice, in order to achieve its objective of dominating the local political

³³⁴ Ibid. p. 129

³³⁵ Fatton, R. (1987). The making of a liberal democracy : Senegal's passive revolution, 1975-1985. Boulder, Colo., L. Rienner Publishers.

Vengroff, R. and L. Creevey (1997). Senegal: The Evolution of a Quasi-Democracy. Political Reform in Francophone Africa. J. F. Clark and D. E. Gardinier. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press: pp. 204 - 222.

Salih, M. A. R. M. (2003). African political parties : evolution, institutionalism and governance. London ; Sterling, Va., Pluto Press.

space. This behavior entailed the muzzling of democratic freedoms".³³⁶ In sum, the ruling party continued their practice of suppressing, dominating and integrating opposition forces through their strategies of limited multipartism and ultimately, the move to full multipartism, reflecting the driving logic of achieving stability and continuity through politics of integration.

CONTESTED and OPEN TRANSITIONS: ZAMBIA and BENIN

ZAMBIA

Zambia's incumbent authoritarians also planned initially a controlled transition to multipartism, culminating in a pluralist election that they expected to win. However, the weakness of the incumbent regime, particularly evident in coup attempts and massive strikes and protests agitating for regime (and leadership) change, forced the incumbents to alter their agenda and respond to the demands of the opposition. The initial incumbent agenda in Zambia mirrored strategies proposed in Ghana and Senegal, reflecting the party's desire to maintain power. They proposed a national referendum to rally support for the incumbent and using the single party national assembly as a tool to legislate change without real social participation. However, the lack of social support for the incumbent and the forceful agenda of the opposition led to contestation that required a series of amendments to the planned transition, and further compromised authoritarian control over who would be eligible to compete and under what rules. The 'contested' transition pitted a deteriorating incumbent against a coherent opposition eager to inherit

³³⁶ Diaw, A. and M. Diouf (1998). The Senegalese Opposition and its Quest for Power. The politics of opposition in contemporary Africa. A. O. Olukoshi. Uppsala, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet: p. 117.

the state system in tact, ultimately resulting in a modest but significant opening for new entrants and shaping of the rule making process.

Initial Strategies of the Incumbent

The incumbent single party authoritarian regime in Zambia endeavored first to hold a national referendum on the question of transitioning to multipartism, in order to stave off rising pressures for political liberalization. The incumbent regime, UNIP, planned the referendum to demonstrate the public's preference for the single party system. However, the incumbent campaign to retain the single party system was met with such resentment by the population that it forced UNIP to cancel the referendum. "The signs became obvious, even to [President] Kaunda, that the people were not going to rally to support him and his arguments for the single party system. So when he knew he was going to lose the referendum, he withdrew it and began planning for a snap election".³³⁷ The decision to proceed rapidly with elections, or wait for the government's term to expire naturally with the next set of scheduled elections (occurring within the single party framework) resulted from an internal party debate. "UNIP realized that it was potentially cutting short their existing term if it lost, but felt the social situation necessitated elections so as to quell public discontent and hopefully reap the benefits of both a less organized opposition, and popular social support of initiating changes according to the people's wishes".³³⁸ This dual logic reflected the incumbent calculation of its own precarious position as well as the concern over a potentially powerful opposition force.

³³⁷ Mbikusita-Lewanika, A. (July 2006). Founding Member of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia.

³³⁸ Ibid.

Kaunda calculated that repealing Article 4 and bringing elections early, snap elections, would allow him and UNIP to win. He thought that the opposition was not well enough organized, it was a nascent force and early elections would capitalize on that. He could have waited until his mandate was over in 1993 to hold the elections, but that plan ran the risk of more discontent, becoming ungovernable and even a coup. KK underestimated the pent-up anger...and the extent to which UNIP incapable of maintaining the state system. The Constitutional change to repeal Article 4 and allow multipartism was a move for self-preservation. UNIP changed the constitution prior to its defeat in line with its own strategic needs, in order to help itself... not with a systemic or procedural reform in mind.³³⁹

UNIP expected their reform agenda to work in their favor, by convincing the public that they were meeting their demands.

Despite the fact that the incumbent party was aware of the public discontent, they estimated that the social change being demanded would be satisfied with the move to multipartism, rather than a change in governing party. There was no debate within UNIP about whether or not to maintain the party, as the decision to hold multiparty elections was seen as the means to maintaining the ruling party.³⁴⁰ UNIP Central Committee members felt that the party was the tool through which they would “maximize their chances to win, because UNIP had done so much historically for Zambia. There was no debate within the party as to the fate of UNIP itself. We who stayed with it would continue to be involved in politics only within the framework of UNIP... Furthermore, we should be the ones to initiate the change ourselves, to accept the people’s wishes”.³⁴¹

Elections would have been held in 1993, but the expectation that that the opposition was a heterogeneous force that would quickly divide with the legalization of multiple parties pushed the incumbent to change strategy more rapidly. Mwanakatwe, J. M. (1994). *End of Kaunda era*. Lusaka, Zambia, Multimedia Zambia. p. 204, 206

³³⁹ Habasonda, L. (2006). Director SACCORD. R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia.

³⁴⁰ This was particularly the case because UNIP controls remained in place over the media and state repressive agents. Mwanakatwe, J. M. (1994). *End of Kaunda era*. Lusaka, Zambia, Multimedia Zambia p. 231.

³⁴¹ Masheke, G. M. (2006). UNIP Central Committee member during democratic transition. Army Commander and Minister of Defence 1985-1988; Minister of Home Affairs 1988-89; Prime Minister of Zambia from 15 March 1989 to 31 August 1991. R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia.

The strategy of UNIP to initiate political liberalization was based on a need to regain public support, to bolster its social standing. The party's desire to show its responsiveness to public pressure was a reflection of its weak position, its need to gain popular appeal due to an inability to manage opposition to their liking. In earlier periods, "UNIP had been capable of eliminating opposition through singular tactics and repression but the broad scale of social mobilization against the regime, beyond a narrow political elite, meant that UNIP could no longer use those strategies of eliminating opposition."³⁴² The regime was instead forced to initiate changes they were uncertain to control.

UNIP party leadership capitalized on their single party legislature to set the terms of the transition to their liking. The National Assembly was instructed by the party leadership to repeal Article 4 of the constitution, which mandated the single party system. In this way, multiple political parties were legalized. In line with the strategy of calling snap elections to encourage the opposition to fragment, there was little restriction on new parties to encourage their proliferation. UNIP calculated that they might well lose their majority in parliament following the elections, but they focused their strategies on maintaining power by dividing the opposition and preserving the presidency.³⁴³

³⁴² Mbikusita-Lewanika, A. (July 2006). Founding Member of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia.

"This strong push of wide swath of society was the only reason that KK/UNIP was forced to change to multipartis; if it had remained only an elite opposition they had been dealt with as individuals all along either through incorporation or elimination". Habasonda, L. (2006). Director SACCORD. R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia.

³⁴³(NDI), N. D. I. f. I. A. and F. f. D. P. (FODEP) (2003). The State of Political Parties in Zambia: Final Report. N. I. f. M. D. (IMD). Lusaka, Zambia.

Chongwe, R. (2006). Former Cabinet Minister. R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia.

Simutanyi, N. R. (2006). Institute of Economic and Social Research, University of Zambia. R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia.

Pushback from the Opposition

The opposition represented a broad array of social forces engaged in the push for change. The initial push for political reform was a united and active base of churches, civil society organizations, students, academics and business elite who articulated the need for change, united by the infrastructure and resources of the national trade union.³⁴⁴ Political elite (particularly defectors from UNIP) surfaced as the opposition movement assured electoral competition, to take over leadership positions; “they waited to see which way the tide was turning before they formed MMD as a party to capture power”.³⁴⁵ With the legalization of multiparty politics, the opposition’s broad base of support maintained unity and gained strength as the political leadership began to cohere around a political party focused on winning state power. The opposition MMD party, rather than splintering with the prospect of elections, coalesced around the anti-incumbent sentiment that was parallel to the call for multiparty competition. The opposition united more strongly around a specific transition agenda of achieving alternation.³⁴⁶ Despite the immense unpopularity and weakness of the regime, the possibility of alternation remained improbable given the incumbent advantages of state control and the tilted playing field it implied; alternation required an incredible organization for democratization reforms on the part of the opposition.

The strength of the opposition combined with the weakness of the incumbent UNIP required them to submit to many demands, aiding the push for reform. Most

³⁴⁴ Bratton has highlighted the role of the trade union movement as the ‘lead institution’ in mobilizing opposition to the UNIP regime and establishing a ‘broad based alternative ruling coalition’. Bratton, Michael, “Civil Society and Political Transitions in Africa” in Harbeson, J. W., D. S. Rothchild, et al. (1994). *Civil society and the state in Africa*. Boulder, L. Rienner Publishers. p. 73

³⁴⁵ Habasonda, L. (2006). Director SACCORD. R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia.

³⁴⁶ The MMD and the ‘pro-democratic’ opposition more generally. Mwanakatwe, J. M. (1994). *End of Kaunda era*. Lusaka, Zambia, Multimedia Zambia. p. 193-205

critically, the incumbent government lost control of initiating the transition process, and had to invite the organized opposition to all key decisions and meetings to the extent that the opposition began controlling the transition implementation.³⁴⁷ The opposition focused on diminishing UNIP's preferential access to and control over the state machinery. Considerable reforms were achieved, which separated to a significant extent the government from the state. The MMD recognized that the main challenge was not the content of laws per se, but the supremacy of UNIP as the single party which allowed for the "conscious destruction of the republican Constitution for the sole purpose of maintaining political power... Reform means not remaking the constitution but returning to the existing condition of pluralism to allow it to function".³⁴⁸ The opposition tactically focused on reforming UNIP's embedded advantages, their ability to subvert the legal process, and the overlap of party-state which ensured UNIP's monopoly and political hegemony.³⁴⁹ The challenges mounted by the MMD also focused on contesting the incumbent's contacts and privileges, through the courts and media, and lobbied these channels to increase the opposition's access to public coverage and limit the ruling party's ability to manipulate the electoral process to their favor.³⁵⁰ Finally, the opposition

³⁴⁷ Posner, D. N. (2005). *Institutions and ethnic politics in Africa*. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press. p. 177-8

³⁴⁸ (MMD), M. f. M. D. (1991). MMD Democratic Transition Assessment. MMD. Lusaka, Zambia.

See also Mbikusita-Lewanika, A. and D. Chitala (1990). The hour has come : proceedings of the National Conference on the Multi-party Option, held at Garden House Hotel, Zambia, 20-21 July, 1990. Lusaka, Zambia, Zambia Research Foundation. p. 86

³⁴⁹ The early documents of the MMD argued that UNIP built its monolithic structure by creating "The Party and Its Government... a monolithic structure that would ensure the monopoly of power by the chosen few through the introduction of undemocratic practices in the election process within the party and nationally and through the appending of the party constitution to the Republican Constitution. These measures, as we all know, brought up a situation in which it became no longer possible to effect change through the ballot and led to the disenfranchisement of many people as people became apathetic to politics". Mbikusita-Lewanika, A. and D. Chitala (1990). The hour has come : proceedings of the National Conference on the Multi-party Option, held at Garden House Hotel, Zambia, 20-21 July, 1990. Lusaka, Zambia, Zambia Research Foundation. P.89

³⁵⁰ Mwanakatwe, J. M. (1994). End of Kaunda era. Lusaka, Zambia, Multimedia Zambia. p. 235

also backed the international and domestic groups providing electoral monitoring, as a further challenge to the incumbent's ability to control the transition and electoral process.³⁵¹ The most important realization of the opposition was that alternation required the redefinition of the relationship between the incumbent party and the Government, in order to place all competitors on equal footing. This required multiple tactics, and all of the MMD's reforms centered on removing UNIP from its dominant position in society.³⁵²

The MMD changed tactics as the specific focus of reform transformed. In the early stages, strategies of broad mobilization, strikes, riots and protests pushed the incumbent regime to legalize multiparty politics. Once this was accomplished, the opposition moved to a second-stage strategy of direct negotiation and bargaining with the incumbents in order to secure their preferred agenda and political leadership status.³⁵³ The opposition's support base and national organization gave them negotiating power. Once multiple parties were legalized, the MMD supported the overall transition agenda in an electoral focus, and even pushed to accelerate UNIP's rapid timetable to get to multiparty elections.³⁵⁴

³⁵¹ The domestic and international electoral monitoring groups played a large role and were part of the general negotiations between incumbent and opposition forces. Burnell, P. (2001). *The Party System and Party Politics in Zambia: Continuities Past, Present and Future*. ECPR Workshop 'Party, Party Systems and Democratic Consolidation in the Third World'. Grenoble.

³⁵² According to the opposition, "reform requires the end of the party- state b/c UNIP, by collapsing the distinction between the party and government, resulted in the use of the state as an instrument of a ruling clique that was only accountable to itself." For example, the single party state was achieved by making changes to the Party Constitution, so that it was possible to wipe out opposition in parliament. The party also required the allegiance of the security and civil forces... Reform requires the removal of UNIP from its dominant position in society, as one of any number of possible social organizations, equal among others, separating the Government structure from UNIP. Mbikusita-Lewanika, A. and D. Chitala (1990). The hour has come : proceedings of the National Conference on the Multi-party Option, held at Garden House Hotel, Zambia, 20-21 July, 1990. Lusaka, Zambia, Zambia Research Foundation. p. 91

³⁵³ MMD's reticence to use the tools of broad mobilization following the consolidation of the political leadership of the party signaled their shifting incentives to limit the scope of participation, limit further transformative reform, and inherit the system through electoral contestation.

³⁵⁴ Originally the MMD also feared that their heterogeneous and broad base of support would not withstand an extended electoral campaign, and the leadership's focus on electoral victory was a means to an end of

The incumbents had to respond to what the opposition required; rather than leading the transition they were responding to the circumstances according to their capability. An internal party assessment in the midst of the transition came to the stark conclusion that “*The UNIP government is in crisis, and as a result the Party finds itself improvising strategies in response to situations it has no control over. At the moment, it appears that the opposition is setting the agenda, and UNIP is acting as though it were in opposition. UNIP, nation-wide, is facing a crisis of confidence. Without stating the obvious, UNIP must change to survive.*”³⁵⁵ The extent to which UNIP took on an internal reform and endeavored to deconstruct the existing party-state was transformative, and one of the most important elements of the opening the democratization process provided.

UNIP’s deterioration occurred through both substantial defections to the opposition camp as well as internal challenges to the party hegemony. The party lost many of its key members, both in terms of individual financial supporters and regional social leaders. A mass exodus occurred in the run-up to the founding elections as the writing on the wall became clear to many and they jumped on the MMD bandwagon. “Many UNIP political leaders, academics, and business affiliates deserted the party in the

inheriting the state system. “The coalescence of the MMD leadership coincided with the legalization of multiparty politics and the decision to hold early elections. From this point forward, the MMD leadership was satisfied with multiparty elections as the goal of the democratization process, and the main focus was on the separation of the government from the incumbent party in order to prepare the electoral terrain for opposition victory”. While activism for multiparty competition was high, and pushed the incumbents well beyond the reform agenda they were comfortable with implementing, “events before and after Zambia’s 1991 elections indicates that ‘older political logics’ do not disappear merely because authoritarian regimes are challenged by forces from wider society. In Zambia, a range of civil society actors were *excluded* from the transition negotiations by an agreement between the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) leaders and Kenneth Kaunda at the little known Mulungushi (constitutional) Conference in July 1991. This exclusion confirmed the weakness of civil society, and laid the basis for an authoritarian resurgence under the Third Republic MMD government in which a restricted social group established its dominance”.

Bartlett, D. M. C. (2000). “Civil society and democracy: A Zambian case study.” *Journal of Southern African Studies* 26(3): 429-446. p. 431- 440.

³⁵⁵ Mwanakatwe, J. M. (1994). *End of Kaunda era*. Lusaka, Zambia, Multimedia Zambia. (Emphasis added) p. 239

run-up to the 1991 elections, and joined the heterogeneous mix making up the MMD. UNIP was thus left as a skeleton of its former self, with only a few of its core leaders still affiliated with the party”.³⁵⁶ The extent of party crisis was so great that it culminated in an internal challenge to President Kaunda’s leadership of the party in the 1991 UNIP Party Congress. Although the attempt was unsuccessful, it was a shocking signal of the weakening of internal control and the demise of the party’s cohesion. Facing this decline, party intellectuals undertook internal assessments of the party’s problems, and recommended extreme changes to improve the party’s political image, including the abandonment of the “Old Guard” of UNIP “who had outlived their usefulness if UNIP as to stand any chance of winning the elections”.³⁵⁷ These unprecedented reports proposed the retirement of the entire Central Committee and their replacement by young technocrats who would manage and rule UNIP. The reports also acknowledged the need to depend more on voluntary workers as the sources of affluence through party channels were in decline.³⁵⁸ The reports summarized the findings with the postmortem of UNIP control : “It will never be the same again”.³⁵⁹

³⁵⁶ Ibid.

³⁵⁷ Ibid.

³⁵⁸ Remarkably, even the insulated President Kaunda recognized the peril of his party, but mistakenly assumed that UNIP would lose a majority in the Parliament while retaining him as the President. In this recognition of the failing popularity of UNIP, and the desire of the population for change, Kaunda began recommending Constitutional amendments that would allow him as President to appoint Cabinet members from outside of Parliament (anticipating UNIP losses in the assembly), but MMD opposition was sufficiently strong to block this attempt. Kaunda also began massive changes within UNIP, bringing in new members as well as a new campaign team and professional consultants and strategists to oversee the campaign. He retired old members from key positions in order to bring in new elements. “This was the greatest campaign and internal reform that UNIP had ever engineered, but it was already too late.” Mbikusita-Lewanika, A. (July 2006). Founding Member of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia.

³⁵⁹ Niyrenda, C. U., S. U. Mumba, et al. (1991). Party Memorandum to All Chairman of the Provinces on Sept. 19, 1991. Re: Delinking of the UNIP from the Government. Report of the Committee on the Proposed Political and Staff Structure for Party Headquarters, Provincial District Offices, Future Status of Party Institutions and surrender of Seconded Staff. Lusaka, Zambia.

The debate around the Constitutional reform process reflected the strategies and bargaining capacity of the incumbents and opposition to pursue their favored agendas. The weak incumbents saw an opportunity to gain necessary popular support through an ostensibly participatory commission that gathered the views of the society. UNIP planned to gain favor by collecting public opinion and then dictate the terms of the new Constitution. The opposition wanted to limit the time to elections and potential benefits to the incumbent, particularly provisions which would further embed their advantages. UNIP initiated the Mvunga Commission to under-take country-wide consultations to solicit the views of the public, and then draft a new constitution. The Commission included broad representation of prominent citizens, scholars, trade unionists, the Church, and representatives from the opposition.³⁶⁰ However, the MMD and Church representatives did not take up their positions on the commission in protest of its pro-UNIP character, arguing that it would reflect the government's priorities. MMD then completely rejected the entire reform process, claiming it was controlled by the UNIP government. UNIP had to oblige to reforms because the opposition threatened to boycott the upcoming elections, which would have created untenable social tensions throughout the country.³⁶¹

³⁶⁰ Promulgated October 1990.

³⁶¹ The Mvunga Commission was charged with proposals for the transition, including a draft constitution, and the UNIP government made its recommendations in May 1991. The MMD completely rejected the entire constitutional reform process, claiming it was controlled by the UNIP government and advocated instead for a return to the 1964 constitution with some amendments. The opposition threatened to boycott the upcoming elections unless the government responded to its concerns. The incumbents lacked the strength to push through their agenda without opposition support, and the social tensions were creating an untenable stalemate in the country. Through intervention of the student unions and the Church, mediation achieved a compromise agreement – the incumbents had to concede a great deal of control to the reform process, and *perhaps more critically was the general perception that the MMD would not allow UNIP to control the process*. The new Constitution and election law were accepted on September 4, 1991 (with the elections held Oct 31, 1991). “The Mvunga Commission successfully produced a constitution for Zambia which was adequate mainly for the restoration of plural politics in Zambia. Its principal task was to produce a constitutional compromise between the ruling party (UNIP) on the one hand and the opposition

The final product entailed major UNIP concessions. Most important were the separation of powers (legislative, executive and judicial) and the separation of the party from the government. These elements were fundamental to the opposition to weaken the incumbent's electoral advantages. The opposition's main concern was not the constitution per se, but the subversion of the constitutional and governmental realm by the supremacy of the incumbent party.³⁶² Rather than benefiting from the public relations process and the opportunity to dictate the terms of the new constitution, UNIP ended up conceding to their weakened position and compromised on the process, providing another indication of their inability to manage the larger democratic transition.

Outcome: The Contested Transition

Opposition pressure and mobilization contributed to the severe deterioration of UNIP, and pushed the incumbents to include key opposition leaders in all decisions, forcing the agenda of the transition beyond the incumbent's control. This allowed for key reforms, particularly undermining the party-state model and the degree of control that the incumbent exercised over the state organs, and ultimately, the extent to which they could control the electoral competition. The degree of reform was sufficient to allow for a victory by the broad opposition in the founding elections, and this was revolutionary.

The strength of the opposition in the democratic process led to their take-over of the reform agenda, resulting in a contested transition. Once the opposition leadership

parties... at the height of the campaign for the re-introduction of multi-party politics in Zambia. Mwanakatwe, J. M. (2003). *John M. Mwanakatwe : teacher, politician, lawyer : my autobiography*. Lusaka, Zambia, Bookworld Publishers. p. 221, 454

³⁶² “The structures of UNIP as elaborated in the idea of the supremacy of the party, are reflections of a conscious course of action aimed at progressive destruction of the Republican Constitution for the sole purpose of maintaining political power”. Mbikusita-Lewanika, A. and D. Chitala (1990). *The hour has come : proceedings of the National Conference on the Multi-party Option, held at Garden House Hotel, Zambia, 20-21 July, 1990*. Lusaka, Zambia, Zambia Research Foundation. P86- 89

was included in the process at the level of direct negotiation with the incumbents, they scaled back dramatically on the type of reform they were promoting and the breadth of mobilization they would initiate or encourage. The heterogeneous mix of forces encompassed *within* the MMD was the extent of new participation. "By July 1991 MMD effectively monopolized mobilization for political action.... The MMD and [President] Kaunda established a forum for constitutional discussions that excluded the full range of social and political actors present at the original meeting. The exclusion of all other interested parties from civil and political arenas was a significant step in, and confirmation of, the process by which MMD leaders established themselves as the only legitimate political force".³⁶³ The MMD's consolidation as a coherent opposition and UNIP's implosion as the incumbent had enduring consequences for the establishment of the nascent party system, as their contested negotiations allowed for significant reform on a limited transition agenda.

BENIN

In Benin, the decision to undertake a transition to a multiparty system reflected the incumbent's desire to maintain power by re-consolidating their tenuous hold, recognizing the necessity of reform. In the face of political crisis, the incumbent crafted a strategy to mobilize and channel support for the ruling party; the strategy had to be inclusive in order to re-establish authority and reach consensus on the direction of reforms, yet their capacity to control the attempted mobilization was insufficient. The PRPB decided to hold a large convention, with diverse social representation, to provide

³⁶³ Bartlett, D. M. C. (2000). "Civil society and democracy: A Zambian case study." Journal of Southern African Studies 26(3): 429-446. p. 445

an opportunity for citizens to voice concerns and affirm their support for the incumbent's proposed solutions.³⁶⁴ This strategy reflected both the incumbent's goal of maintaining power and their need for the cooperation of a broad range of society, with the idea that making them partners in a limited reform process would reconsolidate the authority of the state and the regime. While the majority of the incumbent party, the PRPB, did anticipate their continued reign through this route, they also recognized that the proposed changes would alter the nature of the party and its relationship with the state indefinitely, as it would put an end to the Marxist-Leninist regime and single party rule. Thus, because of their weak position, they were prepared to accept a significant degree of change, but intended to manage the broad participation as the means to preserve their rule. This agenda however, quickly escaped the control of the weak incumbent regime, and led to their complete exclusion from the decision-making arena. The disposed incumbents meant that the political class established interests would not forge the new regime system. The heterogeneous and incoherent opposition forces established *transitional* institutions to oversee the reform process, expanding the scope of new participation and agenda for rule shaping in an open transition.

Initial Strategies of the Incumbent

The incumbent's initial agenda for liberalization in Benin recognized the need for drastic reforms, which would "bring together all of the political tendencies in the country, to recreate state legitimacy and authority in order to move forward".³⁶⁵ The weak

³⁶⁴ A strategy which had been successfully carried out previously in Benin, but in a different international climate.

³⁶⁵ Dossou, R. (2000). L'expérience béninoise de la Conférence nationale. Bilan des conférences nationales et autres processus de transition démocratique. Février 19 - 23. Actes de la Conférence régionale africaine

incumbent PRPB was forced by the deteriorating socio-economic crisis to initiate a plan for reform that would provide for more than a façade of change. While they accepted that change was inevitable, they hoped to manage the reform process in order to retain their position of supremacy within the system. The debate within the PRPB centered on the direction and extent of change that could be controlled and yet fulfill the desires of the population and the needs of the regime to re-establish their authority. Barons of the party (long standing members of the Bureau Politique and military officials) were against extensive reform. According to the Minister of Defense Azonhiho, hardliners (like himself) were for “guarding the state in its present form, and were willing to use force to maintain it and protect ourselves as revolutionaries”.³⁶⁶ President Kerekou and other PRPB leaders felt that sweeping changes were necessary, and following an extensive internal party debate, this position emerged as the majority.³⁶⁷ Pierre Osho, Kerekou’s closest advisor, acknowledged the pressures they were facing in crafting the transition strategy: “We knew that we *had* to change, and it was just a question of implementing the correct methodology. We put in place the formula to get to the point where the party would find a certain level of reform acceptable, believing that they would still regroup around Kerekou to maintain power”.³⁶⁸

preparatoire. IV Conference internationale sur les democraties nouvelles ou retablies, Cotonou, Benin, 4-6 decembre 2000., Editions Pedone. Paris, France.

See also Assogba, T. and W. Lassissi Memoire: Bilan et Perspective du Role des Parties Politiques dans l’eracinement de la Democratie au Benin de l’ere du Renouveau Democratique, Universite du Benin: p. 184.

³⁶⁶ Azonhiho, M. C. D. (2005). Former Minister of Defense; PRPB Bureau Politique. R. Interview. Cotonou, Benin.

³⁶⁷ “This status quo position was the minority, and the hardliners came to accept the majority position of the party to convene the national conference, but insisted upon Kerekou’s maintenance as Head of State in particular. Ibid.

³⁶⁸ Osho, P. (2005). PRPB Bureau Politique; Minister of State and Charged with National Defense. R. Interview. Cotonou, Benin.

Strategies Into Action

The incumbent regime held an extraordinary session to set the ‘formula’ for the pervasive and encompassing reforms they were prepared to enact. The *session conjointe* of the members of the Government, the Revolutionary National Assembly, and the *Bureau Politique* of the PRPB in December 1989 called for the separation of the party and state, the end of Marxist-Leninist ideology as the guiding principle of the state, and a national conference convening ‘all active forces in society’ to provide the basis for a ‘democratic renewal’ and a new Constitution.³⁶⁹ The *session conjointe* further required the initiation of an ‘intermediary government’, including a transitional Council of Ministers. These were serious steps undertaken by the incumbents as *internal government reforms* that Kerekou and the PRPB deemed necessary to prepare a governmental team around which they would “solicit the mobilization of all Beninois” in support of the broader democratic renewal.³⁷⁰ The proposed changes for a transition agenda were dramatic, ending the ideology that mandated a single party system, granting political amnesty to exiles and political prisoners, and initiating a national conference that would include all of these previously repressed voices. The PRPB believed these extensive reforms were necessary, even inevitable, and made the calculation that the government must initiate the transition in order to better control the political reform and

³⁶⁹ Known as the preparation for a “Renouveau Democratique”. Noudjenoume, P. (1999). La démocratie au Bénin, 1988-1993 : bilans et perspectives. Paris, L'Harmattan.

140. See also Adeloui, A.-J. (1998). "Democratisation et Cooperation Franciase en Afrique de l'Ouest (1990 - 99): Cas du Benin."

³⁷⁰ The *Conseil des Ministres* constituted the previous members of the permanent committee of the national executive council. Initiated by Decree 90-45 of March 2, 1990. However, this transitional government initiated by Kerekou would last only 12 days, replaced by the Transitional Government established by the National Conference to lead from March 14, 1990 through April 4, 1991, led by Nicéphore Soglo as the Prime Minister and a new cabinet of ministers. Métinhoué, P. G. (2005). Les gouvernements du Dahomey et du Bénin : mai 1957 - février 2005. Porto-Novo, Centre National de Production de Manuels Scolaires. P. 117 – 120

maintain leadership.³⁷¹ In this spirit, Kerekou appointed known reformers to a government sponsored Preparatory Committee, to prepare documents of suggested changes for the new system. These proposals would be presented at the national conference to set the agenda for debate and lay the foundations for a new constitution.³⁷²

The decision to hold a highly participatory national conference was acceptable to the incumbent regime because the PRPB had successfully used this tactic once before to manage a period of great social tension. In 1979 the PRPB convened a conference with a diverse mix of civic representatives, to discuss the challenges facing the country. The conference had successfully allowed for, and managed, a public debate, which reconsolidated the regime's authority and simultaneously dissolved tensions, and yet the PRPB had implemented few, if any, of the conference proceedings.³⁷³ The experience taught them that a well-managed public form could bolster the ruling party with little long-term cost or constraint. This historical precedent gave the PRPB new hope of controlling a similar forum to their own advantage and maintaining the status quo in terms of leadership authority, while reconciling to the need for systematic reforms to the regime.³⁷⁴ Thus, while the incumbents were planning for a fairly extensive and participatory transition agenda, they began its implementation with the hope that it was a mechanism through which they would be able to reconsolidate their control and "reunite

³⁷¹ Girigissou, G. (2005). PRPB Bureau Politique. Ancien Député de l'Assemblée Nationale du Bénin. Ancien Vice-Président du Groupe National de l'Assemblée nationale R. Interview. Cotonou, Benin.

Vilon-Guezo, R. (2005). Former President of the Assemblée Nationale Revolutionnaire; Vice President de la Grande Chancellerie. (PRPB Bureau Politique). . R. Interview. Cotonou, Benin.

³⁷² Dossou, R. (November 2005). Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Member of Preparatory Committee for the National Conference. R. Interview. Cotonou, Benin.

³⁷³ Banegas, R. (2003). *La démocratie à pas de caméléon : transition et imaginaires politiques au Bénin*. Paris, Karthala.

³⁷⁴ Noudjenoume, P. (1999). *La démocratie au Bénin, 1988-1993 : bilans et perspectives*. Paris, L'Harmattan.

Banegas, R. (2003). *La démocratie à pas de caméléon : transition et imaginaires politiques au Bénin*. Paris, Karthala. P. 143

society behind a shared plan for reform, maintaining the current power holders and mobilizing the social forces in political and economic solutions to the crisis they faced".³⁷⁵

Given the incumbent's circumscribed position, they felt that in order to achieve their goal of reestablishing support for the regime through a deliberative process, it was necessary to include significant diversity of social representatives, including previously repressed opposition voices in the composition of the National Conference. While the incumbent authoritarian regime determined participation (via the Preparatory Committee, who were generally recognized as reformists), the make-up of the delegates was extremely broad. 495 participants were invited to represent the 'active forces of the nation', encompassing political exiles who were granted amnesty, past presidents, representatives of locally based social associations, university representatives, and judicial officials.³⁷⁶ The government was not overly represented, and those who were selected from the PRPB were mostly reformers.³⁷⁷ The composition of the National Conference was very extensive and represented a heterogeneous composition of the

³⁷⁵ Dossou, R. (2000). L'expérience béninoise de la Conférence nationale. Bilan des conférences nationales et autres processus de transition démocratique. Février 19 - 23. Actes de la Conférence régionale africaine préparatoire. IV Conférence internationale sur les démocraties nouvelles ou rétablies, Cotonou, Bénin, 4-6 décembre 2000., Editions Pedone. Paris, France. p. 184.

³⁷⁶ Adamon, A. D. (1995). Le renouveau démocratique au Bénin : les élections de la période de transition. Porto-Novo, Bénin, Editions du Journal officiel.

Bierschenk, T. and R. Mongbo (1995). ""Le terroir en quête de démocratie"." Politique Africaine

59.

³⁷⁷ The *Comite National Preparatoire* was selected by the PRPB and Kerekou for National Conference, of the 8 government representatives chosen, they represented not the hardliners or Old Guard of the party but rather reformists. In fact, only 1 was part of the PRPB party leadership, and even that representative was a younger 'reformist', who was a member of the Central Committee but not of the Bureau Politique. Dossou, R. (2000). L'expérience béninoise de la Conférence nationale. Bilan des conférences nationales et autres processus de transition démocratique. Février 19 - 23. Actes de la Conférence régionale africaine préparatoire. IV Conférence internationale sur les démocraties nouvelles ou rétablies, Cotonou, Bénin, 4-6 décembre 2000., Editions Pedone. Paris, France. p. 213 - 4.

social forces of the country.³⁷⁸ “The PRPB, in taking the decision to *hold* the National Conference, had decided upon its participatory and inclusive character as a solution to the problems facing the country.”³⁷⁹

Pushback from the Opposition

While Benin’s incumbent regime initiated an extensive reform agenda, including the drastic measure of separating the party and state, the heterogeneous opposition pushed the reforms much further than the PRPB originally envisioned. Once the National Conference was convened, the representative members declared themselves sovereign, displacing the regime as the executive authority of the state. The decisions taken by the conference quickly moved beyond any control of the incumbent regime to a complete rejection of the former political system, and put in place *new transition institutions* to displace the authority and influence of the government representatives and to move definitively beyond the authoritarian regime’s interests. In this moment of great uncertainty and contestation, the military representatives threatened their rejection of the proceedings and their willingness to impose force if necessary. However, the maintenance of President Kerekou as a figurehead, retaining his position as Head of State

³⁷⁸ Dossou, R. and R. Ahouansou (2000). *Systematique de la transition democratique des annees 1990 en afrique. Publie a l'occasion du 10eme anniversaire de la Conference Nationale du Benin par le Departement de l'information et de la Documentation de l'ASD. Fevrier 2000. Dakar, Senegal (premiere conference panafricaine de Dakar).*

³⁷⁹ Girigissou, G. (2005). PRPB Bureau Politique. Ancien Député de l’Assemblée Nationale du Bénin. Ancien Vice-Président du Groupe National de l’Assemblée nationale R. Interview. Cotonou, Benin.

but stripped of his executive authority, allowed for their acceptance of the concomitant collapse of his party and his government.³⁸⁰

Benin's National Conference then stripped the incumbent of authority completely, established a transitional government, the *Haut Conseil de la Republique*, and began crafting a new political system without the embedded interests of an incumbent *or* an organized and coherent opposition force. Constructing the new Constitution in this setting provided great scope of possible reform through open deliberation to institute a new political system.³⁸¹ The "general principles reflected first and foremost the desire of the representatives to institute overarching reform, based on democratic pluralism."³⁸² The reforms focused on mass-based goals of political pluralism, universal human rights, national sovereignty, and development, and intently avoided restricting participation and political expression; the debate around the constitution was continually focused on the promotion of liberty and freedoms, both personal and political. These priorities were expressed as a way of moving beyond the influence of the previous authoritarian regime, and reform meant a new system that corrected the limitations and control of the PRPB. The national conference provided an arena in which the constitution could be crafted to fulfill these principles, embodying the path to transformation.

³⁸⁰ It was critical to the Conference to keep Kerekou's mandate to mark his acceptance and work to implement the changes, particularly to keep the military in line with the proposed changes, rather than working on the outside of the transition as a spoiler. Dossou, R. (2000). L'experience beninoise de la Conference nationale. Bilan des conferences nationales et autres processus de transition democratique. Fevrier 19 - 23. Actes de la Conference regionale africaine preparatoire. IV Conference internationale sur les democracies nouvelles ou retablies, Cotonou, Benin, 4-6 decembre 2000., Editions Pedone. Paris, France. p. 225 - 6

³⁸¹ A baseline of reform was provided by the 'Committee Prepatoire de la Conference Nationale' – a conglomeration of reformists that President Kerekou had appointed prior to the holding of the conference. They had prepared reform proposals, working from international constitutional models (1988 Algerian liberalization laws) to make recommendations. Dossou, R. (November 2005). Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Member of Preparatory Committee for the National Conference. R. Interview. Cotonou, Benin.

³⁸² Karinthe, J. (1999). Le multipartisme du renouveau democratique au Benin. Departement de science politique. Paris, Universite de Paris VIII. memoire de maitrise. p. 53

Following the National Conference's declaration of sovereignty, President Kerekou sacrificed all connection to the party in order to maintain his position as a figurehead.³⁸³ "The PRPB completely imploded – bereft of their ideological foundations, their leadership, and the resource base of the state".³⁸⁴ Party barons expressed that the complete dissolution of the party was important:

A few within the party were for the option of using force to continue, so if we had stayed a coherent party it would have nourished those ideas and the desires of some to retake power, and to oppose that which we had already accepted through the decisions of the national conference. So we wanted to avoid that, and therefore chose not to use the PRPB as an instrument to go forward in the new system. The advantage was that it liberated each individual and it put in place favorable conditions for the opening of the democratic transition.³⁸⁵

³⁸³ At the height of the uncertainty of the transition, Kerekou negotiated to maintain himself as the Head of State while accepting the sovereignty of the conference, spelling the complete end of the former regime system and the supremacy of the PRPB over the government and the military. Kerekou came to the realization that by separating himself from the party and state organization of the previous period, he as an individual might be able to remain viable in the new system, but only at the cost of the death of his party. Ali, H. (November 2005). Former Minister of Information under the PRPB. R. Interview. Cotonou, Benin.

³⁸⁴ "While we were waiting for days for Kerekou to attend the PRPB meeting, he sent a letter instead that he quit the party. We were so disappointed at this point, we couldn't continue. The party was dissolved by the fact of lacking our leadership, without direction. Before that, some of us wanted to overhaul the PRPB, continue working through it – we thought it was possible because Kerekou was maintained as Head of State and he was President of the Party. But it was all a completely New (transition) Government installed by the Conference. So we lost any advantages of incumbency, we were out of it well before the run-up to elections. And with the advent of multipartism, those who wanted to left to create their own parties or join others, they didn't want to be associated with PRPB either... Some abandoned the political battle completely. So the dissolution of party was due to the betrayal of our leader. Without him, we weren't prepared for our own reformation. We couldn't get along with each other enough to elect a new leadership. We preferred to let it die, and go elsewhere." Garba, R. (2005). Former PRPB Bureau Politique. R. Interview. Cotonou, Benin.

"The PRPB was left beheaded... After the conference, the party held a meeting in which we decided to put an end to the political experience of the PRPB. Most of the main actors went into retirement or returned to their military or professional careers, seeking to leave their past association with the defunct PRPB behind them; some members went off separately to create their own parties, to go into others already created, others to leave politics". Osho, P. (2005). PRPB Bureau Politique; Minister of State and Charged with National Defense. R. Interview. Cotonou, Benin.

³⁸⁵ Girigissou, G. (2005). PRPB Bureau Politique. Ancien Député de l'Assemblée Nationale du Bénin. Ancien Vice-Président du Groupe National de l'Assemblée nationale R. Interview. Cotonou, Benin.

"If we continued the PRPB, then people wouldn't be free to leave it. And it would give the overall impression of the force of the PRPB against the decisions of the conference and the *Renouveau Democratique*. If the PRPB had continued, it would have created a lot more anxiety around the first elections, about PRPB intentions, whether it supported the changes and what it would do, etc. By ending our political force, we supported the *Renouveau* to allow full opening." Osho, P. (2005). PRPB Bureau Politique; Minister of State and Charged with National Defense. R. Interview. Cotonou, Benin.

With such a void in the political arrangement of forces, the representatives of the *Conférence Nationale* represented the embryonic political groupings that were immediately propelled to the forefront, along with newly returned exiles that had financial resources, and locally-based civic organizations that had some organizational networks already in place. This context of freedom from the *ancien régime* provided for the openness and empowerment of the population through direct participation in the reform process.³⁸⁶ Entirely new political contributors emerged by default, because of the de facto exclusion of the representatives of the previous order with the express purpose of opening up the political system to new participation.³⁸⁷

Outcome: The Open Transition

The complete implosion and disintegration of the incumbent PRPB facilitated a broad representation of civic forces engaged in a significant contribution to the reform process, and simultaneously allowed a cacophony of voices. The ‘opposition’ had no need to be united in the usual transition goal of defeating the incumbent. The disintegration of the PRPB meant that conference participants were not previously incorporated by the ruling power, they had no pre-existing order to maintain, and therefore they were able to shape the rules of the new system from a very different

³⁸⁶ The transition was very open, a new political class emerged. The National Conference was distinguished by inclusion of the population in decision-making. Civil society representatives were equal individuals, really representative of their constituencies, appointed for this purpose, rather than on the condition of supporting the leaders. Adeloui, A.-J. (1998). "Democratisation et Coopération Française en Afrique de l'Ouest (1990 - 99): Cas du Bénin." p. 388

Métinhoué, P. G. (2005). Les gouvernements du Dahomey et du Bénin : mai 1957 - février 2005. Porto-Novo, Centre National de Production de Manuels Scolaires.

vantage point.³⁸⁸ The social rights focus of the conference proceedings further exemplified the degree to which the embedded interests of an established political class were not at play in this open transition.

In Benin's open transition, the incumbents recognized their constraints and that a new order was necessary. According to a PRPB baron at the eve of the transition, "we all accepted change because we had to prioritize the survival of the state; in deciding to organize the Conference, we were already prepared to accept concessions".³⁸⁹ But the outcome itself was uncertain; the degree and direction of change was not pre-determined. Rather, reform was pushed well beyond the initial incumbent agenda by the heterogeneous forces of opposition. This context provided for extensive transformation, the creation of a new constitution, and the emergence of new players in the political game.

Conclusion

This detailed analysis of the initial incumbent agendas, the actions they took to carry out a democratic transition under their control, and the extent to which opposition pressures forced changes to the authoritarian regime's plans, provides evidence of the extent of opening the transition context provided in Ghana, Senegal and Benin. These cases demonstrate the importance of the degree of authoritarian control over the transition. The absence of authoritarian control creates political space in which new participants can access the political arena and shape the nature of the new regime. The ability to

³⁸⁸ The role of Monseigneur Isidore de Souza (Archbishop of Cotonou), who was chosen to proceed over the National Conference - as the '*Président du présidium de la conférence nationale*' - represented the degree to which apolitical forces were able to set the transition agenda.

³⁸⁹ Girigissou, G. (2005). PRPB Bureau Politique. Ancien Député de l'Assemblée Nationale du Bénin. Ancien Vice-Président du Groupe National de l'Assemblée nationale R. Interview. Cotonou, Benin.

overcome the status quo interests of an established political class provides an opportunity to reshape formal rules and the informal structures of power relations. Where authoritarian control dominates the transition, this also shapes the nature of the new regime; the accepted players shape the system to reflect their interest in maintaining power. The context of the democratic transition – from controlled to open – shapes the enduring nature of multi-party competition, and thus, level of systemic institutionalization. As we will see in Chapter 6, these varied transition contexts provide different opportunities to reshape rules and establish new barriers to entry that define the enduring multiparty system.

Chapter Six

The Emergence and Endurance of the Multiparty System

Zambia

“We consciously built the MMD from the basis of three aggrieved contributors – the intellectuals, the workers, and the political business class... but they had no sense of being a ‘group’, they were only individuals brought together by the circumstances... thus, once we had formed government, it was not easy to maintain coherence. The three pillars the movement was based on for broad social support crumbled... The only choice for each ‘dissident’ [from the MMD] was to form another political party, but due to the circumstances in which it was born, the fate of a party formed by any given dissident is limited by the fact that you haven’t yet reached the time of critical mass of disenchantment. So whatever you offer, your party will remain a minority.”

Akashembatwa Mbikusita-Lewanika – Founding Member of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). Interview July 2006.

Ghana

“There is a de-facto situation of two party competition in Ghana because of realism – each one organizes for *power*, they chose one of two main parties as a better bet to win.”

Dr. Nana S.K.B. Asante – Chairman of the Committee of Experts for Draft Constitution for the Democratic Transition. Interview April 2006.

In the context of a competitive marketplace of multiple political parties, isomorphic pressures shape the emergence and endurance of the party system. Based on the extent of power the authoritarian incumbent commands over the democratization process, the presence or absence of a dominant party shapes the context of competition and rational organizational imperatives going forward. Coercive, mimetic and normative pressures are the three isomorphic processes that shape the emergence and endurance of the multiparty system.³⁹⁰

Coercive pressures relate to the hierarchical legal system of rules and regulations that are established according to the preferences of either an authoritarian incumbent

³⁹⁰ These three isomorphic processes – coercive, mimetic and normative – are derived from DiMaggio and Powell’s discussion of institutional isomorphism in the competitive marketplace. DiMaggio, P. J. and W. W. Powell (1983). “The Iron Cage Revisited - Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields.” *American Sociological Review* 48(2): 147-160.


party or a heterogeneous opposition. In the African democracies, eligibility rules of party registration act as barriers to entry, either making party formation difficult or facilitating it. The resulting limitation or proliferation of political parties ties directly to the preferences of the rule makers involved in the transition. Secondly, mimetic pressures describe the rational strategies of emulation and modeling in the context of great uncertainty inherent in new multiparty competition. New parties either try to emulate the authoritarian incumbent party or create something entirely new so as to not be associated with the discredited past. Thirdly, normative pressures infuse the meaning of political party competition, particularly the position of each party vis-à-vis potential rival or coalition parties. The structuring of competition and the extent of polarization is evidence of the ways in which the party system formed around the hegemonic position of the authoritarian incumbent or a void created by its absence. The lack of ideological positioning is replaced by the polarizing pressures in the competition for access to the state.

In all three processes, competition serves as the driving engine of organizational rationalization.³⁹¹ Competitive institutional isomorphism maintains both highly structured, polarized competition and highly fluid, adaptable competition. *Eligibility rules, modeling strategies and polarization* provide evidence of the coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphic pressures that shape the organizational forms, competitive positions and actions of the new political parties and constrain the multiparty system to maintain its character over the long term.

³⁹¹ Weber, M. (1968). *Economy and society; an outline of interpretive sociology*. New York., Bedminster Press.

This chapter analyzes how the extent of initial authoritarian incumbent dominance in the new multiparty system determines the resulting level of institutionalization of the party system. Because of the organizational incentives facing incumbents and nascent opposition, more open and transformative democratic transitions create the context for party proliferation whereas more highly controlled transitions provide for aggregation into two broadly opposing camps (Step 2 of the argument, Figure 6.1). Chapter 5 demonstrated that where authoritarian incumbents are weak, transitions are open and broadly inclusive, providing a unique opportunity to fundamentally rewrite the rules of the new regime, without established interests pushing to retain the status quo. Where authoritarian incumbents are strong they control the transition agenda and participation, and set the stage for their commanding victories in the founding elections. This chapter details the final and crucial step – the emergence of the new multiparty system, and the mechanisms which lock in a certain competitive logic and party system character. I explain how *new parties form*, how the party *system* emerges through a competitive logic, and why these characteristics *endure* over time despite alternations in power.


Figure 6.1: Determinants of Party System Institutionalization



As I demonstrated in Chapter 3, the extent of control that authoritarian incumbents maintained over the democratic transition had a strong correlation with the resulting level of party system institutionalization in the analysis of 21 African democracies. The explanatory variable of authoritarian power is measured as the percentage of lower house legislative seats that the authoritarian incumbent party won in the founding election. Because this measure captures the extent of authoritarian incumbent party power *in the initial round of multiparty party competition* (rather than prior to the democratic transition as discussed in Chapter 4), it represents the focus of this

chapter: the electoral and competitive pressures at work that shape the formation and continuation of the party system.³⁹² This relation is depicted graphically in Figure 6.2.

Figure 6.2: Authoritarian Incumbent Power and Party System Institutionalization in all African Democracies



This chapter uses the comparison of the four national studies of Benin, Zambia, Ghana and Senegal as well as 12 sub-national cases to assess the possible hypotheses that

³⁹² This measure of the explanatory variable of authoritarian power clearly captures only the extent of incumbent party success in the founding elections – a retrospective indicator that is measured after the transition dynamics have largely played out (stage 1 of the model). However, this is a very useful measure for stage 2 of the argument, which claims that electoral and general competitive pressures induce institutional isomorphism – emulation, aggregation and polarization on the part of the opposition that *forces the endurance of the nature of the party system over the long term*.

follow from this argument. The country comparisons pair Ghana and Senegal as cases of very *controlled* democratizations in which the authoritarian incumbents remained largely in command of the decision making process and the establishment of the new system. Benin and Zambia are cases of transformative democratic transitions, with Benin as the most *open* transition, and Zambia slightly closer to the center as a *contested* transition. Interviews with national party officials past and present, particularly those critically involved in party creation, as well as informants and observers, allow a comparison of the logic of party formation. Additionally, the sub-national case selection varies to control for level of development and ethnic demographics. In each country, 3 district capitals were selected to represent two rural locations and one highly urban, developed locale. The two rural cases were similar in population size and level of development but one was largely ethnically homogeneous and the other represented a very heterogeneous population for the country. The urban location selected was the main ‘second city’, the most economically developed location that was a significant distance from the capital. I personally conducted interviews with four party officials from each of the major parties represented in the legislature in each of these sub-national cases (Figure 6.3).³⁹³ These data will be used to evaluate the coherence and polarization of the structure of party competition cross-nationally and sub-nationally.

³⁹³ In most cases in Benin and Zambia, the regional nature of party organization meant that there were not four party officials for each party in each sub-national case. (Nyimba and Mumbwa in Zambia; Couffo, Kandi and Parakou in Benin).

Figure 6.3: Breakdown of Political Party Member Interviews by Sub-National Cases

(# of interviews)	Rural, Ethnically Homogeneous	Rural, Ethnically Heterogeneous	Urban, Second Geographically Distant City
Senegal	Podor – 12	Tambacounda - 12	Ziguinchor – 12
Ghana	Koforidua - 8	Takoradi - 8	Tamale – 8
Benin	Couffo – 18	Kandi - 19	Parakou – 19
Zambia	Nyimba - 13	Mumbwa - 13	Kitwe – 16

*total 213, including national level party members in the capital; [see Appendix I for geographical locations of these cases].

In order to test this argument, the three main components of evidence relate to the **establishment of formal eligibility rules, the models of party organization, and the structure of party competition** (Figure 6.4). Regarding formal eligibility rules, the theory predicts that where authoritarian incumbent power was high, they would have the incentive and capability to establish restrictive barriers to entry. This would encourage nascent opposition to *aggregate* into one organization in order to meet the threshold requirements and be eligible to compete against the incumbent party. Where authoritarian incumbent power was low, the opposition would have the incentive to establish permissive rules for party registration, ensuring a low bar for their own entrance into multiparty competition. This would encourage the new opposition parties to *proliferate* based on the assumption that each potential candidate would want to maximize their personal autonomy and access to the state rather than bartering away their influence and following for an ambiguous place in a larger organization.

Regarding models of party organization, the theory predicts that where authoritarian power was high, the rational response of nascent opposition to uncertainty is to model the existing, successful example. The same logic would predict that where the authoritarian incumbent was weak or non-existent, new political parties would try to

differentiate themselves from the past and experiment with new models, strategies and names for party organization.

Finally, regarding the structure of party competition, the theory predicts that where authoritarian incumbent power was high, the nascent opposition would define themselves vis-à-vis their opposition to the incumbent party. We would expect that a dualistic logic of competition would be almost predetermined, as the opposition's focus on defeating the incumbent creates a polarized competitive environment. In contrast, where the authoritarian incumbent was weak or non-existent, we would expect that the new parties would form without a highly structured relationship to one another. This ambiguity in inter-party relations would be reflected in mutable coalitions and a lack of coherence in inter-party assessments of their relationships. The structure of party competition would not likely remain static; inter-party relations would fluctuate as each party sought its own immediate advantage rather than be bound by a pre-determined rivalry structure.

Figure 6.4: Observable Indicators of Electoral and Competitive Pressures

Processes of Institutional Isomorphism	I. Coercive Pressures: Formal Rules & Regulations	II. Mimetic Pressures: Organizational Modeling	III. Normative Pressures: Structure of Competition
High Party System Institutionalization (Ghana, Senegal)	High Barriers to Entry: Restrictive Party Registration Requirements	Emulation	Coherent Inter-Party Relations; Dualistic / Polarized
Low Party System Institutionalization (Benin, Zambia)	Low Barriers to Entry: Permissive Party Registration Requirements	Innovation	Fluid Inter-Party Relations; Mutable Coalitions

These three processes affect the incentives to form new political parties and function as external constraints, continually shaping expectations, strategies and relations between the emergent parties. The structure of competition, barriers to entry and party organization reinforce each other, so that over time it becomes increasingly difficult for the party system to change in character despite the lack of ideological cleavages.

This chapter presents institutional isomorphic processes as the mechanisms that structure the enduring nature of the party system, according to the extent of authoritarian incumbent domination emerging out of the democratic transition.³⁹⁴ The analysis provides insight into the nature of African multiparty competition. It is well established that rather than ideological or programmatic alignments, the contest over wielding power is one in which access to the state is the key objective.³⁹⁵ Competition for power drives party formation and party system structure, built upon social structures of direct reciprocity, personal relations, and small-scale organization.³⁹⁶ Yet it is not yet well understood why individuals seeking power pursue their goals through such different forms of organization across countries. In some contexts, these locally based, direct and personalized relations aggregate around coherent national parties that supersede heterogeneous social conditions. While patronage politics remains central to competition, locally powerful personalist brokers are incorporated into one unified party. In other contexts, the party system remains based on fluid coalitions of localized and personalized parties that represent direct relations between a politician and a constituency. The small

³⁹⁴ Extent of authoritarian incumbent domination emerging out of the democratic transition is measured by success in the founding election.

³⁹⁵ (IMD), N. I. f. M. D. (1004). Ghana Report.

Salih, M. A. R. M. (2003). African political parties : evolution, institutionalism and governance. London ; Sterling, Va., Pluto Press.

IDEA (2007). Political Parties in Africa: Challenges for Sustaining Multiparty Democracy.

³⁹⁶ Hydén, G. (2006). African politics in comparative perspective. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

and particularistic parties do not establish a maximum winning coalition by seeking new constituency bases, nor do they fade away into oblivion. These diverse outcomes represent the variation between high and low party system institutionalization. The objective here is to demonstrate how such different systems have emerged and are maintained over time.

Open and Contested Transitions: Benin and Zambia

The transition process in both Benin and Zambia provided an open, transformative arena to allow many challengers to the status quo.³⁹⁷ The collapse of the incumbent as a formidable power, unable to control the transition, allowed new players to negotiate the rules and set the stage for multiparty competition.³⁹⁸ Despite differences in the extent of opening in Benin and Zambia, the weakness of the authoritarian incumbent party and the heterogeneity of the embryonic opposition forces created a void around which the party system has since struggled to consolidate. The continual fluctuation and fragmentation of the party system can be traced to the permissive rules for new party formation, experimentation in party organization and constituency linkage strategies, and ultimately the transient nature of coalitions and alliances that lack a binding cohesion.

³⁹⁷ See evidence of this in Chapter 6; see also Bratton and van de Walle 1997 on the early and transformative nature of these two transitions in Benin and Zambia. Bratton, M. and N. Van de Walle (1997). *Democratic experiments in Africa : regime transitions in comparative perspective*. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, NY, USA, Cambridge University Press.

³⁹⁸ See Chapter 5 for the extent of authoritarian weakness and Chapter 6 for the transition dynamics.

Open Transition: Benin

Eligibility Rules

The implosion of the *Parti de la Révolution Populaire du Bénin* (PRPB) created an unusually wide political vacuum in which the new party system was established. This void encouraged the multiplication of embryonic political groupings that sought to compete for power via the formation of parties. Exiles, business leaders, and primarily local association and community leaders were mobilized through their participation in the national conference, and became the entrepreneurs who quickly formed nascent political parties to compete in elections.³⁹⁹ These heterogeneous forces lacked any anti-incumbent unity that would encourage their self-identification as a cohesive group and instead saw themselves as individuals representing their own constituencies, as per their call to participate in the national conference. This position – newly free from authoritarian dictates and only beginning the recovery from and reaction against the limitations of the *ancien regime* – shaped the mindset of the new rule makers.

Given this context and their individual incentives to ensure their own access to the electoral arena, the conference participants continually prioritized freedoms and liberties – particularly freedom of association - to allow and even encourage the formation of any new party imaginable. The Preparatory Committee for the National Conference debated extensively over the risks and benefits inherent in creating more or less stringent requirements for party registration, particularly whether the number of legal political

³⁹⁹ Parties emerged out of local, small-scale associations. Market women's associations, farmer and fishermen representatives, tailor, dressmaker cooperatives, etc constituted the participants. Bako-Arifari (1995). "Democratie et logiques du terroir au Benin." *Politique Africaine* 59(Le Benin): 2-119. p. 14.
Heilbrunn, J. R. (1993). "Social Origins of National Conferences in Benin and Togo." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 31(2): 277-299.

parties should be capped. The representatives of the old political class were in favor of general limitations, but the reformers were the majority of the participants and they were united in their view that “liberty cannot be limited”.⁴⁰⁰ Their argument was that ongoing elections would eventually and naturally limit the number of parties, as those that were not successful would die away and coalitions would merge, leading to an organized rationalization of the competitive parties.⁴⁰¹ According to members of the committee charged with drafting the legal documents for the national conference, the goal was to allow the reform process to take its course by offering opportunities for broad participation and natural regroupings of social and political interests.⁴⁰² Given the majority desire to prevent the restrictions of the previous regime, the conference participants felt that restricted their rule-making role so as to avoid dictating the terms of the new system to the greatest extent possible and instead let a natural evolution run its course. “The priority of the conference continually referred to the freedom of expression, liberty and association. This was most clearly reflected in the registration requirements for new political parties”.⁴⁰³

⁴⁰⁰ Dossou, R. (1993). Le Bénin: du monolithisme à la démocratie pluraliste, un témoignage. L'Afrique en transition vers le pluralisme politique: colloque, Paris, 12 - 13 décembre 1990. La Vie du droit en Afrique. M. Alliot and G. Conac. Paris, Economica: 517 p. p. 196.

⁴⁰¹ They also had faith that the political party charter stipulation that required national unity would prevent tribal or regional appeals (Article 5). République Du Bénin, L. H. C. d. l. R. (1990). Charte des Partis Politiques.

Dossou, R. (1993). Le Bénin: du monolithisme à la démocratie pluraliste, un témoignage. L'Afrique en transition vers le pluralisme politique: colloque, Paris, 12 - 13 décembre 1990. La Vie du droit en Afrique. M. Alliot and G. Conac. Paris, Economica: 517 p. p. 196.

⁴⁰² Dossou, R. (November 2005). Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Member of Preparatory Committee for the National Conference. R. Interview. Cotonou, Bénin.

⁴⁰³ Adeloui, A.-J. (1998). "Democratisation et Cooperation Franciase en Afrique de l'Ouest (1990 - 99): Cas du Bénin."

Therefore, the laws governing political party registration established extremely low barriers to entry.⁴⁰⁴ The *Charte des parties politiques* that set the eligibility rules for party formation required no national distribution quotas for the founding members of a party, and the total number of founding members was unspecified. One hundred twenty total members had to be identified, with ten members represented from each of the six departments. In practice this meant only that founding members of a party had to submit their personal details (judicial and nationality certificates, place of residence, place and date of birth, department and profession) along with the demand for registration to the Minister of the Interior which included the party statutes, internal regulations, manifesto and the constitutive meeting minutes, with an attached list of 120 names.⁴⁰⁵ Therefore the founding members could be a very few individuals from the same constituency, and simply prepare a list of ‘total’ members from the other departments. Beyond the specific rights and obligations of functioning, the Political Party Charter makes its goals clear by recognizing liberty of formation, association, freedom of the press, freedom of financial sources, benefits of state aid, and protection of the right to exist.⁴⁰⁶

⁴⁰⁴ Bako-Arifari (1995). "Democratie et logiques du terroir au Benin." *Politique Africaine* **59**(Le Benin): 2-119. p. 15

⁴⁰⁵ Republique Du Benin, L. H. C. d. I. R. (1990). *Charte des Partis Politiques*.

⁴⁰⁶ According to interviews with those involved in drafting the charter, they strove to allow all of the nascent ‘political regroupings’ that had submitted tracts of contribution prior to the national conference and who were then invited by the preparatory committee to participate in the conference, to pursue formalization as political parties. A conscious goal of the rule-making process was to avoid exclusion and shaping of political alignments from the top down. Rather, they saw parties forming organically from embryonic groupings and believed that competition would sort itself out over time, becoming less ‘anarchic’ through competition and coordination. *Ministere d'Etat charge de la coordination de l'Action Gouvernementale, d. P., du Developpement et de la Promotion de l'Emploi* (1999). *La classe politique beninoise: evolution, enjeux, perspectives. Etudes nationales de perspectives a long terme NLTPS-Benin 2025*. P. d. N. U. p. I. Developpement. Cotonou, Benin. **PRCIG-NLTPS-BEN/96/001**.

Houkpe, M. and F. Laleye (2005). *Directors, Analyses politiques et socio-economiques*. R. Interview. Porto-Novo, Benin.

Dossou, R. (November 2005). *Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and Member of Preparatory Committee for the National Conference*. R. Interview. Cotonou, Benin. p.35.

Following the December 1990 conference and January 1991 referendum inaugurating the new constitution, 30 parties officially registered with the Ministry of the Interior in a month in order to compete in the February 1991 founding elections. The vast majority of these parties could not present fully national lists of candidates to cover the positions available in the 64 seats available in the national assembly, representing 18 constituencies across the country.⁴⁰⁷ According to the examination of the party dossiers by the *Haut Conseil de la République* (the transitional government) on January 23rd, not a single party had fully completed the dossier, reflecting the lack of capability. The transitional government, rather than prohibiting competition to limit the number of parties, provided an extension to all parties to permit their better coordination prior to the elections. The result was the election of 19 parties to the first legislature. The founders of these parties were often local level leaders who had been involved in ‘development associations’ operating at the village level under the shadow of the *ancien regime*; they seized the opportunity that the new Republic offered, launching themselves into a political career by creating their own party and presenting at elections.⁴⁰⁸ The result of this strategy has been the extreme ethnic and regionalization of politics through these direct relations of representation.⁴⁰⁹

The only eligibility rules established that could be considered restricting were meant to *privilege* new entrants and inhibit established interests associated with the *ancien regime*. The three critical limitations that were established were term limits,

⁴⁰⁷ Karinthe, J. (1999). Le multipartisme du renouveau démocratique au Bénin. *Département de science politique*. Paris, Université de Paris VIII. **memoire de maitrise**.

⁴⁰⁸ A prominent example of this trajectory is Saka Kina. Ministère d'Etat chargé de la coordination de l'Action Gouvernementale, d. P., du Développement et de la Promotion de l'Emploi (1999). *La classe politique béninoise: évolution, enjeux, perspectives*. *Etudes nationales de perspectives à long terme NLTPS-Bénin 2025*. P. d. N. U. p. I. Développement. Cotonou, Bénin. **PRCIG-NLTPS-BEN/96/001**.

p. 36.

⁴⁰⁹ Ibid. p. 22 – 23

exclusion of the military and an age exclusion. These regulations had dramatic consequences because at various stages in electoral competition the rules necessitated a new search for political leadership rather than maintaining the status quo. In the founding elections, this was particularly significant because the military exclusion prevented a significant cadre of PRPB leadership from eligibility, and the age limitation prohibited independence era presidents from competing as executive candidates. Although this was widely debated at the time, the consensus was a preference for new leaders and to avoid returning to the divisions of the past.⁴¹⁰ The term limits and age exclusion continued to shape the enduring nature of the volatile party system over time, as generations of leaders passed in and out of their competitive window, and new leaders attempted to fill the void.⁴¹¹

Models of Party Organization

The drastic dissolution of the former authoritarian party and its general negation in the wider public made its model of mass party organization invalid. New parties sought to establish themselves through more direct relations rather than replicate the PRPB model. Whereas the PRPB had focused on establishing a national infrastructure of party functionaries and prioritized card-carrying membership, many new parties preferred

⁴¹⁰ Adamon, A. (1995). Le Renouveau démocratique au Bénin, La Conférence des forces vives et la période de transition. Paris, l'Harmattan.

Houdou, A. (2005). Former Minister of Information. R. Interview. Cotonou, Benin.

⁴¹¹ For example, in the March 2006 Presidential elections, both former presidents Kerekou and Soglo would have been the two main competitors, but were barred from running again due to both age and term limit restrictions. Their replacement by a new generation of competitors contributed to the electoral volatility and unprecedented three alternations the country has seen – all to independent candidates. The victor, President Yaya Boni, developed support through his base in international development work rather than a direct political party affiliation.

to eschew membership cards and sought mainly to identify with ‘grand electors’ (community leaders) with whom they could affiliate to deliver their follower’s votes.

Precisely because local level associational leaders, exiles with a regional home base, prominent local businessmen and community leaders, formed the new parties quickly new party organizations were extremely particularistic and locally based.⁴¹² The goal of many embryonic parties at the founding elections was to elect the party leader to the legislature or district council, with the secondary goal of linking up to the presidential victor. Many parties that registered in Benin only placed candidates and competed in one or two districts, a pattern that continues into the present period. The implosion of the incumbent party further relates to the patterns of regional and local level concentration in voting. Because new parties were not forced by the context of competition to cover the national territory in the founding elections, they were satisfied with individual victories by district. An analysis of 2003 legislative elections confirms that parties’ constituency bases are extremely regionally concentrated, as parties receive between 45 and 78% of their votes from only 2 of the 12 administrative departments.⁴¹³ Often, these departments are geographically contiguous, further emphasizing that parties cater to a very specific and targeted population. Only one legislative entity received less than 45% of its support from its top two departments, the *Union pour le Bénin du Futur*, (31%), which was a temporary alliance of multiple parties pledging their support for the incumbent president, and quickly dissolved into multiple factions directly following the elections. Even this

⁴¹² Ministère d'Etat chargé de la coordination de l'Action Gouvernementale, d. P., du Développement et de la Promotion de l'Emploi (1999). *La classe politique béninoise: évolution, enjeux, perspectives. Etudes nationales de perspectives à long terme NLTPS-Benin 2025*. P. d. N. U. p. l. Développement. Cotonou, Benin. PRCIG-NLTPS-BEN/96/001.

⁴¹³ (CENA), C. E. N. A. (2003). Fiche récapitulative des suffrages obtenus par parti ou alliance aux élections législatives de 2003. Porto-Novo, Benin, CENA.

coalition received its greatest level of support, 20%, in the single department of Couffo, the region associated with the leader of that coalition's most prominent party.

The regional patterns of voting established since the transition provide further evidence to counter the hypothesis that ethnic demographics shape the nature of the multiparty system. In comparison to the tri-partite regional competition of the 1960's, the new multiparty competition has been significantly *more* localized, dividing up the country into at least five main zones of contestation, with further divisions among regional leaders within those zones.⁴¹⁴ Whereas the single party PRPB was effective at temporarily neutralizing traditional authorities and reducing the political salience of ethnic identities, the new pressures of electoral competition, the fluid structure of party competition, and the formal eligibility rules have shaped the multiparty system, creating even more localized ethnic affiliations, and therefore, increasing the total number of parties, none of which have a claim to national representation.⁴¹⁵

Structure of Competition

Because government elected positions were not already occupied by a dominant incumbent party in Benin there was little incentive for new party leaders to coordinate at an aggregate level. In the context of great uncertainty and untested electoral campaigns, each locally powerful leader preferred to campaign in their own territory, using their personal influence and resources to directly benefit themselves rather than campaigning

⁴¹⁴ While the 'North' has generally tended to identify as one political support group despite the very ethnically heterogeneous nature of the population, the Southern region is divided among the Adja and kin in the West, the Yoruba in the East, the Fon centered around Atlantique, etc. See Ferree, K. (2004). Ethnic Demographics and Electoral Volatility in Africa. Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 2004.

⁴¹⁵ This finding strongly parallels Posner's claims for Zambia. Posner, D. N. (2005). Institutions and ethnic politics in Africa. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

on behalf of a collective party.⁴¹⁶ New district and legislative candidates were free to remain open to second round or post-election bargaining rather than affiliate themselves with a particular presidential candidate and party. This would not have been possible where a powerful incumbent forced affiliation to the ‘government’ or the ‘opposition’. The capture of political positions in the context of openness and uncertainty has motivated rapid mobilization, strategic alliances, and regional voting patterns.⁴¹⁷

The fluidity of inter-party relations has been particularly evident as parties change affiliation throughout the stages of the electoral period.⁴¹⁸ Following the initial bandwagon of many parties around the independent candidate of Nicephore Soglo in the first presidential election, there was a rapid reconfiguration as the new legislators bargained for the internally elected National Assembly positions.⁴¹⁹ Regrouping for legislative influence was followed by fragmentation leading up to the next election, as parties marketed their individual candidates. Successful parties then sought new affiliations with the change of executive.⁴²⁰ This pattern has occurred in successive

⁴¹⁶ Karinthe, J. (1999). Le multipartisme du nouveau démocratique au Bénin. Departement de science politique. Paris, Université de Paris VIII. mémoire de maîtrise. p. 59

⁴¹⁷ Ministère d'Etat chargé de la coordination de l'Action Gouvernementale, d. P., du Développement et de la Promotion de l'Emploi (1999). La classe politique béninoise: évolution, enjeux, perspectives. Etudes nationales de perspectives à long terme NLTPS-Bénin 2025. P. d. N. U. p. I. Développement. Cotonou, Bénin. **PRCIG-NLTPS-BEN/96/001**. p. 21-22

⁴¹⁸ The lack of substantial ideological or programmatic divisions was another result of the transformative national conference, as most agreed on the broad agenda of political and economic liberalization. This has further allowed for volatility in inter-party relations, based on calculation of electoral advantage.

⁴¹⁹ The fact that Soglo had no political party in the first elections is relevant because his victory did not provide an umbrella organization or structure that could formally link followers in a sustained fashion. As his support waned it led to the proliferation of more parties. Soglo, N. (2005). Former President of Benin and Mayor of Cotonou. R. Interview. Cotonou, Bénin.

⁴²⁰ For example, in preparation for the 2006/07 presidential and legislative elections, the parliamentary groups made up of numerous parties either supporting the ‘presidential movement’ or the opposition saw a great deal of reshuffling, as “political leaders with their own ambitions moved away from [either side] in order to make their own personal mark”. Holo, T. (2006). UNESCO Chair of Human Rights and Democracy, University of Benin and Member of the Constitutional Court. Column on Legislative Election Preparations. Le Matinal. Cotonou, Bénin.

electoral cycles in Benin, indicating the strategic logic of individual positioning rather than any overarching competitive structure defining the party system.

These three processes demonstrate the ways in which the vacuum of power in Benin resulted in rapid party proliferation, incomplete organization and volatile inter-party relations. The cross-national data analysis of party competition structure discussed in the following section demonstrates that these patterns have endured in the contemporary multiparty system.

Contested Transition: Zambia

Zambia's transition was similarly quite transformative, due to the broad mobilization of opposition forces under the banner of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), and the degeneration of the incumbent authoritarian United National Independence Party (UNIP) as it faced its future in a competitive environment. The political space available for reform was significant, yet because the incumbent authoritarian was maintained through the founding elections, and the opposition was organized and resourced from its base in the trade union, the transition provided slightly more structure to shape party competition than in Benin. The key factor remains, however, the extreme weakening of UNIP running up to and particularly after their loss in the founding elections, which left a void in the competitive structure of the party system. The rapid accession of the opposition from democratizing movement, to political party, to government left no time for party construction and organization. The decimation and invalidation of UNIP had two key consequences for the establishment of

the party system: first, the MMD rapidly fragmented without the glue to hold it together that defeating UNIP had provided; secondly, there was no coherent opposition to the newly elected MMD. UNIP received less than 25% of the vote in the presidential contest of the founding elections in 1990, and won only 25 out of 150 seats in the legislative arena. Further defections followed their massive electoral defeat, exacerbating the party's incapacity to structure the new party system.⁴²¹ These two consequences of a weak authoritarian incumbent led to party proliferation and fragmentation in Zambia.

Eligibility Rules

The calculations of the weak incumbent authoritarian party drove the very low requirements for political party registration in Zambia. UNIP was feeling its vulnerability to the challenge the opposition presented, yet calculated that the "MMD would divide quickly once political party registration was legalized, as it was not sustainable as a coherent entity in anything other than an oppositional call for change".⁴²² UNIP therefore had incentives to propose open and easy party registration to encourage the disintegration of the opposition movement into multiple official parties.⁴²³

⁴²¹ UNIP's weakness was further exacerbated by their 1996 boycott, now acknowledged to have been a major tactical error, including by former President Kaunda himself. Kaunda, K. (2006). *Former President of Zambia*. R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia.

⁴²² Mwanakatwe, J. M. (1994). *End of Kaunda era*. Lusaka, Zambia, Multimedia Zambia. p. 207

⁴²³ Many calculated that the "pro-democracy activists had merely formed a movement, not a political party", and it would be difficult to gain public support for another political party. "In the opinion of many leaders in UNIP, once the time came for registering political parties, differences among the new political leaders would emerge and there was every possibility of disintegration of the movement. Certainly the people who combined to start the movement came from all walks of life but they all had only one thing in common – the desire to eliminate the single-party rule in Zambia and re-introduce multi-party democracy". Mwanakatwe, J. M. (2003). *John M. Mwanakatwe : teacher, politician, lawyer : my autobiography*. Lusaka, Zambia, Bookworld Publishers. p. 426.

The MMD was widely viewed as the route to transition and to dislodge the incumbent, rather than installing a transitional government as occurred in many other open transitions. Posner, D. N. (2005). *Institutions and ethnic politics in Africa*. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press. p. 187

The MMD, also cognizant of its heterogeneous nature, saw benefits to limited multipartism in the early stages of formation. In the formational meeting of the movement, the opposition leaders concurred that "not more than three Political Parties shall be allowed in the amended constitution. Such Parties shall have to fulfill and comply with certain specified constitutional requirements before they can be approved for registration. For example, they have to prove that they are broadly based and can claim membership throughout the Republic".⁴²⁴ While this was the MMD's strategic preference to aid internal coherence, once the incumbent UNIP initiated the lax eligibility rules, the MMD had no acceptable argument to publicly protest a high level of freedom to form political parties. And because competing against the authoritarian incumbent presented enough of a glue to keep the MMD together for the founding elections, following their victory their incentives changed rapidly to also prefer permissive registration requirements that would encourage the proliferation of any new parties, and inhibit the growth of a strong opposition.

The rules that UNIP established created extremely undemanding registration requirements. Embryonic parties need only to furnish the necessary documentation of party name, leaders and administrative fee to the Registrar of Societies – no national distribution or quota restrictions were included in any form.⁴²⁵ The Electoral Act stipulated only that party activities and goals could not be at odds with the laws of the country, or parties could be refused registration or deregistered. The minimal restrictions on party formation have led to the formation of numerous parties, with over twenty

⁴²⁴ Mbikusita-Lewanika, A. and D. Chitala (1990). The hour has come : proceedings of the National Conference on the Multi-party Option, held at Garden House Hotel, Zambia, 20-21 July, 1990. Lusaka, Zambia, Zambia Research Foundation. p. 17

⁴²⁵ Sakala, M. (July 2006). Director, Registrar of Societies. R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia.

parties forming in the first two years⁴²⁶, and by 2005 over 28 parties had been formed.⁴²⁷

“People are unrestricted in promoting their own political parties and canvassing openly for support from their fellow citizens”.⁴²⁸ The “level of freedom of association and freedom to form political parties is very high. There are no legal or administrative inhibitions to freedom of association”.⁴²⁹ The ease with which political parties can register has contributed over time to the fragmentation of the party system, as defections from the governing party result in new political parties rather than the increasing force of a unified opposition.

The result has been the proliferation of parties, from two in the 1991 elections, to five in the 1996 in addition to numerous independent candidates, and eleven parties contesting in 2001. By December 2005, over 35 parties have registered and seven were elected to both the 2001 and 2006 Parliaments.⁴³⁰ The second largest party in the 2006 legislature was an upstart, demonstrating the continuing fragmentation of the party system, related to continuing MMD defections that are not forced to coalesce with the existing opposition.⁴³¹

⁴²⁶ Mwanakatwe, J. M. (1994). End of Kaunda era. Lusaka, Zambia, Multimedia Zambia. p. 269

⁴²⁷ Momba, J. C. (2005). Political parties and the quest for democratic consolidation in Zambia. Johannesburg, EISA.

Sakala, M. (July 2006). Director, Registrar of Societies. R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia.

⁴²⁸ Mwanakatwe, J. M. (1994). End of Kaunda era. Lusaka, Zambia, Multimedia Zambia. p. 269

⁴²⁹ Momba, J. C. (2005). Political parties and the quest for democratic consolidation in Zambia. Johannesburg, EISA. p. 46

⁴³⁰ Kalale, D. (July 2006). Director, Electoral Commission of Zambia. R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia.

Sakala, M. (July 2006). Director, Registrar of Societies. R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia.

⁴³¹ The Patriotic Front, a party formed just prior to the 2001 elections, was the closest challenger to the MMD, and was a spoiler to the existing opposition’s attempt to coalesce with the United Democratic Alliance to defeat the MMD.

Models of Party Organization

While UNIP had constructed a mass party with a nationally organized personnel and physical infrastructure, the opposition MMD eschewed this model and rapidly formed along the basis of the national union communication network. The MMD was initially formed by a few activists who recruited intellectuals, laborers, and the political business class.⁴³² Even “these targeted groups did not affiliate as a section or recognize the fact that they had group interests”; rather than an ideological basis of unity the MMD focused on recruiting local leaders as individuals who had been hurt by the authoritarian regime’s political and socio-economic management.⁴³³ The heterogeneous coalition began the push for the return to political pluralism as a solution to the political and economic stalemate facing the country – but they pursued this agenda for many different reasons. This broad mix of reformers incorporated “democratic activists in the universities, human rights groups, clandestine political organizations and frustrated businessmen [who] channeled social anger into broad movements for democratic reform”, challenging the incumbent UNIP government for freedoms of expression, economic reform, and participation in local and national government.⁴³⁴ The movement was quickly joined by retired and disaffected politicians from within the UNIP ranks, “farmers, students, workers through their trade unions, academics, unemployed urban

⁴³² “These three groups offered the greatest potential to contribute to the Movement’s goals because they were (1) aggrieved, and (2) had the ability to contribute to alternative solutions ... but they weren’t united as groups. The only reason we were able to mobilize them is because of the general socio-economic circumstances – it was a circumstantial moment that was ripe for their participation in the movement. There was no greater interest in group mobilization or increased consciousness. People came in as individuals who were hurt by current circumstance rather than as groups”. Mbikusita-Lewanika, A. (July 2006). Founding Member of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia.

⁴³³ Ibid.

⁴³⁴ Mwanakatwe, J. M. (1994). *End of Kaunda era*. Lusaka, Zambia, Multimedia Zambia. p. 266.

youth and ordinary rural people”.⁴³⁵ These diverse interests had the unified agenda of achieving a multiparty system.⁴³⁶ But once the defeat of UNIP as the incumbent had been achieved, rapid fragmentation began which resulted in the proliferation of new parties.

Because the MMD had no unity or common cause beyond ending the one-party state, each individual became disenchanted for different reasons because the promise of multipartism meant various things to each of them, and thus they were not coherent beyond that immediate single goal... The struggle within the movement was based on the many different ideas composing it, and *without the threat of UNIP to keep them united*, the outcome desired itself became contestable.⁴³⁷

The ‘Movement’ did not choose to focus on party building in the rapid run-up to the founding elections. At the outset the MMD communicated with its heterodox base of supporters using the national union as a platform. Following the MMD’s victory over the authoritarian incumbent party, internal fragmentation began quite quickly, beginning with the intellectuals who were most committed to political reform, followed by disenchanted politicians who were not satisfied with their positions.⁴³⁸ The MMD went so far as to intentionally dismantle the national union’s strength by deregulating trade union membership and ending mandatory due payments, which allowed the proliferation of unions and reduced their concentrated power. These strategic moves to inhibit future challengers emerging from this foundation was evidence of the MMD’s strategy to

⁴³⁵ Simutanyi, N. R. and N. Mate (2006). *One Party Dominance and Democracy in Zambia*. Maputo, Mozambique, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. p. 8

⁴³⁶ Mwanakatwe, J. M. (1994). *End of Kaunda era*. Lusaka, Zambia, Multimedia Zambia. p. 238.

⁴³⁷ Mbikusita-Lewanika, A. (July 2006). *Founding Member of the Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD)*. R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia. (emphasis added).

See also Mwanakatwe, J. M. (2003). *John M. Mwanakatwe : teacher, politician, lawyer : my autobiography*. Lusaka, Zambia, Bookworld Publishers. p. 433.

⁴³⁸ Mbikusita-Lewanika, A. and D. Chitala (1990). *The hour has come : proceedings of the National Conference on the Multi-party Option, held at Garden House Hotel, Zambia, 20-21 July, 1990*. Lusaka, Zambia, Zambia Research Foundation.

Chongwe, R. (2006). *Former Cabinet Minister*. R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia.

consolidate their own power through deinstitutionalization of the system rather than a concerted effort to build a mass party across the national territory. Further evidence of this strategy has been the shifting support base of the MMD, as leadership changes and high level defections cause the party to constantly renegotiate their linkages to supporters, rather than relying on well-established party organization to maintain loyal members.⁴³⁹ Ultimately, rather than focus on building a party organization, the MMD used the organs of the state to consolidate and centralize power around an elite few. Once UNIP had been defeated, “the elite within the MMD began maneuvering to consolidate their power”; this became the goal of the party leaders rather than building an enduring party organization.⁴⁴⁰

In the present period, many parties have formed, all of which are institutionally weak and lack organization structures throughout the national territory.⁴⁴¹ New parties that have formed center their appeal on a few leading candidates and work within a regional base to gain a deep, but not broad, following. Conscious of the limitations of this strategy to defeat the incumbent party, the fluid opposition has created strategic and temporary electoral alliances, which can be renegotiated easily depending on shifting

⁴³⁹ See, for example, the shifting support for the MMD between the 2001 and 2006 elections. Following former President Chiluba’s persecution by successor President Mwanawasa, and the defection of top party leader Michael Sata, the Bemba vote concentrated in the Copper Belt – once the core of the MMD’s support – moved to the newly formed Patriotic Front, and the MMD gained support in the central region, populated by Mwanawasa’s ethnic kin.

⁴⁴⁰ Mwanakatwe, J. M. (2003). *John M. Mwanakatwe : teacher, politician, lawyer : my autobiography*. Lusaka, Zambia, Bookworld Publishers. p. 433

⁴⁴¹ (NDI), N. D. I. f. I. A. and F. f. D. P. (FODEP) (2003). *The State of Political Parties in Zambia: Final Report*. N. I. f. M. D. (IMD). Lusaka, Zambia. p. 13.

Posner also finds that all Zambian parties try to portray themselves as national while painting their opponents as ethnically based, and all campaign within their regional strongholds with veiled references to party leadership of the same ethnicity. Posner, D. N. (2005). *Institutions and ethnic politics in Africa*. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press. p. 107-114.

calculations.⁴⁴² But these partnerships have proved to be of limited value because of two factors. First, the weakness of party affiliation makes creating a single list difficult. Each party does not maintain 100% of their previous following, because many voters were local level supporters of a particular candidate who may not be retained. Secondly, the ease with which new parties can register and the weak citizen attachment to parties means that the ground is fertile for new parties to capture a significant portion of the vote. Therefore, it is difficult for successful electoral alliances to form based on previous voting results because they will miss important shifts in the electorate's support.

In general party capacity is weak, and political parties lack a wide base and popular appeal.⁴⁴³ The new models of regional organization and ethnic leadership appeal are very different from the single party era of UNIP inter-party ethnic balancing, mass membership drives and party headquarters in every constituency.⁴⁴⁴ Parties are used as tools to achieve power and propel leaders rather than represent interests. The result is weak citizen attachment to parties.⁴⁴⁵ Studies in 1996 and 2003 reveal that up to 65% of

⁴⁴² For example, in 2006 the United Democratic Alliance, which is made up of the remnants of UNIP (support based in the East), the UPND (a Southern/ Tonga party), and the FDD (also Eastern support due to high level MMD defectors protesting Chilbua's attempt to run for a third term). The individual parties learned from the 2001 elections that the majority of the population voted against the MMD presidential candidate, yet the opposition's fractionalization prevented its victory. The UDA attempted to address this by making a single electoral list; however, the volatility of inter-party relations and weak constituency links meant that strategizing from the previous electoral results would undoubtedly not capture the full dynamics. The 2006 elections privileged yet another new party, the PF, which was not part of the UDA.

⁴⁴³ Muunga, A. (2006). Consultant, Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (IMD). R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia.

Simutanyi, N. R. (2006). Institute of Economic and Social Research, University of Zambia. R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia.

Simutanyi, N. R. and N. Mate (2006). One Party Dominance and Democracy in Zambia. Maputo, Mozambique, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. p. 10.

⁴⁴⁴ Kaunda, K. (2006). Former President of Zambia. R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia.

Zulu, G. (2006). Former Secretary General of UNIP (Vice President of Zambia). R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia.

⁴⁴⁵ Bratton, M., P. Alderfer, et al. (1997). "Political Participation in Zambia, 1991-1996: Trends and Determinants." *Michigan State University Working Papers on Political Reform in Africa*(No. 16).

Simutanyi, N. R., Zambia Democratic Governance Project., et al. (1997). *The tendency towards one-party dominance : democratic struggles and the electoral process in Zambia*. [Lusaka, s.n.

Zambians were not affiliated with any political party, reflecting an enduring disconnect between party activity and citizen affiliation. The unreliable membership base and a lack of commitment means that mass mobilization is difficult, and opposition has little ability to articulate clear policy alternatives, hold government accountable (particularly on issues of electoral and constitutional reform and observance of the rule of law) or use parliament to exert control and oversight over the executive.⁴⁴⁶ The lack of policy alternatives reinforces the personalization of parties. The void created by the feebleness of the incumbent authoritarian ultimately influenced both the continued weakness of the MMD as a party and the continued volatility and incoherence of the opposition.⁴⁴⁷

Structure of Party Competition

Finally, UNIP's decimation also left a void in the structure of party competition, providing no viable alternative to the incoherent and uninstitutionalized MMD. Because the 'Movement' encompassed a heterogeneous blend of reformists and opportunists, their overwhelming victory left no opposition. The country's mood was generally supportive of the promised political and economic liberalization and wanted the MMD to have the backing it needed to accomplish these tasks. UNIP was incapable of providing a unifying theme around which a new opposition could organize, particularly because new defectors from the MMD had no reason to ally with the former authoritarian party that they had worked to defeat. UNIP was a party that was past its prime, and the lack of any alternative to the new party in power contributed to the fragmentation of the party system

⁴⁴⁶ Simutanyi, N. R. and N. Mate (2006). *One Party Dominance and Democracy in Zambia*. Maputo, Mozambique, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. p. 10

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid.* p. 15

as the Movement for Multiparty Democracy had accomplished its goal and began to fall apart.

Additionally, the transition experience provided an important lesson *against* loose coalitions promising an easy victory but lacking a binding cohesion. Those disenchanted with the MMD did not want to form another broad coalition that lacked any common cause beyond the defeat of the sitting government. Their recent experience of unseating UNIP and then being sidelined within the new government taught them that “the opposition can unite broadly to win and come to power, but that individually they might still lose out from within that coalition”.⁴⁴⁸ According to Akashambatwa Lewanika, an MMD founder and an early defector, the lesson of UNIP’s defeat and MMD’s fragmentation was that it was better to rely on one’s own personal party rather than be caught up in a heterogeneous coalition that does not truly reflect your own interests. Furthermore, those who left MMD early were a heterogeneous mix of regional powerbrokers who had been excluded from coveted positions as well as disenchanted academics and reformists; they too lacked any reason to coalesce to form an effective opposition or a ‘government in waiting’.⁴⁴⁹ The lack of competitive structure in the party system fueled party proliferation, personalism, financial weakness and lack of a national organizational structure, and the reliance on a few regional strongholds as a constituency base.⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁸ Muunga, A. (2006). Consultant, Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (IMD). R. Interview. Lusaka, Zambia.

⁴⁴⁹ Mwanakatwe, J. M. (1994). *End of Kaunda era*. Lusaka, Zambia, Multimedia Zambia. p. 249

⁴⁵⁰ The ruling MMD attempts to exacerbate the condition of opposition weakness by co-opting potential challengers through poaching, and the opposition remains too unorganized and fragmented to stop it. Simutanyi, N. R., Zambia Democratic Governance Project., et al. (1997). *The tendency towards one-party dominance : democratic struggles and the electoral process in Zambia*. [Lusaka, s.n. p. 30

Controlled Transitions: Senegal and Ghana

In both Senegal and Ghana, the democratic transitions were characterized by a very high degree of control by the incumbent party, which maintained its authoritarian status throughout the founding electoral period and used its power over state agencies to ensure its dominance. The limitations placed on the opposition, and the skewed playing field in favor of the strong authoritarian incumbents, meant that little political space was open for the formation of numerous new parties, forcing the opposition forces to consolidate into one main entity focused on the defeat of the incumbent.⁴⁵¹

Controlled Transition: Senegal

Eligibility Rules

The incumbent party in Senegal, the *Parti Socialiste* (PS), dictated the transition to multipartism with the intention of decreasing elite domestic pressures, improving international alliances, and moderating internal party pressures from the next generation of party leaders aspiring to leadership positions already occupied by the founding party barons. The incumbents decided first to institute a three party system *multipartisme limité*, and determined what ideological positions those parties would have, and who would be allowed to lead them.⁴⁵² The liberal-democratic *Parti Démocratique*

⁴⁵¹ While Senegal's transition was substantially earlier than the rest of the continent, beginning in 1976 and moving to full multipartism in 1981, the same dynamics of internal pressures and international preferences pushed the incumbent to make the move to liberalize in order to consolidate its own position domestically. Ghana is perhaps unique in the meaningful attachment that remains among citizens to historical independence-era party identities. While these affiliations are central to citizens' political identities, it is critical to note the ways in which the independence era cleavages have been *reshaped* by the competitive structure of party competition that emerged during the democratic transition. (See Chapter 3 for a discussion of democratizing pressures and historical legacies as alternative explanations. See Chapter 5 for the linkage of historical political identities into the current party structure in Ghana).

⁴⁵² The legislation was passed via constitutional amendment (Article 3), accepted by the single party legislature without debate.

Senegalais (PDS) was accepted as the first legal party of opposition; its founder had formerly been within the PS ranks. The *Rassemblement National Démocratique*, led by the popular Cheikh Anta Diop, presented too much of a challenge to the incumbent and was refused registration as a party because it did not fall within the official ideological space. The third party of the ‘limited’ pluralism was the Marxist-Leninist *Parti Africaine de l’Indépendance*, which remained marginal, in part because it did not compete in early elections and contested the nature of the system at large.⁴⁵³ The incumbent-orchestrated move to legitimize opposition within the realm of PS control was powerful because it allowed for the incumbent party to take up the most desirable ideological position in the very wide center of the spectrum, and to prohibit challengers that would upset the status quo. The incumbent’s rationale for dictating the acceptable parties for registration was to severely limit the scope of opposition action, yet it inadvertently forced the majority opposition elements to coalesce around the PDS in order to contest the ruling party.⁴⁵⁴

The conscribed eligibility rules were implemented through two main channels. First, the ruling party carefully dictated the terms of new party registration (total number, leadership and ideological position) and extensively monitored them to make sure that they were not moving outside of the mandated realm of ‘contribution’.⁴⁵⁵ The move to full multipartism five years later opened up the registration process, and the opposition

⁴⁵³ Hayward, F. M. and S. N. Grovogui (1987). Persistence and Change in Senegalese Electoral Processes. *Elections in independent Africa*. F. M. Hayward. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press: xvii, 318 p. p. 257-264.

⁴⁵⁴ For example, in reaction to the 1983 elections and the increasing control of the incumbent party, in particular the unilaterally implemented electoral reform, the PDS led an anti-PS alliance to contest the reforms. The PS, in turn, focused its energies on weakening the PDS, particularly by co-opting individual members into the government. Ibid. p. 257.

⁴⁵⁵ The *Parti Socialiste* had already proved its mastery over the limitation of competition through the use of various electoral provisions in the 1960’s to ensure its dominance by excluding opposition parties and not allowing them to win seats in the National Assembly despite official legal status. Nohlen, D., M. Krennerich, et al. (1999). *Elections in Africa : a data handbook*. Oxford ; New York, Oxford University Press. p. 756

PDS claimed that the incumbent party implemented the change as a strategy to promote the “splintering of the opposition into smaller, less viable and less competitive groupings”.⁴⁵⁶ The rules have since remained fairly open, and over 84 political parties are now officially registered. Yet the number of *effective* parties remains small – only three parties receive more than 5% of the vote, reflecting the incumbent versus concentrated opposition dynamic established in the transition period.⁴⁵⁷

The second channel of incumbent influence over party registration and eligibility was initiated through the electoral code in 1983, coinciding with the move to full multipartism to maintain the PS control over the new system. The electoral code required that parties competing for legislative seats have complete electoral lists (disqualifying small and emerging parties with popular individuals in many districts); that election of candidates would be governed by the party’s list (which advantaged the stronger and better organized PS and limited the appeal of some popular and effective opposition candidates); and prohibited coalitions among parties (making the prospects for opposition victory even more difficult).⁴⁵⁸ Of course, these rules to enforce the PS advantage would only serve to reinforce opposition cohesion to present complete electoral lists, thereby creating a stronger opposition party in the long term.

⁴⁵⁶ Vengroff, R. and L. Creevey (1997). Senegal: The Evolution of a Quasi-Democracy. Political Reform in Francophone Africa. J. F. Clark and D. E. Gardinier. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press: pp. 207

⁴⁵⁷ Young, C. and B. Kante (1992). Governance, democracy and the 1988 Senegalese elections. Governance and politics in Africa. G. Hydén and M. Bratton. Boulder, Colo., L. Rienner: xii, 329 p.

Ciss, G. (1997). Les fondements democratiques du systeme politique senegalais. Dakar, Senegal, Universite Cheikh Anta DIOP de Dakar.

Vengroff, R. and M. Magala (2001). "Democratic reform, transition and consolidation: evidence from Senegal's 2000 presidential election." Journal of Modern African Studies 39(1): 129-162.

⁴⁵⁸ Hayward, F. M. and S. N. Grovogui (1987). Persistence and Change in Senegalese Electoral Processes. Elections in independent Africa. F. M. Hayward. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press: xvii, 318 p.

Gueye, B. O. (2005). Prefet, Chef de la Division des Affaires Politiques et Syndicales (Ministere de L'Interieur et des Collectivites Locales) - Direction des Affaires Generales et de l'Administration Territoriale. R. Interview. Dakar, Senegal. p. 257-8

Model of Party Organization

The incumbent authoritarian party PS reigned not only as the party to beat, but also as the model to follow, in organizational and mobilizational terms. PDS party officials at both the national and local level acknowledged that the PS “had a significant presence across the national territory, with deep connections to the rural world”.⁴⁵⁹ The vast majority of PDS party officials, when asked about the way in which their party had been created, responded that they had modeled it on the successful example provided by the incumbent party.⁴⁶⁰ Even founding PDS members in remote districts of the country understood that the national scale and scope was based on an established competitive model, as Yakhore Diop recalled in Tambacounda, the deep interior of the country: “Why reinvent the wheel? We had to compete with [the PS] in every village, in every constituency, so we had to create the same structures so that the local people would understand what we were offering”.⁴⁶¹ The incumbent party had a broad reach across the national territory and deep connections with the rural population, which the PDS as the nascent opposition endeavored to replicate from the outset.⁴⁶²

The PDS attempted, with its limited opposition resources, to create a parallel party organization. Where the incumbent PS organized *le comité* at the village level, the PDS organized *la cellule*, both of which fed into the *séction* at the constituency level and

⁴⁵⁹ Dramé, L. (2005). PDS Secrétaire Chargé des affaires sociaux for the Mouvement des anciens Responsable du Section. R. Interview. Ziguinchor, Senegal.

⁴⁶⁰ Riedl interviews in Dakar, Podor, Tambacounda and Ziguinchor.

⁴⁶¹ Diop, Y. (2005). PDS Representative in Tambacounda. R. Interview. Tambacounda, Senegal.

⁴⁶² The PS as the incumbent party did not hesitate to use the support of the state to build the party, but used those resources to prioritize party training of cadres, local leadership selection, and developing strong party links with local leaders such as the *marabouts*. The PDS sought to build a parallel structure over time, but was certainly encumbered by resource weakness inherent in the opposition.

then into equivalent organs at the district, regional and national levels, and corresponding executive leadership in the *bureau politique* (Figure 6.5).⁴⁶³

Figure 6.5 State Administrative Units and Corresponding Party Structures in Senegal

State Administrative Units	PS Organigramme	PDS Structures Du Base
Immediate Community	le comité	la cellule
Village (rural) or Quartier (urban)	la section	le secteur
l'Arrondissement	l'union locale de sections	la sous-section
Sous-prefecture (rural) or Ville (urban)	la coordination	la section
Departement	l'union departementale	la federation
Region	l'union regionale	le conseil regionale
National Executive	bureau politique	bureau politique

The national organization strategies and dualistic nature of competition were reflected in the party officials' comments of the necessity of party organization and penetration in every electoral district across the country. The perceptions of party presence and electoral competition are dualistic and zero-sum: "we don't concede any district, because that would be giving it to the other side, and *any* constituency could be the swing factor in the next election".⁴⁶⁴ Voting patterns reflect wide national coverage –

⁴⁶³ (PDS), P. D. S. "Statuts & reglements." from www.sopionline.com/.

(PS), P. S. "Statuts & reglements." from http://www.partisocialiste.sn/ps_structures/statregl.htm.

Kebemere, A. (2005). Assistant to Quester, Assemble Nationale. R. Interview. Dakar, Senegal.

⁴⁶⁴ Sentiments similar to this were expressed by multiple PDS and PS party officials. Thiam, L. (2005). PDS Responsable du parti. R. Interview. Dakar, Senegal.

in the 1993, 1998 and 2000 legislative and presidential elections, both the PS and PDS received significant support in each of the 30 constituencies.⁴⁶⁵

Structure of Party Competition

The dualistic nature of the campaign of opposition against the incumbent began at the democratic transition and has remained over time even following a successful alternation. The incumbent PS recognized the growing strength and cohesion of the opposition and made moves to manage this increasing challenge after five years by initiating full multipartism. The transition to full multipartism was initiated, again, by the incumbent PS to serve their own interests, in an attempt to gain legitimacy for the new PS leadership following President Senghor's succession in 1981.⁴⁶⁶ With the move to unlimited multipartism, numerous political parties have registered in Senegal over time, but the PDS remained the only significant competitor, garnering between 14% of the vote up to 25% before its eventual victory in 2000.⁴⁶⁷ No other opposition party received more than 5% of the vote until a significant split from the ruling party occurred in 1998 and contributed to the alternation in 2000, ultimately playing kingmaker. Because of the proscribed nature of party registration at the outset of political liberalization, the PDS was at first the only viable challenger, and continued to be the main electoral threat to the authoritarian successor party, focusing on the strategic call for "change" and "alternation" to attract pragmatic followers to coalesce to defeat the ruling party. Following the PDS

⁴⁶⁵ Election Results. *Sud Quotidien*. Dakar, Senegal.

⁴⁶⁶ Hayward, F. M. and S. N. Grovogui (1987). Persistence and Change in Senegalese Electoral Processes. *Elections in independent Africa*. F. M. Hayward. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press: p. 257

⁴⁶⁷ Important parties of the left have existed in Senegal but they have not achieved a mass following and thus affected the structure of party competition; rather, they have served as important contributors to the political dialogue.

victory in 2000, the tables turned but party competition remained dualistic, with the focus of the new opposition to offer a critique of the government and present a viable alternative, led by the former authoritarian party PS.⁴⁶⁸

Controlled Transition: Ghana

Eligibility Rules

In Ghana, the transition to multipartism was well orchestrated by the ruling Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), which maintained the authoritarian legal code and instruments of state repression throughout the party formation process and founding elections. One of the most important elements of formal rule making in the transition process in Ghana was the decision about how new parties could be formed and registered. The government retained a ban on political party formation during the entire Consultative Assembly “to ensure that the process of constitutional deliberation is non-partisan”.⁴⁶⁹ This not only delayed party formation but also helped prevent the opposition from being legally able to communicate and associate in order to effectively push for their agenda.

Following the constitutional debates, party registration opened according to very demanding requirements. The PNDC mandated unilaterally that party registration requirements would be extremely rigorous for embryonic opposition. Political Parties Law of 1992 (passed by the PNDC Assembly as PNDCL 281) legislated that registration

⁴⁶⁸ The PS remained the core focus of the opposition to the newly empowered PDS, despite the drama of high-level defections from the new ruling party and their fallout in the electoral realm. The somewhat tumultuous process of realignment is expected given the complete reversal of roles for both parties. The case of Idrissa Seck’s defection from the PDS and his presidential bid in 2007 does not seem to indicate a change in the fundamental party structure, and the opposition has again begun to coalesce to present a united challenge to the PDS.

⁴⁶⁹ (1992). Report on the Consultative Assembly. *Daily Graphic*. Accra, Ghana.

of a political party shall be made to the National Electoral Commission including an application that provides the constitution, rules and regulations of the party signed by the leaders of the party, at least one *founding member of the political party from each of the 160 districts*, a full description of the identifying symbols, slogans and colors of the party, a registration fee, and within 60 days the party must provide evidence of the existence and location of *national, regional and district offices in each locality*.⁴⁷⁰ The high level of organization necessary to have physical offices in all 160 districts, as well as founding members representative across the country meant that nascent parties faced a very high barrier to registration, and without formal registration they were not legally allowed to operate. Furthermore, the threat of refusal of registration and de-registration was clearly stated in the political parties law if parties fail to comply with the requirements or fail to submit the annual accounting and auditing documents necessary.⁴⁷¹ In interviews, members of smaller opposition parties mentioned these party registration requirements as a constant pressure to their existence. “The threat of deregulation is always in our minds, and although it has not been used against us we are cognizant of the fact that it is a tool that the state can employ at will to limit opposition forces that become too threatening”.⁴⁷²

These high barriers to entry forced the majority of citizens interested in joining a party or running as a candidate to ally with one of the two main contenders, who had

⁴⁷⁰ PNDC (1992). PNDCL 281: Political Parties Law 1992. Accra, Ghana.

⁴⁷¹ The Director of the Electoral Commission noted that the office has not yet utilized the tool of deregistering parties because they don't want to politicize a cause that is dying away on its own, but that they could at any time if they felt it was necessary to stop a party from organizing in only a select area. Kangah, D. (2006). Electoral Commission Director. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

⁴⁷² Opoku, N. K. (2006). General Secretary of the National Reform Party; NGO Coordinator of the Civic Response. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

Pratt, K. (2006). CPP Secretary General and Communications Director. Founding Member of the Movement for Freedom and Justice, a democratization pressure group. Editor of the Weekly Insight. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

established the necessary infrastructure and assets for maintenance.⁴⁷³ Because it is difficult to fund and oversee party operations in each district, for parties to be truly competitive they require a significant number of Members of Parliament to be elected, particularly because the representatives in the National Assembly serve as the major source of party funding.⁴⁷⁴ Overall, the regulations for party registration established during the democratic transition have been successful in avoiding party proliferation and limiting entrants into the political marketplace. Many at the time of transition criticized the party registration process as limiting freedom and the right to associate.⁴⁷⁵ Some opposition charged that the law was a deliberate attempt to restrict, harass, and limit their choices and functioning.⁴⁷⁶

Model of Party Organization

Both the incumbent (P)NDC and the opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) focused on bolstering their national party organization, building their ‘foot-soldiers in the field’ and felt confident of their ability to convert their networks into votes and win the

⁴⁷³ In particular, it is necessary to have a large number of Members of Parliament (MPs) to continue party maintenance, as the representatives in the National Assembly have served as the major source of party funding. The high registration requirements of infrastructure in each district make it necessary to pool resources.

⁴⁷⁴ (IMD), N. I. f. M. D. (1004). Ghana Report.

Institute of Economic Affairs (Ghana) (2004). Joint symposia of the registered political parties of Ghana. Accra, Ghana, Institute of Economic Affairs.

Morrison, M. K. C. (2004). "Political parties in Ghana through four republics - A path to democratic consolidation." Comparative Politics 36(4): 421-+.

Ghana Center for Democratic Development. and Institut für Afrika-Kunde (Hamburg Germany) (2005). A report of a survey on political parties and party systems in Ghana conducted in December 2003. Accra, Ghana Center for Democratic Development.

Commeys, L. (2006). NPP National Organizer. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana. NPP Headquarters.

⁴⁷⁵ Ninsin, K. A. and F. K. Drah (1991). Ghana's transition to constitutional rule : proceedings of a seminar organised by the Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon. Accra, Ghana Universities Press. p. 28-30

⁴⁷⁶ Oquaye, M. (2004). Politics in Ghana, 1982-1992 : Rawlings, revolution, and populist democracy. Osu, Accra, Ghana, Tornado Publications. p. 492 and 504

elections. The organizations were based on the mass party model of the independence-era parties and the grass roots, ‘revolutionary’ participation that the PNDC wanted to encourage. The model focused on strong linkages between national, regional, district and local level party agents to tie the leadership of the party to their mass base. The three main groups of supporters of the incumbent regime included those who generally supported the PNDC according to their earlier revolutionary rhetoric or later economic and political liberalization reforms, those who had specifically benefited from PNDC largesse in the past or were affiliated via local patrons who held positions within the PNDC government, and those who were generally fearful of change and the possible violent repercussions that an alternation would bring. These constituencies covered a large swath of the population, across the national territory. The PNDC, as it transformed into the democratically competitive NDC, worked hard to unite these various constituencies through the party organization, building party affiliation through membership in the party organization. Similarly, the NPP was made up of disparate communities of anti-authoritarian groups and had to work diligently to bring these diverse members into a functional party organization, replete with intra-party elected positions and staffed headquarters in each district.

The 1992 presidential elections garnered electoral support for the NDC in all 10 administrative regions of the country; the NDC party machine was not absent in any specific zone. The NPP necessarily had to mobilize nationally as well to be competitive against the dominance of the incumbent’s breadth and depth of organization. As an opposition party, the NPP clearly faced difficult obstacles in national representation but was still able to win constituencies in 6 of the ten administrative regions in the 1992

presidential elections, and increased to 6 and 7 in the 1996 and 2000 elections, respectively. By the 2004 elections, in which the NPP were incumbents, the party won constituencies in every region, as did the NDC. The Electoral Commission's monitoring of the number of political party offices across the country in 2000 found that of the 120 electoral districts across the country, the NDC had offices in 110 and the NPP had offices in 107, showing impressive national coverage in some of the more remote areas of the country.⁴⁷⁷ As a comparison, the next most organized political party, the CPP, had 67 district offices in 2000, along with 3 constituency seats won in 2 districts in the 2004 elections. This stark difference in party organization reflects the arduous challenges of party building and maintenance in a developing country and the domination of party organization and competition by the two main contenders.

Structure of Party Competition

Given the context of continued authoritarian control over the democratization process, the essence of party competition in Ghana's founding elections centered on a dyadic competition between the reigning PNDC regime and the unified opposition that coalesced to challenge the supremacy of the authoritarian incumbent. The opposition was able to unify rapidly as the only plausible alternative to the incumbent due to two main factors. First, the unaltered nature of the incumbent party (undergoing only a name change from PNDC to NDC, the National Democratic Congress) allowed the opposition to compete on a cohesive anti-authoritarian platform. The first electoral campaign rhetoric focused heavily on the opposition's call to vote for 'democracy' and linked the

⁴⁷⁷ Tetteh, F. (2000). Political Party Organization in Ghana. E. C. Research and Methodology Department. Accra, Ghana.

(P)NDC to its revolutionary, authoritarian origins. The opposition NPP was careful to market itself as open to all who were opposed to continued (P)NDC reign, which allowed new elements to be incorporated within its ranks. The (P)NDC campaign also used this dialectical approach, arguing that a vote for the incumbents was a vote for stability, status quo and reflected confidence in the direction of the current regime and a desire to maintain their leadership.⁴⁷⁸

Secondly, the NPP emerged quickly as the principle opposition because it built rapidly from national networks that shared ‘liberal’ or anti-authoritarian perspectives – incorporating professional associations (particularly the lawyers association, as well as university and medical organizations) and social networks (such as the Danquah/Busia independence leaders and descendants, who maintained communications across the country).⁴⁷⁹ These associations and traditions provided a base and national human infrastructure for rapid party organization to mobilize in opposition to the authoritarian incumbent.⁴⁸⁰

An enormously important element of Ghanaian party formation is the degree to which contemporary parties have endeavored to build their foundations of constituency support by linking to historical traditions of independence era leaders and their associated party frameworks. While the Nkrumahist and Danquah-Busia cleavage of

⁴⁷⁸ The PNDC campaign was national in focus: it worked to capitalize its support within the population, emphasizing its national successes in terms of economic reform and its associated developmental gains and political stability.

⁴⁷⁹ Which they were able to do even during the repressive authoritarian period through purely social functions, particularly through funeral attendance of important independence era leaders. The professional associations were tolerated by the regime despite their reformist views because the state required their technical expertise to function. Jonah, K. (2006). Acting Head, Governance Center at the Institute for Economic Affairs in Ghana. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

Ninsin, K. A. (2006). Professor of Political Science, University of Ghana, Legon. R. Interview. Legon, Ghana.

⁴⁸⁰ It also reflects the degree to which party formation is based on previously incorporated elites – those who had held political office prior to the PNDC ‘revolution’.

independence-era politics retains great salience in popular affiliation across generations, the divide between these two historic camps was *re-shaped around the powerful structuring force of the transition competition*. The historical legacy associated with the Nkrumah tradition lost much of its competitive relevance over time as many key leaders were incorporated into the revolutionary PNDC regime, due to the overlapping leftist orientation.⁴⁸¹ That left the Danquah-Busia tradition as the ‘liberal’ ideology to serve as a foundation for opposition to the new force of the PNDC. While the Nkrumahist tradition retained an emotive power, and a few parties have tried to capitalize on these sentiments, the *meanings of these identities have been remade to fit into the new multiparty era*. The founding elections of 1992 centered on a theme of “P/NDC versus ‘the rest’”⁴⁸²; and ‘the rest’ congregated around the NPP banner due to their initial organizational advantages and alternative liberal ideology.⁴⁸³ Nkrumah affiliates have either had to remain marginal through small party contributions, fold into the NDC as a leftist ally, or join the NPP despite the historic divide because their opposition to the

⁴⁸¹ Jonah, K. (2006). Acting Head, Governance Center at the Institute for Economic Affairs in Ghana. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

⁴⁸² Obeng, P. (2006). Former Presidential Advisor on Governmental Affairs. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

⁴⁸³ The extent to which ‘liberalism’ was a differentiating ideology from the socialist models both supposedly represented by the Nkrumahist parties and by the P/NDC is very limited, as the Rawlings economic reforms of the 1980’s had basically subscribed to the neo-liberal model and there was actually little debate on either side about this direction. The main divide identified the P/NDC as the ‘revolutionary/ authoritarian’ party and the NPP as the liberal/ democratic party; the Nkrumahist parties were marginalized in this dualism and have remained secondary to the main battle for power in the multiparty arena. The Nkrumahist mantle does maintain salience, and is represented by the CPP and PNC as political parties. They maintain an entrenched membership and appeal because of their vibrant historical links with society, but the extent to which the dualistic nature of competition has diminished their importance in the electoral arena has significantly undermined their role in the broader political spectrum. Dowouhna, M. (2006). CPP General Secretary. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2006). Executive Director, Centre for Democratic Development. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

Ndegbure, M. (2006). PNC Member of Parliament. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

Opoku, N. K. (2006). General Secretary of the National Reform Party; NGO Coordinator of the Civic Response. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

Pratt, K. (2006). CPP Secretary General and Communications Director. Founding Member of the Movement for Freedom and Justice, a democratization pressure group. Editor of the Weekly Insight. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

PNDC became primary.⁴⁸⁴ This dualistic logic has continued into the present period, even following the NPP's presidential and legislative victory in 2000. The polarized and coherent structure of incumbent versus opposition has remained, but the two main parties have switched sides in the equation.

Cross-National Analysis

I continue the analysis into the present period by analyzing cross-national survey data I collected of party representatives' responses to relative *coherence and polarization* of the party system's competition. Because ideological position on the right-left spectrum is not an organizing framework in these African democracies, I instead use the concept of intra and inter-party coherence to assesses the party officials' perceptions of competitive structure and polarization of the party system (Kitschelt et al 1999 measure coherence using ideological position questions; I measure whether the parties are internally coherent in their assessments of their own competitive position vis-à-vis other parties and whether the parties are in agreement across the system regarding their competitive relations).⁴⁸⁵ The institutional isomorphic processes would lead us to expect that where there was a strong authoritarian incumbent who maintained dominance in the founding elections, the party system would be highly polarized and there would be a high level of intra-party and inter-party coherence in the party representatives' assessments of each party's position in relation to another. The parallel argument is that where the founding elections were either free of incumbent competition or issued a overwhelming

⁴⁸⁴ Blay, F. (2006). CPP Member of Parliament. R. Interview. Accra, Ghana.

⁴⁸⁵ Kitschelt, H. (1999). Post-communist party systems : competition, representation, and inter-party cooperation. Cambridge ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

check to the authoritarian successor party, the resulting structural void would make it difficult for all members of political parties to gauge the position of their party in relation to other parties.

In surveys I conducted with party officials at the national and district level in each of the four country case studies, I evaluate party system coherence and polarization through party members' assessments of party competition. These data are the most direct cross-national measure of the third process of institutional isomorphism – the structure of party competition – reflecting ways in which the democratic transition determines a shared perception of *what competition is about (coherence), and to what extent the competitors are rivals or merely players in the same game (polarization)*. This measure, however, also taps the inter-related nature of the three isomorphic processes. We can expect that the model and depth of party organization would influence the intra-party coherence, because the quantity and quality of information and training that party representatives receive about party competition and party system relations is dependent on the links of communication that flow from the national executive to local level party branches. Secondly, eligibility rules influence the difficulty of creating new parties, and in the context of party proliferation and rapid party formation, it is difficult for any inter-party assessments to maintain validity in a shifting competitive environment. These data, therefore, reflect the parallel processes at work in the coercive, mimetic and normative forms of institutional isomorphism that are driven by the extent of authoritarian control over the democratization process.

Political party members were asked to indicate on a scale of 1-10 if the given party combinations were very close in agreement (1) or not at all in agreement (10) in

regard to their goals, strategies, and visions for the future.⁴⁸⁶ Intra- and inter-party coherence would mean that the responses to this question have a small *standard deviation*; party members within and across each party share a similar perception on how parties relate to each other in competition. Polarization is reflected in the *mean*; party systems that are organized according to a dualistic structure of rival competition would be likely to identify the main parties as ‘not at all in agreement’, because competitive pressures force them to continually attempt to differentiate between the party in power and the opposition as presenting a clear alternative to the other. These data are exhibited in the cross-national comparison of the incumbent party in relation to its primary rival (Figure 6.6 and 6.7).

Riedl Survey Question: Indicate if the given party combination is close in agreement or not at all in agreement in regard to their goals, strategies and visions for the future. [Scale 1 (close, in complete agreement) - 10 (not at all in agreement)]

Figure 6.6: POLARIZATION of the Party System: Incumbent versus Primary Opposition Party Assessment, with all parties responding

Country	Party Combination	Obs	POLARIZATION (Mean)	Polarization: Alternate Measure (Median)
Benin: LOW PSI	FARD v. RB	56	7.29	7.5
Zambia: LOW PSI	MMD v. UNIP	57	7.56	8
Ghana: HIGH PSI	NPP v. NDC	37	8.32	9
Senegal: HIGH PSI	PDS v. PS	36	8.94	10

⁴⁸⁶ In a pilot survey, I had party members use this same ‘scale of agreement’ to measure more specific programmatic positions, to proxy coherence in programs and policies. However, all party members who took this portion of the survey protested that these policy positions were not relevant in assessing party relations. Instead, they argued for a more ‘relational’ metric of affiliation, whether parties were in opposition or possible allies in the national competition for political power. The wording of this question was used to reflect that broader sense of how parties view themselves in the struggle for power.

Figure 6.7 COHERENCE of the Party System: Incumbent versus Primary Opposition Party Assessment, with all parties responding

Country	Party Combination	Obs	Coherence: (Standard Deviation)	Coherence: Alternate Measure (Absolute Deviation)	Coherence: Alternate Measure (Min/Max)
Benin: LOW PSI	FARD v. RB	56	2.33	2.07	2/10
Zambia: LOW PSI	MMD v. UNIP	57	2.78	2.44	1/10
Ghana: HIGH PSI	NPP v. NDC	37	1.67	1.38	5/10
Senegal: HIGH PSI	PDS v. PS	36	1.66	1.25	4/10

In the numerical cross-national analysis, the level of polarization between the two primary rivals is higher in both Senegal and Ghana, as measured by both mean and median calculations. While the pairs selected in Benin and Zambia have a historically antagonistic relationship, the nature of mutable coalitions and shifting alliances provides incentives to each party to define inter-party relations as differentiated while remaining open to future partnership. Party representatives are hesitant to draw too sharp of a line in any relationship, given that the future may necessitate their coming together in a new strategic alliance. This was well stated by Etienne Sogbedji, the *Parti Social-Démocrate* (PSD) Constituency Secretary in Djakotomey, Benin: “There is no eternal opposition in politics, all is negotiable. It comes down to resources and advantage, and the strength of a party must be its relationships, its ability to influence and offer something in these negotiations”.⁴⁸⁷

Furthermore, Benin and Zambia exhibit less coherence in assessing the structure of party competition, with responses across the scale from 1 to 10. In Ghana and Senegal


⁴⁸⁷ Sogbedji, E. (2005). PSD Constituency Secretary. R. Interview. Djakotomey, Benin (Mono/Couffo Region).

the standard deviation of responses is low, meaning that respondents were highly coherent in their assessment of the party relations.⁴⁸⁸

In Benin, even the most antagonistic relations between the two former presidents do not transfer into a clear oppositional polarity for the members of their associated parties, the *Renaissance du Benin* (RB) and the *Front d'Action pour le Rénouveau et le Développement* (FARD). While 22% of the party members surveyed felt that the RB and FARD were very distant in their relations by giving a score of '10' (as their history of antagonism and opposition would indicate), still 20% felt that these parties were neutral or even close in agreement (5 or less). The bi-modal nature of the responses, with a minor mode at the halfway point of 5, indicates a large degree of uncertainty on where the parties stand in relation to one another (Figure 6.8).

⁴⁸⁸ When I assess these same party combinations/ relations using only the responses from the two parties involved in the relationship, Zambia's standard deviation is actually higher (3.0), meaning that the party members of MMD and UNIP are even less coherent in their assessment of their parties' relations than all of the party representatives represented in this survey. Similarly, the polarization score was lower (6.94), with 33 observations. The responses in the remaining three countries were all slightly more coherent and polarized, as we would expect by limiting the sample to representatives of these two parties. Benin was slightly more coherent (2.13 standard deviation) and more polarized (8.07 mean), with 27 observations. In Ghana and Senegal, the results changed little (particularly because most of the sample included these two parties in Ghana). In Ghana, with 35 observations, the mean was 8.23 and standard deviation 1.66. In Senegal the mean was 8.71 and standard deviation 1.78.


Figure 6.8: Benin's Incumbent and Major Opposition Party Relations



Like in Benin, in Zambia there is a high degree of uncertainty in the party members' assessment of the relationship between the incumbent party MMD and their historical rival UNIP.⁴⁸⁹ While the plurality of respondents recognized the gulf between the incumbent party and the opposition, there is a large amount of uncertainty and incoherence among the party members' assessments, as 28% felt that the relations were neutral or close (5 or less). This survey was administered in the run-up to the 2006 elections, and parties therefore had ever more reason to understand their competitive position and be coherent in their assessments because of opposition attempts to make a united alliance against the incumbent MMD. But even given these electoral incentives for coherence, nearly one third of the respondents still believed the two historically rival parties were not adversarial (Figure 6.9).

⁴⁸⁹ In both Benin and Zambia, the standard deviation is similarly high between the incumbent and other possible opposition parties. See Figure 4.6.

Figure 6.9: Zambia's Incumbent and Major Opposition Party Relations



In Senegal and Ghana there is high agreement, particularly on the modal answer of the maximum polarization '10', and the difference between the two countries is a matter of degree of polarization rather than the nature of the relation. In Senegal, the party representatives were coherent and all understood the relationship between the former authoritarian party, the PS, and its primary challenger, now in government, the PDS, to be extremely polarized, with a score of 10 (Figure 6.10). In Ghana, all party representatives were coherent in their responses and identified the relationship as polarized, but varied in the extent of polarization, with a score between 8-10 (Figure 6.11). All respondents in both Ghana and Senegal understood the adversarial nature of the competitive relationship, and only 1 respondent out of 79 felt that the two parties were 'close' (score of 4, near neutral) rather than oppositional.

Figure 6.10: Senegal’s Incumbent and Major Opposition Party Relations





Figure 6.11: Ghana’s Incumbent and Major Opposition Party Relations



The relationship of the current incumbent and primary opposition demonstrate in particular the fluid dynamics and incoherence that contribute to perpetually low party system institutionalization. I also consider the inter-party assessments of relations including significant ‘third parties’, or other effective parties in the system. It is useful to consider numerous other parties because as the number of parties increases, the relative of position of each party in relation to another may become incrementally less clear. While the ‘third parties’ vary in terms of their electoral significance and whether they have electoral alliances with either the incumbent or primary opposition party, there is less coherence in these assessments across all countries (Figure 6.12). It is interesting to note that in the cases of high party system institutionalization, Ghana and Senegal, important third parties demonstrate that *only* the relationship between the incumbent and major opposition is highly coherent, while the assessment of the incumbent or primary opposition parties in relation to significant third parties are just as incoherent or more so than in Zambia and Benin. This data suggests that the isomorphic pressures that structure the dualistic nature of competition between the authoritarian incumbent and a coherent opposition in controlled transitions are the mechanisms driving this result, particularly because third parties that are not as affected by this structuring logic show more similarity across all four cases, with most standard deviations well above 2.5.⁴⁹⁰

⁴⁹⁰ The exceptions are the parties in Zambia that formed an electoral alliance in the run-up to the 2006 elections, which were fairly coherent in understanding their united position vis-à-vis one another and the Parti Socialiste relation to the AFP in Senegal.

Figure 6.12: 3rd Party COHERENCE Assessments of the Party System: All Party Combinations in Benin, Zambia, Senegal and Ghana

Country	Incumbent – 3 rd Party Coherence	Major Oppos- 3 rd Party Coherence	3 rd Party- 3 rd Party Coherence
Benin: LOW PSI	Fard – PSD 2.51 Fard - PRD 2.41	RB – PSD 2.81 RB - PRD 2.68	PRD– Madep 2.77 PRD – PSD 2.38 PSD – Madep 2.15
Zambia : LOW PSI	MMD – UPND 2.65 MMD – FDD 2.67	UNIP – UPND* 1.78 UNIP – FDD* 1.78	UPND – FDD* 1.89
Ghana: HIGH PSI	NPP – CPP 2.18 NPP – PNC 2.06	NDC – CPP 2.07 NDC – PNC 2.11	
Senegal: HIGH PSI	PDS – AFP 2.61	PS – AFP 1.53	

* Were in Temporary Electoral Alliance

The responses in Ghana in particular may be less coherent in assessing the inter-party relations involving third parties in part because the stakes of minor party competition are not as high; the presidential and legislative elections have not been decided by the ‘kingmaker’ influence of a third party.⁴⁹¹ In Ghana, both the incumbent and the opposition judged their relations to be around ‘neutral’, in relation to the minor parties. Furthermore, the minor parties themselves are not coherent in their relations to the incumbent and opposition. Both the minor parties, the Convention People’s Party (CPP) and the People’s National Convention (PNC) exhibit internal schisms that feature the party’s legislative representatives and national party executives each supporting opposite sides of the government/ opposition contest. Across all combinations in Senegal and Ghana, third party relations have lower levels of polarization than the incumbent – primary opposition combinations assessed above. In Benin and Zambia, the third parties play a much more central role in determining electoral victories and the map of

⁴⁹¹ Whereas in Senegal in 2000 the role of the ‘third party’ was essential, following a split from the incumbent authoritarian party and its successive defeat.

constituent support across the country. Some parties engage in formal or informal partnerships, but these relations also vary over time due to changing strategic calculations. The range of relations, clustering around polarization scores of ‘neutral’ (5), exhibits the mutable nature of coalitions in Zambia and Benin (Figure 6.13). In particular, in Benin, the significant ‘third parties’ of PSD and *Parti du Renouveau Démocratique* (PRD) were only slightly closer in relation to the incumbent than to the opposition, positioned just on the cusp of advantage by affiliating with the party in power, but simultaneously locating themselves close enough to the opposition so as to not rule out future partnerships.

Figure 6.13 Third Party POLARIZATION Assessments

Country	Incumbent – 3 rd Party Polarization	Major Oppos- 3 rd Party Polarization	3 rd Party – 3 rd Party Polarization
Benin	Fard – PSD 3.85 Fard – PRD 4.92	RB – PSD 5.84 RB – PRD 6.85	PRD – Madep 5.35 PRD – PSD 7.4 PSD – Madep 4.13
Zambia	MMD – UPND 7.66 MMD – FDD 7.29	UNIP – UPND* 2.09 UNIP – FDD* 2.12	UPND – FDD* 2.23
Ghana	NPP – CPP 5.19 NPP – PNC 5.75	NDC – CPP 4.62 NDC – PNC 4.76	
Senegal	PDS – AFP 8.32	PS – AFP 2.42	

Within the party relation analysis, I have sorted responses by party to determine if there are any parties that are serving as outliers or which vary significantly from the rest of the national responses. In this analysis of variance there is no party that has a significantly different mean, which would be skewing the results in one direction or another. There are, however, some minor cross-national trends in type of party and their responses. The most obvious pattern is that incumbent parties are slightly less coherent

internally than opposition parties across all countries (Figure 6.14). This might be due to the bandwagon tendencies inherent in patronage systems, such that the governing party's ranks would tend to swell after a victory, incorporating individuals who are less well indoctrinated and less informed about the relations between various parties.

Members who remain in opposition parties may be assumed to be more committed party loyalists and potentially more indoctrinated and in communication with the national party leadership. This is particularly interesting because opposition parties in capital-scarce contexts face great resource challenges, but this data suggests that while their total numbers may decline while in opposition, those party representatives who remain are coherent and cohesive in their views of party competition.

There is additionally some limited support for the prediction that isomorphic pressures would contribute to higher intra-party levels of coherence in contexts where the authoritarian incumbent party remained dominant through the founding election. I find that in Senegal and Ghana, the opposition parties do exhibit greater coherence than in Benin and Zambia, as demonstrated by their lower standard deviations in all categories. For the new incumbent parties, Ghana's intra-party coherence remains high whereas Senegal's new incumbent party shows signs of stress from rapid expansion adapting to its role as governing party.

Figure 6.14 Intra-Party Assessments of Coherence

Country	Current Incumbent	Std Dev -All party combinations	Std Dev: Incum-Primary Oppos Rivalry	Std Dev: Diadic Relations Only	Primary Challenger/ Opposition Force	Std Dev -All party combinations	Std Dev: Incum-Primary Oppos	Std Dev: Dyadic Relations Only
Senegal: (High PSI)	PDS	2.28	2.09	2.64	PS	1.62	1.15	1.4
Ghana: (High PSI)	NPP	1.81	1.62	1.84	NDC	1.69	1.65	1.6
Zambia: (Low PSI)	MMD	2.03	2.99	2.74	UPND	2	2.65	1.9
Benin: (Low PSI)	FARD	2.09	2.24	1.77	RB	2.22	2.02	2.08

Finally, intra-party assessments of polarization suggest that primary opposition parties tend to see their competitive relation with the incumbent as even more polarized than the governing party (in Senegal, Zambia and Benin). In general, those who remain in the opposition are those who have internalized the rivalry between the incumbent and opposition. In Benin and Zambia, because of the ease of party creation and the facility of party switching, there are numerous other parties to affiliate with in order to change one's status vis-à-vis the incumbent party. In Senegal and Ghana, however, it is more difficult to make this switch, so the differences in intra-party assessments are smaller when comparing by party type (Figure 6.15).

Figure 6.15 Intra-Party Assessments of Polarization

Country	Current Incumbent	Mean of all Party Combinations	Mean: Incum-Primary Oppos	Mean: Dyadic relations only	Primary Challenger / Opposition Force	Mean of all Party Combinations	Mean: Incum-Primary Oppos	Mean: Dyadic relations only
Senegal (High PSI)	PDS	5.72	8.07	7.42	PS	6.81	9.36	6
Ghana (High PSI)	NPP	5.86	8.65	6.08	NDC	5.55	7.83	4.96
Zambia (Low PSI)	MMD	4.07	6.23	6.49	UPND	5.18	8.17	4.28
Benin (Low PSI)	FARD	5.56	7.8	4.67	RB	6.63	8.42	7.59

While generalizations from the intra-party assessments must be made with caution due to the small sample size, the trends between party type are generally similar across all countries, whereas the polarization and coherence assessments demonstrate greater divergence in the systemic cross-national analysis, when all party types are taken into account. This suggests that the main forces shaping the emergence and endurance high or low levels of institutionalization are systemic processes, and reinforces the conclusion that institutional isomorphism shapes all component parties within the system according to the same coercive, mimetic and normative logics. Because competition is the driving engine of organizational rationalization, each type of party maintains its own characteristics according to the role it plays *within the system*.

In totality, these responses demonstrate a more clearly defined, dualistic competition between the incumbent and major opposition party in cases of high party system institutionalization, through the higher mean score of polarization and lower

standard deviation of coherence. In cases of low party system institutionalization we see that survey respondents had a greater dispersion in their responses, indicating uncertainty or differing interpretations of the relations between parties. Furthermore, responses in cases of low party system institutionalization centered around a 'neutral' response of 5 to a greater degree, as many party officials cited their hesitancy to identify any other party as an enemy, keeping open strategic options for alliance and coalition partners as needed on a particularistic basis. This evidence supports the argument that the continued strength of the authoritarian incumbent through the transition structures electoral competition to a large degree, forcing an otherwise disparate opposition to find common ground in attempting to defeat the hegemon. Where the incumbent authoritarian is weak, the new party founders have no incentives to ally, and a multiplicity of parties emerge that lack a structured relation to one another. This condition endures, as parties are able to join or leave coalitions as they wish, shaping mutable coalitions in response to fluid competitive dynamics.

These findings suggest several important implications. First, the legacies of authoritarian power are critical because they determine the premises of the new multiparty system, by defining the norms, standards and logics of competition that shape and channel the formation and continuation of the party system. Secondly, this analysis highlights the democratic transition as a point of critical intervention at which new party leaders can define appropriate models of organizational structure and competitive logics that continue to structure the nature of the party system for years to come. But these calculations are made in response to the context of the competitive marketplace that they

must respond to in order to be competitive, e.g. the existence of a powerful authoritarian incumbent or the void created by its absence.

Party Organization

In addition to analyzing the structure of competition in a cross-national framework, I also use the local level interview data to assess the current organization and operations of the effective parties in a cross-national framework. Particularly through the interviews with party representatives who were involved in constructing the party organization at the local level in its early stages, I find evidence to suggest that the extent of modeling and emulation versus innovation and experimentation varied a great deal according to the dominance of the authoritarian incumbent party throughout the founding electoral period. In Benin and Zambia, the incumbent models were invalid, and new party organizations endeavored to differentiate themselves by providing a different model. In Zambia, the broad ‘movement’ of the MMD eschewed the party structures of the past and made deliberate attempts to deconstruct the organizational foundation of the trade union network that the MMD rode into power. In Benin, parties were created through particularistic, direct relations of politician and supporters, and party creation often followed a strong showing of support for an individual candidate. In contrast, in Ghana and Senegal, the opposition parties used the mass party model of the incumbents as a template, and tried to replicate their national scope and hierarchical linkages between national, regional, district and constituency levels of party organization to connect to the mass base. These differing foundations have compounded over time, and today the organizational capacities of the parties vary greatly cross-nationally. In particular, the

amount of physical infrastructure in use, the depth and breadth of party activity across the national territory, and the ability of national level executives to identify multiple party positions at the district or constituency level are the areas in which the variations in current party functioning reflects the different origins (Figure 6.16).

Figure 6.16: Cross-National Evaluation of Party Organization

	Physical Party Infrastructure	Scope of party activity	Connection between National and Local Level Party Officials
Benin (Low PSI)	Few national headquarters; None at the local level	Constituency to regional strongholds only	Very minimal; One contact person
Zambia (Low PSI)	Some national headquarters activity; UNIP as only party with district level organization	Regional strongholds	Multiple contacts only in party's regional stronghold
Ghana (High PSI)	National headquarters active, District and Constituency offices.	National	Party officials at multiple levels in contact
Senegal (High PSI)	National headquarters active for opposition; Incumbent now uses Govt. offices	National	Party officials at multiple levels in contact

The levels of physical infrastructure today vary most strikingly between Ghana and all other countries. In Ghana, not only did the two major parties have a staffed party office at each district capital, each constituency within the district also had its own office. These offices were actually centers of activity, around which party cadres congregated to organize rallies, receive messages from the national executive, and just to ‘talk politics’. In interviews conducted in these constituency level offices, party supporters were

intermittently dropping by, often to discuss their personal issues and seek assistance from the party. This frequent interaction meant that party members in general were better informed about the party's current positions and programs, that party membership was meaningful, and that party activity occurred beyond the electoral period. The national level offices of both the incumbent and opposition parties were centers of activity, with a full time executive office, permanent party staffers running the bureau and frequent visits from regional and district presidents. In Senegal, the authoritarian incumbent party, the PS, is now in opposition; its national headquarters is the center of party activity and an important resource for the party to maintain its coherence. The bureau has permanent party positions. The national headquarters for the once opposition PDS, now in government, is in transition. Now in power, they are in the process of building an elaborate new party headquarters. In the interim, government offices are used for party business while the old building sits vacant. The party officials of the PDS overlap with government positions, such that their time allocated to purely party business is minimal. Neither the PS or PDS has much physical infrastructure beyond the capital, as party officials at the regional, district and constituency levels are expected to support themselves and often use their own homes as meeting places; occasionally halls are rented for larger meetings, particularly when internal elections are held.⁴⁹²

In Benin, of the five major parties (all having at least 5% representation in the legislature), only one had a national party headquarters that was in regular use (*Mouvement Africain pour la Développement et le Progrès* - MADEP). Interestingly,

⁴⁹² There were exceptions in constituencies where a particular party leader was exceptionally active, or had strong links to the national executive of the party. For example, the PS had an office in Podor, due to the personal resource support of Aissatou Tall Sall, the Speaker (*Porte Parole*) for the PS through 2000 and former Minister.

two of the major parties were led by the top candidates for the upcoming presidential elections, but rather than use any party infrastructure or even the party name for their campaigns, they created separate ‘associations of support’ for their candidacy (Bruno Amoussou of the PSD and Adrian Hounbedji of the PRD). Their campaign managers explained that affiliating too closely with their own party would turn many potential supporters off, because they would assume that the positions to be distributed post-victory would be given to long-standing party members, whereas an ‘association of support’ implied openness to incorporating new followers.

In Zambia, the MMD, in power since the transition elections, has a vibrant national headquarters, staffed by permanent party officials, and has district level offices in their regional strongholds. UNIP, now in opposition, remains weak in popular support, but retains the offices that they ‘owned’ during the party-state era as their party property; therefore, they are the only party in Zambia that has offices across the entire country. The remaining opposition parties have only a national headquarters (United Party for National Development, the Forum for Democracy and Development and the Patriotic Front). The fluidity in the opposition relations also meant that temporary electoral alliances form, and party office space is shared for alliance business.

As we would expect, the scope of party activity in Ghana and Senegal shows both national breadth and local depth. The parties were present and active in every constituency. Whereas in Benin and Zambia, parties were even unable to find suitable candidates to run in particular constituencies, the opposite was true in Ghana and Senegal – too many candidates wanted too few positions.⁴⁹³ In Benin and Zambia, parties

⁴⁹³ This phenomenon often caused local level factions in the competition for party positions, but it is interesting to note that if party members were so disgruntled that they wanted to leave the party, they would

concentrated on winning their regional strongholds, and made temporary alliances prior to elections (Zambia) or after (Benin) in order to gain influence at the national level. In Benin, for example, parties operate beyond their regional stronghold generally only if some ‘settlers’ have transplanted into other districts and wish to work there for the party of their home region. A recent survey of party activities in Benin found that 73% of respondents felt that political parties in Benin lack a national following.⁴⁹⁴

The information flow from local to national level party organization varies greatly across the countries as well. Because the distances are great and resources are limited, party members at the local level rely on active district and regional party officials to relate messages from the executive and to express their concerns or issues. In Benin and Zambia, these linkages are lacking, and the level of contact between the party leadership and the local officials is extremely minimal, occurring mainly only during electoral periods. Furthermore, national party officials in charge of party organization had difficulty providing more than one contact for any given location, and had no contact whatsoever for some constituencies outside of their base. The fact that the national executive could not provide the names and contact information for basic party positions at the district level is evidence of the lack of communication from top to bottom as well as the lack of internal party procedures that would hold regular elections for those positions. Generally party positions were temporarily filled by people hoping to be the party’s candidates for the next elections. In Benin, in the aforementioned survey, the

join the rival PS/ PDS rather than creating a new party of their own. This reflects the extent to which these two parties were ‘the only game in town’.

⁴⁹⁴ Survey of politicians, representatives of civil society, institutional members, university affiliates and ‘leaders of opinion’. *UNDP (2005). Projet de Renforcement des Capacites Institutionnelles des Partis Politiques. December 7, 2005. Cotonou, Benin.*

majority of respondents felt that there is a lack of communication between party leaders and their militants (51%) and that parties do not fulfill their obligations to provide training to their members (73%).⁴⁹⁵

In contrast, in Ghana, the national level Chairman and Party Organizer, as well as their administrative staff, had regular contact with the regional and district Chairmen, who then relayed the information to their colleagues in the positions of treasurer, secretary, women and youth organizers, and vice-chairman. In Senegal as well, the '*Responsable du Parti*' at the national level had detailed contact information for multiple party posts at the district level. While internal election procedures in Ghana and Senegal were not often followed to the letter, they did have intermittent contests to fill party posts.⁴⁹⁶ This was lacking in Benin and Zambia, where the process of assuming a position at the local level had more to do with establishing a direct, close connection with the party leadership.

Despite these differences in functioning and scope, parties remain important in each political system. Even in Benin, where independent candidates have been incredibly successful (all victorious presidents have stood without party affiliation), surveys find that citizens agree that parties play a critical role in animating political life, particularly by organizing conferences, participating in debates and making statements on issues of interest to the general population, including critiques of the government of the day. In these ways, citizens felt that parties contributed to the development and justice of the

⁴⁹⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁹⁶ Institute of Economic Affairs (Ghana) (2005). Joint political parties symposia 2004 : another giant stride in Ghana's growing democracy. Accra, Ghana, Institute of Economic Affairs.

country.⁴⁹⁷ In my own survey, when asking Beninois political party representatives whether they thought that parties played an important and influential role at the center of the political system, the average response of 76 respondents was 7.73 on a 1-10 scale, 10 being the most influential. Ghanaian respondents averaged even higher at 9.13 (37 respondents), Senegalese averaged 9.04 (42 interviewed) and Zambian party members' responses averaged 8.55 (58 interviewed). My argument and data do not suggest that parties and party competition are not important in some contexts; rather, I highlight that while parties play a critical role in *all* countries, they do so in *different forms*, exhibiting multiple modes of organization, competition for power, interest representation, and influence on governance.

Conclusion

This chapter has argued that the enduring structure of party competition and character of party organization are established through institutional isomorphic processes. The competitive marketplace of the founding elections presents a critical point in the establishment of the party system; where the authoritarian incumbent party dominates the competition, sets high barriers to entry and models the appropriate form of organization in the initial elections, the character of the party system is forged around this dominant force. Isomorphism is also at play where the authoritarian incumbent party is weak or non-existent, because the embryonic parties form in reaction to the void of power, and offer new models of organization and logics of competition to redefine the multiparty era in opposition to the *ancien regime*.

⁴⁹⁷ UNDP (2005). *Projet de Renforcement des Capacites Institutionnelles des Partis Politiques*. December 7, 2005. Cotonou, Benin.

The formal eligibility rules reflect the interests of the players involved in the transition period and embed those incentives into institutional constraints that shape the nature of the party system and electoral competition over the long term. These mechanisms of reproduction continue to operate over time, shaping current perceptions of the party system, as seen in the cross-national survey analysis. Comparative assessment in the contemporary period reveals similarities in Beninois and Zambian parties in their forms of organization, activities and structure of party competition, as political contenders seek loose affiliation at the national level but privilege direct local connections based on particularistic and targeted constituencies. In Ghana and Senegal the party competition is structured in a dualistic logic of incumbent versus opposition, and both camps endeavor to build national party structures to link the party leadership to regional and local level party representatives across the country.

This chapter demonstrates that the strength of an incumbent authoritarian to dominate the founding elections and shape new rule creation creates a focal point that determines the character, coherence and organization of the nascent opposition and establishes an enduring logic of competition that drives the party *system*. The dominant presence of the incumbent structures electoral competition to a large degree, and disparate opposition groups often coalesce in competitive anti-incumbent unity. The opposition models the organizational structure and mobilization strategies of the incumbent in its best attempt to defeat and replace it as the governing party. By contrast, where the incumbent authoritarian does not dominate the founding elections, many forms of nascent opposition are able to compete and have no incentives to coalesce. Without the presence of a strong authoritarian, a multiplicity of parties emerge that have no structured

relation to one another and no incentive to aggregate. Party proliferation and mutable coalitions continue over time, as parties are able to constantly renegotiate their relations to one another in the system, according to shifting perceptions of immediate advantage.

Chapter Seven

Africa and Beyond:

Institutional Development in New Democracies Compared

What do African party systems tell us about democracy in other developing regions of the world, and about our theories of institutional development in new democracies in general? To highlight the broadly generalizable findings as well as make clear what is distinct about African institutional development I compare the patterns in African democracies to party system development in Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe. Three main issues will be addressed in this conclusion. First, extending the research to new democracies across the developing world *reinforces the conclusion that party system form and function vary greatly within regions across the world. Party system diversity is a global phenomenon*, and the highly volatile systems share similar characteristics across continents as do the highly stable party systems. Secondly, the *importance of authoritarian incumbent power to control the democratic transition and set in motion isomorphic competitive pressures in the party system to induce emulation, aggregation and polarization is relevant beyond Africa*. The expanded cross-regional analysis supports the conclusion that authoritarian power transferred into the multiparty system creates competitive and electoral pressures that lead to more highly structured and stable competition. In many of these cases, the opposition has grown in strength and support over time to be highly competitive, and achieve victory over the former

authoritarian party. Finally, the historical argument presented in this dissertation suggests that *strategies authoritarian incumbents chose early in their tenure for regime consolidation had unforeseen consequences and unequal effects in providing both depth and breadth of support in times of regime contestation*. In high patronage settings, I suggest that prior incorporation strategies of local elites are more successful in creating a loyal following during the challenge of democratization than modernizing strategies that seek to undermine the power of traditional authority and establish new organizations that link the masses directly to the party-state. A cursory glance at other regions suggests that this logic can apply beyond Africa as well, and future research could establish the nature of these linkages, connecting informal institutions of patronage to formal institutions of democracy in varied settings.

The second section discusses the implications of this research for the meaning and practice of democracy in the developing world, and in Africa in particular.

Africa and Beyond: Measurement and Estimation

Using the all-Africa data set of party system institutionalization to generate hypotheses and the case-study qualitative data to test the argument in depth according to predictable observations, the expanded data set offers an additional test of the argument by assessing cross-regional comparisons of electoral volatility across Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa. I use electoral volatility as the dependent variable for the cross-regional analysis primarily because the measures for party system institutionalization are not available in all cases. Using electoral volatility as a substitute, however, allows me to speak to some of the contemporary party system debates regarding

institutional and structural influences as well as to utilize existing data in Asia and Eastern Europe. I also test these arguments against the dependent variable of party system institutionalization in Latin America, to compare the findings on both measures of the character of the party system.

Party System Evaluation

Electoral volatility describes the net change in vote shares for individual parties across consecutive elections, providing a thin measure of party system development and stabilization.⁴⁹⁸ As a central component of party system institutionalization, electoral volatility taps the central principle of stabilization versus fluidity of the interactive party system. It implies intra-party organization and endurance where any party is continually successful. “In principle, volatility is an index that reflects the extent of personal vote transfers between subsequent elections”, approximating the level of individual voter shifts from aggregate electoral statistics.⁴⁹⁹ Electoral volatility is also an indicator of relative strength and social rooting of leading parties and, therefore, an important indicator of party system stabilization (Krupacvicius 1999: 8, Toka 1997:3). Electoral volatility is calculated as the sum of each party’s absolute change in vote share (Przeworski 1975; Pedersen 1983), such that in a party system with ‘n’ parties:

$$EV = (\sum_{i=1}^n |vote_{i,t} - vote_{i,t-1}|) / 2$$

⁴⁹⁸ Bartolini, S. and P. Mair (1990). Identity, competition, and electoral availability : the stabilisation of European electorates 1885-1985. Cambridge [England] New York, Cambridge University Press. p.19


⁴⁹⁹ Ibid. p. 20 – 34

Nooruddin, I. and P. Chhibber (2008). "Unstable politics - Fiscal space and electoral volatility in the Indian states." Comparative Political Studies 41(8): 1069-1091. p. 6).

Where $vote_i$ is the share of the total vote gained by party i in election t . The sum of the absolute change is divided by two, as one party's gain is another party's loss. The resulting index of electoral volatility has a range of perfect stability (0) to perfect instability (100). In interpreting this measure, high electoral volatility is one key element of low party system institutionalization.

These data demonstrate that across the developing world, electoral volatility ranges from high to low – parallel to the measures of party system institutionalization in Africa as discussed in Chapter 2. There is much greater intra-regional variation than intra-regional similarities (Figure 7.1). The countries included here are those that have democratized as part of or since the ‘third wave’, as well as those few that have remained democratic since independence in the developing world (India, Botswana, Mauritius).

Figure 7.1: Electoral Volatility By Region



Sources: Asia: (Kuhonta, Hicken et al. 2007); Africa: Riedl; Latin America: (Mainwaring and Scully 1995); Eastern Europe: (Birch 2001; Tavits 2005)

Eastern Europe ranges from extreme volatility with Lithuania and Latvia and their respective countries averages as high as 42.2 and 40.9 %, whereas Slovakia and Bulgaria

were only 18.4 and 20.7 %.⁵⁰⁰ In Eastern Europe the average electoral volatility is 25.6% , and in Latin America during the 1980's and 1990's it was 21.4%.⁵⁰¹ It is interesting to compare these volatility scores to other long-established democracies. Indian state elections from the period 1967 – 2004 had a modal volatility of around 20%, average 25.52%.⁵⁰² Bartolini and Mair find in their study of 303 West European elections that the average volatility from 1885- 1985 was only 9.1, only five had electoral volatility scores higher than 25 and none were higher than 32.1.⁵⁰³ This comparison highlights that across all regions of the developing world there is significant variation and higher overall levels of volatility. The same question then applies, which is why do certain configurations of party systems arise in particular places?

Explaining Party System Development and Stabilization

Potential explanations for differences in party systems can be grouped into economic, social and institutional variables (see Chapter 3). An additional hypothesis that can best be considered through cross-regional variations assumes that the stabilization of the party system is a function of the passage of time. We might expect voters' attachment to parties, information about the relative strength and position of various political parties, party organizational structures, and knowledge about

⁵⁰⁰ Birch, S. (2003). Electoral systems and political transformation in post-communist Europe. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

⁵⁰¹ Roberts, K. M. and E. Wibbels (1999). "Party systems and electoral volatility in Latin America: A test of economic, institutional, and structural explanations." American Political Science Review 93(3): 575-590.

Tavits, M. (2005). "The development of stable party support: Electoral dynamics in post-communist Europe." American Journal of Political Science 49(2): 283-298.

⁵⁰² Nooruddin, I. and P. Chhibber (2008). "Unstable politics - Fiscal space and electoral volatility in the Indian states." Comparative Political Studies 41(8): 1069-1091.

⁵⁰³ Bartolini, S. and P. Mair (1990). Identity, competition, and electoral availability : the stabilisation of European electorates 1885-1985. Cambridge [England] New York, Cambridge University Press.

institutional incentives all take time to develop.⁵⁰⁴ Following this line, early elections in any country would be particularly chaotic, predictable patterns emerge as citizens learn and parties are able to effectively coordinate, and electoral volatility would decrease over time in any new democracy. Figure 7.2 presents a summary review of the relevant alternative arguments.

Figure 7.2: Summary of Hypotheses for Electoral Volatility

Hypotheses	Relevant Literature	Prediction for EV
H1: Level of Economic Development	Lipset, Przeworski	-
H2: Severity of Economic Crisis	Haggard and Kaufman, Tavits	+
H3: Social Cleavages: Ethnicity	Lipset and Rokkan, Lijphart, Rogowski and Weaver, Ferree	+
H4: Electoral Systems: Proportional Representation	Duverger, Downs, Cox	+
H5: Colonial Legacy: Identity, Ideology and Timing of the Colonial Conquest	Lipset, Young, Wilkinson	+/-
H6: Passage of Time	Converse, Deets, Cox, Tavits	-
H7: Control of Authoritarian Incumbent	Riedl	-

Measurement Strategies

Level of economic development is measured according to the GDP per capita in the year of democratic transition (constant US \$2000, logged). I selected this time point,

⁵⁰⁴ Converse, P. E. (1969). "TIME AND PARTISAN STABILITY." *Comparative Political Studies* 2(2): 139-171.

Cox, G. W. (1997). *Making votes count : strategic coordination in the world's electoral systems*. Cambridge, U.K. ; New York, Cambridge University Press.

Tavits, M. (2005). "The development of stable party support: Electoral dynamics in post-communist Europe." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(2): 283-298.

prior to the establishment of democracy, in order to speak to the theories of democratization that assume that a certain level of development is necessary for commencing or sustaining multiparty democracy.⁵⁰⁵ Economic crisis is measured as a percent change in GDP in the five years prior to the formation of the multiparty system. I used a percentage in order to capture the idea of relative gains and losses experienced within the country, as the extent of gain or loss that might inhibit or induce action for political reform is theoretically particular to the existing living conditions within each country.

To measure ethnic heterogeneity within each country I employ the ethnolinguistic fractionalization index (Roeder ELF85).⁵⁰⁶ This country-level measure reflects the likelihood that two people chosen at random will be from different ethnic groups. The ethnolinguistic fractionalization measure that I employ includes all sub-groups by tribe rather than grouping all within a broader linguistic category. While this measure does not capture whether or not the coded ethnic groups are engaging in political competition in relation to that group identity, it provides an important cross-national metric that captures *the potential number of groups that could form the support basis of a political party*. This measure is useful for our purposes because it reflects the same estimation that is relevant for party building in each country: how many and what size groups would need to be subsumed within one party coalition in order to form a

⁵⁰⁵ Przeworski, A., M. Alvarez, et al. (1996). "What makes democracies endure?" Journal of Democracy 7(1): 39-55.

Przeworski, A. and F. Limongi (1997). "Modernization - Theories and facts." World Politics 49(2): 155-&.

⁵⁰⁶ Roeder, P. G. (2001). "Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (ELF) Indices, 1961 and 1985." <<http://weber.ucsd.edu/~proeder/elf.htm>>.

plurality.⁵⁰⁷ Lower levels of ethno-linguistic fractionalization would encourage a close mapping between defined societal cleavages institutionalized through party competition and constrained electoral alignments. The multiplicity of possible social divisions that might be politicized for electoral support and the likelihood or even necessity of cross-party alliances extends the cleavage argument to explain higher levels of volatility.⁵⁰⁸

The electoral system measure is a simple categorical dichotomous variable that groups countries into plurality or proportional representation, or mixed electoral systems. While the literature on electoral systems has added important complexity to these arguments, this first cut is useful because of the near infallibility of Duverger's law. The qualitative evidence that I present in chapters 3 and 5 suggest that first, historical precedent may be the driving factor for selecting a particular electoral system – in which case institutional choice is actually reflective of earlier historical legacies (colonial administrative system, for example). Secondly, I show that in the African cases of first past the post electoral rules, the number of parties has not reduced to two and, in many cases, electoral volatility remains high. It is therefore interesting to test these surprising results in the cross-regional analysis.

⁵⁰⁷ Regardless of whether the groups at the time of party creation were politically relevant or not, this is a prior question about whether identity groups exist that *could be mobilized* and become engaged in political competition via political party membership associated with that ethnic identity.

⁵⁰⁸ Building on Heath 2005, Tavits 2005, rooted in Lipset and Rokkan 1967 that finds the roots of modern party systems in historical social cleavages. Bartolini and Mair call this 'cleavage closure' and argue that strong party-cleavage linkages stabilize party politics by making cross-party alliances less likely and providing fewer viable alternatives to voters.

Bartolini, S. and P. Mair (1990). Identity, competition, and electoral availability : the stabilisation of European electorates 1885-1985. Cambridge [England] New York, Cambridge University Press.

Tavits, M. (2005). "The development of stable party support: Electoral dynamics in post-communist Europe." American Journal of Political Science 49(2): 283-298.

Lipset, S. M. and S. Rokkan (1967). Party systems and voter alignments: cross-national perspectives. [Contributors: Robert R. Alford and others]. New York,, Free Press.

Heath, O. (2005). "Party systems, political cleavages and electoral volatility in India - A state-wise analysis, 1998-1999." Electoral Studies 24(2): 177-199.

Colonial legacy is also measured as a categorical variable according to the colonizer and by region, to capture place and time specific effects of the character of the colonial experience.⁵⁰⁹

Finally, the measure of authoritarian power over the transition is measured according to the percentage of legislative lower house seats the authoritarian incumbent party won in the founding elections of multiparty competition. This measure works well to capture the dynamics of step 2 of the argument: the extent to which competitive and electoral pressures operate in relation to the presence of a powerful authoritarian successor party, or the void created by its absence. However, it is a retrospective measure of the authoritarian incumbent's cannot tap the degree of power the authoritarian incumbent had over the transition agenda, the players involved, and the rules created in its favor (step 1 of the argument). In my qualitative assessments of the four country case studies I employ local elite interview data I collected to gauge the extent of support the authoritarian incumbent party commanded, according to the degree of defection occurring with the onset of political liberalization. These data are obviously not available for the full set of 56 countries. Future research could develop the link between authoritarian strategies of power consolidation, such as incorporation or modernization, and the degree of support regimes command in times of challenge such as democratization. In this project, only step 2 of the argument is possible to test cross-nationally. The measure of authoritarian power as the % of seats won in the founding elections provides a comparative assessment that can be used for all transitioning democracies. It is useful because while incumbent power can be built upon many

⁵⁰⁹ See Wilkinson, S. (2008). How Colonial Legacies of Party Competition Affect Post-Independence Levels of Democracy. American Political Science Association Annual Meeting. Boston, MA.

foundations in different settings (from coercion to capital to charisma to incorporation capabilities), the election victory measurement remains in the purely political sphere, separate from the very distinct cross-regional economic contexts that surrounded democratic transitions.

Figure 7.3: Summary Statistics of Cross-Regional Data

Summary Statistics	Obs	Mean	Std Dev	Min	Max
Electoral Volatility	56	28.07	14.68	9.1	70
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization	55	0.53	0.27	0.01	0.92
GDP per capita (log) year prior to transition	51	6.91	1.27	4.85	8.99
Economic Crisis (% change over five year period)	45	0.07	0.18	-0.42	0.4
Electoral System (Categorical 0,1, 2)	51	0.92	0.69	0	2
Colonial Power (Categorical 0 – 6)	56	2.75	2.41	0	6
Incumbent Control Over Transition	55	39.06	30.21	0	100

Figure 7.3 provides the summary statistics for these 6 alternative variables as well as for the dependent variable, electoral volatility. Using these measures, I test the structural and institutional hypotheses discussed in chapter 3 and summarized above.

Analysis of the Arguments Cross-Regionally

In this cross-regional analysis, I use the same formulation of the economic, social and institutional independent variables, but use electoral volatility as the outcome of interest.

$$\text{Electoral Volatility} = \alpha + \beta (\text{Economic Development}) + \beta (\text{Economic Crisis}) + \beta (\text{Social Cleavages}) + \beta (\text{Incumbent Control of Transition}) + e$$

The main finding is that the importance of the *authoritarian incumbent winning the founding election remains significant* in this expanded data set across the developing world. The relationship's direction is the same as the analysis of party system institutionalization in Africa supported: where the authoritarian successor party wins a greater percentage of legislative seats in the first elections, the future multiparty system will be less volatile. The salience of authoritarian power remains significant at the 1% level in all specifications of this model. The level of economic development is also significant at the 10% level. When I exclude Africa from the analysis, the importance of authoritarian power remains significant at the 10% level, and effects of economic development drop out (Figure 7.4).

Figure 7.4: OLS Regression Analysis of Electoral Volatility across Africa, Asia, Latin America and Eastern Europe

Variable	Main Effects β (SE)	Institutional β (SE)	W/o Africa β (SE)
Economic Development	-3.77* (2.17)	-4.75* (2.66)	0.50 (3.06)
Economic Volatility	4.63 (12.09)		7.33 (12.63)
Social Cleavages: ELF	2.16 (10.29)	1.66 (11.34)	13.05 (10.89)
Transition: Incumbents Win	-0.26*** (0.07)	-0.27*** (0.08)	-0.13* (0.09)
PR Electoral System		6.19 (4.14)	
British Colonial Power		-0.50 (1.55)	
R Squared	0.28 (n=45)	0.32 (n=42)	0.13 (n=28)

*** Significant at $p < 0.01$. ** Significant at $p < 0.05$. * Significant at $p < 0.10$.

Using this expanded analysis, it is interesting to compare these findings to the focus of other studies on economic factors in explaining electoral volatility. There is a substantial literature which details economic voting, and provides the expectation that good or bad economic performance causes voters to change their vote from the previous election, relating to higher or lower levels of electoral volatility.⁵¹⁰ This finding is

⁵¹⁰ Remmer, K. L. (1993). "THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF ELECTIONS IN LATIN-AMERICA, 1980-1991." *American Political Science Review* 87(2): 393-407.

documented, for example, in Latin America as incumbents lost in the face of economic distress and inflation, whereas economic growth had stabilizing effects.⁵¹¹ Similarly, Chhibber and Nooruddin use state level data from India to argue that fiscal space, the ability of the government to spend on public programs without severe constraints, means that incumbents will be rewarded with returning votes, and therefore less volatility.⁵¹² Finally, Tavits finds in post-communist states that while ethnic cleavages have no independent effect on electoral volatility, in economic downturns social cleavages increase electoral volatility.⁵¹³ My analysis does not dispute these subtle changes within countries across time in relation to ups and downs of the economic cycle, but rather looks to explain what causes the drastic variation between countries from the outset of democratization – patterns of volatility that remain fairly constant over time.⁵¹⁴

Roberts, K. M. and E. Wibbels (1999). "Party systems and electoral volatility in Latin America: A test of economic, institutional, and structural explanations." *American Political Science Review* **93**(3): 575-590.

⁵¹¹ Roberts, K. M. and E. Wibbels (1999). "Party systems and electoral volatility in Latin America: A test of economic, institutional, and structural explanations." *American Political Science Review* **93**(3): 575-590.

Bohrer, R. E. and A. C. Tan (2000). "Left turn in Europe? Reactions to austerity and the EMU." *Political Research Quarterly* **53**(3): 575-595.

⁵¹² Nooruddin, I. and P. Chhibber (2008). "Unstable politics - Fiscal space and electoral volatility in the Indian states." *Comparative Political Studies* **41**(8): 1069-1091.

⁵¹³ Tavits, M. (2005). "The development of stable party support: Electoral dynamics in post-communist Europe." *American Journal of Political Science* **49**(2): 283-298. p. 295 -6

⁵¹⁴ While Huntington hypothesizes that changes in patterns of mobilization, particularly the rapid increase in social mobilization resulting from concurrent political and economic reform, might be destabilizing to developing societies, my analysis suggests that it is not the change in size of the electorate or the introduction of new or previously abstaining voters with different preferences that affect electoral volatility, but the extent to which existing voters are *free to express preferences and participate in the electoral arena by forming new parties and competing for power*, or the extent to which authoritarian control is eliminated over the transition process and the formation of the nascent party system in the democratic game. Categorical regional variables are not significant in this analysis, and we find a great deal of inter-continental variation. In addition, in region-specific analyses, the differences within the region are a constant theme (Esperanza in Central America, Mainwaring and Scully in Latin America, Kuhonta and Hicken in Asia). While significant differences are apparent – particularly in the extent and nature of economic reform – these do not correlate to outcomes of electoral volatility. Note that beyond Africa, often 'crisis transition' and 'outgoing government' are synonymous. For example, Haggard and Kaufman do not assume that incumbents could win or be maintained in a crisis; rather, authoritarian coalitions disintegrate quickly and policy orientation is reversed. In Africa, by contrast, almost all transitions were simultaneous with economic crisis and yet some incumbents were maintained and others were not. Haggard, S. and R. R.

Passage of Time

The argument that the passage of time affects the deep-rooted socialization of voters and, therefore, lowers electoral volatility found early support in Eastern Europe and Latin America.⁵¹⁵ This was based on the idea that there has been a trend of party consolidation in the region due to parties acquiring more sophisticated polling and alliance techniques, fewer new parties form unless they are convinced that they will have viable shot at victory, and voters more strategically choose their candidates - but debate remains contested.⁵¹⁶ In Latin America, Asia and Eastern Europe new studies find no evidence that the passage of time matters for electoral volatility.⁵¹⁷ It is particularly interesting that political parties in Eastern Europe have become more volatile since 2000, which the complete collapse of parties in Poland, Serbia, Slovakia and Bulgaria leading to more in-depth questioning about this party volatility. Part of this late volatility in the

Kaufman (1995). The Political economy of democratic transitions. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press. p. 14

⁵¹⁵ Przeworski, A. (1975). "INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF VOTING PATTERNS, OR IS MOBILIZATION SOURCE OF DECAY." American Political Science Review 69(1): 49-67.

⁵¹⁶ Deets 2000: His first claim was that several successive elections offer a high degree of learning by both party elites and voters. Ultimately, voting patterns are rational, as people vote based on what happened in previous elections. The second claim was that successive electoral cycles would produce party convergence. Deets, S. (2006). Reds, Greens, Blues and Browns: Party Development, Electoral Volatility and On-Going Surprises in East European Elections. East European Studies, Washington DC.

Others along this line include: Olson, D. M. (1993). "Political parties and party systems in regime transformation: inner transition in the new democracies of Central Europe." American Review of Politics 14: 619 - 58.

Tavits, M. (2005). "The development of stable party support: Electoral dynamics in post-communist Europe." American Journal of Political Science 49(2): 283-298.

Lupu, N. and S. C. Stokes (2007). Regime Change and Partisan Stability in Twentieth-Century Argentina. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hotel, Chicago, IL, Apr 12, 2007.

⁵¹⁷ In Latin America: Mainwaring, S. and M. Torcal (2006). Party System Institutionalization and Party System Theory after the Third Wave of Democratization. Handbook of party politics. R. S. Katz and W. J. Crotty. London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif., SAGE; p. 204 - 227.

Mainwaring, S. and E. Zoco (2007). "Political sequences and the stabilization of interparty competition - Electoral volatility in old and new democracies." Party Politics 13(2): 155-178.

In Asia: Hicken, A. (2006). "Stuck in the Mud: Parties and Party Systems in Democratic Southeast Asia." Taiwan Journal of Democracy 2(2): 23-46.

Eastern European context may be explained by the fact that the parties experiencing the most volatility are the reformed Communist parties, which have had difficulty competing against newly consolidated social democratic parties.⁵¹⁸ Ultimately, volatility has not decreased over time in Eastern Europe, with the three year moving average remaining around 25%.⁵¹⁹

Incorporation and Modernization: Authoritarian Regime Strategies

While the data of authoritarian support *prior* to the founding elections of the democratic era is not available beyond the case studies presented in Chapter 5, a cursory look at archetypical cases of incorporation (Mexico) and modernization (Turkey) are useful for extending the argument cross-regionally.

Mexico's *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) was a hegemonic ruling party that used the party-state model to pursue incorporation of labor as well as local notables that allowed its continued reign for seven decades.⁵²⁰ The stability of the dominant party characterized the multiparty system, despite opposition difficulties in consolidation, until an eventual unification among the challengers and alternation in 2000. The PRI's strategies for regime consolidation and legitimation focused on containing in-traelite tensions, interest mediation and conflict resolution, and political control mechanisms through local notables and mass organizations that were charged with

⁵¹⁸ Deets, S. (2006). Reds, Greens, Blues and Browns: Party Development, Electoral Volatility and On-Going Surprises in East European Elections. East European Studies, Washington DC.

⁵¹⁹ Sikk, A. (2008). Party Systems in the Baltic States: Reflections on Systemness and Cleavages. The Baltic States in the 21st Century - Democracy, Integration and Identities. University of Fribourg.

⁵²⁰ Collier, R. B. and D. Collier (1991). Shaping the political arena : critical junctures, the labor movement, and regime dynamics in Latin America. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press.

Craig, A. and W. Cornelius (1995). Houses Divided: Parties and Political Reform in Mexico. Building democratic institutions : party systems in Latin America. S. Mainwaring and T. Scully. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press: p. 250 - 254.

mobilizing voter support for the regime.⁵²¹ As changing economic conditions necessitated new partners, the PRI reconfigured its ruling coalition and opened incorporation to business elite, to gain new influence in an increasingly complex, urban society.⁵²² The PRI's domination of the political system depended in large part on strategies of incorporation to create "an equilibrium based on mutual incentives to remain loyal to the regime".⁵²³ And despite alternation in 2000, the PRI's strength as a party allowed it to continue as a strong opposition, and it continues to hold a majority of state and local offices following the 2007 elections.

In Turkey, the modernization agenda that Ataturk began in the 1920's was both deep in vision and broad in scope. While Turkey was successful in many realms of reform, the seeds of confrontation with the traditional provincial realms may continue to contribute to the relative instability of Turkey's democratic regime and party system, and the propensity to military take-over. The central political transformations of Ataturk's modernization agenda were the creation of a modern republican state structure with a constitution, an elected parliament and other western-type institutions; founding of a political party as the chief agent of modernization; recruitment of a modern bureaucracy; disestablishment of religion by removing religious officials from their institutionalized positions and secularizing education and the courts; and reformation of the Turkish language and official alphabet.⁵²⁴ These dramatic changes were actively opposed by various sectors of the population, and required the abandonment of old loyalties in the

⁵²¹ Craig, A. and W. Cornelius (1995). *Houses Divided: Parties and Political Reform in Mexico*. Building democratic institutions : party systems in Latin America. S. Mainwaring and T. Scully. Stanford, Calif., Stanford University Press: p. 250 - 254.

⁵²² Ibid.

⁵²³ Langston, J. (2002). "Breaking out is hard to do: Exit, voice, and loyalty in Mexico's one-party hegemonic regime." Latin American Politics and Society 44(3): 61-88.

⁵²⁴ Landau, J. M. and Makhon le-me*h*kar *al shem Heri S. *Truman. (1984). Atatürk and the modernization of Turkey. Boulder, Colo. Leiden, the Netherlands, Westview Press ; E.J. Brill.

political sphere (to religious authorities, to the Ottoman Empire, etc). The modernizing party, the Republican People's Party, lost power through elections in 1950, shortly after initiating multiparty democracy in 1946. Moreover, the great advancement of Turkey's modernization and the transformation of Turkish politics resulted in a "confrontation between provincial/ traditional and urban/modern cultures, new social classes, and the fragmentation of the conservative electorate".⁵²⁵ The continual volatility and fragmentation of the party system, in addition to military coups and interim governments, suggests that the strategy to neutralize and overrule traditional authorities and old guard elites rather than incorporate the social basis of authority into the reformed political system may have created a foundation for continued instability in multiparty practice.

While these two countries obviously present a multitude of differences, the brief comparisons of earlier regime consolidation strategies suggests support for the importance of authoritarian era legacies in shaping the context of democratization and the nature of the multiparty system.

Generalizability

In order to go beyond the limits of comparing four countries in great detail, this project looks at the applicability of the argument to the larger set of African democracies as well as across Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe. Using quantifiable measures, I find support for the central variable of authoritarian power in explaining variation in party systems. These specifications are meant to bring Africa into the comparative

⁵²⁵ Narli, N. (1999). "The Rise of the Islamist Movement in Turkey." Middle East Review of International Affairs 3(3).

literature, to approach it as one of many comparable countries, and ask whether the same types of political factors affect African countries as elsewhere? The focus on African democracies is useful because the combination of similar pressures and timing of democratization across the continent produced a unique number of comparable cases. Additionally, within the set of 21 African democracies, a few assumptions are held constant; in particular that class cleavages are much less mobilized, less salient identities, and that a focus on ethnicity as the relevant social cleavage is valid. Additionally, geo-strategic importance and external pressures are fairly constant, as compared to cross-regional differences. Expanding the data set to include cross-regional analysis shows that the argument does transfer at a very general level to other new democracies. By comparing this argument to social, economic and other institutional explanations, we gain leverage on the understanding of party system development in new democracies.

However, the more nuanced arguments in this dissertation call attention to the ways in which neo-patrimonialism has shaped the authoritarian legacies, democratic transition context and formation of the modern multiparty system and now provides the foundation for democratic persistence and success in multiple cases across the continent. Neo-patrimonialism must be seen as a historically-conditioned cluster of attributes that are liable to change as political contexts shift, rather than a fixed and static set of institutions. Therefore, while continuing variants of neo-patrimonialism may also be central in other regions, the way in which they influence multiparty competition and which social cleavages they activate may vary.

Finally, an important scope condition holds for the process that I have described in this dissertation. In emphasizing the lack of ideological polarization of the party

system, I assume that absence of real classes and class politics, and by extension, industrial revolution. Furthermore, the state-creation of process and formal decolonization in Africa did not require the development of a strong nationalist movement that could lay the groundwork in both organization and ideology to transfer into a strong political party following independence.⁵²⁶ Therefore, given the weakness of both class and nationalist affiliations, the salience of traditional authorities at the local level remains central to understanding the accumulation of power in any regime type – be it authoritarian or democratic – in Africa.

Institutional Development in Africa: Implications

The key concern in Africa has long been too little order rather than too much. While levels of development and inequality are problematic issues, the ability of heterogeneous societies to live in peace is a prerequisite for questions of distribution and economic growth. Given this preoccupation, higher levels of party system institutionalization provide benefits regardless of the ideological content (or lack thereof) of parties being institutionalized. Because political institutions provide community and stability⁵²⁷, they are particularly useful in contexts where the lack of both capitalist and national revolutions have not provided alternative bases of identity beyond ethnic affiliation. “Strong institutions allow for the realization of common interests in society; they deal with social conflict in bounded order... [This] holds society together, by working in the service of society as a whole rather than individual or particularistic

⁵²⁶ Regarding state weakness in Africa and the lack of nationalist movements, see Jackson, R. H. and C. G. Rosberg (1982). "WHY AFRICAS WEAK STATES PERSIST - THE EMPIRICAL AND THE JURIDICAL IN STATEHOOD." *World Politics* 35(1): 1-24.

⁵²⁷ Huntington, S. P. and Harvard University. Center for International Affairs. (1968). *Political order in changing societies*. New Haven,, Yale University Press. p. 10, 24

interests".⁵²⁸ For Africa, the aggregation tendencies in highly institutionalized party systems provide an institutional context around which new ethnic calculations are made. Ethnic groups can renegotiate their political affiliations in negotiation and coalition with other groups. And while in many ways this may seem to bring ethnic competition to the fore, the politicized cleavages are constructed *in relation to democratic competition*, which provides for a new idea of community, provides legal routes for channeling and redressing grievances, and makes multiparty competition sustainable through bounded uncertainty.

The centrality of this potential cannot be underestimated. At the most local level of party membership, in villages and arrondissements across Ghana, Senegal, Benin and Zambia, when asked what role political parties were supposed to play, the overwhelming majority replied that parties were meant to educate and "sensitize" the population:

What we mean when we say that the role of parties is *sensibilization* is that they are supposed to help us keep peace and order. Citizens, party militants, everyone must be instructed that competition is about keeping order, the peaceful conquest of power through elections, avoiding conflict, chaos and problems elsewhere.
(Queino 2005)

The corollary argument is that weakly institutionalized party systems face challenges for stable, peaceful co-existence more generally, and sustaining democratic practice in particular. Democratization is an alternative source of new mobilization to development, but without the accompanying political institutions, it can deepen social divides and cause disorder, instability and violence.⁵²⁹ Political institutionalization can be generally

⁵²⁸ Berman, S. (1997). "Civil society and the collapse of the Weimar Republic." *World Politics* 49(3): 401- &

⁵²⁹ Ibid.

Snyder, J. L. (2000). *From voting to violence : democratization and nationalist conflict*. New York, Norton.

divided into two categories: value infusion (content) and behavioral routinization (stability).⁵³⁰ To the extent that parties work to mobilize voters for peaceful competition and organize groups into parties, multiparty elections have their own habituating and democratizing impact which can make the content of institutionalization increasingly democratic through time.⁵³¹ The threat to both stability and democratic content in weakly institutionalized party systems is that the political channels will not be sufficiently strong to force new forms of neo-patrimonialism to emerge that are symbiotic with democratic practice.

The potential for change may occur particularly in the economic sphere going forward. As capitalist development increases across the continent, the particular blend of neo-patrimonialism *with* democratic competition may not be sustainable. Patronage provides social cement in the contemporary context of ethnic heterogeneity and underdevelopment, but as labor organizes and civil society increasingly emerges over time, party systems based on links to local elites may become deinstitutionalized. As development increases in Africa there may necessarily be a new politics that becomes institutionalized in the long term, which may correspond with ideologically positioned political parties. The stable social and political arrangements that emerged from highly controlled democratizations may not be durable as capitalism replaces patronage ties and new social structures emerge, requiring new institutions. While the prospects of these changes are currently dim, one could imagine that the peace dividend from neo-

⁵³⁰ Levitsky, S. (2001). "Organization and labor-based party adaptation - The transformation of Argentine Peronism in comparative perspective." *World Politics* 54(1): 27-+.

⁵³¹ See, for ex, Lindberg, S. I. (2005). "Consequences of electoral systems in Africa: a preliminary inquiry." *Electoral Studies* 24(1): 41-64.

patrimonial democracy could provide a foundation from which economic growth and, necessarily, new forms of institutionalization could develop.

Given that the roots of highly stable democratic party systems are in authoritarian power and strong links to traditional powerbrokers at the local level, can highly institutionalized party systems provide the foundations for liberal democracy? There is certainly a balance between the value of stability versus the opportunities for reform, particularly in new democracies, where “the values held by parties (and their leaders) in the embryonic phase of democracy can easily be a hindrance rather than an advantage for subsequent democratic development”.⁵³² But the practice of stable democratic competition provides the opportunity for values to change and for alternation to occur.⁵³³

As my argument claims, stability is often achieved through high barriers to entry that create obstacles to the evolution of the party system through new and dynamic parties. While this may suggest challenges for democratic development, legitimized and unified opposition provides a “certain room for maneuver and a breathing space for progressive forces to offer political alternatives... and may unleash a dialectic of change that may transgress the perimeters of liberal democracy. The reforms cannot be dismissed as a mere sham: they represent a new political configuration that simultaneously creates opportunities and dangers. They form a basis on which progressive forces can further the expansion of democratic rights”.⁵³⁴ Furthermore, it is crucial to remember that the actual state of democratic practice is not along an ideological

⁵³² Sikk, A. (2008). Party Systems in the Baltic States: Reflections on Systemness and Cleavages. The Baltic States in the 21st Century - Democracy, Integration and Identities. University of Fribourg.

⁵³³ For the democratizing effects of multiparty elections, see Lindberg, S. I. (2005). "Consequences of electoral systems in Africa: a preliminary inquiry." Electoral Studies 24(1): 41-64.

⁵³⁴ Fatton, R. (1987). The making of a liberal democracy : Senegal's passive revolution, 1975-1985. Boulder, Colo., L. Rienner Publishers. p. 152

continuum in Africa. There is often little debate between contending parties on the policy agenda for economic and social reform, which may be dictated externally. To the extent that a strong incumbent party forces opposition unification, it provides the potential for a stronger critique of government policy and greater accountability. Fundamentally, “political organizations lead to power, and power is conservative... so that the struggle is no longer of principle, but of *competition*”.⁵³⁵ While the iron law of oligarchy predicts that the modern political party is the “methodical organization of the electoral masses”, that very *organization* of social cleavages is critical, providing a system of bounded uncertainty that allows for a foundation of democratic practice, stability, and most essentially, prospects for peace.⁵³⁶

⁵³⁵ Michels, R., E. Paul, et al. (1915). Political parties: a sociological study of the oligarchical tendencies of modern democracy. New York,, Hearst's International Library Co. Chapter 1

⁵³⁶ Ibid p. 335.

Appendix I: Research Sites By Country

Research Site Criteria:

1. Capital City; 2. Major Second City; 3. Rural, Ethnically Heterogeneous; 4. Rural, Ethnically Homogeneous



Ghana: 1. Accra; 2. Tamale; 3. Koforidua; 4. Takoradi
 Senegal: 1. Dakar; 2. Ziguinchor; 3. Tambacounda; 4. Podor

Benin: 1. Cotonou / Porto-Novo; 2. Parakou; 3. Kandi; 4. Djakotomey
 Zambia: 1. Lusaka; 2. Kitwe; 3. Mumbwa; 4. Nyimba



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